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Titles Policy, Planning and Administration in 
Papua New Guinea 1942-52, with special 
reference to the role of Colonel J.K.
Murray
The thesis asks whether there was in fact a change 
in colonial policy after World War 2s if so, where 
did it come from and who was responsible for 
putting it into effect. The roles of Ward, his 
Department, the Directorate of Research and Angau 
are discussed. The balance of forces changed at the 
end of the war, and it was left largely to Col. Murray 
to carry on with the Directorate’s intentions. He 
had very little support. His problems included: the 
state of the country, Ward’s lack of interest, the 
inefficiency of the Canberra Department, the weakness 
of the Provisional Administration’s staff and 
opposition from whites generally. All of these 
factors are examined. Murray and his people attempted 
to plan, but were ignored in Australia. As a 
consequence, Murray and the Provisional Administration 
were blamed for apparent lack of progress when the 
government changed in 1949« Spender tried to favour 
whites, but made little headway, while clashing with 
Murray. Once Hasluck became Minister, it was a matter 
of time until Murray was dismissed. But in his 7 
years as Administrator, nad persisted with a pattern 
that could not be reversed: had his ideas been 
followed further, there would have been some plan 
for P.N.G. and not just the ad hoc decisions of the 
next 20 years.
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.... an administration, like a machine, 
does not create. It carries on. It 
applies a given penalty to a given 
breach of the rules, a given method to 
a given aim. An administration is not 
conceived for the purpose of solving 
fresh problems... For this to happen, 
a man would have to intervene with 
authority to rip the whole thing up.
But an administration is conceived as 
a safeguard against disturbances 
resulting from human initiative. The 
gear-wheels of the watch stand guard 
against the intervention of man. The 
watchmaker has no place among them.
Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, 
Flight to Arras
ABSTRACT
This study of policy and administration in Papua 
hew G-uinea during and after World War 2 provides 
additional information about events and personalities 
which have previously been discussed only in outline. 
Existing summaries have suggested that the Provisional 
Administration and the Administrator during the period, 
Colonel J.K. Hurray, were largely unsuccessful in 
executing changes in policy in Papua hew G-uinea. The 
present study seeks to present a clearer picture, 
developing it in three different stages. The first part 
of the discussion is a basically chronological account 
of conditions up to the latter part of the 1940’s; the 
second sets out essential details of the major post­
war programmes, which led to attempts at long-term 
planning; and the third, again mainly chronological, 
traces the final rejection of planning in favour of 
ad hoc welfare provisions.
Thus Chapter One comprises a brief resume of pre­
war colonialism in the islands, noting the irreconcilable 
tension between white economic development and village 
welfare, the consequent European domination of the 
colonies and the differences - real and imagined - 
between the Mandated Territory and Papua. Chapter Two 
discusses the changes in the balance of power that
4followed the outbreak of war, and particularly the temporary 
dominance of the Directorate of Research over planning 
for the post-war period. Chapter Three shows that the 
Directorate's dominance ensured the rejection of the 
so-called "iurray tradition" and the appointment of an 
Administrator sympathetic to the Directorate's own 
approach. Chapter Four points out, however, that 
conditions in Papua New Guinea, which were far more 
difficult than has previously been suggested, made the 
immediate implementation of reforms virtually impossible; 
this was particularly so when white interests began to 
re-assert themselves. Chapter Five indicates that 
programmes of reform were in any case lacking; the Minister 
had relied heavily on the Directorate for policy advice, 
and the Australian bureaucracy was unable to fill the 
vacuum after the Directorate was disbanded. Chapter Six 
notes that the Territory Administration, comprising 
several rival factions, possessed few officials able to 
compensate for the weakness in Canberra; and that their 
task was made much harder by the government's failure 
to provide effective administrative structures or 
security for public servants. Chapters Seven and Eight 
trace the emergence of the Administration's own plans 
for social and economic development, against the background 
of pressures and problems that developed in these 
fields during the post-war years; they conclude that 
useful draft plans were produced, to be ignored in 
Canberra. Chapter Nine demonstrates that the impasse
5in the planning and execution of post-war policy was 
created in Australia by an ineffectual Minister, an 
obstructionist Secretary and an apathetic Department; 
last-minute attempts to produce effective plans came too 
late to dispel the impression that both the Labor 
government and the Territory Administration had failed 
in their attempts at post-war development. Chapter 
Ten outlines the Liberal-Country Party government’s 
search for greater efficiency through renewed encouragement 
of white interests, another campaign that could be only 
partly successful owing to changes in conditions and 
attitudes during the preceding decade. Nevertheless, 
the new government saw its problems in mainly political 
terms, linking them and the difficulties of the post-war 
years with inefficiency in the Territory, rather than 
in Australia. This attitude led to the dismissal of 
Colonel Murray and the assertion of further influence 
from Canberra, events which are reviewed in the final 
Chapter. The Conclusion argues, in its first section, 
that Colonel Murray’s strengths as Administrator far 
outweighed some minor weaknesses, and in particular 
that his dedication to reform provided the only effective 
link between the Labor Party’s broad aims and the 
officials responsible for executing them. The second 
section of the Conclusion uses the terminology of 
systems and organization theory to generalise about the 
bureaucratic processes involved in programmes of
6innovation; it suggests that the systems approach 
helps to indicate relationships between the various 
agencies involved in innovation, but that it provides 
no useful insight into the forces promoting 
innovation.
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scheme, she lectured at the Australian School of 
Pacific Administration until her death in 1955.
INTRODUCTION
The present problem - An organizational 
model - The colonial situation
The present problem
Papua New Guinea, at independence, is seeking 
to introduce major changes of policy and 
administration throughout the country. These 
involve a movement from the benevolent but closely 
supervised colonialism of the decades following 
World War 2, to an autochthonous, self-reliant 
pattern of development which emphasises mass 
participation and rural improvement. In attempting 
to effect this transformation the national 
government faces two major problems: a recent 
history of almost a century of white paternalism; 
and an administrative structure which for most of
1. The first stage of the scheme is set out in
Papua New Guinea, Department of the Chief (now 
Prime) Minister, National Improvement Plan,
Port Moresby, Government Printer, 1973.
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this period has concentrated on control and 
direction of the village population, rather than 
on the encouragement of innovation.
The following study, which concerns a decade 
of colonial administration that has been neglected 
in discussions of Papua New G-uinea, indicates that 
the present government has two kinds of precedents 
to guide its attempts to introduce change. Firstly, 
the history of the period following World War 2 
reflects most of the social, economic, political 
and bureaucratic forces which persist in the modern 
nation: it adds some light to the present scene.
Secondly, attempts during that period to create 
innovative bureaucratic structures may provide a 
model for current initiatives, provided that a 
sufficiently generalised basis can be established 
for comparing the two situations: for the late 
1940’s saw a fundamental change in administrative 
strategy, from repressive exploitation of the village 
people to heavily subsidised development of the 
country’s social and economic infrastructure. In 
particular, the burden placed on the innovative 
administrators of the post-war period by resistance 
to change among entrenched interests was comparatively 
as great as any obstacle now being encountered by 
Papua New Guinea’s national government. If they are
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to succeed, today's reformers will have to learn, 
hy example, to overcome the obstacles that confronted 
their colonial predecessors.
An organizational model
In an attempt to arrive at generalisations that 
might be applied to another situation across a gap 
of some thirty years, the study of the post-war period 
in Papua New G-uinea concludes with an examination of 
several features of systems theory. The systems 
approach is said to promise some advantages for a 
comparative study. Morton Kaplan, for example, has 
claimed that, "....rather than merely attempting to 
describe institutional behaviour, taking into account 
all the variables of a particular case, the systems 
approach attempts greater generality by its use of
pmodels that are first-order approximations of reality." 
In the fields of management, education and, to a 
lesser extent, public administration, systems theory 
has been applied in studying the various kinds of 
organizations involved, while in the area of politics
2. Morton A. Kaplan, Macropolitics, Chicago, Aldine 
Publishing Co., 19&9, p. 74.3. Studies in these fields include; John A. Beckett, 
Management Dynamics: The New Synthesis, New York, 
McGraw Hill, 1971; C. Kenneth Tanner, Designs for Bducational Planning, Lexington, Mass., Heath, 1 9 7 1 ; 
Guy Black, The Application of Systems Analysis to 
Government Operations. New York. Praeger. 19^8;
Saul M. Katz, "Exploring a ¿Systems Approach to 
Development Administration" in Bred W. Higgs (ed. ),
it has concentrated particularly on post­
independence phenomena in the ’’developing" nations.^” 
Systems theory has also encountered many 
criticisms. Initially, these mainly concerned the
details of systems analysis, particularly as they
5
were formulated by David Easton. More recently, as
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Frontiers of Development Administration, Durham, 
N.C., Duke University Press, 1971, p. 109.
Some attention has also been directed towards 
systems of international relations, as in 
Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in 
International Politics, New York, V/iley, 1957. 
"Systems thinking" spreads much more widely; 
for an indication of its various applications, 
and criticism of the uses to which it has been 
put, see Ida R. Hoos, Systems Analysis in 
Public Policy, Berkeley, Calif., University of 
California Press, 1972.
4. The development of the theory in this application 
can best be traced through the work of one of 
its major proponents; see G-abriel A. Almond and 
James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the 
Developing Areas. Princeton, . J ., Princeton 
University Press, 1960; Almond and G.B. Powell, 
Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. 
Boston, Little, Brown, 19^6; Almond. Political 
Theory and Political Science. New York, McGraw 
Hill, 19^7; Almond, "Political Development: 
Analytical and Normative Perspectives",
Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 1 No. 4, 
January 1 9 6 9 , p. 447; and Almond, Political 
Development. Boston, Little, Brown, 1970.
5. Easton’s main contributions are A Systems Analysis 
of Political Life, New York, Wiley, 1965 and
A Framework for Political Analysis, Englewood 
(Jliffs, W.J1., Prentice-Hall, 1965. Critiques 
include: Peter Nettl, "The Concept of System in
Political Science", Political Studies, Vol. 14 
No. 3, September 1966, p. 3^5; M.B. Nicholson and 
P.A. Reynolds, "General Systems, the International 
System and Eastonian Analysis", Political Studies, 
Vol. 15 No. 1, March 1967, p. 127 Oran R. Young, 
Systems of Political Science, Englewood Cliffs,
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one aspect of the post-behavioural revolution, 
the very notion of applying an all-embracing theory 
to social and political activity has come under 
bitter attack for being anti-historical, ethnocentric 
and inherently conservative in its ideology.^
The more sweeping attacks are justified when 
levelled against the extravagant claims of the 
'•general systems" theorists, who propound a 
mechanistic approach aimed at large-scale social
(continued) N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1968;
Michael Evans, "Notes on David Easton's Model 
of the Political System", Journal of 
Commonwealth Political Studies, Yol. 8 No.
2, July 1970, p. 117. Perhaps the fullest 
general discussions of Easton and Almond are: 
"Eugene E. Miller, "David Easton's Political 
Theory", and Stanley Rothman, "Functionalism 
and its Critics: An Analysis of the Writings 
of Gabriel Almond", both in George Carey (ed.), 
The Political Science Reviewer, Vol, 1, Pall 
1971 , pp • 184-235 and 236-76, respectively.
6. See, for example, Martin Kesselman, "Order or 
Movement? The Literature of Political 
Development as Ideology", World Politics.
Vol. 26 No. 1, October 1973, p. 139; Susanne 
J. Bodenheimer, The Ideology of Developmentalism: 
The American Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin 
American Studies. Sage Comparative Politics 
Series, Vol. 2, No. 01-015, Beverly Hills,
Calif., Sage, 1971; Marvin Surkin and Alan 
Wolfe (eds.), An End to Political Science:
The Caucus PapersV New York. Basic books. 1970; 
and Terry Nardin, Violence and the State: A 
Critique of Empirical Political theory,
Sage Comparative Politics Series, Vol. 2,
No. 01-020, Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage,
1973.
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engineering, “but the study of a particular situation
need not involve the kinds of commitments alleged by
systems theory's most severe critics.” In matters of
detail, the present failings of the systems approach
are fairly obvious: as Roy Macridis has observed,
there has been considerable attention to the building
of "grand theory" at the one extreme, and to social
trivia at the other, but little study of political
events in between.Q Yet this could be an argument in
favour of applying systems concepts in a particular
situation, rather than for discounting them as no longer
useful. Moreover, the approach has scarcely ever been
10used in the study of a colonial situation, and few 
attempts have been made to link the insights from the 
various fields in which systems theory has been
7
7. This group is represented by the members of the 
Society for General Systems Research and their 
yearbook General Systems; a brief statement of 
their position is contained in Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy, "General Systems Theory - A Critical 
Review", General Systems, Vol. 7, Ann Arbor, 
Mich., University of Michigan Press, 1962, p. 1.
8. For a more balanced approach, see Lee Sigelman, 
Modernization and the Political System: A 
Critique and Preliminary Empirical Analysis,
Sage Comparative Politics Series, Vol. 2, No. 
01-016, Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage, 1971.
9. Roy C. Macridis, "Comparative Politics and the 
Study of Government", Comparative Politics,
Vol. 1 No. 1, October 10 6 8, p . 79, particularly 
pp. 80-9.
10. A preliminary application of the model is
attempted in Brian Jinks, Colonial Political 
System? (University of Sydney, Department of 
Government colloquium paper), Sydney, mimeo,
1970.
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employed. It seems premature to dismiss the 
theory because of its jargon or the possible 
implications of its more extreme forms. Instead, it 
is examined in the conclusion with the more limited 
aim of seeking further insights into the topic 
under discussion: the post-war period in Papua Few 
Guinea is analysed in a mainly chronological 
narrative, then a systems framework is examined for 
generalisations which may be applied to the present 
situation in the country. There is no intention of 
"proving" or "disproving" systems theory, but 
merely of applying it as an analytical tool.
The colonial situation
Systems theory should be appropriate to studying 
the development phase of colonial administration - 
that is, when the colony is being advanced 
deliberately and as a matter of policy towards 
self-government - because political and bureaucratic 
roles and considerations are closely inter1,voven; 
the study of this phase presents an opportunity for 
testing the relevance and relationships of different
11. There is growing interest in drawing together 
various parts of the theory, as in Ralph 
Braibanti (ed.), Political a,nd Administrative 
Development, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 
19b9, and Colin Campbell, "Current I Models of 
Political Systems: An Intellective-Purposive 
View", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 4 
No. 1, April 1971, p. 21.
11
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strands oi' systems analysis. However, since dynamic
analysis is required for the study of a development
situation, it is possible to examine the different
approaches to system equilibrium and adaptation,
which are key concepts in the analysis of ongoing 
1 2process. The discussion leads from the consideration
of systemic process to an analysis of policy content;
more particularly, it concerns the reaction of
1 3bureaucratic structures to specific policies. It
is necessary, in this context, to consider the adaptive
capabilities of different structures in relation to
changing policy content and to delineate the decision-
i 4.making procedures which result. Analysis of process, 
content and capability directs attention back to the 
systems approach itself: specifically, to the uses 
of systems theory in generalising about the
12. See, for example, Daniel Katz and Robert L.
Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations.
New York, Wiley, 1966, particularly pp. 23-6).
13. The study of content as distinct from process 
has received relatively little attention: see 
Austin Ranney (ed.), Political Science and 
Public Policy, Chicago, Markham Publishing Co., 
1968, pp. 3-10, and Martin Albrow, Bureaucracy, 
New York, Praeger, 1970, pp. 95-6. Por further 
comment see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change 
to Change: Modernization, Development and 
Politics11, Comparative Politics, Yol. 3 No. 3, 
April 1971, p. 283, particularly pp. 309-11.
14. Of particular relevance are the summaries of 
theory and analysis in sucn works as Peter Blau, 
The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (rev. ed.), Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1963, Part 3, and 
Louis C. G-awthrop, Bureaucratic Behaviour in the 
Executive Branch, New York, Collier-MacMillan 
The Pree Press, 1969, Ch. 7.
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1 5administration of change.
The colonial situation chosen for the examination 
of change is that in the Territory of Papua-New 
Guinea from the return to civil administration in 
October 1945 until the departure of the first post­
war Administrator, Colonel J.1C. Murray, in June 
1952. During those years post-war rehabilitation was 
essentially completed and the development phase 
begun. Australia acquired her colonial possessions 
some decades after the European expansion into the 
tropics reached its peak. She lagged behind most 
other powers in timing the development of her major 
colonies of New Guinea and Papua, where independence 
has only now been achieved. It is almost a generation 
since that stage was reached throughout Asia and more 
than a decade since the greatest part of Africa was 
granted independence. The time differential meant that 
Australia's colonial policy was often criticised as 
involving unnecessary delays. On the other hand, once 
the Pacific war forced a drastic revision of policies 
throughout the region, Australia still had sufficient 
time to begin the planned development of Papua New 
Guinea, provided that changes could be financed and 
executed with reasonable efficiency. That is, there
15. Organization and change are discussed in Victor 
A. Thompson, Bureaucracy and Innovation, 
University, Ala., University of Alabama Press, 
1969, in which (pp. 55-7) he is scathing about 
certain aspects of the systems approach. However, 
each body of theory can be used to supplement the others for both analysis and generalisation.
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was a conjunction of three factors in Australia's 
colonial relationship that was denied the majority of 
European powers: there emerged a consciousness that 
change was needed; a resolve (although not always a 
strong one) that change should he introduced; and a 
reasonable length of time to put it into effect.
Relative neglect of hew (Guinea and Papua by the 
Australian governments of the inter-war period denied 
the Territories' administrators the opportunity to 
introduce major, planned innovations in policy. The 
intrusion of an alien system inevitably produced a 
number of changes in the traditional pattern of life, 
but the changes were incidental by-products of colonial 
control and were not intended innovations in the 
direction of eventual independence and self-sufficiency 
for the people of the colonies. When such innovations 
were announced as the ultimate objectives of post-war 
policy, they were bound to require major changes in 
administrative practice; and, as such, were likely 
to provoke strong reactions from those who had found 
security in the old colonial relationships. The 
following study examines those innovations and 
reactions.
CHAPTER ONE
PRE-WAR PATERNALISM
End of the Murray era - Early administrations - 
Australia and New Guinea - Sir Hubert Murray and 
Papua - Papua and the Mandated Territory - 
Attitudes of the field staff - Papua New Guinea*s 
Europeans - Tropical fantasies
End of the Murray era
Australia*s pre-war policy in Papua New Guinea 
collapsed when the Japanese bombed Rabaul in 
December 1941. Within a few weeks invading forces 
occupied the outlying islands and most of the north 
coast; the Japanese then turned their attention to 
Papua and its headquarters town, Port Moresby. 
George Johnston described the scene there:
Strewn all over the main street are pieces of 
twisted corrugated iron, splintered plaster and 
smashed timber - souvenirs of the two night
1. G.H. Johnston, New Guinea Diary. Sydney, Angus 
and Robertson, 1943, p. 18.
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raids. A few houses and shops have been blown 
to pieces and scores of others damaged by- 
blast.. .Papua* s capital is now abandoned and in 
the houses and hotels where there were the 
sounds of tinkling ice and swing music only a 
few weeks ago there is no sound but the buzzing 
of the insects...The troops are not waiting for 
the town to be wiped out. Looting has been 
going on for days, in some cases on a grand 
scale.
It was clearly beyond the capacity of the civil 
government to deal with such a situation. Military 
rule was declared by Major-General Basil Morris,
General Officer Commanding Eight Military District, 
on 12 February 1942. There were subsequent accusations 
that officers in the Papua public service had, in 
effect, deserted their posts in the face of the 
enemy; the charges were substantially discounted by
pa commission of inquiry which reported in 1945, but 
the pre-war Administrator of Papua, Leonard Murray, 
nephew of the eminent Lieutenant-Governor Sir Hubert 
Murray, was not re-appointed when hostilities ended.
The **Murray era”, which had begun in Papua in 1908, 
was over. None of the Administrators in the Mandated 
Territory had enjoyed Sir Hubert*s status, so that at 
war’s end there was a serious gap in New Guinea’s 
leadership. If the Labor government were to introduce 
far-reaching changes in policy for the Territory, as
2. Commonwealth of Australia, Department of External 
Territories, Report of a Commission of Inquiry 
into the suspension of the Civil Administration 
of the Territory of Papua in February 1942, 
typeserfpi, Canberra, 1945* The inquiry is 
discussed in Chapter Three.
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was their announced intention, then they would have 
to find a new agent to supervise its execution. And 
in view of Australia^ relative neglect of its 
colonies during earlier years, policy changes were 
clearly needed.
Early administrations
Australia had exercised full control over eastern 
New Guinea only since 1914, following the capitulation 
of the Germans at Rahaul; earlier, she had assumed 
control of Papua from Great Britain not long after 
Federation. Few of the historical details in the 
development of the separate Territories of New Guinea 
and Papua between the wars are directly relevant to 
the discussion which follows, although several broad 
trends are significant. These include the legacies
3* The following discussion is a generalized account 
which assumes a broad knowledge of Papua New 
Guinea colonial history; only points of 
Particular significance to the post-war situation 
are noted in any detail. There is no comprehensive 
general history of eastern New Guinea. S.W. Reed,
The Making of Modern New Guinea. Philadelphia, 
American Philosophical Society, 1943, deals with 
that Territory to 1941; J.D. Legge, Australian 
Colonial Policy. Sydney, Angus and Robertson,
1956, is a study of British New Guinea and Papua 
to the early 1950*s; the first edition of L.P. 
Mair*s Australia in New Guinea (London, Christophers, 
1948) outlines key policies, notably social 
services and labour, to the time of publication 
and was the first book to attempt an assessment of 
the situation discussed in this study, although 
the second edition (Melbourne, M.U.P., 1970) is
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of the earlier colonial regimes, the relationship of 
the two Territories with each other, their standing 
with the Australian government and people, and 
incidental or historical events which affected 
their relative affluence*
The Germans and Englishmen who first 
administered eastern New Guinea experienced a 
number of common problems; this was to be expected, 
in view of the ethnological and geographic 
similarities in that part of Melanesia* The islands 
were far from the respective centres of metropolitan 
government, so that a sense of isolation was 
immediately apparent. Neither power appeared 
anxious to acquire another colonial possession: 
the British government repudiated an attempt by
(continued) sketchy on the period. Other books 
which deal with certain periods up to the early 
1950*s in some detail are C.D. Rowley, The 
Australians in German New Guinea* Melbourne,
M.li*P., 1958; W.E.ti. Stanner* The South Seas 
in Transition* Sydney, Australasian Publishing 
Co., 1953; and L.A. Mander, Some Dependent 
Peoples of the South Pacific. tfew York. MacMillan. 
1954* Biographies of some major figures are 
referred to later in this Chapter. The only 
recent general history is P. Biskup, B. Jinks and 
H. Nelson, A Short History of New Guinea. Sydney, 
Angus and Robertson, 1970, bui it is intended 
mainly for New Guinea secondary schools.
Selected readings may be found in B. Jinks, P. 
Biskup and H. Nelson (eds.), Readings in New 
Guinea History. Sydney, Angus and Robertson,
1973* The lack of detailed research in a number 
of areas is an important factor in accounting 
for the persistence of certain myths about New 
Guinea, particularly for the periods of German 
administration and the 1940's.
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Queensland to annex Papua in 1883,^ while Bismarck
was initially prepared to establish only a chartered 
5company, although this move prompted the British to 
declare a Protectorate in the south-east. There 
followed several years of frustration and confusion 
in each case. It was not until Sir William MacGregor 
arrived in British New Guinea in 1888 and the Imperial 
government assumed sovereignty over German New Guinea 
in 1899 that patterns of administration began to 
emerge. Nevertheless, MacGregor and the German 
Governors were severely limited by the general policy 
that, if the colonies could not turn a profit, as was 
hoped, then they should cost the home countries as
7little as possible. The British overcame the problem 
by requesting an annual subscription from each of the 
three eastern Australian colonies; this attitude
4. Port Moresby*s European community was similarly 
opposed to Queensland control; see R. Lovett, James 
Chalmers: His Autobiography and Letters, London, 
Religious Tract Society, 1903, pp. 237-8.
5. The proclamation granted extensive powers and placed 
few limits upon company operations: P. van der
Veur (ed.), Documents and Correspondence on New 
Guinea* s Boundaries. Canberra, A.ltf.rf. Press, 1*966,
pp. 14-16.6. The proclamation’s declared intention of protecting 
Papuan interests nevertheless contrasts with the 
Kaiser’s pronouncement; see C. Lyne, New Guinea:
An account of the establishment of the British 
Protectorate over the southern shores of New Guinea, 
London, Sampson Low, 1885, pp* 8-9*
7. This was, of course, a general policy until World 
War 2; see D.K. Pieldhouse, The Colonial Empires, 
Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1966. Financial 
assistance subsequently granted to the Territory 
of Papua is outlined later in this Chapter.
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served to divide control over policy, under which 
MacGregor was required to explore and control the 
country while at the same time attracting European 
settlers. Owing to the fact that relatively little 
money and few staff were available, a basic conflict 
between the demands of ’’native administration” and
Q’development” appeared from the earliest years.
MacGregor succeeded in setting up a field service 
to execute policies which persisted for seventy years 
or more, including the Native Regulations, the Village 
Constable system and the Armed Constabulary; but 
economic development posed an intractable problem. As 
long as Papuan land and labour enjoyed a measure of 
protection, European entrepreneurs believed they could 
not secure a return on their investments proportionate 
to the risks involved. Economic progress was therefore 
painfully slow.
In German New Guinea controls were less strict, in 
a geographical environment relatively more favourable 
to plantation enterprise, so that a much stronger base
Qwas established there by 1914; land and labour laws
10were generally tailored to the needs of the companies. 
There is little evidence to support the contention that 
German settlers were notably harsher in their exploitation
8. Details of the conflict during the years before World 
War 2 are set out in Legge, op. cit., Chs. 6, 10,
11 and 12.
9. S.S. Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul, Sydney, 
Angus and Robertson, 1934, describes (pp. 112-13; 
the companies dominant role in German New Guinea.10. Rowley, op. cit.. pp. 10b-8.
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of labour than were their counterparts in Papua,
although such allegations were used as partial
justification for the expropriation of German
plantations after the 1914-18 war. In general,
the Germans showed a more imaginative approach to
social policy than did the administrators of Papua.
Nevertheless, the myths, once established, had a
significant effect on New Guinea field administration
between the wars and helped to sustain the tension
1 2between Papua and the Mandated Territory. German 
legacies were such that the Australians who ultimately 
came to control them under the Mandate gained 
experience on a scale that was unknown in Papua.
Australia and New Guinea
The fact that the major policies for eastern 
New Guinea were set by others meant that Australia 
had very limited early experience in colonial 
planning and innovation. Moreover, once the possessions 
had been acquired, Australians lost interest in them; 
planning was scarcely considered necessary. It was
11. The labour system would be viewed with horror 
today, but it was in keeping with colonial 
practice of the period; this is borne out by 
the description of the German system afforded 
by an Australian, G. Thomas of the Rabaul Times, 
in an article in Pacific Islands Monthly, Vol.
9 No. 7, February 1939, p. 34.12. As observed by Marnie Bassett, Letters from New 
Guinea, Melbourne, Hawthorn Press, 1989, PP* 
11-1 2 , 3 9 .
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nevertheless essential that general Australian interests 
be maintained* In this respect, three factors combined 
to give an unusual cast to the Australian relationship 
with the colonies* Firstly, New Guinea and Australia 
are closer geographically than any other colony and its 
metropolitan power; the nearest piece of Papuan sand 
is only a few hundred yeards from the northern border 
of Queensland. This meant that, even in the era 
before the development of modern communications, the 
Australian authorities were physically able to exercise 
closer control of New Guinea affairs than was possible 
in the great majority of colonial situations. Secondly, 
New Guinea was the colony of an ex-colony which retained 
a self-conscious and sometimes aggressive attitude 
towards criticism, both from overseas and from within 
the Territories. Thirdly, New Guinea was the only 
major possession administered by Australia. Whereas 
the Colonial Office in London devoted varying amounts 
of attention to scores of territories and a letter to
Aa Governor might elicit a response within six months,* 
the Australian officials, though few in number, were 
able to concentrate almost entirely on the details of
13* This argument has not been developed in other 
studies. I first made these points in J.D.B.
Miller and Brian Jinks, Australian Government 
and Politics, 4th ed., London, Duckworth, 1970, 
“ 260.----14. A whimsical example is provided by Sir Arthur 
Grible in A Pattern of Islands (London, Allen, 
1954), where at the appointment interview an 
official is portrayed as searching the maps for 
the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Protectorate.
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administering eastern New Guinea, These conditions 
made possible the bureaucratization of the 
relationship between Australia and her major 
colonies, particularly in respect of the bureaucratic 
principles of hierarchical control and concern for 
the routine of precedent.
It may be argued that two additional factors - 
the lack of concern for New Guinea affairs within 
Australia and the small amount of money allocated 
to the country - made close attention unnecessary. 
This does not necessarily follow, however. Since 
Papua and the Mandated Territory were of political 
significance only on the rare occasions when crises 
occurred or when Australian status as a colonial 
power was in question, the permanent officials in 
Melbourne (and later in Canberra) received little 
attention from the Ministers who were at various 
times in charge of External Territories. N<r did 
the fact that few resources were allocated to the 
colonies before World War 2 necessarily reduce the 
degree of control from Australia; there was even 
more need to ensure that nothing was wasted. The 
existence of a generally bureaucratized relationship 
is substantiated by the historical evidence. In the 
Territory of New Guinea, the initial military 
administration acted only as a caretaker and was 
required to concentrate on the routine tasks of
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promoting law and order and plantation production.
The principles of military discipline ensured that 
directives were applied as far as control extended 
into the field. There was an understandable 
tendency for Army officers to apply what they 
considered to be German precedent rather than to 
innovate. An analogous situation existed in the 
Mandated Territory under civil administration: the 
inter-war Administrators were ex-Army officers with 
no immediate experience of peacetime work in a 
colony, while the permanent officials in Australia 
had been supervising the administration of Papua 
for a numbers of years, so that there was no question 
as to who was boss.
Sir Hubert Murray and Papua
The situation in Papua was more complex. It 
has been suggested that Sir Hubert Murray enjoyed so 
much prestige and authority as Lieutenant-Governor 
of the Territory, and was acknowledged as such an 
expert on colonial administration, that he was allowed 
virtually a free rein by the Australian government in
15* Rowley, op. cit., pp. 100-1. He also makes the 
point (pp. 18, 25) that there were instances of 
troops acting in contravention of the spirit of 
the military occupation; the implication is 
not that the army was acting on its own initiative 
but that in some cases control was ineffective 
in the absence of detailed instructions from 
superiors.
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his control of the colony. It is true that by the
end of his 32-year tenure Murray had become something
of a legend, his opponents of former years had mostly
departed the field, and any move to change his methods
or appoint a successor while he was still alive might
have proved embarrassing politically. But in earlier
years his position had been far less secure and there
had been several challenges to his authority. His
biographer, P.J. West, presents the picture of a man
dogged by insecurity and the knowledge that he had his
17last chance, in Papua, to build a successful career.
Prom the first he made a number of enemies among the
Port Moresby community and relations were constantly
strained between Murray and Atlee Hunt, who was
responsible for Papuan affairs for much of the period
before World War 2. In addition, W.M. Hughes, Prime
Minister during crucial years for Papua, disliked
18Murray: West quotes him as saying:
16
He was quite impossible. Believe me, a very 
opinionated man. He was stubborn. He wanted 
to tell me, not let me tell him. Oh, I assure 
you, quite impossible. Well, life’s far too 
short, brother, and I had better things to do than 
bother with a man who was usurping the role of 
God Almighty, so I left him to be God Almighty 
among his blackfellows if that was the way he 
wanted it.
16. Murray was a good publicist in his own cause; 
his effectiveness can be gauged from Lewis 
Lett's embarrassingly eulogistic biography, Sir 
Hubert Murray of Papua, London, Collins, 1949.
17. P.J. West, Hubert Murray: The Australian 
Pro-Consul. London, O.U.P., 1968•
18. Ibid., pp. 202-3.
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As far as Hughes and his successors were concerned, 
Papua could remain a backwater.
Like all regimes, the colonial administrations
of New Guinea and Papua could have achieved greater
autonomy had they been able to establish a degree of
financial self-sufficiency. But New Guinea was barely
able to support itself and Papua was dependent at all
19times upon its annual grant from Australia. There
19. The Territory of New Guinea received no financial
grant from Australia. Papua received grants ranging 
from £30,000 to £50,000 annually, depending upon 
economic conditions; these usually comprised 
between 20 and 25 per cent of total annual 
expenditure. The comparative scales of finance 
and administration between the two Territories 
are difficult to assess, particularly in relation 
to their impact on the villagers. The Mandated 
Territory had a good deal more money available to
it, as the following table shows:
Year Papua New Guinea(£ Australian)
1930/31 135,325 293,3771931/32 128,682 282,404
1932/33 118,762 321,5671933/34 121,199 348,817
1934/35 152,901 367,4701935/36 166,116 425,793
1936/37 170,920 460,1181937/38 183,102 508,612
1938/39 166,331 502,5791939/40 177,932 500,614
However, the village population in the Mandated
Territory was estimated to be two and a half times
that of Papua, so that on the basis of funds per
head of population, Papua was perhaps no worse off
in terms of things that might have been attempted
in the villages. Two additional points of
particular significance for this study are, firstly, 
that the administrative staff of the Mandated 
Territory became accustomed to dealing with more 
money, more people and, consequently, larger
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was a certain inevitability in the situation, for
the Territories were dogged by economic misfortune.
Following the stagnation brought about by the 1914-18
war, production had just begun to increase again
when the recession of the early 1920*s affected
world prices. The price of copra was almost halved
and the value of exports of this crop from both
Territories dropped by some 40 per cent, even though
20the total quantity produced increased by one-fifth.
The financial problems that arose from declining
internal revenue were aggravated by the application,
in July 1921, of the Commonwealth's Navigation Act to
all exports from the Territories; since Papua and
New Guinea markets were mainly in London, the necessity
to re-route produce via the expensive Australian
21coastal trade was a heavy imposition, illustrating 
Australia's narrow view of its responsibilities as a
(continued) projects. Secondly, the table shows 
that the funds available in the Mandated 
Territory increased by 74 per cent during the 
1950's entirely from internal sources, while 
Papua was able to increase its finances by only 
47.5 per cent in the same period, even after the 
Australian grant is taken into account. The 
New Guinea public servants developed the opinion 
that they were not only capable of administration 
on a larger scale than were their counterparts 
in Papua, but also that they could do this from 
their own resources. (Sources: Papua Annual 
Report, 1930/31-1939/40; New Guinea Annual 
Report. 1930/31-1939/40).
20. Reed, op. cit., pp. 193-4; Legge, op. cit., 
p. 149. Even after the drop in prices, the 
Mandated Territory, with copra exports of £474,110 
in 1922, had more than five times the income from 
this source than Papua, where copra exports in 
1922 returned only £87,377 (Legge, loc. cit.).
21. Mair, op. cit., (1970), pp. 116-7.
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colonial power* The Act was not applied after 1923> 
but scarcely had production again recovered than 
the Depression crippled both Territories1 plantations; 
in 1934 copra brought £4.11.0 per ton, less than the 
cost of shipping it to London.
The economic crises had two important consequences 
for policy-makers in later years. They embittered the 
European planters, many of whom had to sell out to 
the major companies, thereby increasing yet further 
the commercial sector's importance among economic 
interest groups. The slumps also convinced both the 
companies and those independent planters who survived 
that they were an embattled, beleaguered community 
that would have to protect its future interests by 
every means if it were to survive. The effects on 
the villagers were slighter, in economic terms, since 
indigenous production accounted for only a small 
part of total exports and the people could simply 
revert to subsistence agriculture; but they were of 
the utmost psychological significance. The attempts, 
mainly by the Papuan administration, to establish 
the nucleus of a village cash economy came to nothing. 
Most villagers became disillusioned with white
promises and were convinced that their enterprises were
22bound to fail. This, in turn, created a demonstration
22. A case study is set out in R.G. Crocombe, Communal
Cash Cropping Among the Orokaiva, New Guinea
Research Bulletin No. 4, Canberra, A.N.U., 1964.
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effect for white settlers, who came to view the people 
as shiftless and lacking perseverance. The failures 
meant, moreover, that villagers continued to rely for 
introduced goods on wage labour for lEucopeans, who 
were thus able to maintain their economic domination 
of the country.
Papua and the Mandated Territory
The Territory of New Guinea was saved from the 
worst effects of the Depression by the discovery of 
substantial deposits of alluvial gold in the Wau-
2*5Bulolo area of the Morobe District in the early 1930*s.
By 1935 gold exports were £1.9 million, 81 per cent
of the Mandated Territory*s total. In contrast, total
Papuan exports of gold, copra and rubber in the same
year were but one-ninth of this amount.  ^ The disparity
in income led to jealousy and wistful hopes for an oil
discovery in Papua, and a disparaging attitude among
the New Guinea public servants towards their poorer
25colleagues to the south.  ^ Tensions were maintained 
by the continued separation of the Territories from 
each other. In a number of details the laws of one 
differed from those of the other; New Guinea had 
District Courts and Courts of Native Affairs, while
23. The most authoritative account is A.M. Healy,
Bulolo, New Guinea Research Bulletin No. 15, 
Canberra, A.N.U., 1967*
24. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 233.
25. Mair, op. cit., (1970), pp. 15-16.
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Papua used Courts of Petty Sessions and Courts for 
Native Matters. New Guinea was divided into Districts, 
each administered by a District Officer, while Papua*s 
Divisions were presided over by Resident Magistrates. 
Although these should have been minor matters, the 
differences between the staff of the field services 
for the two Territories extended well beyond the 
titles which the members of each group assumed. As 
in the British Colonial Service, none too subtle 
distinctions appeared in the occupational philosophy
of the services and the status which each accorded the
+Vt 25 other.
The basic difference between the British Colonial 
Service and the field services of the Territories of 
New Guinea and Papua was that the educational level 
required by the latter was much lower; a good honours 
degree was not merely considered unnecessary, but a 
probable hindrance to the Australian officer who, like 
his counterpart in the home public services, was 
expected to develop his important skills through 
experience. This experience was expected to begin 
rather earlier in Papua than in the Mandated Territory. 
Sir Hubert Murray attempted to recruit the sons of
25. The basic distinctions are outlined, from the 
outsider's viewpoint, in Heussler, Yesterday1s 
Rulers, op. cit. and by Sir Ralph Purse, tne 
originator of the British recruitment system, 
in his autobiography, Aucuparius, op. cit.
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Territory families to his field service: the Champions, 
the Healeys, the Bramells were thought to he 
particularly suitable for appointment, initially as 
clerks and after probation as Patrol Officers, simply 
because they had been b o m  in Papua and had spent much
p/Tof their early lives there. Other officers were 
recruited from the ranks of unsuccessful settlers, 
restless employees of the trading companies and sometimes 
directly from Australia, and through tours of inspection, 
reports and regular circular instructions Murray sought 
to exercise a similar style of paternalistic control 
over them.2  ^ Such methods of supervision need not have 
deadened initiative among the majority of officers, 
since Murray was a man of intellect and imagination; 
but in addition the Papuan officers commanded relatively 
few resources and so were limited in their sphere of 
operation. Officers of the Papua service could not be 
given additional training because the money was not 
available; they were not even paid travelling expenses 
while on leave and there was no pension scheme until 
1918.28 Those who stayed on were either uncertain of 
their prospects elsewhere or, in a number of cases, 
were men dedicated to colonial administration and to
26. The most detailed study of one of these officer1s
lives is J.P. Sinclair’s The Outside Man,
Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1969, the biography of
the young explorer of Papua, Jack Hides.
27. West, op. cit., pp. 167-73.
28. Ibid., pp. 194-5.
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the "Murray tradition" 29
The Territory of New Guinea service began with
a different tradition - or possibly no tradition at
all. It was staffed in three main stages, the first
being in the years immediately after World War 1,
when a number of ex-soldiers remained on from the
military administration and others were recruited
upon their return from overseas. At the outbreak of
the Pacific War the majority of senior positions were
held by men from this group, many of whom lost their
"50lives during the Japanese occupation. A second
group arrived in the late 1920's, after the Territory
had recovered from the effects of the post-war
recession; included in their number were such men
as H.L.R. Niall and J.K. McCarthy, who were to reach
"51top levels during the 1950*s. The third stage of 
recruitment took place after the Depression; the 
members of this group retired at about the time of 
self-government.
The New Guinea service had no particular reason
29. The tradition, together with the personal Murray 
legend, was publicised by Lewis Lett in Knights 
Errant of Papua (Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1935)
and The Papuan Achievement (2nd. ed., Melbourne, 
M.U.P., 1944).
30. Unlike Papuan officers, members of the New Guinea 
field service published almost nothing between 
the wars. Some indication of their outlook and 
service conditions is provided in G.W.L.
Townsend, District Officer, Sydney, Pacific 
Publications, 1968 and Malcolm Wright, The Gentle 
Savage, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1966.31. See J.K. McCarthy, Patrol Into Yesterday, Melbourne, Cheshire, iyb3.
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to doubt its abilities. It was sustained through the
inter-war crises by three main factors: it had taken
over a comparatively sound economic and administrative
infrastructure, its minimum finances were assured by
the gold discoveries and its major sense of achievement
came from the exploration of the rich, populous
Highlands valleys during the 1930's. Its comparative
scale of operation is illustrated by the fact that
at the outbreak of the Pacific war it numbered three
32times as many officers as the Papua service. Although
conditions of service were comparably poor, salaries
in the mandated Territory were marginally higher than
those in Papua, while on the older-established
stations officers had the advantage of the very superior
surroundings that had been created by the Germans. In
addition, a cadetship scheme involving a year's
university study was instituted in 1925, although it
lapsed during the Depression and had scarcely been
34revived when the Pacific war broke out. The fact
remains that even the New Guinea public service was
small by post-war standards; the combined numbers of
both Territories' services at the time of the Japanese
35invasion - 612 officers - more than doubled by 1950.
36Moreover, as Mair has pointed out,
32. CRS A518, item B800/1/7, 20 October 1945.
33. Mair, op. cit. (1948), gives salaries on 
engagement as £300 and £285 respectively (p. 42).
34. Ibid., p. 34.35. Brian Jinks, New Guinea Government: An 
Introduction, Sydney, Angus and Robertson,
1970, p. 150.36. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 33.
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Despite their greater numbers the administrative 
officers here too were unable to devote nearly 
enough time to native matters. Owing to the 
greater importance of the commercial community, 
many of them had to give their entire time to 
dealing with questions affecting Europeans.
As in other colonies, the size of the settler 
community affected the willingness and ability of 
the field staff to carry out certain policies.
A debate continued for many years about the 
alleged differences in policies and attitudes between 
New Guinea and Papua. This was pointless in most 
contexts, since both administrations conducted massive 
invasions of the traditional system and neither 
possessed the means to achieve any but modest goals. 
Nevertheless, both services had higher ambitions and 
each developed its own ethos about these. It has 
been noted that the early administration of New Guinea 
was thought to condone harsh treatment of villagers, 
while Sir Hubert Murray enjoyed a reputation for 
enlightened administration. However, the contrast 
between the two Territories was by no means as sharp 
as Lett and even Mair have suggested. In the Mandated 
Territory, for example, there was some ”spillover” of 
revenue produced by the larger scale of European 
enterprise to village development and welfare. The 
Department of Agriculture, for example, employed some 
research staff and although Reed, in particular, makes
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scathing comments about the Territory*s provision
37for village education, there were a few government
schools, whereas Papua relied wholly on the missions,
aided by some subsidies, for education. Similarly,
public health expenditure in New Guinea ranged from
four to ten times the amount provided by the Papuan
administration, although a larger part of this was
spent on services for Europeans in the Mandated
Territory. There were also some attempts to formulate
long-range policies; the Queensland Director of
Education was commissioned in 1929 to prepare a plan
for the extension of government schooling.^ On the
other hand, the provisions for development and
services in the Mandated Territory remained inadequate
in relation to its needs, and the Australian government
usually ignored advice tendered by the League of 
41Nations. Moreover, one of the most commonly remarked 
features of life in the Territory of New Guinea was 
the unabashed, unqualified acceptance of the notion
37. Reed, op. cit., pp. 187-90.
38. Leg&e, op. cit., p. 187; Mair, op. cit. (1948). 
p. 169.39. Mair, op. cit. (1948), pp. 175-9.
40. N.G.A.R. 1929/30, pp. 127-9.
41. The most detailed study of this question between 
Australia and the League is W.J. Hudson, 
"Australia*s Experience as a Mandatory Power**, 
Australian Outlook. Vol. 19 No. 1, April 1965, 
while the matter is placed in a wider context in 
Hudson* s Australia and the Colonial Question at 
the United Nations. Sydney, S.U.P.. 1970. Ch. 1.
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of European racial supremacy. The assumption
assiduously promoted by the Rabaul Times was that
the white man’s security depended upon the maintenance
of his "prestige" and that this could be accomplished
only by physical, social, economic and psychological 
45segregation.  ^ Public servants and settlers alike 
were socialized into this environment, which was an 
important influence in determining the attitudes of 
Europeans towards the post-war administration when it 
threatened to weaken the old barriers between the races.
42
Papua under Murray enjoyed a different reputation. 
The Mandated Territory’s Europeans alleged that Papua 
achieved little because of its over-protective policies 
towards villagers. In reply, Papuan residents could do 
little but attempt to make a virtue out of necessity, 
so that the attitude of each group towards the other
44became increasingly coloured by myth over the years.
The situation influenced Sir Hubert Murray in the 
presentation of his policies: in his official reports 
he was by turns defensive and aggressive in the face 
of the repeated frustrations which his Territory
42. See, for example, R. Pink and I. Grosart, Race 
Relations in Papua and New Guinea, Australian 
School of Pacific Administration, Staff Seminar 
No. 3, Sydney, 1963, particularly pp. 3-4; and 
Hank Nelson, ’Our Boys Up North: The Behaviour of 
Australians in New Guinea", Meanjin Quarterly,
Vol. 32 No. 4, December 1973, p. 433.
43. Reed, op. cit., pp. 243-52.
44. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 17. The groups rarely met 
except on the ships taking them on leave, when 
there were comments about the "coon bashers" and 
"kanaka lovers", respectively.
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experienced, while his public statements and books
tended to develop into expressions of hopes that had
45grown gradually dimmer.  ^ Murray wrote so much about 
Papua and its people that it is difficult to find an 
uncontradicted philosophy on the essential question of 
colonial development: almost everything in Murray*s 
published work that might be considered liberal and 
progressive can be qualified by reference to his more 
paternalistic pronouncements. This was only to be 
expected of a gifted, complex personality unable to 
show full potential through concrete actions: Sir 
Hubert Murray's is the story of what might have been.
When all this has been said, however, there is 
still a discernible difference between administrative 
norms in Papua and the Mandated Territory. Murray's 
directions to his field staff on extending control by 
peaceful means were much more explicit and direct than 
were any issued in New Guinea,^ and it was this model 
that was generally applied in the post-war years.
Murray was also prepared to ensure much closer 
co-operation with the missions in his area than any of 
the New Guinea Administrators was able, or indeed
45. It is unfortunate that West's biography of Murray 
provides much less detail about the late 1920's 
and 1950*s, which were the most difficult years
in Papua's history, than about the earlier period. 
However, some indication of the contradictions in 
Murray's writings is provided in Jinks, Biskup and 
Nelson (eds.), op. cit., pp. 118-139.
46. J.H.P. Murray, The Scientific Aspect of the 
Pacification of"Papua, Port Moresby, Government 
Printer, 1932.
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willing to do.^ It should be pointed out that the 
relationship had been established by Sir William 
MacGregor and that assistance from and for missions was 
an utter necessity in Papua;^ nevertheless, the fact
that missionaries were, almost without exception, 
willing to endorse the "Murray tradition" says much 
for both its moral and paternalistic qualities. In 
Papua the most publicised, and perhaps most real concern 
was for village rather than European welfare; in New 
Guinea it was fairly clear that the reverse situation 
applied, at least in the major centres.
Another thread running through Murray*s policy 
statements was his wish to develop enterprises at the 
village level. Here again, initial provisions had been 
made by Sir William MacGregor in his Native Regulations 
Ordinance; these were expanded by Murray through the 
Native Taxation Ordinance and Native Plantations Ordinance.^ 
At the same time, Murray was conscious that there was 
a lack of resources for agricultural extension, while 
every attempt to develop the villages tended to reduce
50the immediately available supply of plantation labour.
47. See, for example, R.R. McNicoll, "Sir Walter McNicoll 
as Administrator of the Mandated Territory", Journal 
of the Papua and New Guinea Society. Vol. 2 No. 2, 
1969, pp. 8-10. Part of the problem was that the 
missionaries, being Germans, were suspect to many 
Australian returned soldiers, among whom were all
of the Territory*s Administrators.
48. Legge, op. cit.. pp. 176-8, 180.
49* Details are provided in West, op. cit.. pp. 185-6.
50. See, for example, J.H.P. Murray, Papua or British- 
New Guinea. London, Fisher Unwin, 1912, PP* 340-5.
57
In addition, there was the general failure of indigenous
ventures to show an adequate profit, owing to the
51inter-war economic crises. Murray appreciated all 
of these problems, commented on them at length and 
created the impression that he was not sure whether 
village enterprise was really designed to assist the
52people or to force them to find money for their taxes.
In the event, ”native development” became another 
catalogue of inevitable frustrations, but a sincere 
attempt had at least been made to introduce such a policy.
In summary, it can be said that the Territory of 
New Guinea possessed the minimum of finance necessary 
to improve village welfare, together with the staff 
to introduce a few basic innovations, but that the will
5*5to move in this direction was far from strong. The 
Papuan service had the will to promote indigenous 
development, but it did not possess the means even to 
maintain itself without Australia's assistance. The 
result was that in 1941 the great majority of villages 
in New Guinea were indistinguishable, in terms of the 
white impact upon them, from those in Papua: visited 
by patrols perhaps once a year, lacking most services,
51. See above, pp. 45-7.52. An implied contradiction appears as early as the 
statement on taxation in the Papua Annual Report 
1918-19, pp. 5, 65-8 .
5 5. McCarthy, op. cit., pp. 79-82, related that when 
he attempted to set up a village marketing scheme 
he was quickly transferred to another areas as a 
consequence of pressure from local planters.
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isolated from neighbours, relying on European traders 
and plantation labour for cash to pay taxes.
Objectively, there may also have been greater 
similarities between the field services than has been 
suggested. But the officers themselves considered 
that substantial differences existed, and this was to 
be an important factor once the administrations were 
amalgamated.
Attitudes of the field staff
Another important influence on administration, 
once additional staff and finance were provided in the 
1940*s, was the attitude towards village life which 
had evolved among the field staff during the preceding 
years. For several reasons, many officers came to 
assume that Papua New Guineans would not take advantage 
of new opportunities, even if these were provided.
With very few exceptions, traditional socio-political 
groups were small, the clan of a few humdred members 
being the basic unit. For purposes of hunting, 
warfare and trade there was a greater degree of 
co-operation between clans, but still on a much smaller 
scale than could be found in much of Africa and almost 
the whole of Asia. Traditional technology was limited;
54. As in the history field, Papua ttew Guinea lacks a 
survey of its society; the closest approach is 
C.D. Rowley's impressionistic The New Guinea 
Villager, Melbourne, Cheshire, 196$.
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metal was not used, the wheel was unknown and there
55were no draught animals. The very difficult terrain 
of the country combined with the fragmented socio­
political structure and the basic technology to create
a cycle of suspicion that a century of European contact
56has done little to overcome. Until administrative 
control was established in each area, clan warfare, 
"payback” killing and sorcery set limits upon the life 
of every villager. Under these circumstances, Europeans 
tended to view New Guinea Society as being particularly 
savage, on the grounds that the members of the 
community at large could not maintain law and order 
among themselves. It might have been a more accurate 
analogy had each language group been considered the 
counterpart of the Wastern state, determined to preserve 
its sovereignty in the face of threats from its 
neighbours; but this functional comparison scarcely 
occurred to whites who were aware only of the structures 
and norms of their native political systems. They 
saw New Guinea society as lacking dignity and having 
little claim to survival. Had they been confronted by 
the power and trappings of Emirs or Sultans, by 
courtiers and age regiments, their reactions would 
have been different; some colonial administrators 
came to view most highly those peoples whom they had
55* I have suggested some of the political consequences 
of this situation in New Guinea Government, op. cit., 
Chs. 2-5.
56. P. Hastings, New Guinea: Problems and Prospects 
(2nd. ed.) Melbourne, Cheshire, 1973, Chs. 5, t.
60
pacified at greatest cost. But Melanesian society- 
capitulated to Western dominance with little overt 
resistance.
Even had they viewed traditional New Guinea 
society as intrinsically valuable, white administrators 
would have been forced to intervene directly because 
of its weak authority patterns. The clans lacked 
hereditary chiefs who, by right of birth, exercised
57executive and judicial power over a group of subjects.
The lack of an elitist principle meant that **indirect 
rule” on the Afro-Asian colonial pattern, whereby the 
traditional chief acted as the agent of the white 
regime, proved impossible. Instead of powerful leaders 
capable of exacting obedience even to unfamiliar laws, 
provided their own status was protected, New Guinea*s 
administrators found headmen whose limited authority 
rested on group consensus. It mattered little whether 
these headmen approved of the new order being introduced 
to their villages: if their people chose to reject it, 
then the headmen could not enforce it. In order to 
achieve results, the field staff resorted to appointing 
minor officials in every village. These men relayed 
instructions to their people and were given the power 
to arrest non-compliers, but as far as the Territories* 
administrations were concerned, they possessed little
57. K.E. Read, **The Political System of the Ngarawapum**,
Oceania, Vol. 20 No. March 1950.
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authority apart from their official appointments. By 
comparison with the general Afro-Asian pattern of 
colonial administration, the system in Papua New 
Guinea could only be classed as "direct rule", although 
Murray believed that special factors modified the
COPapuan practice. He observed:
So in Papua we have found it necessary to follow 
the method of Direct Rule in building up a form 
of administration of our own, both executive and 
judicial; but in the substance of our administration 
we adhere as closely as we can to native custom 
and native tradition generally. We cannot fulfil 
the letter of Indirect Rule, but we are true to the spirit.
Even if the spirit of indirect mile were observed - 
and it is debatable whether it had as its primary aim 
the protection of traditional custom - circumstances 
in both New Guinea and Papua forced upon the 
administrators a fragmented system of control that 
was not expanded until the introduction of local 
government in the 1950's. Before that time, officers 
generally were experienced only in giving orders 
directly to small groups. Area administration and the 
notion of development through extension techniques 
were virtually unknown. J Even where the spirit of 
indirect rule was observed, officers tended to adopt
58. J.H.P. Murray, Indirect Rule in Papua, Port 
Moresby, Government Printer, 1929, p. 11.
59. The officers responsible for introducing local 
government in the post-war years went to great 
lengths in emphasising that a completely new 
approach to field work was involved; see Territory 
of Papua and New Guinea, Department of District 
Services and Native Affairs, Local Government 
Circular No. 1, Port Moresby, typescript, 1952.
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a protective attitude; they lacked both the time and the
training to assume a developmental or innovative role.
This was the situation that led Lord Hailey to observe
that Murray* s policy amounted to **no more than a well-
60regulated and benevolent type of police rule”.
Villagers were not given the opportunity to show their 
abilities, and Europeans formed condescending, 
paternalistic attitudes towards them, at best. Murray 
wrote:^
The truth, of course, is that the native is a man, 
and not a child; he has a man*s passions and a 
man*s power to hate and love, but he is a very ignorant man, and he is a man whose customs and 
ways of thought are strange to use, even in the rare instances in which we try to understand them.
There were few doubts and less self-examination
in the Territory of New Guinea. Forty years after
Murray wrote, a District Officer of the pre-war period
saw little reason to be repentant: after blaming the
62villagers for a lack of enterprise, he went on:
We could have done more in education, but not much 
more in view of the cultural indigestion of the 
natives...Our Administration was admittedly paternal. 
But I believe it was the most humane way of 
governing the country at the time. If we had 
forced that native into a civilized commercial 
way of life then, he would have died off in 
thousands. The other alternative was to have 
imported Eastern coolie labour, in which case the 
result would have been worse still.
60. In his introduction to Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. xvi.
61. J.H.P. Murray, Papua of Today, London. King,
1925, p. 250.
62. E. Feldt, ”New Guinea's Between-Wars Administration 
is Too Frequently Misunderstood”, P.I.M., Vol.
57 No. 5, May 1967, pp. 58-9.
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The alternative of emphasising village welfare at the
expense of "civilized” European commerce was not even
considered. As one of the settler's wives observed
6^5about her days in New Guinea:
According to today's book, we were long in sin. 
According to ours, long in virtue. The extraordinary 
thing is that less than a generation separates the 
two attitudes.
This generation gap was to create enormous tension 
around the post-war administration and its policies.
A variety of factors thus combined to limit 
initiatives at all levels in Australia's pre-war 
administration of Papua New Guinea. The Australian 
government and people saw no reason to provide additional 
finance and staff for the Territories. Moreover, 
Australia's peculiar situation as a colonial power and 
the nature of traditional New Guinea society transformed 
a highly bureaucratized relationship between metropolitan 
power and colonial administration into a fairly rigid 
paternalism at the lowest levels of the hierarchy of 
control. The restrictions which this system imposed at 
the village level were undoubtedly resented by the 
people, but it has only been in very recent years that 
they have been able overtly to express their resentment; 
the cultist outbreaks of earlier years were partial 
manifestations of these sentiments, but they were usually
63. Judy Tudor, Many a Green Isle, Sydney, Pacific 
Publications, 1966, p. 67.
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viewed as irrational aberrations. On the other hand, 
European resentment was a constant source of friction 
with both the Territories* administrations and the 
Australian government; relations were at all times 
strained and occasionally became openly hostile.
Papua New Guinea's Europeans
Several sources of tension among Europeans in Papua 
New Guinea have already been noted: labour supply, 
shipping, trade difficulties, village development and 
services, race relations and the feeling of insecurity 
found in all communities isolated as a small minority in 
an alien environment. But even in those areas where 
there was substantial agreement between Territory field 
staff and officials in Australia, such as the need for 
"development" and the extension of law and order, 
attitudes were dissimilar because of the different 
cultural backgrounds against which the two groups 
functioned. For the men in Papua New Guinea, their work 
constituted their environment; most of them became so 
thoroughly socialized that they looked to their colleagues 
for security even when on leave in Australia.^ In
64. Until it was demolished, Usher's Hotel in Sydney 
was Australian headquarters for the Territory 
service; it had a New Guinea bar and a New 
Guinea book, where officers who had become lonely 
while on leave could look up the leave addresses 
of colleagues who were often in the same plight.
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addition to feeling isolated while in the islands, a 
number thus became alienated from Australian society.
This feeling tended to manifest itself in constant 
criticism and occasional bitterness directed at the 
Australian officials who exercised final control over 
the Territories* affairs without having to undergo the 
relative hardships of New Guinea life. ** They were not 
required to show the same "dedication”; their future 
rested among the anonymous papers in their comfortable 
offices, rather than in the romantic visions of pacifying 
mountain tribes that supported the remote existence of 
the colonial field officers. Above all, they could 
find relief from their work, and this made them the 
objects of both scorn and envy among those in Papua 
New Guinea who considered themselves hardier souls.
There was no policy designed to promote a sense
of identification among the officers administering
Australia*s colonies. Planned interchange of staff
between the Territories and the administering
Department in Australia was scarcely considered,
owing partly to the strict recruitment procedures
66governing the Commonwealth Public Service. Territory 
public servants were thus denied the opportunity of
65. Evident in the correspondence colums of the islands 
press and Pacific Islands Monthly and underlined 
by many of Sir Hubert Murray's comments in P.J.
West (ed.), Selected Letters of Hubert Murray, 
Melbourne, O.U.P., 1970.
66. The situation did not change; post-war attempts 
to arrange secondments are outlined in Chapter 
Six.
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gaining wider experience and of demonstrating their 
ability to those who ultimately controlled their work. 
There is some analogy with the villager, unable to 
convince the visitor to his area of the capabilities 
of his own system of government; the Papua New Guinea 
public servants found themselves the junior partners 
in administering the country with which they were by 
far the most familiar.
Australian control
It was indicative of the unusual relationship between 
Australia and her Territories that the islands were 
visited quite frequently by official parties. The 
Burns Philp steamers made round trips to Port Moresby, 
Rabaul and a varying number of other island ports, the 
journeys lasting from one to two months, depending on 
the number of towns visited and the size of the ship.
This could be a pleasant cruise, particularly during the 
Australian winter, when parties of up to forty 
parliamentarians and their families arrived in the 
Territories; at other times individual politicians 
were the subjects of scathing comment from Murray and 
disinterested visitors alike. ' On such occasions 
those unfamiliar with tropical climate, customs and
67. West (ed.), op. cit., pp. 58, 119; Bassett, op* cit.. pp. 85-6, 90-1.
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dress rarely appeared at their best, so that many 
Territory Europeans became more than ever convinced 
that they were being governed by people out of touch 
with the realities of New Guinea life.
White cynicism was increased by the confusion
over the control of islands affairs. At the time of
Federation the Prime Minister*s Department was made
responsible for Papua; in 1908 control was transferred
to the Department of External Affairs, later passing to
the Department of Home Affairs, then to Home and 
68Territories. The Mandated Territory at first came 
under the Prime Minister’s Department, thus for a time 
splitting the control of colonial matters. Home and 
Territories was then made responsible for both 
colonies from July 1923 until the Department was 
abolished in January 1929. Control of colonial affairs 
then passed to the Territories Branch of the Prime 
Minister’s Department. This was a small section whose 
activities were considered of less significance than 
those of the other branches, so that in effect the 
status of colonial affairs was reduced in the decade 
preceding World War 2.
In their discussions of pre-war Australian attitudes
68. D.E.T., Notes on the History and Functions of the
Department, Canberra, typescript, n.d., p. 1. 
Additional details in this passage are drawn 
from West, op. cit., p. 201 and Legge, op. cit., 
pp. 134-5.
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towards Papua New Guinea, such authors as Legge and
West concentrate on individual politicians, notably
Hughes, Mahon, Marr and Scullin, rather than on their
parties, simply because little in the way of party
69policy can be found. Labor may have had marginally
greater interest than non-Labor, but it can be argued
that this arose mainly from Labor*s concern for
immigration policy. Were theffc much credit to be taken
for pre-war development, neither of the major party
groupings could legitimately claim it. The lack of
political concern meant that the influence of permanent
officials in Australia could be very great. The pattern
was set by Atlee Hunt, who remained Secretary of the
various departments administering Papua from 1901 to 
701921. Hunt set the tone of early Australian policy in 
Papua with a report in 1905 which recommended that the 
colony be viewed as a commercial asset for European 
settlement; Murray, who was never on good terms with 
Hunt, spent much of his 32 years in Papua attempting, 
with little success, to correct the false impressions 
and high expectations created by Hunt's attitude. In 
later years officials less gifted than Hunt sought to 
exert the same control, which was all the more galling
69. Legge, op. cit., p. 148 comments, "....Australia had 
no clearly formulated colonial policy, and...it
was only when situations demanding action presented 
themselves that she realized she had a colony at all."
70. This and the following passage is drawn from Legge, 
op. cit.. pp. 118-9, 129-30 and West, op. cit., 
pp. 48-52, 67-9, 104-9, 118-23.
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because of their lower status. Europeans in the Territories 
grew accustomed to being the objects of curiosity rather 
than interest among the remote politicians and officials 
who nevertheless possessed the power to veto any 
proposals from the islands.
Tropical fantasies
People with imagination and the ability to plan 
for the future of eastern New G-uinea, such as Sir Hubert 
Murray, were affected by the situation in which they 
found themselves, but it should not be supposed that the 
rest of the European community found islands life 
wholly depressing or frustrating. Even when copra prices 
and salaries were low, liquor and servants were plentiful 
and cheap; Europeans performed no manual labour and in 
the areas of settlement there were clubs, tennis courts 
and horses to ride.71 It was not difficult to convince 
oneself that life was better than anything that could 
be found in Australia at a comparable socio-economic 
level. There was fever, certainly, and the food often 
was poor; children had to be sent away to school and 
marriages were rarely free from strain. But each of 
these things came to be accepted as part of tropical 
life and could be rationalised into a kind of mystique
71. Bassett, on. cit.; L. Overell, A Woman's Impressions 
of German New G-uinea. London, Bodley Head, 1923, 
particularly pp. 27-9.
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not shared by outsiders. Only visitors found the
existence grotesque, and for each one who did there
was another who was convinced of its romance. Under
these circumstances, many figures became larger than
life, and some of their accomplishments were indeed
remarkable. Karius and Champion crossed the island
from south to north in 1928, Hides and O’Malley explored
the area between the Strickland and Purari Rivers in
1935 and Champion, accompanied on separate patrols by
Adamson and Timperley, penetrated the Southern 
72Highlands. Although the exploits of the Leahy 
brothers and James Taylor in New Guinea received little 
contemporary publicity, their discoveries were of great 
significance for future development; Taylor led the 
historic patrol from Bena Bena to Mount Hagen in 1933 
and explored between Mount Hagen and the Sepik River 
headwaters in 1938-39.^ It was therefore not difficult 
for Europeans to believe that they had made New Guinea 
a vastly different place from what it had been a few 
decades earlier, and from their point of view they were 
correct•
72. I.F. Champion, Across New Guinea from the Fly to 
the Sepik. London, Constable, 1932; tf.Gr. Hides, 
Through Wildest Papua, London, Blackie, 1935;
Hides, Papuan Wonderland, London, Blackie, 1936; 
Hides, Savages in Serge,' Sydney, Angus and 
Robertson, 1938.
73. N.G.A.R. 1933-34, pp. 115-20; 1938-39, pp. 147-51.See also Gavin Souter, New Guinea: The Last 
Unknown, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1963, Ch.
13 and Colin Simpson, Plumes and Arrows, Sydney, 
Angus and Robertson, 1962, pp. 127-58.
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The villagers of Papua New Guinea were not asked 
their opinions and because of the lack of development 
in their country they were unable to express them of 
their own accord. Yet by some measures their situation 
had improved considerably. Many were better off, in 
material terms, than they had been. In a number of 
areas they no longer lived in constant fear of sudden 
attack. The rate of infant mortality had slowly begun 
to decline and a few children were receiving more than 
just elementary schooling. Offsetting these gains 
were the beginnings of the breakdown of the traditional 
social fabric and the total economic and political 
domination of the settled areas by whites. In 
comparison with what had gone before, there had been 
some accomplishments; by the measure of what had still 
to be done, these were scarcely a beginning.
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The impact of war
The Japanese invasion severely affected each of 
the three major instruments of Papua New Guinea 
administration: the Territory of New Guinea public 
service, the Papua service and the Department of 
External Territories in Australia. The severity of 
the war’s impact varied according to the distance
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of each agency from the main centres of battle. In
the Territory of New Guinea most of the administrative
plant and equipment were demolished, almost all records
were destroyed and a substantial number of personnel
were killed.^ The Northern, Central and Eastern
Divisions of Papua suffered direct attacks and
considerable destruction and the rest of that Territory
suffered such indirect effects of war as labour and
food shortages, insecurity and tensions within the 
2community. The Department of External Territories, 
recently elevated in status from its position as a 
branch of the Prime Minister’s Department, continued 
as the nominal administrative agency of the Australian 
government in Papua New Guinea affairs, but it played 
only a minor role during the years of the Pacific war.^
1. At the end of the war more than 600 civilians were 
known to have been killed or were missing; see 
Commonwealth of Australia, Statement made by the 
Hon, P.C. Spender. Minister for External Territories, 
in the House of Representatives. 1 June 1930*
Canberra, Government Printer, 1950. The great 
majority had lived in the Mandated Territory, where 
the pre-war population had included some 4,600 
whites (N.G.A.R. 1939/40, p. 131). More than 300 
Chinese and Australians, mainly from the New Guinea 
islands and including many officials, died in June 
1942 when the prison ship Montevideo Maru, en route 
from Rabaul to Japan, was sunk, probably by an 
American submarine. For a reconstruction of the 
event from contemporary records, see A.J. Sweeting, 
’’Montevideo Maru - Myth or Merchantman?”, Australian 
Terri-fcories, Vol. 1 No. 2, February 1961, p. 36.
A list of all civilian casualties, including those 
lost on the Montevideo Maru and tfhose who fates 
were unknown, was published as a special supplement 
to P ,1,M., Vol. 16 No. 6, January 1946.
2. The areas in question are now the Northern, Central and 
part of the Milne Bay Districts, respectively.
3. The situations of the islands public services and 
the Canberra Department are discussed in more 
detail later in this Chapter.
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The remnants of the peacetime colonial administrative 
system were either absorbed by the new instruments of 
military rule or existed in a state of minimal animation 
for the duration of hostilities. Military power was 
supreme from early 1942 until late 1945, but as the 
war neared its end civil administrative interests, 
assisted in some cases by commercial and planters' 
representatives, sought to apply such influence as 
might help to shape the post-war colonial system in the 
image they desired.
Countervailing interests
The emerging Provisional Administration of 1945 
is best seen as the product of several countervailing 
interests which survived, or were set up during the war. 
The extent and duration of their power varied widely, 
but it can be said that those which were most severely 
handicapped by the peculiar conditions of war and 
military control were best able to exert their claims 
for consideration as more familiar conditions returned 
to the islands. Conversely, those interests which 
owed their existence to war were soon eclipsed, although 
not without a struggle, once peace came. The interests 
included:
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the Territory of Papua public service; 
the Territory of New Guinea public service; 
the Department of External Territories; 
the Minister for External Territories; 
the Labor government of the period; 
the commercial and planting communities 
from the islands;
the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit; 
the Allied Land Forces Headquarters 
Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs.
The evolving relationships of these interests with each 
other help to indicate the balance of forces at war*s 
end. The relationships were complex and frequently 
marked by tension; in order to show their significance 
for post-war events it is first necessary to outline 
the circumstances of each as the war progressed.
The devastation and slaughter by the opposing 
armies, of each other and in the villages of Papua New 
Guinea, form the permeant background to the political 
and bureaucratic manoeuverings of the period, but they 
can be noted only as they affected the interests which 
are central to this discussion.
The first major contest for influence arose between 
the officers of the New Guinea and Papua public services. 
With the establishment of military rule in February 
1942, all the able-bodied public servants of military
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age who had not already joined the armed services were 
conscripted into the Army's Australian New Guinea 
Administrative Unit, Even then the separation of the 
two Territories continued for a time; initially, two 
Units were established and it was not until 10 April 
1942 that they were amalgamated.^ The staffs of the 
separate public services brought with them the differences 
in perception and approach that had emerged during the 
pre-war years in their two Territories, and which have 
been discussed in the previous Chapter,^ These have been 
commented upon in recent years by some of those who 
worked in Angau,^ but it is difficult to find a 
contemporary assessment of differences by the staff 
members themselves. For example, at the 1944 conference 
of Angau staff papers were presented by officers from 
the separate Territories on their respective methods 
of administration, but most of their information was 
comparatively trivial: the nature of the village officials 
systems, pension plans for the constabulary and rates
7of taxation. One explanation for the situation might
4. Peter Ryan, "The Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit”, The History of Melanesia (2nd Waigani Seminar), 
Canberra, A.N.U. Press, 1969, p. 532.
5. See Chapter One, pp. 47-58. It was noted that Papuan 
officers considered themselves the more enlightened 
and New Guinea officers the more efficient
admini strato rs
6. Interviews with Mr. G.C. 0*Donnell, 15 June 1969 and 
Mr. D.M. Fenbury, 8 August 1972. See also Ryan, ibid.
7. Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit, Conference 
of Officers of Headquarters and Officers of Districts 
Staff, Port Moresby, 7-12 February 1944t Port Moresby, 
1944, Vo1 . 1, papers 3 and 4. ihe papers were by 
Majors Penglase (New Guinea) and Austen (Papua). The 
conference is discussed in greater detail later in 
this Chapter.
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have been that the tensions felt by each group were so 
acute that they could not be allowed to come to the 
surface, but it is more likely that the staffs were 
rarely hostile in a direct way; rather, they were 
chronically antipathetic towards each other owing to 
their patterns of socialization into different roles and 
environments. This was to have an important effect 
during and after the war.
Angau staffing and the New Guinea ascendancy
Officers of the Mandated Territory service, 
considered as a group, tended to gain the ascendancy 
over their counterparts from Papua during the war years, 
notably in military renown, decorations for bravery and 
administrative reputations. This situation arose for 
a variety of reasons, most of them circumstantial. The 
New Guinea service was still considerably larger than 
the Papuan, notwithstanding its losses in the islands.
By late 1944 New Guinea staff outnumbered Papuan by more 
than two to one in the key Department of District 
Services and Native Affairs, as shown in the following 
table
Members of the suspended 
Administrations
T.N.G. Papua Total
Field staff 35 17 52Other than field staff 20 6 26
55 23 78
8. The information is drawn from Australian New Guinea
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The formal appointments held by the officers of the two 
services did not suggest dominance by either group: of 
the fifteen District Officers attending the 1944 Angau 
conference, eight were from the Mandated Territory and 
seven from Papua; the Director of District Services was
a New Guinea officer, the Director of Native Labour from
qPapua. This did not necessarily indicate that Papuan
staff had received significant appointments out of
proportion to their total numbers. The Papuan District
Officers were mostly confined to the difficult routine
of war-time support administration, supervising patrolling
by new Army recruits through the unoccupied areas,
controlling the recruitment of labour for the armed
services and the plantations, and assisting the Production
Control Board in the harvesting and transport of tropical
produce. That at least some of them were dissatisfied
with their roles was indicated by the commanding officer,
Major-General Morris, in his opening address to the 1944
10Angau conference:
(continued) Administrative Unit, Report on the Activities 
of Angau in respect of Native Relief and Rehabilitation 
in the Territory of Papua and the Mandated Territory 
of New Guinea. Port Moresby, typescript, 1944, p. 7.
9. Angau. Conference. Vol. 1, title page. The trend 
towards following the precedents of the Mandated 
Territory is illustrated by the fact that the titles 
of these major segments of Angau were taken from New 
Guinea, as was the term ’’District Officer”. The 
Papuan Department of Native Affairs had been primarily 
concerned with labour matters and had been absorbed 
by the Department of the Government Secretary shortly 
before the war.
10. Ibid.. paper 1 (pages were not numbered). Brief
biographies of the major figures of the period under 
discussion are provided in the introductory pages of 
this study.
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Some may think they are being put into backwaters - 
Districts where there are no operations. It is not 
given for everyone to live out their lives in the 
limelight. In every walk of life there are some 
whose only reward is the satisfaction of a job well 
done. To some of the older men of the former 
Territories* Service I want to explain (and I hope 
it will help), that it is not possible in a military 
organization to put them in appointments that their 
seniority in the Civil Administration might warrant.
Confined as they were to the unpopular service functions 
of Angau, the Papuan officers were often unhappy and 
seemed relatively ineffectual.
The New Guinea staff at the outbreak of war
suffered greater disasters than did the Papuan group,
but they at least had little doubt about the response
required of them, having been thrown immediately into
12a situation of total hostilities. Many acquitted
themselves with exceptional resourcefulness and courage,
immediately after the invasion and later, while working
behind Japanese lines as members of the Coastwatchers
organization or carrying out the operational functions 
1 3of Angau. By far the greater part of the Japanese-
11. The structure of Angau is discussed later in this 
Chapter.
12. There were some exceptions, owing mainly to the 
lack of officially accepted contingency plans. On 
the fate of Lieutenant-Colonel Walstab*s ’Blue Book” 
plan, see J.K. McCarthy, op. cit., Chapters 20-21.
13* In addition to coastwatching, these involved forward
reconnaisance for the armed services. A coastwatcher*s 
story is Malcolm Wright’s If I Die. Melbourne, 
Lansdowne, 1965. Peter Ryan’s Pear Drive My Feet, 
Melbourne, M.U.P., 1960, gives a vivid and detailed 
account of the author’s operations in occupied 
areas of the Morobe District when he was an Angau 
officer.
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held areas lay within the former Mandated Territory, so 
that almost all coastwatching and intelligence parties 
were led by men who were familiar with those regions. 
They were subsequently awarded a number of decorations 
and were the subjects of a good deal of merited praise 
and publicity.^ Meanwhile, the Papuan officers 
suffered the ignominy of having their administration 
suspended by the military in 1942, in the manner 
discussed in the next Chapter.
The operational role assumed by many of the Mandated
Territory officers also provided a particular perspective
on the problems of labour recruitment and employment and
of village welfare. The Angau report on the relief and
rehabilitation of the people makes it clear that priority
in newly-liberated areas had necessarily to be given to
15the needs of the forces, adding:
District Services Personnel are known to the 
natives as the representatives of the Government 
in the pre-war days (i.e. the "Kiap" or No. 1). 
Because of their influence in pre-war days they 
have a decided effect on the natives even where 
the area has been under Jap domination. Experience 
with Task Forces to date has shown this.
14. They included R.I. Skinner, M.C.; A%A. Roberts, 
M.C.; C.D. Bates, M.C.; H.L. Williams, M.C.; 
R.R. Cole, M.C.; D.M. Fenbury, M.C.; M. Wright, 
D.S.C.; J.K. McCarthy, M.B.E. Commander Eric 
Feldt, the war-time chief of coastwatching 
operations and a former Mandated Territory public 
servant, published The Coastwatchers (Melbourne, 
O.U.P.) in 1946, at a time when it was likely to 
have a considerable impact on the reputations of 
those officers who returned to New Guinea after 
the war, particularly in the eyes of new recruits 
to the field service.
15. Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 12.
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The New Guinea officers who were members of the operational
teams were, on average, a good deal younger than the
senior Papuan District Officers such as A.C. Hall, Leo
Austen and W.H.H. Thompson. Austen's paper on "Native
Welfare" at the 1944 Angau conference seems unimaginative
in comparison with the address given by the younger New
16Guinea officer James Taylor on the same subject. Taylor
was the exception rather than the rule among the New
Guinea group, but the impression remained that those men
were better suited to responsibility than their Papuan
colleagues. Dr. Gunther has summed up the impression
created by the Mandated Territory officers in saying that
"there were a lot of good Tories in the New Guinea field
17service; they seemed more efficient, more dependable". 
Department of External Territories
The Department of External Territories had hardly
been established as a separate entity, following many
years as a minor branch of the Prime Minister's
Department, before its formal activities were virtually
paralyzed by the war. The External Territories portfolio
was created as part of the Menzies government in June
1941, but the Department continued to rely on its parent
18organization for many facilities throughout the war.
16. Angau, Conference, op. cit., Vol. 2, papers 9 and 10.
17. In an interview of 4 December 1968.
18. Barry, op. cit., pp. 44-5, 51.
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The Department of External Territories had no separate
permanent head until 11 May 1944, when Mr, J,R, Halligan
was appointed S e c r e t a r y . At the outbreak of the
Pacific war the Department boasted a staff establishment
of twelve and there were still only 95 officers on
strength by 1947.20 The 1950 Minister, Mr. P.C. Spender,
did not overstate the case when he said that the External
Territories organization had long been the ’Cinderella
21of Commonwealth Departments”. Under wartime conditions
the Department had few functions to perform. Papua New
Guinea was under the control of Angau and the Japanese,
Nauru was occupied, and Norfolk Island was a minute
territory. The Papua New Guinea Production Control
Board was formally responsible to the Minister for
External Territories, but its chairman, Brigadier D.M.
Cleland, was also Quartermaster-General of Angau ana its
effective chief of staff, in which capacity he was first
22answerable to its commander, Major-General Morris.
Even then, the Department would have been the repository 
in Australia of knowledge about Papua New Guinea, had 
that role not already been usurped by the Army* s 
Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs. Under the
19. Commonwealth of Australia, Spender Statement, op. cit.. 
p. 20; CRS G37/1, Halligan papers, staff lists.
20. D.E.T. memorandum, 19 July 1972.
21• Commonwealth of Australia, Spender Statement, loc cit.
22. Angau, Report, op. cit.. Diagram 3.
23. The role and activities of the Directorate are 
discussed later in this Chapter.
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circumstances, and in view of the very small staff of 
the Department, such influence as it possessed was 
likely to flow very largely from the status and background 
of its permanent head and Minister* In neither case was 
the Department particularly well served.
Mr. J.R. Halligan
Halligan was a Commonwealth public servant of long 
experience, having been appointed to the Department of 
External Affairs in 1911.^ In 1916 he transferred to 
the Department of Home and Territories and subsequently, 
through his contacts in that Department, was seconded to 
the Mandated Territory as an accountant at Rabaul. In 
1929 he returned to the Prime Minister*s Department and 
in 1933 transferred to the Territories Branch as an 
unattached Third Division clerk. In 1935 he was appointed 
Senior Clerk and in 1937 Deputy Administrator of Norfolk 
Island. Following his return to Australia he was 
appointed Assistant Secretary of the new Department of 
External Territories in 1941, and its permanent head in 
1944. Halligan was clearly a member of the traditional 
pre-war school of Commonwealth public servants, in that 
he had joined the service in his teens and had worked his 
way up primarily on the basis of seniority. His 
appointment as Secretary thrust him into an extremely
24. The following passage is based on CRS G37/1,
Halligan papers, staff lists.
84
difficult position: he had a miniscule staff to advise 
him and was increasingly forced to deal personally with 
the powerful authorities in the Army and Angau, and with 
the intellectuals of the Directorate. This created an 
administrative style in his Department that was eventually 
to create numerous delays and difficulties in the post­
war period.
It is difficult to establish an objective picture
of Halligan’s personality. A number of people who had
close dealings with him at senior level during and after
the war seem to have some understanding of his difficult
position and limited background, but are scathing 
25nonetheless. A former member of the Department who 
worked with Halligan considers that he was personally 
pleasant towards his staff, but the unmistakable impression 
is that the Secretary was both out of his depth and 
behind the times.
Mr. E.J. Ward
The Minister for External Territories, Mr. E.J.
Ward, was in an equally difficult position in dealing 
with his portfolio during the war years. Following 
his clashes with Prime Minister Curtin, particularly over
25. The comments and their sources would add little to 
the discussion in this context. Interviewees who 
made them are listed elsewhere in this study. 
Halligan*s relations with J.K. Murray are discussed 
in Chapter Nine.
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the ’’Brisbane Line” controversy and the Royal Commission
which ensued, he had been in effect demoted from the
relatively important post of Minister for Labour to that
of Minister for Shipping and Transport, which was not
insignificant in strategic terms but which had far less
impact within the Labor movement. The External
Territories portfolio constituted a minor appendage to
what was already, to the Minister, a post of reduced
status. There is no evidence to suggest that Ward took
an interest in New Guinea affairs for their own sake;
his biographer makes almost no reference to Ward’s role
as Minister for External Territories, even though he held
the position for more than six years. It is hard to
disagree with Sir John Kerr’s assessment that Ward’s role
28in colonial affairs was anathema to him. Ward set
great store by his reputation of being a radical socialist
and in this respect his second portfolio was a political
embarrassment. His only possible reaction was to take
what he saw as a radical line on New Guinea questions, to
some extent on matters affecting the country’s people and
29particularly in his dealings with its settler community.
26. P.M.C. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-
1945« Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1970, pp. 711-7. 
See also Elwyn Spratt, Eddie Ward: Firebrand of 
East Sydney, Adelaide, Rigby, 19&5.
27. Spratt, ibid., while a poor biography, shows that^ 
faction fights and ideological questions ranked first 
in Ward’s political priorities, with his External 
Territories portfolio very much in the ruck.
28. Interview with Sir John Kerr, 50 June 1969* This 
passage draws heavily upon Kerr’s information and 
impressions.
29. Ward's New Guinea dealings are set out in general 
chronological order in later Chapters.
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But Ward was not in fact radical in such opinions as 
he possessed about New Guinea and there is nothing in 
his few speeches on the country to suggest that he knew 
much about it. What he did have to say would have been 
considered quite unexceptionable in England at that period 
and most of his statements would have seemed distinctly 
conservative in some British Labour circles. Ward’s 
career had never required him to establish a policy 
position on colonial matters and his ideological stance 
made it difficult for him to do so after he was appointed 
to the External Territories portfolio. The major 
contributions to policy, and certainly all the details 
of planning, would have to come from other sources.
Ward, Evatt and Labor policy
Pew such policies or plans were likely to flow from 
the Australian Labor Party in government. There was no 
precedent of involvement in colonial affairs upon which 
the part could draw and until 1944 its leaders were 
heavily committed to the prosecution of the war. There 
was more time for post-war planning as events swung in 
the Allies’ favour, but this was devoted largely to 
domestic matters. As Hasluck has observed, ’’....the 
approach of the party and of some of its leading 
personalities to post-war problems was that here was the 
opportunity to do what they had long contemplated as 
desirable but had never had the chance of doing before.
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The ball was in their hands at last."^ There were 
many matters for attention: health, housing, a
31national works programme, migration, employment.
Ward's Ministerial concern was primarily for the
standardization of railway gauges, although his party
32political interests ranged much wider. Since Papua 
New Guinea had never been seriously considered as a 
domestic issue in Australia, it did not figure in 
metropolitan post-war plans; there certainly was no 
occasion to amalgamate railways there.
Insofar as they attracted attention from the 
government, the islands were mainly a matter for 
foreign policy and defence. They were certainly 
viewed in this way by the Minister for External 
Affairs, Dr. H.V. Evatt. Evatt's interest in New 
Guinea stemmed largely from his commitment to the 
United Nations concept and in this respect the principles 
of the U.N. Charter and the broad objectives of 
Labor party policy neatly coincided. In one of several 
highly generalized statements on New Guinea's future 
made by Ministers in the mid-1940's Evatt said, "We 
recognize that the future of the native races is a 
subject of legitimate international interest, and are 
ready to collaborate to ensure the welfare of colonial 
people and their steady advancement economically,
30. Hasluck, op. cit., p. 444.
31. Ibid., pp. 508-23.32. Ibid., p. 519. Spratt, op. cit., Chs. 9-11.
30
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socially and politically.”^  The statement could 
equally well have been made, although with less 
justification, by many pre-war Ministers. And the 
Labor government showed that it had not yet broken 
away from the old colonial attitudes when Evatt 
successfully pleaded Australian case for a ”special 
interest” in New Guinea before the U.N. One of Evatt*s 
biographers has suggested that he was ”embarrassed” by
■34.this necessity, as well he might, but he was merely
encountering the difficulty confronting all Western
statesmen who have tried to disentangle colonial from
strategic interests: on another occasion, for example,
Evatt included New Guinea in the "zone of security”
35which he envisaged for the Pacific area. Nevertheless, 
Evatt was the only Labor Minister to make a clearly 
personal contribution to Australia's New Guinea policy.
Even allowing for the government's preoccupation 
with domestic matters and the complexities of 
international affairs, a Minister other than Ward, less 
egocentric and with different ideological interests and 
involvements, may have produced from Cabinet a specific 
dynamic for New Guinea affairs: that is, an endorsement
33. H.V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia, Sydney, 
Angus and Robertson, 1945, p. 145. See also 
Evatt's statement on Trusteeship, reprinted from 
his House of Representatives statement of 13 March 
1946 in his Australia in World Affairs. Sydney,
Angus and Robertson, 1946, pp. 163-7.
34. Kylie Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice,
Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 19W, P* 197* "
35. Evatt, Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 145.
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of detailed programmes and not, as proved to be the case, 
mere pious hopes. But Ward was a problem for his leaders 
and, eventually, for New Guinea. His talents were 
political rather than administrative and his actions within 
and outside Cabinet tended to direct attention away from 
his portfolios rather than towards them; Ward himself 
often became the issue, rather than the matters for which 
he was formally responsible. Crisp has named him as the 
chief irritant to Prime Minister Curtin, as a man who 
"imperfectly accepted the bonds of collective
’zc
responsibility". Ward was never entirely at ease with 
Evatt, the Minister from whom he could have learned most 
about the need for a New Guinea strategy. He had his 
disagreements with Evatt, no more than with other senior 
members of the government, but relationships were further 
strained by the fact that he lost the deputy leadership 
of the party to Evatt in 1943 and again, by a two-to-one 
margin, in 194 6.^ Having alienated his Prime Minister 
and set his deputy leader at a distance, Ward was in a 
weak position to persuade Cabinet to exercise its vision 
on New Guinea's behalf. In this context, it might be 
argued, a genuinely reformist party leadership was 
obliged to create its own design for the transformation 
of New Guinea society. Yet the basic materials for such 
a design were simply not available from orthodox sources, 
since the Ministry, the party and the bureaucracy lacked
36. L.P. Crisp, Ben Chifley, Melbourne, Longmans, 1960, 
p. 143.
37. Tennant, op. cit., pp. 206, 270; A. Dalziel, Evatt 
the Enigma, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1967, p. 29.
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the necessary information and experience or were 
preoccupied with otner concerns* The basic data and 
planning for post-war Papua New Guinea had to be found 
elsewhere.
The New Guinea settlers
Three major interests could possibly have provided 
advice to the government about New Guinea: settlers,
Angau and the Directorate of Research. Of these, the 
settlers were most truly based in the Territories and had 
the greatest material stake there, but assessing their 
strength presents some problems. Detailed statistics of 
the European population in the pre-war Territories were 
not published, but from indirect sources, such as the 
numbers of officers in the public services and the numbers 
of plantations in production, it is possible to arrive at
70broad estimates. These can be presented most clearly in 
the form of tables. The first shows the three main groups 
of Europeans - officials, missionaries and settlers - in 
round figures at 30 June 1940:
Total Officials Missionaries Settlerspopulation No. No. * No. 1o
Papua 1,800 325 18 250 13 1225 69
Mandated
Territory 4,400 800 18 825 18 2875 64
38. Figures for the Mandated Territory are drawn from 
N.G.A.R. 1939/40 and those for Papua from P.A.R.
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The settler group can he sub-divided approximately 
as follows:
Planters
etc.
Mining and 
exploration
Commerce Miscellaneous
Papua 500 150 475 100
Mandated
Territory 1,000 700 925 250
It may be objected that employees of commercial and
(continued) 1938/39 and 1939/40 and from R.W. Robson 
(ed.), Pacific Islands Yearbook 1944« Sydney, Pacific 
Publications, 1944. Papua annual reports are particularly sketchy in their statistics and it is 
my opinion that the tables over-estimate the settler 
group and under-estimate missionaries for that 
Territory; some allowance has been made for the 
fact that in 1940 and 1941 increasing numbers of 
Australian troops were stationed in Port Moresby. 
Briefly, the figures were established as follows:
1) officials - numbers of officers employed, multiplied by less than two (since many children 
went to school in Australia); 2) missionaries -
figures for Catholics, plus figures for Protestants 
multiplied by about 1.5 (quite a few lay workers 
and spinsters were employed); 3) planters - numbers
of plantations multiplied by less than two (larger 
plantations had two or more white staff, but on average there would be fewer married men than in 
the case of officials, with fewer children living 
permanently with their parents); 4) miners -
the approximate number is given in N.G-.A.R. 1939/40, 
p. 121; 5) commerce and miscellaneous - the
remainder, plus guesswork and personal knowledge; 
this group includes independent small traders, 
recruiters, crocodile shooters and schooner masters. 
The figures obviously cannot be accurate, but they 
are supported by sufficient evidence to show the 
relative sizes of the segments of the white community 
and, consequently, the pressure which could later 
be applied to the Provisional Administration. There 
were also 2,061 Chinese in the Mandated Territory 
at 30 June 1940 (compared with a handful in Papua, 
where Australian immigration laws applied), but they 
had almost no standing with the white community and 
had not at that time challenged the economic 
domination of the Europeans. The small Malay 
community was not listed, but numbered several hundred 
people.
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mining firms can hardly be termed »'settlers”, since they 
were not long-term residents of the Territories. However, 
the object is to show the approximate strength of interests 
in the islands, and in that sense the employees identified 
much more with their companies than with the official or 
mission groups.
The settlers, representative of the colonial capitalist 
interests which most antagonized Mr. Ward, enjoyed little 
sympathy in the Australian Cabinet, despite their having 
been severely affected by the war: captured by the 
Japanese, conscripted into the Army or hastily evacuated 
from the country at the outbreak of hostilities. None 
had reason to be impressed by government planning or by 
the efforts of the military. In Papua, the suspension 
of civil administration had been accompanied by confusion 
on the outstations and followed by summary treatment of 
civilians at the hands of the Army. J The situation in 
the Mandated Territory had been disastrous. Its main 
centre, Rabaul, should have been evacuated but was not, 
owing to serious errors of judgement both there and in 
Canberra.^ Residents of the outlying islands had stood 
little chance of survival, while many of those who 
escaped from the mainland had been forced to flee on 
foot into the Highlands or across the ranges into southern
39* Barry, op. cit., pp. 9, 26-47. See also Chapter Three. 
40. The most succinct account is A.J. Sweeting, "Civilian
Wartime Experience in Papua and New Guinea",
Appendix 2 to Hasluck, op. cit., pp. 669-81.
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Papua. Some refugees from the Morobe District were 
rescued dramatically from Wau by civil and military 
aircraft as the Japanese closed in, while a number of 
survivors of the Rabaul debacle were evacuated from the 
south coast of New Britain by seaplanes and coastal
A A
vessels. But the survivors brought with them accounts 
of death from starvation and disease, "betrayals” by 
villagers and executions carried out by the Japanese.^
In all, the white community had no difficulty in finding 
martyrs and allocating blame. Its members straggled into
A '3)Australia in 1942 bitter and disillusioned people.
Many of the settler evacuees went to their families
41• Details are set out in Dudley McCarthy, South West 
Pacific Area: First Year, Canberra, Australian 
War Memorial, 1959, pp. 47-64 and in Hasluck, op. cit., pp. 680-90.
42. For a graphic account see D. Selby, Hell and High 
Fever. Sydney, Currawong, 1956.
43. Missionaries in the islands usually suffered the 
same fate as the soldiers and settlers: see D. 
Tompkins and B. Hughes, The Road from Gona, Sydney, 
Angus and Robertson, 1969, Chs. 4-6. The survivors 
were able to serve with their parent organizations 
in Australia and in the forces as priests and 
chaplains during the war years. Unlike the settlers, 
the missionaries possessed a wider role which allowed 
them to continue their basic work, notwithstanding 
the occupation of New Guinea. They could also be 
reasonably assured that their pre-war efforts in the 
islands were viewed with some favour by the 
authorities and that their return would be considered 
sympathetically once conditions were suitable. The 
settlers, and particularly the planters, enjoyed none 
of these advantages. The Chinese and Malay 
communities were denied Australian citizenship and 
thus were not evacuated. They eked out a miserable 
existence in prison camps or labour compounds 
throughout the war, providing assistance to the 
Allies on occasions; see Gavin Long, The Final 
Campaigns, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1963, 
pp. 137-9, 557 and P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 8, March 
1946, p. 57.
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throughout Australia, but the lives of others had
centred on the islands for so long that they tended
to congregate, like exiles, in northern Queensland,
Brisbane and, more significantly, in Sydney, where they
found a staunch ally in R.W. Robson, founder and editor
of the Pacific Islands Monthly and defender of settler
interests.^ In May 1942 the Sydney group formed the
Pacific Territories Association, which Wolfers has termed
the "roof organization” for the various interests
45represented among the settler evacuees. The leading
44. Throughout this study a great deal of information 
and opinion has been drawn from the pages of the 
Pacific Islands Monthly, mainly because it was the only civilian-controlled publication with an 
interest in Papua New Guinea affairs which was 
available from 1942, when the Papuan Courier was suspended by the Army, until mid-1950, when 
the South Pacific Post began publication in Port 
Moresby as a twice-weekly and, for a time, weekly 
newspaper. The magazine, like its editor, was 
bitterly anti-Labor and usually opposed also to 
the wartime and post-war administrations of the islands, but it reflected rather than led settler 
opinion in this respect. In an interview of 3 
July 1969 Mr. Robson was outspoken in his 
continuing support for the settlers, whom he 
considered to be, in the strictest sense, the 
"small men”, rather than the owners and 
representatives of the major companies; at one 
point he grew incensed at a suggestion that he 
would have been forced to support the companies 
because of his reliance on their advertising and 
gave details of personal clashes with them over 
many years. Robson gave a sensitive appreciation 
of the settlers* wartime plight, noting that although 
they could find employment in Australia, their 
economic future was very uncertain until late 1944 
and their situation was psychologically demoralizing; 
these matters are discussed further in Chapters 
Pour and Five.43. E.P. Wolfers, ”The Unsettled Settlers: New Guinea 
in Australia 1942-1946”, Journal of the Papua and 
New Guinea Society. Vol. 1 No. 2, 1967, p. 9*
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figures in the Association were Mr. E.A. James, a Port
Moresby accountant and former proprietor of the Papuan
Courier, and Mr. C.A.M. Adelskold, an employee of the
4-6British New Guinea Development Company. They directed
the Association towards its two main aims: return of
settlers to Papua New Guinea as soon as possible and
preservation of conditions there as they had been at the
outbreak of war. Neither goal was achieved. It was
not until May 1945 that the first male civilians were
allowed to return, and then only to work their holdings
47on behalf of the Production Control Board. By May
1944 there were still only 65 planters in the Territories,
almost all of them in Papua, while many hundreds more
48languished in Australia.
By this time the Association had become seriously
concerned at the governments treatment of them:
relations with the Minister were very strained; Robson,
having conducted a vitriolic campaign against Labor
since 1942, had been declared subversive by Ward and
49refused entry to the islands; and the military showed 
no signs of slackening its hold on the Territories' 
administration and the settlers' plantations. The 
settlers, like all exiles, thus fell prey to rumours and 
their own imaginations. They began to fear that Papua
46. Ibid., p. 10. Robson interview, 3 July 1969*
47. 3R£nA518, item A800/1/7, 31 May 1944.
48. Ibid. See also the table on page 90 of this Chapter.
49. Wolfers, op. cit., p. 12.
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New Guinea was to be commandeered by an unlikely
combination of Labor and the Army and used as an
50”experiment in socialisation”.
Pacific Territories Association
The response to this situation by the Pacific
Territories Association was to seek as much publicity
as possible for its cause in an effort to create public
sympathy in Australia. At the same time, it attacked
and sought to discredit Angau. Robson wrote of ”fine
pioneer people” becoming ’’victims of a military 
51bureaucracy”, while one of his journalists and former
New Guinea resident Judy Tudor argued in favour of more
52’colonists” for the Territories. Robson accused Angau 
of ”increasing its grip on Papua” without constitutional
authority and James wrote letters to the press urging
53a quick return to civil control. Throughout the latter
50. The term appeared in an article in Smith’s Weekly.
29 July 1944 and seems to have been adopied by 
Robson and the Association thereafter.
51. P.I.M., Vol. 13 No. 5, December 1942, p. 33. Prom 
this time the Monthly gave prominence to Pacific 
Territories Association affairs, reporting its branch 
meetings, social gatherings and campaigns; see, for 
example, Vol. 13 No. 11, June 1943, pp. 8-9, 32-3,
36; Vol. 14 No. 5, December 1943, pp. 11-12;
Vol. 15 No. 3, October 1944, pp. 11-12; Vol. 15 
No. 4, November 1944, p. 7; Vol. 15 No. 7, February 
1945, pp. 4-5; Vol. 15 No. 9, April 1945, pp. 17-19.
52. Letter to the Sydney Morning Herald. 18 November 1944.
53. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 11, June 1944, p. 9 and Vol. 15 
No. 1, August 1944, p. 10; Sydney Morning Herald,
27 October and 23 December 1944.
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half of 1944 Adelskold expressed the Associations 
various concerns to the Minister: the future of military- 
rule, the establishment of the Army's School of Civil
Affairs, the role of the Association in advising about
54-future policy. From the complaints in Adelskold's 
letters it seems that Ward replied infrequently and that 
when he did the Association received little satisfaction: 
in September 1944 the Minister bluntly told the settlers
they paid too much attention to the "anti-Labor daily
55press".
The settler group eventually achieved minor
representation on advisory bodies, such as the Production
Control Board, and at discussions, including the Native
56Labour Conference of December 1944. However, the 
conference merely indicated the settlers* reduced status
54. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 14 and 16 September, 27 
October and 7 November 1944. One of the 
Association's major problems was in choosing and 
holding to a suitable target.
55. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 27 September 1944. Other 
organizations fared no better. In reply to a letter 
from the Papuan Association, based in Brisbane,
Ward stated that he would not answer in detail, 
owing to the discourteous tone of the Association's 
letter; he advised the Association to "secure
the services of a secretary who knew how to 
present a case". (P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 7, February 
1945, p. 6). Settlers' letters were often expressed 
in emotional terms, but this made it even more 
advisable for Ward to have them answered by his 
Department; by entering into partisan slanging 
matches he achieved little, other than to make 
the position of his officials even more difficult 
in later years.
56. CRS A 518, item C213/3/2, 1 December 1944.
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in the wartime scheme of things. They were greatly 
outnumbered by officials, missionaries and academics 
such as Professor A.P. Elkin and Dr. H.I. Hogbin.^ In 
such company their representatives* claim that ’’any 
violent change other than reversion to pre-war conditions 
would be inimical to ¿fthe natives' J present interests 
and future development" was hardly like to win them 
friends. During this period settler influence on 
government policy reached its lowest point.
In 1944 New Guinea could not rely on established 
interests for its plans and programmes. Its surviving 
pre-war administrators had heavy operational responsibilities. 
In Canberra the Department of External Territories was 
moribund, it Minister renowned more as a disruptive 
element than a positive force in Cabinet, and the 
government preoccupied with domestic concerns. The 
country's white entrepreneurs were determined to limit 
change rather than support it. General principles had 
been announced, but detailed plans could at that point 
come only from the organizations that had been set up to 
meet the peculiar exigencies of war. Yet both Angau and 
the Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs were, by 
their very nature, ephemeral bodies whose long-run 
effectiveness in New Guinea affairs was necessarily limited.
57. This and the following passage are drawn from ibid.
The conference is discussed further in Chapter
Four.
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Angau
"The function of Angau is twofold," the Unit’s 
58reports stated:
(a) Operational - to takes its place in the order of 
battle and operate against the enemy in accordance 
with any orders of the senior formation, or of the 
particular Commander of the area in which Angau 
personnel may be located, including US commanders where 
US forces are operating in any part of the 
Territories;
(b) Administrative - to administer and carry out 
within the Territories such of the functions and duties 
of the former civil administration of the Territories 
which by reason of the emergency caused by the present 
state of war or for any cause are now suspended, and 
such other functions which may become necessary for 
the peace, order and good government of the 
Territories and its (sic) peoples.
The operational role of Angau is not of primary concern 
in this discussion, but it must be noted that the Unit's 
record in this sphere was an impressive one. During the 
advances along the New Guinea mainland Angau officers 
accompanied the forces and began relief and rehabilitation 
operations as soon as the Japanese were clear of an 
area.^ Angau detachments also accompanied the task 
forces which established bridgeheads at Nassau Bay, Nadzab,
Hopoi, Finschhafen, Saidor, Arawe, Gape Gloucester, Manus
finand Aitape. The Unit at times operated behind enemy 
lines, obtaining information by "infiltration into native 
villages", contacting leaders and questioning the people.
58. Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 1. The Unit's monthly 
reports often carried a similar preamble.
59. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
60. The remainder of this passage is a precis of ibid.,
p. 12.
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It also provided guides and locally-recruited labour 
for task forces and arranged “administration and 
hospitalisation” of labourers, villagers evacuated to 
make way for defence installations and refugees from 
Japanese-held areas, W.E.H, Stanner has accurately 
summed up the Angau operational role in stating that 
“these tasks were carried out excellently.,.and many
61officers in forward positions acted with great valour”, 
Angau: leadership and structure
The Angau administrative function was both more 
complex and, in a sense, less immediately rewarding for 
the Unit's members. In its early months Angau was a 
"small and somewhat irregular" adjunct to New Guinea 
Force. During this period it was staffed almost 
entirely by former public servants and settlers and was 
divided into two parts, District Services and Production 
Services.^ Its commander, Major-General Basil Morris, 
D.S.O., was originally appointed General Officer Commanding 
8th Military District (subsequently known as New Guinea 
Force) in May 1941,64 He held this post, as well as 
being responsible for Angau in its early days, until 31 
July 1942, when Lieutenant-General S.F. Rowell assumed
61. Stanner, op, cit., p. 76.
62. Ibid.63. Angau, Report, op, cit., p. 1.
64. Long, op, cit., p. 594.
101
operational command in the face of growing danger as
the Japanese launched the second phase of their Pacific
campaign. Morris was then appointed General Officer
Commanding Angau and remained in the post until the
Unit was formally disbanded in June 1946. He was a
competent soldier who, although lacking experience in
colonial administration, took a close interest in the
work of his subordinates, to the point of reading every
65patrol report submitted during his term as G.O.C.
Morris probably enjoyed a good deal of autonomy in his 
control of Angau, since New Guinea Force had many other 
things to concern it and the Unit was doing a good job, 
from the Army’s point of view. In addition, the command 
problems encountered by New Guinea Force left Morris as
65. Angau, Conference, op. cit.. G.O.C.’s address. The 
copies of Angau patrol reports in the Papua New 
Guinea National Archives bear Morris* initials, the 
date of reading and occasional, sometimes pointless 
comments in coloured pencil. While this could 
indicate great interest, it also suggests that 
Morris was not fully occupied; he went so far as 
to initial the appendices to a number of reports 
and even to check the additions in tabl® of 
village census figures (see, for example Patrol 
Report No. 1 of 1944 from Finschhafen Sub- 
District, Morobe District). He seems to have been 
particularly keen on comments indicating ’native 
loyalty”, placing ticks in the margins alongside 
them. In all, he was probably a pompous and rather 
limited man. Osmar White describes him as ”a tall, 
imposing man with a brown moustache and sharp, 
small eyes. When abroad he wore an expensive sun 
helmet and carried a horse tail fly whisk, 
elegantly mounted” (Green Armour. Melbourne,
Wren, 1972, p. 48). Peter Ryan (’’Angau”, op, cit.) 
comments that Morris much enjoyed reviewing 
troops. Whatever its strengths, Morris' personality 
was not of the kind to commend itself to the 
intellectuals in the Directorate of Research; 
their relations are discussed later in this Chapter.
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very much the top man in his own field: the Force had
six different G.O.C.'s on eight occasions between 1
66August 1942 and 30 November 1945. Morris was also 
fortunate in having the services of an effective Deputy 
Adjutant and Quartermaster General in Brigadier D.M. 
Cleland, from 1943.^^
With the stabilization of its command and functions,
Angau entered upon a phase of expansion in staff and
duties that extended to the final stages of the New
Guinea campaign. Angau proposed, and had approved, four
different War Establishments, each larger and more
complex than its predecessor, until by mid-1945 it had
6Bmore than 2,000 men on strength. Angau was formally
responsible to New Guinea Force headquarters, but in
addition it maintained a liaison link with the Department
of External Territories, mainly in matters affecting the
69Production Control Board; several Angau officers, 
including MajorsLonergan, Vertigan and Humphries, were 
attached to the Department during the latter stages of 
the war. However, Angau had no formal responsibilities 
to the Minister for External Territories, nor to the 
Directorate of Research, which was to have great influence
66. Long, op. cit., p. 594.
67. For an assessment of Cleland*s administrative role 
see Ryan, ’’Angau”, op. cit., p. 533. Cleland's 
background is discussed in Chapter Eleven.
68. Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 2.
69. The formal structure of Angau War Establishment 
IV/153/4 is set out in Diagrams 3 and 4 of its 
Report, ibid.
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on Ward and on the Army's own Commander-in-Chief.
Two features of Angau's internal structure are of
interest, in that they set useful precedents that were
not followed for many years. The Royal Papuan
Constabulary and the New Guinea Police Force remained
apart from the Unit, their commanding officer being
70responsible directly to the G.O.C. A significant 
departure from pre-war practice was the establishment in 
1944 of regional headquarters (Southern, Northern and 
Islands) in an effort to decentralize administration and 
delegate authority. Angau's major organizational problem 
arose from its attempt to perform the functions both of 
the pre-war administrations and the settler communities, 
as well as exercising broad control over mission 
activities. It was inevitable that there would be 
clashes of interests.
The staffing pattern of Angau tended to reinforce the
conflicts arising within its formal structure. It drew
its personnel from Papuan officers, New Guinea public
servants, the settler groups and new recruits from within
the Army's own ranks. The tensions these men brought
with them - Papua versus Mandated Territory, official
71versus entrepreneur, newcomer versus "before", civilian
70. The forces were later amalgamated as the Royal Papua 
New Guinea Constabulary, under a single Commissioner, 
but they did not again enjoy autonomy from the main 
service for over twenty years.71. From the pidgin "bipo" and meaning, in this context, 
"old hand".
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versus soldier - were rarely far below the surface.
Moreover, the roles of the main branches of Angau were
in some cases incompatible with the tasks which they had
to perform. District Services, headed by former New
Guinea and Papuan field staff and supplemented by new
recruits, was charged with maintaining village life while
also being called on to recruit a maximum of labour for
73the armed services and the remaining plantations.
District Services came under further pressure from other 
branches of Angau. Production Services (later the 
Production Control Board), comprising mainly plantation 
managers and white overseers, was responsible for the 
copra and rubber industries; its interest in obtaining 
as many labourers as possible for an unlimited period was 
obvious. The Native Labour Branch - drawn to some 
extent from the miscellany of white residents but mainly 
from the Army - allocated labourers, supervised them 
when they were employed away from the plantations, and 
arranged rations, issues and such accommodation as was 
available. The branch had no immediate interest in the 
village welfare responsibilities of District Services.
In all, Angau had an unenviable task, having to operate 
in a crisis situation after inheriting the tensions and 
problems of the pre-war administrations. It tackled them 
in a businesslike manner which was inevitably concerned
with only the most immediate issues.
72. 6 *3 * 0, og.g-t'y.-j ff-
73. Details in this and the following passage are 
drawn from Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 8.
72
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Angau's accomplishments
Angau brought undeniable benefits to New Guinea 
administration. It performed perhaps its most valuable 
function merely by being created as a unified service: 
once the two Territories had been amalgamated there was 
little chance of their again being separated, so that the 
opportunity for co-ordinated planning arose at last.
The Unit also showed a little of what could be done with 
additional staff. Compared with the peak pre-war staff 
in both New Guinea and Papua of some 660,^ Angau 
attained the following strength:^
Date Officers Other Hanks Total
31 December 1942 107 345 452
31 December 1943 169 1056 1225
30 September 1944 288 1361 1649
July 1945 366 1660 2026
(peak strength)
At its peak strength Angau possessed more than three times 
the staff of the pre-war administrations combined, and 
although many of them were involved in duties that would 
not have concerned a peacetime government, the remainder 
were concentrated in a smaller geographical area. More 
than half the staff were in the Native Labour branch, so 
that Angau had a large support organization; of its staff
74. N.G.A.R. 1938/39 and 1939/40; P.A.R. 1938/39 and 1939/ 
40; Pacific Islands Yearbook 1944. op. cit., p. 291.
The figures in published accounts vary according to 
whether exempt and temporary staff have been included 
in the totals. Numbers in both services declined as 
men joined the forces (see Chapter One, p. 51).
75. Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 2. Stanner, op, cit., p. 77.
106
of 1,649 at 30 September 1944, 595 were posted to central
V  6and regional headquarters alone. It had more men in
the field carrying out District Services functions than
77the pre-war administrations, but even then only 173 of
the 1,054 men stationed outside headquarters in 1944 were
members of the District Services b r a n c h . T h u s  the
Angau contribution to village administration, although
larger than the pre-war effort, was not as great as the
total numbers of staff in the Unit might at first suggest.
In the medical field, however, the Angau effort
surpassed anything that had been possible before the
war, even allowing for the fact that many of the services
for labourers and evacuees would not have been necessary
in peacetime. Although in 1944 Angau had only ten
medical officers, compared with sixteen in the pre-war
administrations, it also employed 113 European medical
assistants, compared with 49> and operated 53 hospitals,
7 0in comparison with 20. It is more difficult to compare 
performance, since statistics for Angau were compiled on
80a different basis from those for civil medical services, 
but the sheer volume of Angau effort speaks for itself.
In the year to September 1944 the Medical Services branch 
of the Unit treated 84,617 labourers and villagers in
76. Stanner, op. cit., p. 80; Angau, Report, loc. cit.
77. Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 44.78. Ibid., pp. 2,8. This compares with a combined pre-war 
total of 141 field staff (ibid., p. 8).
79. Ibid., pp. 22-3.80. The civil administrations* annual reports showed the 
number of patients, rather than the total number of 
treatments given.
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its hospitals and inspected 124,362 people during 523 
patrols, administering treatment in 68,332 cases.®1 The 
cost of medical equipment, drugs, rations and comforts 
in this period was more than £240,000, or 35 per cent 
more than the whole budget for Papua in 1939/40.®^
There were other ways in which Angau turned attention
slightly more towards a practical concern for the welfare
of the people. It set up the first non-mission school
and artisan training programme in Papua and provided
seeds, tools, building materials and trade goods to the 
0*2villagers. J Angau also released two of its officers,
D.M. Penbury and C.J. Millar, for study tours of Africa
and England, where they acquired interests which later
placed them in leading roles in the local government and
co-operatives movements in post-war years.  ^ And in an
effort to define its role more clearly the Unit held a
conference of senior staff in early 1944. The papers
and discussions at the conference were less than inspiring,
but they were at least an attempt to look to the future,
and thus a departure from the attitudes of the pre-war
85administrations.
Angau labour policy
In other respects the Angau record was less
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., p. 24. See also Chapter One, p. 44.
83. Ibid., p. 15.
84. Interview with Mr. D.M. Penbury, 8 August 1972. The
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impressive. It was inevitable that the Unit’s 
responsibilities for the labour force would cause 
dissatisfaction among the workers who were recruited, but 
the problem extended further than this. In 1945 Angau*s 
control of labour was reported on in scathing terms by 
Dr. Ian Hogbin following his tour of New Guinea "on 
instructions from the Directorate of Research" between 
March and June 1944. He asserted that "some of the 
Labour overseers are unfit to exercise authority...and, 
to judge from their conversation, a few of the old hands 
regard brutality as part of the regular routine. W.O.
..... , since removed, boasted in my hearing at Bena
Bena, for example, of the number of hidings he had 
administered".^ A major problem was what Stanner termed
(continued) tours were in fact arranged by the 
Directorate of Research and took place after the 
war’s end, but the officers were still on Angau 
strength. See also Papua New Guinea Post-Courier.
26 March 1973.85. Angau, Conference, op. cit., paper 1. The 
conference is discussed later in this Chapter.
86. The information in this passage is drawn from H.I. 
Hogbin, Report of an Investigation of Native Labour 
in New Guinea, typescript, probably written in 
Melbourne in 1944, one of the few Directorate of 
Research documents now available. Others are 
discussed later in this Chapter.
87. Ibid., p. 6 (name included in original). Hogbin’s 
attitude may have coloured his findings; Stanner 
(op. cit., p. 80) quoted the report, without 
acknowledgement, and claimed that one sentence 
contained a "twisted observation" that made the 
objectivity of the report doubtful. However, by 1953, 
when he wrote, Stanner was strongly critical of the 
Directorate, of which he had once been a senior 
member, and his own objectivity was questionable. 
Nevertheless, the report illustrates the tension and 
lack of understanding between Angau and the 
Directorate. In one passage Hogbin wrote, "An incident 
which occurred on the visit of the Minister for
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"a constant waste of labour”• Hogbin reported cases
of apparent corruption in which labour officials had
provided personal servants for soldiers in return for
liquor; on the use of labour to build churches, officers*
clubs and a swimming pool, to make flower beds and even
to spend weeks in the obviously useless pastime of
decorating the gardens around Army buildings with coral
borders. Stanner later referred to these reports as
”ex post facto criticism of the early military period
/”which_% in all circumstances, was little more than a
8Qcounsel of perfection”, but by 1944 the ”early” period
had passed, so that Hogbin*s report carries more weight
than Stanner*s criticism of it. Mr. J.V. Barry, K.C. gave
the most succinct view of the situation, stating, ”....when
the supposed needs of the Army conflicted with the welfare
90of the natives, Army requirements.. .triumphed” . By
(continued) External Territories, the Honourable E.J. 
Ward, to the Song River compound, Finschhafen, is 
worth recording. During the presentation of a carved 
walking-stick, the donor, catching sight of a crack 
at the lower end, remarked casiially, *1 must have 
bashed that coon this morning harder than I intended.*’* 
(Hogbin, loc. cit.). This was a variation of an old 
joke, albeit one in poor taste, and in an interview 
on 21 December 1973 I suggested to Dr. Hogbin that 
the remark was not intended seriously; he maintained, 
however, that it had been made directly to the 
Minister. I still find this hard to believe. In 
any case, Hogbin*s report did little to improve 
relations between Angau and the Directorate.
88. Stanner, op, cit., p. 81.
89. Ibid.
90. Barry, op. cit., p. 57.
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September 1944, when the vital need for labour had 
decreased considerably, only 10,758 men had been
qirepatriated out of a total of 45,203 initially recruited;^ 
Stanner lists eleven villages with a total population 
of 2,769 in which only 38 ablebodied men remained in 
May 1944.92
On one point there can be no doubt: Angau as an
organization was detested by all labourers and villagers
who came into contact with it. Earlier studies have
noted that the war severely affected village life in a
number of ways: death from bombs, bullets and diseases;
dislocation caused by the absence of men, by having to
flee from battles and by being evacuated to foreign areas;
destruction and deterioration of houses, possessions and
93gardens; and major food shortages. Stanner has also
referred to the invisible” as well as the "visible"
effects of war: changes in attitudes and expectations,
increases in cultist activity, new impressions of
94different races and groups of people. The studies made 
immediately after the war were necessarily impressionistic
91. Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 42.
92. Stanner, op. cit., p. 81. The table appears to have 
been taken from the Hogbin report, but there are 
some differences in spelling.
93. The situation is discussed in Commonwealth of 
Australia, Department of External Territories,
Report of a Committee Appointed by the Minister 
for External Territories on Compensation to the 
Natives of Papua and New Guinea for War Injuries 
and War Damage, Canberra, mimeo, 1945.
94. Stanner, op. cit., pp. 86-90.
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and there was little interest in the matter once conditions 
became stable. In recent years, however, students from 
the University of Papua New Guinea and the Administrative 
College have conducted "oral history" projects that 
indicate not only that the war's effects were more complex 
and far-reaching than has generally been supposed but that 
most of the blame for poor conditions in the areas not 
occupied by the Japanese has been placed by the people 
on Angau. While making allowance for the fact that the 
wartime conditions were not of Angau's making and that 
some branches of the organization had to meet more 
difficult demands than others, it is nevertheless clear 
that many of the Unit's decisions and methods were unfeeling 
and in some cases appear deliberately provocative. Its
95. N.K. Robinson, Kukipi in the War, Port Moresby,
mimeo, 1971 and N. Blackburn ted.), War in My Village, 
Port Moresby, mimeo, 1969. The latter accounts 
contain some particularly vivid passages, drawn from 
many parts of the country, that are too consistently 
critical of Angau to reflect only individual 
attitudes. Por example: "The men were strictly 
looked after under the military rule. Anyone who 
disobeyed or refused to go was flogged. Those who 
ran away to their villages were found, flogged by the 
officials...and sent back...under guard...During this 
time of the war the families back in the villages 
were suffering from hunger and many other things."
(E. Lei, "The Effects of the Last War (1942-45) on 
my Village - Lese, Gulf District", in Blackburn,
Ibid., Set 1, p. 7). Also: "Por those who went as 
soldiers it was a story of adventure and courage.
But those who went under ANGAU there was nothing to 
tell the villagers but complaints...These would 
proudly show the scars they received by flogging and 
tell tales which seems (sic) highly incredible to 
us." (W. Abore, "War as it Affected my Village", in 
ibid., set 2, pp. 8-9; the area in question was 
near New Britain, literally on the other side of 
the country from Lei's village).
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staff made strenuous efforts to block contact between
labourers and troops, and particularly with American
negroes; permitted the wearing only of ramis (lengths
of cloth held around the waist and extending usually to
the knees) rather than shorts; confiscated all gifts
from the troops; often demanded military levels of
discipline from the untrained conscript labourers; and
q6meted out canings for disobedience. There were
undoubtedly exceptions to this pattern of behaviour, but
the villagers gained the impression of a repressive
administration that exhibited the worst characteristics
of the authoritarian colonial regime and the petty
brutality of plantation employers. It is important that
the people*s opinions be borne in mind in any debate
over the duration of military rule and the timing of
q 7the transfer to civil administration.
Angau’s influence on events
Angau, established in a situation of major crisis 
and with many operational responsibilities and conglomerate 
personnel, could not have been expected to develop major 
innovations of policy. Indeed, the functions allotted
98to the Unit contained no reference to policy formation. 
Major-General Morris seemed to have no notion of a
96. Robinson, op. cit., pp. 9-15.
97. The question is discussed in Chapter Pour.
98. See p. 99 of this Chapter.
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specific policy role when he opened a conference of 
District Officers in February 1944. He spoke generally 
about the need to build up a "going concern", but told 
his men, "•...it is not possible to commit any future 
Civil Administration that may at a later date be brought
QQinto the Territories." This was a particularly narrow
view of the proper relationship between the military and
civilians and meant that any influence on policy by
Angau depended largely upon the effectiveness of the
informal links its staff possessed with authorities in
Australia. These, in turn, were related to the status
of the Unit's leaders in the metropolitan power structure,
military and civil. In these matters Angau was not well
placed, Morris, the G-.O.C., was a regular soldier with
no discernible political background in a command that was
relatively small, of low priority and physically remote
from the Commander-in-Chief and Cabinet. Moreover, he
shared with the Minister a personal antipathy that was
made public only after the war's end.10^ Nor were he
and his men on good terms with the staff of the influential
101Directorate of Research. Brigadier Cleland, a 
solicitor from Western Australia, had been State Chairman 
of the National Party from 1936 to 1938, and so his
99. Angau, Conference, op, cit., paper 1.
100. In an address to the Institute of Accountants in 
Melbourne Morris later maintained that Ward was 
known to Papuans as "kanaka belong Sydney” (Sydney 
Daily Mirror, 24 November 1948); see also P.I.M.,
Vol. 17 No. 6, January 1947, p. 36.
101. Their opinions of each other are outlined later 
in this Chapter.
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background set him even further apart than Morris from 
Ward and his advisers, although his efficiency was 
acknowledged at all levels. Following the establishment 
of the School of Civil Affairs as an offshoot of the 
Directorate in 1944, some Angau officers attending courses 
there formed links with Directorate personnel, but these 
were well below the command level and involved more an
102injection of Directorate ideas into Angau than the reverse. 
Angau conference, 1944
The main record of Angau thoughts and initiatives 
resides in the proceedings of its conference of District 
Officers held in Port Moresby from 7 to 12 February 1944. 
Angau*s limited role in planning is indicated by the 
fact that this was the only occasion upon which its 
officers discussed future prospects, even though the Unit 
had administrative responsibility for Papua New Guinea 
for another twenty months. The conference brought together 
fifteen District Officers, a number of headquarters 
personnel, the chief of staff, Brigadier Oleland, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel W.E.H. Stanner, the only member of the 
Directorate of Research to attend. Fourteen papers on 
twelve topics were considered, the subjects of ’’native 
welfare” and ’native labour” each being discussed by two
102. The Dj. rectorate* s relations with D.M. Fenbury,
G.C. O ’Donnell, C.J. Millar and James Taylor 
are discussed in their contexts in Chapters Six,
Seven and Eight.
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officers. Two papers were concerned with, background 
details of pre-war administration, three were devoted to 
technical matters (preventive medicine, dental services 
and rice cultivation) and one was delivered by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Stanner.
Of the remaining papers, those on land tenure, 
agriculture, labour policy, village plantations and welfare 
centred on questions of particular importance for future 
development. They were delivered by officers with some 
years of pre-war experience in their respective Territories. 
Each had had two years in which to reflect on the changes 
wrought by the war and was free to speak out: the 
conference was closed to outsiders, the record of its 
proceedings was classified Mconfidential” and the Angau 
commander left after his opening address so that open 
debate could continue.  ^ Under the circumstances, at 
least a few far-reaching proposals might have been expected 
from the participants. All but one of these papers, however, 
show a narrow approach. In particular, there is a 
preoccupation with the problem of labour supply; the 
participants still seem wedded to the concept of development 
through a European-controlled plantation economy. The 
paper on land tenure, for example, concentrates as much 
on the provision of labour to work Mavailable” land as on 
the question of tenure itself. The tenure problem is
103. The material in this and the following passages is 
set out in Angau, Conference, op. cit., Vols. I-III.
104. Ibid., Cover, title page and paper 1.
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discussed almost entirely as a matter of introducing 
individual land ownership, rather than of using usufructory 
rights as a basis for communal enterprise on a Melanesian 
pattern. The paper on agriculture deals largely with 
pre-war facts and opinions and a section on ’’native 
agricultural schools” reaches the grudging conclusion: 3
Native Agricultural Education is likely to prove 
costly, and people would like value for money 
expended. It would be preferable to start out on 
a limited scale, and by experience work out the 
system and syllabus most likely to be of value in 
producing results with New Guinea natives.
The writer, a Mandated Territory officer, approves of 
compulsion in promoting change, stating:
There is often expressed the idea that a native should 
not be compelled to work against his own wishes, even 
where such procedure is necessary for his own good.
To illustrate what is best in practice, the following 
example is given:- The Dutch in 1850, caused the 
Javanese to cultivate food crops, against their will, 
by administrative force, and before many years had 
passed it was realised that there would be little 
need for other than preliminary enforcement as the 
natives recognized the value of what was being done 
for them. At this stage, the population of Java 
was 5 million, and by 1934 it had risen to more than 
40 million population, all due to good Government.
On the other hand, a paper by a Papuan officer, while
making gloomy reading, recognizes the difficulties of
forcing development” on villagers and shows an
appreciation of the people’s feelings and attitudes.
Of the papers on the major issues of labour and
105. This and the following quotation are drawn from 
ibid., paper 17.
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welfare, the two on labour show the same preoccupation
with numbers of labourers available for plantations and
similar enterprises and a lack of foresight in most other
respects. Both writers oppose the abolition of indenture
as a system of employment because, they say, it was
misunderstood. One of the papers on welfare is sympathetic
but unimaginative, reflecting Papuan paternalism. The
other, by James Taylor, is deliberately provocative and
parts of it are almost certainly facetious. Taylor
devotes one page to his introduction - "so much for the
past” - then goes on to criticize most features of
contemporary islands life: plantation economics, indenture
of labourers, health services, orthodox views of cult
activities, missions, education policies and attempts to
try villagers for "treason". Concerning the war he
states, "Our prestige has not suffered. This is because
it is non-existent. The so-called prestige of the white
man is merely a respect based upon his superior arms and
wealth...We are demanding a loyalty to which we are not
entitled, and taking all things into consideration, one
107that we have not the right to expect". Since Taylor1s 
paper stands in such sharp contrast to the others at the 
conference, it suggests that few innovative policy 
suggestions could be expected from Angau as a whole.
This left only one major source of initiatives - the 
Directorate of Research.
106. Ibid., paper 10.
107. Ibid.
Directorate of Research and A. A. Conlon
The Directorate of Research was, during the war
years, virtually the only source of policy advice to the
Australian government on the future of Papua New Guinea.
It warrants a complete study in itself, notwithstanding
108the lack of written records of its activities. All
108. The great hulk of records from the wartime and
immediate post-war periods have suffered sorry fates 
or have been mislaid. In a letter of 4 June 1969 
the Chief Archivist, Australian Archives Office, 
stated:
Over a number of years the Commonwealth Archives 
has conducted extensive enqiiries as to the fate 
of administrative records of Papua-New Guinea in 
the period 1942-46, without reaching satisfactory 
conclusions...The Department of the Army’s "Archives 
Section in Melbourne has been unable to locate any 
significant records produced by the Directorate 
of Research relating to New Guinea. It appears 
certain from contemporary accounts that all major 
policy matters were referred by the military 
administration in New Guinea (A.N.G.A.U.) to the 
Directorate and considerable records should have 
accumulated. However, the ultimate fate of these 
has not been determined...The fate of the majority 
of the records of ANGAU remains a matter of 
supposition. It would appear that, as the war 
came to an end and ANGAU headquarters moved 
northwards in New Guinea, it became re—absorbed 
into the structure of the Army’s HQ 8 MD, and its 
operational records were absorbed...and their 
individual identity was lost...It appears most 
probable /"“that the civil administrative records 
of Angau 7 were handed over to the incoming 
Provisional Administration...It may be that the 
majority were destroyed in two fires - in the 
Government Secretary's Office in 1949> and in the 
Law Department in 1957.
The Department of the Government Secretary was the 
main executive agency of government, and so the 
fire of 12 February 1949 (the anniversary of the 
suspension of civil administration) destroyed almost 
all policy papers, together with much routine 
information concerning the Administrator and his 
office. However, Colonel Murray kept a number of 
files at Government House, where he often worked 
and held conferences. These, together with his
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accounts of the Directorate are unanimous on one (and 
perhaps only one) point; that it owed its existence 
ultimately to the efforts of one man: Dr. Alfred A. 
Conlon. It is difficult to separate fact from legend in 
any study of Conlon, and he seems to have imparted the 
same quality to his Directorate. Thus any examination of 
the organization must necessarily flow from a discussion 
of the man. Conlon was "born in Sydney in 1908 and 
graduated in Arts from Sydney University in 1932, taking
(continued) personal papers, are held in Papua New 
Guinea*s National Archives. The files hold copies 
of some policy material, although this is far from 
complete. The 1957 fire in the Crown Law Office 
destroyed mainly legal papers, although a certain 
amount of policy material was also lost. Ironically, 
a number of policy papers held at the Australian 
School of Pacific Administration, from the period 
between 1945 and 1949 when there was still close contact between Port Moresby and senior staff at the 
School, were also destroyed by fire in 1969. The 
main puzzle surrounds the whereabouts of the records of the Directorate of Research. The letter quoted 
above implies that they could have been destroyed or 
permanently lost. For some years there have been 
rumours that a considerable number of papers, once 
in the possession of Conlon, are now held by other 
people. The assumption seems to be that Conlon took 
most of the Directorate*s files with him when the 
unit disbanded. It has been further suggested that 
Conlon did this because people opposed to the 
Directorate would otherwise have destroyed its 
records. However, Conlon's son, Mr. Telford Conlon, 
has stated that he knows of no collection of papers 
held by his father, other than personal records 
(letter of 22 August 1969). These, he says, were 
bought by Mr. Peter Ryan "on behalf of a private 
trust", but Ryan has advised that he has "no recent 
information" concerning them (letter of 20 May 1969). 
Several people who were associated with Conlon in 
the Directorate, including Dr. H.I. Hogbin, Mr. V.H. 
Parkinson and Colonel Murray, doubt whether many 
policy documents ever existed, since Conlon (to quote 
Parkinson) "was a talker, not a writer". Moreover, 
the Directorate was located in three very temporary 
sites - in Melbourne, Canberra and Sydney - in just 
two years and this would have made files even harder 
to preserve. If located, they should be the basis 
of a separate study.
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an honours degree in philosophy under Professor John
Anderson.  ^ He began studying medicine in the same
year, but then from 1933 to 1936, when he married, he
read law. He subsequently returned to medicine, reaching
third year in 1938, but did not complete this degree
until after the war. He was elected a Fellow of the
Senate, representing undergraduates, in 1939 and was
appointed University Manpower Officer in 1940. His duty
as Manpower Officer was, in his view, to ensure that the
education and skills acquired by students entering the
110armed forces were put to good use.
Conlon made his first recorded contact with the
policy agencies of the government in late 1940, when he
became a member of a committee investigating the
111establishment of an Army Education Scheme. The
109. The material in this passage is taken from the 
memorial volume published by the Benevolent 
Society of New South Wales, Alfred Conlon 1908- 
1961, Sydney, 1963, a series of recorded comments 
edited by John Thompson (Australian Broadcasting 
Commission) and broadcast on 8 October 1963.
110. Like most of Conlon's activities, the nature of 
his work as Manpower Officer varies according to 
the source of information; it has been suggested 
that he spent most of this period extending his 
network of influential contacts and finding 
better military jobs for his associates. The 
difficulties of establishing a clear picture are 
compounded by the fact that some of Conlon's 
wartime colleagues assumed different stances in 
political and ideological matters, during later 
years, from those of the Directorate of which 
they had once been members. One or two of them 
later became embroiled in the controversy 
surrounding Professor Sydney Orr, opposing the 
attitude taken by Conlon in the matter. See "The 
Master Puppeteer", Nation, Vol. 1 No. 1, 26 
September 1958, p. 12.
111. Long, op, cit., p. 84.
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committee was set up by Major-General Victor Stantke,
at that time Adjutant-General, with responsibilites, among
other things, for Army manpower, Conlon’s duties at the
university brought him into contact with Stantke and led
to his appointment to the committee on education. By
late 1941 Conlon's interests centred on two issues: the
morale of the Australian people and the need for expert
advice and research within the Army. The morale question
assumed greater, if passing, significance with the bombing
of Darwin and the scares that followed and in early 1942
Conlon emerged suddenly as Chairman of the Prime Minister’s
Committee on National Morale, whose members included
Professors K. Stout, R.D. Wright and J. Stone, R.M. Crawford
11 “5and Sir Ian Clunies-Ross. The functions and 
deliberations of the committee seem to have gone 
unrecorded and it produced no final conclusions or results, 
but it is probable that it arose out of Conlon's interest 
in the likely effects of a Japanese invasion of 
Australia. The committee's discussions had two main
112. Interview with Sir John Kerr, 30 June 1969.
113* "The Master Puppeteer", op. cit., p. 13.
114. Professor Geoffrey Sawer has suggested that the 
committee actually produced draft national 
security regulations on morale (Canberra Times,
26 January 1972), but Professor Stone says its 
meetings "were just briefings for the P.M."
(National Times, 3-8 April 1972). Hasluck 
(op. cit., pp. 127-30, 401-3) goes to some pains 
to make out a case that part of the morale 
problem was of the government's own making• Any 
further discussion would require a detailed 
examination of Australian politics and personalities 
and would detract from the main theme of this 
study. The need for a detailed examination of 
these structures and personalities is increasingly 
apparent, however.
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consequences: it became clear that much basic data 
necessary for the planning of disaster administration 
was simply non-existent; and Gonlon came to enjoy more 
than ever the "men-only think sessions, accompanied by 
much beer and pipe-smoke?', to use Sawer's description.^^
Conlon's interest in research coincided with the
National Morale Committee's need for information and in
1942 he approached Major-General Stantke with a proposal
that a research organization be established within the 
116Army. A research group, with Conlon in charge and
attached to the Adjutant-General's branch, was formed in
April 1942 and subsequently transferred to the Directorate
117of Military Intelligence. In the meantime, however, 
the command structure of the Army had changed radically. 
The Military Board had been suspended and on. 26 March 
1942 General Blarney had taken up his appointment as
1 1 f tGommander-in-Chief. Major-General Stantke was replaced 
as Adjutant-General by Major-General C.E.M. Lloyd, who
115* There remains a distinct impression, from the 
retrospective comments made on Gonlon and the 
Directorate, that the majority of those who were 
once involved, and are now in eminent and 
influential positions, would like to dissociate 
themselves from the brash idealism that might 
otherwise be thought to have marked their earlier 
years. Many of Conlon's contemporaries maintain 
that they were not close to him in the 
Directorate. One letter seeking information for 
this study was answered in a brief note signed by 
an eminent professor's secretary.
116. Benevolent Society, op. cit., p. 8.
117. Long, op. cit., p. 397.
118. Dudley McCarthy, op. cit., p. 25.
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1 1 Qwas less enthusiastic about the research project, J As 
the invasion scare passed, Conlon came to devote more 
attention to research, however, and was able to counter 
the changes in the Adjutant-General's branch by using 
the contacts he had established with the Prime Minister 
in the morale committee and through Brigadier Eugene
1 20Gorman, a Melbourne K.C. who was a friend of Blarney.
After a period of uncertainty Conlon's group was established
121as the Directorate of Research on 6 October 1943.
Conlon was then promoted Lieutenant-Colonel, with his
office at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne. The apocryphal
story maintains that his relationship with Blarney was
1 22cemented in the following exchange:
Blarney (making first inspection tour of Victoria 
Barracks as new C-in-C): What are you 
doing in this unit, Colonel?
Conlon (removing feet from desk): Research, sir.
Long pause.
Conlon: Well, Tom, we just buggerise around.
Blarney: Ah, Alf, you buggerise around. Well, well.
Blarney trusted Conlon implicitly from that day on 
as the only honest man he had met in the Army since 
his return from the Middle East.
The activities and outputs of the Directorate of
Research (leaving aside the School of Civil Affairs for
the moment) are as difficult to establish as its genesis.
However, there is again one point of consensus: Conlon
enjoyed direct acce^to, and exerted remarkable influence
119. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969.
120. Kerr interview.
121. Department of the Army memorandum of 12 May 1969.
122. The story is an amalgam of the anecdote contained 
in "The Master Puppeteer", op. cit., p. 13 and 
accounts by two other men closely associated with 
Conlon, both of whom used more colourful language.
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on "both the Prime Minister and General Blarney. Precisely
how this came about is not clear; Blarney’s biographer,
even in his second and more detailed account of the
general’s life, has nothing definite to say on the
point.12  ^ However, Curtin and Blarney were under great
pressure and Conlon presumably gave some relief from the
limited orthodoxy of established civilian and military
bureaucracies. Blarney, in particular, enjoyed little
popularity,12^ and had nothing in common with External
Territories Minister Ward, with whom he was supposed to deal
1 25on matters affecting New Guinea’s people. Conlon thus
offered an avenue of contact and negotiation, as well as
providing ideas for post-war reforms. So long as this
network remained, Conlon occupied a key position as its
126power-broker and prophet.
The Directorate’s work
There was little in the Directorate’s terms of 
reference to indicate the work that was expected of it. 
There seems to be no record of its original charter; 
Gavin Long quotes the February and August 1944 issues of
123. John Hetherington, Blarney: Controversial Soldier. 
Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1973, pp.
317-22. In his earlier Blarney (Melbourne, Cheshire, 
1954), Hetherington mentioned Conlon only once, in 
connection with the proposed John Curtin School of 
Medical Research.
124. See, for example, Hasluck, op. cit., pp. 572-6 
and Long, op. cit.. Ch. 3.
125. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969
126. Conlon was not alone. Dr. H.C. Coombs, in particular, 
occupied a powerful position in the wartime 
networks, but operating more comfortably within 
formal organizations than Conlon and stabilising
his influence accordingly.
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The Australian Army War Effort, a propaganda journal, 
1 27when noting: '
By February 1944 the functions of the Directorate of 
Research had been re-defined thus:
(1) To keep the Commander-in-Chief and certain 
other officers informed on current events affecting 
their work;
(2) To undertake specific enquiries requested by 
Principal Staff Officers;
(3) To assist other Government Departments in 
work concerning the Army.
On 20th October 1943 the Directorate was given 
specific duties concerned with the National Security 
(Emergency Control) Regulations. It is required to 
maintain full records at L.H.Q. of all exercise of 
powers and all activities by the Army under the 
Regulations; to effect liaison and collaborate with 
Federal and State authorities on matters arising 
out of activities by the Army under the Regulations 
and to carry out such other duties in connection 
with the Regulations as the C-in-C may direct...
A considerable proportion of the work of the 
Directorate has been concerned with administration 
and development in New Guinea.
Although providing no executive authority, this charter
allowed the Directorate, in maintaining "full records”,
virtually to conduct surveillance over a wide range of
areas, including the administration of New Guinea under
the Regulations. The Directorate thereupon involved
itself in several domestic matters, including the proposals
for a school of medical research and a national university
and in overseas planning for post-war government in Borneo 
1 28and Japan. In the operational sphere the Directorate^ 
efforts were far from successful. Concerning its 
dealing with the British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit, Long
127. Long, op. cit., pp. 397-8.
128. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969
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points out that the Directorate wcontained few officers 
with real military experience, yet it was organizing and 
controlling military units, a task requiring expert 
staff work. At the same time the directorate (sic) was 
causing confusion and distress among the British Borneo 
officers who had arrived to perform a task for which they 
had long been preparing.” 37
In conducting its studies in Papua New G-uinea the
Directorate antagonized the great majority of Angau
staff, who viewed it as, at best, a carping critic and
at worst a spy organization with all power and no
responsibility. Professor Charles Rowley, who worked in
Army Education in New Guinea for some time, recalls that
he had ’’lengthy experience of how the whole Conlon setup
was regarded by the army brass. Among officers, none of
whom knew him, Alf was probably the most unpopular man 
1 *50in the army”. During his wartime travels in New
Guinea Colonel Murray gained the impression that "Major-
General Morris...really hated Conlon and exhausted his
1 31worst expletives on him” . Sawer summarises the 
outsider's impression of Conlon in saying, "I never heard 
him promulgate a constructive idea which was also 
workable,” but adds, "...one great gift he indeed 
possessed; it was the capacity for anticipating a 
problem, and getting other people to do some work on
129. Long, op. cit., pp. 402-3.
130. Benevolent Society, op, cit., p. 22.
131. Murray letter of 26 May 19^9.
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1 "52solving it."
The "other people" who worked with Conlon at that
time included several who were, or would become, among
the most eminent in their professions in Australia. One
group, members of the Directorate who in most cases
went on to teach at the School of Civil Affairs, included
Colonel J.K. Murray, Professor Julius Stone, Professor
K.S. Isles, Professor W.E.H. Stanner, Sir John Kerr,
Sir James Plimsoll, Dr. H.I. Hogbin, Dr. T.P. Pry, the
Honourable Camilla Wedgewood and Professor James
McAuley.^ ^  Others recruited primarily for the School
were Professor John Andrews, Professor Ralph Piddington,
Dr. D'Arcy Croll, Professor Lucy Mair, Mr. P.A. Ryan,
Mr. Justice J.H. Wootten, Professor J.D. Legge, Senator
Sam Cohen and Miss Ida Leeson, while part-time lecturers
included Professor R.D. Wright, Professor Sir Edward
1 34Pord and Professor Sir Stanton Hicks. Of the people
who at various times came within the Conlon orbit without 
being permanent members of the Directorate or the School, 
the most notable were Sir Mark Oliphant, Professor
132. Canberra Times, op. cit.
133. In most cases the names indicate the positions which 
the staff later attained, rather than contemporary 
status. An exception is Murray, who had already 
attained the positions of both Professor and full 
Colonel before joining the Directorate (see 
Chapter Three). Details of the Directorate's 
personnel are drawn from interviews with Sir John 
Kerr and Colonel Murray; letter from Colonel Murray 
of 26 May 1969; Benevolent Society, op. cit.; and 
J.K. Murray, The Allied Land Forces (LHQ) School
of Civil Affairs 1945-46« Brisbane, typescript.
1971, pp. 2-3.134. The work of the School of Civil Affairs is discussed 
in the next Chapter.
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Zelman Cowan and Professor A.P. Elkin.
Such a grouping of talent, with almost no operational
responsibilities and therefore ample time for discussion
and thought, was unprecedented in Australia, providing
great intellectual stimulus for those who belonged to 
1 "55it. But most recollections are of a great deal of
talk and not very much in the way of concrete results.
Colonel Murray recalls that "the Directorate functioned
in a collection of rooms in old buildings in Vic.
Barracks, isolated and suited to the personal arrangements.
The director and one or two others had entree to the
C-in-C. A good deal of discussion and forming of
attitudes was done in Melbourne homes in the evenings to
early mornings...'brains trust* thrashing out of
situations as they arose or looked like surfacing:
1 36dialogue style**. To people of a certain temperament
this method of operation proved irritating or even
infuriating, particularly with Australia at war; the
reactions of Professor Sawer and Major-General Morris
have already been noted. Conlon eventually exasperated
those among his subordinates who favoured a more formal
approach to planning, notably Stanner, who had been one
1 37of the first appointees to the Directorate. Conlon
135. Not all wished to "belong** (see below), and it has 
already been noted that a number had second thoughts.
136. Colonel Murray has prepared a series of notes on 
his recollections. The pages of the manuscript 
(written in a carbon duplicate book) are numbered 
from 16. This and later references refer to the 
numbers stamped on the manuscript pages. This 
quotation is from page 39.
137. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969.
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is reputed to have been ruthless at times in achieving
his goals,1'*8 but on the other hand some of his wartime
associates profess amusement at the faintly G-ilbertain
atmosphere within his entourage; James McAuley has been
quoted as saying he performed the function of ’court
poet”.1^  To others Conlon held the ingredients of
charisma. The journalist Sydney Deamer has called him
’’the absolute visionary.. .He was a bloke who could see
the consequences of things before any of us could see
them”,1^0 and Professor Stone has said that Conlon was
a ’’theoretician of the social process” who was interested
more in theory than in practice. "But of course his genius
1 4-1was precisely that he combined the two.” The 
impression is that Conlon made his most favourable impact 
on those who were least involved in solving immediate, 
practical problems.
Conlon*s influence
Conlon's association with power has been the subject
of some debate. Peter Coleman, summing up his impression
142of the controversy, writes:
...one real theme of Conlon's life was Power - 
studying other people's use of it, needing it himself 
to put his ideas into practice, getting it, using it, 
misusing it, losing it, struggling to get it again.
138. Interview with Colonel Murray, 12 December 1966.
139* By Peter Coleman in the Bulletin. 28 September 
1963, p. 23.140. Benevolent Society, op. cit.. p. 7.
141. Ibid., p. 26.
142. Coleman, op. cit.. p. 23. It is interesting the 
political right should display such a fascination 
for Conlon; the passage quoted is almost certainly by Coleman out of McAuley.
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But this has to be read mainly between the lines 
since so many of the writers feel they have to 
apologize for Conlon's interest in Power. He used 
his power, they repeat, never for personal ends, always 
for the national good, in the service of the 
community, for reform etc. etc. Intellectuals 
themselves, they seem unable to reconcile Conlon's 
being an intellectual with his wanting the power he 
had as...Director of Research...to get things done.
This assessment is not entirely consistent with Coleman's
later claim that Conlon's various projects were of little 
1 45effect, since it does not distinguish between
operational and intellectual power, as exercised by
Conlon. Conlon's efforts at institution-building
alienated many people, but none has seriously argued
against his intellectual force. In relation to New
Guinea, Conlon and the staff of the Directorate and School
created an atmosphere, an aura of conviction, that major
changes would have to be made, and made urgently. Thus
the policy later outlined for Papua New Guinea by the
1 44 -Minister owed much to the Directorate. Colonel Murray
has observed, "My assessment would be, in relation to
PNG, that Conlon and his Directorate, directly and
indirectly (bringing knowledgeable personnel into contact
with the Minister of External Territories) inspired and
1 45formulated in basic ways the 'Ward Policy'". Ward's
acceptance of this policy ensured that the Directorate's 
views also received the tacit approval of Prime Ministers 
Curtin and Chifley. Two essential steps had still to
143. Ibid., p. 24.144. The policy and its genesis are discussed later 
in this Chapter and in Chapter Pive.
145. Murray notes, op. cit., pp. 36-7.
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be taken, however: the broad statements of principle 
needed to be filled out and supported by detailed plans; 
and dynamic administrative structures had to be set up 
if the programmes were to be executed. Unfortunately, 
Conlon was unable to convert his intellectual drive into 
either operational charters or stable institutions, as 
is shown by his abortive efforts in these directions 
after the war.1^
The Directorate's proposals
Any assessment of the Directorate's impact on 
post-war policy and programmes must take full account 
of the fact that the unit had no formal administrative 
role. Perhaps the effort of prompting a change in 
general policy was itself an accomplishment; Lucy Mair, 
for example, viewed it as such in 1948.1^  If this 
opinion is accepted, then the fact that no detailed plans 
can be traced immediately to the Directorate may be of 
little relevance. In such circumstances, not the 
Directorate but the operational agencies of government 
may be at fault. Moreover, among the few papers that 
can at present be linked to the Directorate there are 
indications that a firm basis for detailed planning
1 ARwas being prepared.  ^ Several of the Directorate staff
146. Conlon's post-war role in New Guinea affairs is 
discussed in Chapters Five and Six.
147. Mair, op. cit., (1948), pp. 203-4.
148. Carbon copies of some reports and position papers 
have been located among loose documents at the 
Australian School of Pacific Administration. Most
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visited Papua New Guinea during 1944 and 1945. Conlon 
accompanied General Blarney during the Commander-in- 
chief’s tour of the islands in 1944, but there is no 
available record of any report he might have prepared. 
However, there are surviving documents concerning tours 
made by Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable Camilla 
Wedgewood and by Drs. Hogbin and Pry, while Colonel 
Murray has provided an account of his study of
1 50the agricultural potential of the Territories.
Hogbin's report, while concerned largely with the
"grave" situation he found in villages owing to the
excessive recruitment of labour, gave some indication
of the measures that would have to be taken immediately
the war ended. He recommended that labourers be
repatriated urgently; that tools, seeds and livestock
be distributed; and that measures be taken to stabilize
1 51village and economic life. Hogbin's conclusions 
were neither detailed nor far-reaching, but a clear 
link between the Directorate's activities and Labor's
(continued) bear the notation "prepared in the 
Directorate of Research" in what appears to be 
the handwriting of Dr. T.P. Pry. None of the 
position papers bears a date, author’s name or 
file number.
149* Benevolent Society, op. cit., p. 21.
150. Hogbin's report has been discussed earlier (pp. 
108-9) and Pry's is outlined later in this Chapter. 
Wedgewood's report on education, which was the 
basis of the post-war system, is discussed in 
Chapter Seven. The main features of Murray's 
tour are set out in the following Chapter.
151. Hogbin, op. cit., pp. 8-10. The tone of the paper 
is in marked contrast to the section on labour in 
the Angau report on relief and rehabilitation,
op. cit. and in the District Officers' addresses 
at the Angau conference; Angau's concerns were scarcely related to those of the Directorate.
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post-war policies was apparent, since several of the
labour report’s recommendations were later incorporated
in the War Damage Compensation Scheme, proposed by a
three-man committee of which Hogbin was a member.
Pry's report was a more substantial document, prepared
for the January 1945 conference of the Institute of Pacific
1 53Relations in Melbourne. v Much of the paper was devoted
to background information, but this was presented in a
more analytical way than anything in the proceedings of
the 1944 Angau conference. More significantly, the section
of the report dealing with "Australian colonial policy for
the forthcoming era of reconstruction and development"
clearly presaged Mr. Ward's policy statement to the House
1 54-of Representatives on 4 July 1945. Pry referred to
"control of economic development, in order to protect...
the native communities", "increasing participation by
the natives in the administration of justice and other
duties of government", and repeatedly emphasised the need
for greatly increased spending: "considerable annual sums
from...mainland revenue" in addition to £20 million for
1 55rehabilitation and reconstruction. ^  He quoted statements 
made by Ward during his 1944 New Guinea visit and in his 
disputes with the Pacific Territories Association, in 
effect summing up the Ward-Conlon collaboration to the 
end of 1944 and setting the scene for the more open
152. The findings of the committee are set out in Chapter 
Pour. The other members were Mr. J.V. Barry, K.C. 
and Major James Taylor.
153. T.P. Pry, Relief and Rehabilitation in Australia's 
Territories in New Guinea. Melbourne, raimeo, 1945.
154. I^ bid., pp. 7-9. See also Chapter Five of this study.
155. Ibid., pp. 9» 20.
134
approach to New Guinea policy that followed the establishment 
of the School of Civil Affairs and the Minister's statement 
to Parliament^
Other surviving Directorate documents include 
several position papers prepared for the first meeting 
of the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Papua New Guinea in 
February 1944. These papers show foresight and an 
awareness of comparative developments elsewhere in the 
world, drawing heavily on contemporary thinking on colonies 
from the United Kingdom and on the philosophy which 
supported the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act 
of 1940. One argues the case for the establishment of 
the School of Civil Affairs, another compares the scope 
of civil administration in overseas theatres with the 
likely needs of New Guinea, and a third comprises briefing 
notes for Mr. Ward for the first meeting of the Cabinet 
sub-committee. The details of the policy proposals 
are discussed in context in later Chapters, but it is 
worth noting that the papers correctly predict the major 
problems of the post-war administration. The paper
156. Ibid., pp. 8-9. There is considerable similarity 
between Fry's conclusions and those of James 
Taylor at the Angau conference, although the latter 
are stated more colourfully. This supports the suggestion of John Thompson (Benevolent Fund, op. 
cit., p. 32) that Conlon and Taylor were in close 
contact. Thompson refers to the "relief and comfort" Conlon afforded Taylor, presumably from 
the latter's Angau associates.
157. The fact that the notes for the Minister for 
External Territories were prepared by an Army unit 
formally responsible to the Commander-in-Chief 
indicates the disarray into which the orthodox 
structures of government had fallen in this area.
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dealing with the question of continuity between military 
and civil administration sees the need for ”disregarding 
or modifying those features of the prewar position which 
were based mainly on historical accident or inertia” 
and warns that, while the alternative of ’turning back... 
the clock” is impossible, ’’•••the danger will remain 
that the civil administration will tend to adopt it 
partially, out of a hankering for the past”.1^® The 
briefing notes support the introduction of programmes by 
means of legislation and urge the passage of a Welfare 
and Development Bill for the Territories. ’’The scale of 
the Bill should be determined, not by rough estimates, 
but on calculations derived from the items of policy 
approved by this Committee.” ^17 It was the lack of such 
programmes that subsequently hampered post-war 
administration most severely.
Directorate versus Department
The task of preparing plans and programmes should 
normally have fallen to the Department of External 
Territories, but because of its miniscule staff and the 
peculiar relationship between its Minister and the 
Directorate the Department was in an invidious position.
158. The quotation is from pages 3 and 9 of the paper.
159. The quotation is from page 9 of the notes, in a passage referring to Item XIV of the agenda for 
the meeting of the Cabinet Sub-Committee. The need 
for legislation had been suggested by the Director- 
G-eneral of Post-War Reconstruction, Dr. H.C. Coombs. 
(Ibid.). Later attempts to institute this approach 
are discussed in Chapters Eive and Eight.
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A formal relationship between the Department and the 
Directorate was set out in Cabinet Agendum 597 of 18 
February 1944 in the following terms:
....there should be the closest possible collaboration 
and direct communication between the Department of 
External Territories and the Army. (Through the 
Director of Research).
...the Department of External Territories should be 
the Secretariat for the Cabinet Sub-Committee /"on 
Papua New Guinea_7.
...the Minister for External Territories should be 
the responsible Minister in all matters relating to 
Civil Administration in Papua and New Guinea 
whether for immediate or post-war application.
However, the Directorate emerged as Ward's chief advisory 
group and became heavily involved in planning for civil 
administration; the original arrangement was obviously 
ineffective, and so a year later a more detailed proposal 
was approved by the Cabinet Sub-Committee. This was 
initially proposed by the Department of External 
Territories, but after bouts of bargaining it became so 
complex that it could only have made matters worse.
It provided:
Department of External Territories to communicate 
direct with the Administrative Unit (ANGAU) in routine 
matters and with the Director of Research in matters 
of importance and policy matters. Copies of routine 
memoranda to be sent to Director of Research.
Director of Research to send to External Territories 
copies of communications sent to ANGAU through the 
Lieutenant General Administration and New Guinea 
Force whether such matters originate with the 
Director of Research or with the Department of 
External Territories.
160. CRS A518, item G815/1/1, 18 February 1944.
161. Ibid., February 1945 (full date not shown)
137
ANG-AIT to send to External Territories copies of 
communications sent to L.H.Q. on all matters except 
those of a purely military character.
Any matter of policy on which Angau desires a 
decision to be submitted to the Department of External 
Territories through the Director of Research for 
consideration of the Cabinet Sub-Committee.
Reports /“"representations” deleted_7 by Angau as 
to conditions in the Territories on~the point of 
view of civil affairs therein to be made available 
to External Territories at least monthly for the 
information of the Cabinet Standing Sub-Committee.
Secretary, Department of External Territories, and 
the Director of Research to confer at least once a 
fortnight, alternatively at Canberra and Melbourne 
as convenient to them. The report to be submitted 
to the Minister for External Territories after each 
conference.
Although this charter did not exceed the Directorate's 
original terms of reference as an information­
gathering agency, it emphasised its central role; the 
Directorate, it should be noted, was not required to 
distribute its own policy proposals for information. 
Moreover, two paragraphs of the original draft were 
deleted. These provided:
Any submission relating to civil administration in 
the Territories to be made through the Department of 
External Territories to the Minister for External 
Territories and not to the Minister for the Army.
Copy of the permanent Agendum to be supplied to 
Director of Research and through him to Angau with 
request that submissions to be made to the Department 
of External Territories upon any item thereon. A 
request also to be made for suggestions for any 
additions to the Permanent Agendum.
The deletion of these paragraphs represented a defeat 
for the Department, whose role was reduced to that of
162. Ibid
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a cipher. Relations between the Directorate and the
Department reached a sorry state, with the Secretary
unable to limit access to his Minister by the highly
unorthodox group of interlopers nor to control the
subjects upon which submissions could in any case be 
163made. It suggests an extraordinary lack of sensibility
and, one would think, responsibility on the part of the 
Minister that he should allow interference of this scale 
with the obligations of the civil bureaucracy. The 
problems of co-ordination and the farcical nature of the 
relationship between Department and Directorate are 
apparent from the travel arrangements proposed, like 
those for heads of rival fiefdoms.
Relations were every bit as bad as they appeared 
from the Sub-Committee Agendum. By 1945, Colonel Murray 
recalls, "Conlon and some of his staff'1 had taken to 
calling the Secretary for External Territories and two 
senior New Guinea officers from Angau "the Chan brothers 
and other less kindly substantives" because of their
16 4"stonewalling policies in Angau and External Territories". 
What should have been an alliance of experience with 
talent had become a scattered, disparate assortment of
163. CRS A518, item G815/1/1, entitled "Post-War 
Reconstruction - Liaison with Army Research 
Directorate" contains only three folios. Had the 
Secretary's bid succeeded, he would have been swamped 
with paper, as eventually happened after the war.
164. Murray notes, op. cit., p. 38. The men in question 
were Halligan, Lonergan and Vertigan. The "Chan" was 
the train which made its funereal way from Adelaide 
to Alice Springs.
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competing factions. The enormous disruption caused in 
Papua New Guinea by the war could possibly be overcome 
by a positive development programme, but this could be 
introduced only if there were a smooth transition to 
civil rule and general agreement on progressive policies. 
Unfortunately, the situation grew even less promising, 
owing to a radical change in the balance of forces as 
the war drew to a close.
Conlon’s eclipse
With Curtin*s death in July 1945 a vital link in 
Conlon*s network of influence was broken; his ties with 
Chifley, the new Prime Minister, were by no means
1 RRstrong. ' Moreover, G-eneral Blarney had by this time 
recommended that the orthodox system of Army control 
through a Military Board be restored and he stepped
a r r
down as Commander-in-Chief on 1 December 1945. Once 
he lost the delegated power that had flowed to him from 
Blarney, Conlon was at a great disadvantage. He had no 
permanent organization to support him, no source of 
formal authority, and he was surrounded by ’’oppositionists'* 
(to use Kerr's term) who had been alienated by the 
Directorate's methods, or lack of them, during its years 
of power. Kerr has said, "In terms of the great centres 
of national power Alf's writ ceased to run with the
165. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969*
166. Long, op. cit., pp. 578-9.
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1 £7termination of the war.” On 8 January 1946 Oonlon
was succeeded as Director of Research by Colonel F.B.
168Lambden. Angau, too, had a limited future, although
many of its personnel were ready to join the civil
administration, some resuming and many more beginning
their careers. The staff of the Department of External
Territories, although small in numbers, assumed
responsibility for exercising the full powers of the
Australian government over Papua New Guinea immediately
the National Security Regulations were repealed. The
Directorate had no such personnel or authority to carry
its influence into the post-war years. Its staff, mainly
academics, wished to resume their work in the universities;
only the small group who joined the Australian School
of Pacific Administration retained contact with the
170Territory, and then without a formal policy role. The
task of sustaining the innovative drive of the Directorate 
of Research and Civil Affairs fell to the only man from 
its staff who subsequently worked in the Territory: the 
Administrator of Papua New Guinea from 1945 until 1952, 
Colonel Jack Keith Murray.
167. Benevolent Society, op. cit., p. 31.
168. CRS A518, item H800/1/7, 8 January 1946.
169. The fate of the Australian School of Pacific 
Administration is discussed in Chapters Five 
and Six.
CHAPTER THREE
THE ADMINISTRATORS MURRAY
Keith Murray - University, war service and 
a career - Murray and the Directorate 
School of Civil Affairs - Administrator 
wanted - Leonard Murray - Suspension 
of Papuan Administration, 1942 - Rejection
of Leonard Murray - The Barry Commission 
Anomalous findings - Colonel J.K. Murray, 
Administrator
Keith Murray
Keith Murray is a slightly-built, wiry man of 
less than medium height. He has a fairly narrow face 
with even features, grey hair that has not receded in 
old age, and a clipped moustache. He speaks in a 
considered manner with an "educated Australian” accent, 
quietly but with an air of constant interest and 
enquiry, extremely courteous in an unfashionable way 
and always aware of those around him. He enjoys 
conversation, while expecting attention from his 
listeners, and has a sense of occasion, so that he tends
142
to become the central figure. Murray gives the impression 
of a contained, alert personality, accustomed to 
authority and recognition of his status. His wife,
Evelyn, is a well-proportioned woman, taller and heavier 
than Murray, strong in character and ready to support 
her husband, who is several years her senior, with clearly 
stated opinions. Keith and Evelyn Murray have obviously 
supported and relied on each other in a variety of 
situations over many years. They have no children. They 
live in a small, shaded house in the university suburb 
of Saint Lucia, Brisbane.
Murray*s childhood was not unhappy, but it was 
unsettled and by no means secure, financially. He was 
born at Brighton, Melbourne on 8 February 1889 to John 
and Elinor Mary Murray (nee Grant). A sister was born
ithe following year but died in 1894. Murray's 
grandfather, Y/illiam Murray, was a tea merchant of some 
substance who had migrated from Invernesshire. John 
Murray, Keith's father, was educated at Scotch College, 
Melbourne, and was cared for by a guardian after both 
parents died while he was still young. John Murray was 
left in comfortable circumstances from his father’s 
estate, but had little left of his inheritance when he 
married Elinor Grant in 1887. The couple separated in 
1891, the two children remaining with their mother. John
1. The biographical details are taken from Colonel
Murray's notes, op. cit., pp. 16-23; interview with 
Murray, 12 December 196>6; and Brian Jinks, J>K.
Murray: A Brief, Port Moresby, mimeo, 1968, a history 
seminar paper, University of Papua New Guinea, with 
corrections, comments and additions by Murray.
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Murray died in July 1916. Elinor Murray moved to New South 
Wales after the separation and her son only once saw his 
father to remember him: in about 1898, when he and his 
mother paid a visit to Melbourne to enquire if there was 
any residue from William Murray's estate. Elinor Murray 
possessed no skills, but she was a strong-willed woman 
and able to support herself and her son as best she could 
by taking generally domestic work; at one time she 
worked as a stewardess on one of the North Coast Steam 
Navigation Company's vessels plying between Sydney and 
Newcastle. In such ways she managed to keep her son at 
school and maintain a home for them both. Elinor Murray 
died in Sydney in December 1950, aged 83. Colonel Murray 
has said that he finds it "impossible to pay an adequate
ptribute to her". She was a Roman Catholic, educated in 
convent schools, but possessed a broad outlook on 
religious matters which she passed on to her son; this, 
coupled with his wide education, went a good way towards 
shaping his outlook.
Murray moved about the Sydney area with his mother 
for several years, during which he attended no fewer 
than seven State primary schools and five denominational 
primary schools (one Protestant, four Roman Catholic).
He completed his secondary schooling at St. Joseph’s 
College, Hunter's Hill, between 1904 and 1907, his main 
academic achievements being that he topped the State in
2. Murray notes, p. 18
Intermediate Chemistry and was third in that subject at 
the Leaving Certificate examination. Murray says that 
he was treated generously at St. Joseph*s, although he 
found the atmosphere occasionally restrictive; he recalls 
that copies of The Descent of Man and The Origin of Species 
were confiscated before he completed them. These 
restrictions on his curiosity gave him an insight into 
the problems of inquiry and gave rise to his life-long 
impatience with doctrine. He remembers particularly the 
orthodoxy of St. Joseph’s and the contradictions between 
the British history he had learned at primary school and 
the nSt. Patrick’s Lay and Ireland” approach at the 
College. His mother regularly bought nev/spapers and 
these formed a link between the world at large and the 
College to which Murray did not wholly belong. At the 
end of 1907 the College applied for a university bursary 
on Murray's behalf and he was awarded a half-grant of 
£25 per year. He took chemistry, in which he already 
excelled, and he was advised to take Latin, French and 
mathematics as well. After a year marked by a good deal 
of self-discovery despite (or perhaps because of) the 
fact that he lived at home, Murray gained a High 
Distinction in chemistry and failed his other subjects.
He then obtained a cadetship in the State public service, 
being posted to the Chemist’s Branch at Cowra Experimental 
Station in 1909*
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University, war service and a career
Murray began the agriculture course at Sydney 
University in 1911 as a member of the second group to 
enter the faculty. He gained Upper Second Class Honours 
in 1914 - being very close to a First - as well as taking 
three extra Arts subjects in each of the last two years 
of the Agriculture degree and graduating in Arts in 1915.
It was typical of Murray that he repaid £25 to the 
bursaries fund for his earlier failure in Arts I. During 
his last two years at the University Murray lived at St. 
John's College on a scholarship. The rector, Monsignor 
O'Brien, "was kind and freely available, sympathetic in 
philosophical discussions generally and in relation to 
theism, atheism and agnosticism, which rather absorbed 
me". Murray was a member of the University of Sydney 
Regiment and a first-class rifle shot, gaining an Imperial 
Universities Badge and the University Rifle Club gold 
medallion. He was awarded a University Diploma in Military 
Science in 1913 and, upon completing his degree and a 
few more months at Cowra, he went into the Army, being 
promoted Captain in 1916.
From July 1916 to January 1917 Murray served in the 
Sea Transport Service as adjutant on troop transports 
between Australia and England, but was then released and 
went to Hawkesbury Agricultural College, where he taught
3. Murray notes, p. 24
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for a few months. This did not satisfy him, and so he 
joined the Australian Army Veterinary Corps as a Private 
and again went overseas. After the Armistice, Murray 
was granted leave under the A.I.E. Educational Scheme to 
undertake the National Diploma in Dairying course at 
Kilmarnock, Ayrshire, where he topped the course in gaining 
his Diploma at the end of 1919. He returned home hy way 
of an extensive tour of universities and diarying schools 
in Canada and the United States, arriving in Sydney in 
March 1920 to take up an appointment as Lecturer in Dairy 
Bacteriology and Technology at Hawkesbury. In December 
1923 Murray was appointed Principal of Gatton Agricultural 
College, Lawes, Queensland, after interviews with J.D.
Story and E.G. Theodore; and, in 1927, foundation 
Professor of Agriculture in the University of Queensland.
He held both posts concurrently until his appointment as 
Administrator of Papua New Guinea in 1945.
Citizen soldier
In 1935 Murray joined the 25th Battalion, Darling 
Downs Regiment, from the Reserve of Officers, with the 
rank of Captain.^- He achieved the rank of Lieutenant- 
Colonel and command of the Battalion in 1939. In that 
year Murray volunteered for the 2nd A.I.P. and was a 
candidate for appointment as Brigade Machine Gun Officer 
in 18 Brigade. By this time, however, he was over
4. This section is based on Murray’s notes, pp. 30-34.
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50 and the recommendation for his appointment was not 
approved on the grounds of age. Instead, Murray was 
appointed G.S.O. II (Training) at Northern Command 
headquarters. While taking a staff officers' course at 
Seymour, Victoria in 1940, Murray was seriously injured 
in a Bren carrier accident and spent three months in 
hospital and convalescing. Upon his return to duty he 
was promoted Colonel and appointed Commandant of the 
Queensland Line of Communications Training Depot at 
Redbank, Queensland. In 1942 Murray was transferred from 
the Australian Military Forces to the A.I.F. and posted 
as second in command of the North Eastern Training 
Centre, an enlarged command created after the return of 
the 2nd A.I.F. from the Middle East campaign. Late in 
1943 he transferred to Allied Land Forces Headquarters, 
Melbourne, initially to undertake a potentiality survey 
of the Northern Territory and to investigate such matters 
as the Army farms in the area. His reports were by no 
means favourable.
Murray and the Directorate
In Melbourne Murray met Conlon and some of his staff 
and joined the Directorate of Research towards the middle 
of 1944. Murray differed from almost all other members 
of the Directorate in several ways. Although he shared 
the breadth of education and interest of the other staff, 
his main training and profession lay in the area of the
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sciences rather than the humanities. He was older than 
the great majority of his colleagues and possessed very 
much wider experience in both military and educational 
administration. Murray was a somewhat paradoxical figure: 
a liberal, tolerant humanitarian by upbringing and 
intellectual conviction, he was also a man whose attitudes 
had been shaped by the mores of the early years of the 
century and by the exercise of authority over a long 
period. The potential conflicts in these traits of 
Murray's character had not developed before the war and 
were unremarkable in a Directorate peopled by unorthodox 
personalities. However, in circumstances of tension 
within more ordered institutions they could lead to 
apparent contradictions in Murray's conduct.
While in the Directorate Murray was engaged more 
in survey work than in long-range legal and administrative 
planning, travelling throughout New Guinea, Papua and 
the British Solomon Islands. He does not claim to have 
been particularly close to other members of the 
Directorate, nor to have made a particular impression 
upon them prior to his appointment to the School of Civil 
Affairs. Murray worked initially with two veterinarians, 
A.P.S. Ohman and William Grainger, on agricultural and 
animal husbandry policy for the Northern Territory and 
Papua New Guinea. In late 1944 he was attached to Angau 
for visits to agricultural centres and training 
establishments in Papua, moving on to tour New Guinea 
with the assistance mainly of U.S. forces.
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Murray's wartime observations in Papua New Guinea
are too detailed and in many cases too technical to be
5dealt with in this study. The main features were his 
visits to the Morobe, Manus, New Britain and Bougainville 
Districts, to the Highlands area and to Guadalcanal. 
Murray was at Finschhafen at the time of Mr. Ward's 1944 
visit to New Guinea and subsequently discussed islands 
affairs with General Blarney in Port Moresby. He 
particularly investigated the production of quinine at 
the experimental station at Aiyura (Eastern Highlands 
District) and his assessment of Manus as having "third- 
class" agricultural potential was a factor influencing
7his later advice to the Minister on the island’s future. 
Murray gained an accurate impression of the war's impact 
on the Territories and of the attitudes of the troops 
and Angau personnel. He was not unimpressed by Angau 
efforts, forming the opinion that the Unit played a part 
in changing old outlooks on the administration of New 
Guinea. Murray was developing a deep interest in the 
Territories and it is significant that his attitudes 
were shaped while he was a disinterested observer and 
researcher, beginning his investigations with only the 
most basic knowledge of the area. He has observed, "I
5. Details are in Murray's notes, pp. 35, 40-51.
6. The impression created by Ward during this visit, 
which is discussed later, was of considerable 
importance in determining public attitudes towards 
him and his associates (including Murray) in later 
years.7. The Manus question is discussed in the next Chapter.
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knew no more of...P.N.G. ¿“in 1943_J7 'than the general 
run of Australians and that would he little indeed. 
Everything in most minds was subordinated to the needs 
of the S.W.P.A. situation (availability of labour and
gP.I.R. recruitment).” But Murray was ready to learn 
more about the islands when he took charge of the School 
of Civil Affairs in 1945.
School of Civil Affairs
The first proposals for the School of Civil Affairs
were made at least twelve months before its establishment
qm  January 1945. A strong case for it was made out in 
one of the Directorate of Research papers referred to in 
the previous Chapter. The paper argues:
....expansion of ANGAU raises the problem of training 
the selected recruits...They will lack the background 
knowledge necessary to deal with problems of native 
administration, which have become more difficult as 
a result of the war...This training is also needed 
by those members of the present staff who were taken 
into the unit without any previous training in 
colonial administration...The establishment of an 
Army school to provide this training is an immediate 
necessity...The course will be intensive, as it will 
need to be sufficiently short to permit all students 
to attend the school within a reasonable time.
Murray recalls that the School's function "was to train 
suitable candidates (volunteers from the services) for 
military government in P.N.G., Borneo, Morotai etc. as
8. Murray notes, p. 49. The abbreviations refer to the 
South-West Pacific Area and the Pacific Islands 
Regiment.
9. Like the Directorate of Research, the School of 
Civil Affairs left no records that are currently 
accessible.
151
areas south of the equator were occupied by allied 
10forces”. The candidates were selected by interview
panels which at various times included such people as
Professor D.S. McElwain, Murray and Mr. Cyril Chambers,
M.H.R. Staff were drawn mainly from the Directorate and
provided a staff-student ratio of one to eight. Subjects
studied included Law, Anthropology, G-overnment and
Geography in courses of three months duration. Murray
supervised the first two courses, which were conducted
within the Royal Military College, Duntroon. He requested
that his appointment as Chief Instructor should be in an
acting capacity only, since he wished to write up the
findings of his New Guinea tour and conduct follow-up
studies. Murray*s most pleasing recollection of the
School is that he was able to attend classes on New
Guinea affairs conducted by experts in their fields, but
it is likely that the staff were more difficult to
administer even than most academics, and there were
several clashes between lecturers and officers with New
11Guinea field experience. Murray gave lectures on 
agricultural potential and development, but was otherwise 
engaged with administrative detail and with planning a 
permanent status for the institution.
10. The information in this and the following passage 
is drawn from Murray*s notes, pp. 56-8.
11. Interviews with Mr. W.E.T. Tomasetti, 20 November 
1968; Mr. G.C. O'Donnell, 15 June 1969; Mr.
J.K. McCarthy, 8 November 1968. Among the staff
of the School only Mr. Peter Ryan, who was tutoring 
students, had worked as a field officer in Papua 
New Guinea. No field staff ever held permanent 
academic posts at either the School of Civil Affairs 
or the Australian School of Pacific Administration.
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It was the intention of Gonlon and his advisers that
the School should continue, as a civil institution after
the war, to fill the serious gaps in the training of
field staff for Papua New Guinea. The aim was to seek
affiliation with an established university, giving the
peacetime institution a measure of autonomy by statute.
The three-month introductory courses would be followed,
once the students had gained some field experience, by
two-year courses of full tertiary standard providing
credits towards a degree. Gonlon obtained some finance
to begin work on a permanent site and Colonel Murray
began negotiations with the Minister for Internal Affairs,
Mr. J.S. Collings, for possible locations near the Canberra
University College. However, Murray recalls, ’’the
D.Q.M.G....was unsympathetic and unhelpful. The Army may
well have had more urgent projects, but it was
unfortunate for the School. Further pressure was of no 
1 3avail”. This was a sign that the Conlon drive would
falter for lack of a permanent institutional base. Few
of the established New Guinea interests had reason to
support the A m y  School. Pre-war administrative officers
favoured training in the image of their old services.
They saw their postings to courses as something of a
reflection on their competence as field officers, and
were unimpressed by the theoretical approach to subjects,
14particularly anthropology. The Department of External
12. Murray notes, p. 58.
13. Ibid., pp. 58-9.
14. Interviews as in footnote 11.
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Territories favoured training under its own control, as 
its later dealings with the Australian School of Pacific 
Administration showed. To the settler community the 
School represented the twin evils of continued military 
control of New Guinea and entrenchment of the policy 
favoured by Ward and Conlon. The settler attitude soon 
found expression through Robson and the Pacific Islands 
Monthly.
In an unattributed article in the June 1945 article
of the Monthly, Murray first came to public attention in
connection with New Guinea affairs. The circumstances
and tone of the article, as well as its treatment of
Murray, set the pattern for press comment on his role in
New Guinea for the next seven years: he was associated
with the problem, but not singled out for blame.
"Depressing End of the First Glass” is the sub-heading
of the article, which maintains that the plan for the
School was "faulty in conception", without stating what
1 5that conception should have been. It continues:
The plan seems to have been the product of the 
combined genius of Mr. Ward, Minister for External 
Territories, and Colonel Conlon, who is called a 
"Director of Army Research", but who has been 
described disrespectfully to us in other language.
He seems to have much to do with the School, but 
has no apparent standing in connection with 
Territories administration...Present information 
suggests that there was too much anthropology in
15. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 11, June 1945, p. 17. The
article refers to "statements made to this journal" 
and gives details which would have been known only 
to individuals closely associated with the School. 
It was probably provided by a pre-war officer 
attending the first short course in early 1945.
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the School, and too much Gonlon everywhere,. .The 
students describe the School itself as a farce... 
The students expected that the School would give 
them a well-rounded-out picture of tropical 
administration. Instead, it was devoted to a very 
large extent to instruction on native affairs and 
native welfare. European and economic affairs 
were comparatively neglected. "It was definitely 
an Eddie Ward show, so far as atmosphere and 
politics were concerned,” said one student...
Little improvement can be expected until the School 
is freed from Labour Party politics, Canberra 
bureaucracy, Army headquarters and anthropology 
rampant.
However, the article specifically absolves from blame
for this situation "the man in charge (Colonel Murray,
an expert agriculturalist) or the Second in Command
(Colonel Piddington, an anthropologist)”. There were
probably two reasons for Murray’s escape on this
occasion: his manner was too obviously military to
invite attack and the opposition wished to concentrate
their spleen upon the men whom they then saw as the main
threats to their positions. The article also bears
out the impression gained by some officers who attended
the early courses at the School that Murray was a
reserved figure, not obviously associated with the Conlon 
16group. Murray has stated, however, that he continued 
to be closely involved with planning, being drawn 
further into New Guinea affairs owing to a growing 
interest in the survey of agricultural potential he had 
begun; at one time he considered applying for the 
position of post-war Director of Agriculture. But as
16. Interviews as in footnote 11.
17. Murray notes, p. 59; Murray interview, 14 December
1966 .
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far as Murray was aware there was some time before firm 
decisions would be required.
Administrator wanted
In mid-1945 the Directorate of Research was planning
on the basis that hostilities would end in about twelve
1 Rmonths time, or possibly as late as the end of 1946.
The assumptions were that the Japanese would be slowly 
"mopped-up" from the islands bypassed in MacArthur's 
advance; that the campaign against the Japanese islands 
would be long and costly; and that, in the intervening 
period, stability would have to be restored by military 
administrations in the areas previously occupied by the 
Japanese. Once this had been achieved there would be a 
phased transfer of control back to civilian authorities.
This was the meaning of the ”smooth transition" to civil 
government propounded in the position paper referred to 
in the previous Chapter. An important assumption in the 
paper was that the military administrations, having 
progressive views inculcated by the School of Civil 
Affairs, would be able to institute sufficient reforms 
to make it impossible for the restored civil administrations 
to revert to pre-war policies. In Papua New Guinea 
progress was to begin with the appointment of a suitable 
Administrator in 1945, giving him time to settle in and
18. Murray notes, p. 52; Murray interview, 12 December 
1966; Kerr interview, 30 June 1969. The 
restoration of civil administration is discussed 
in the next Chapter.
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arrange an orderly assumption of responsibility. The 
positions of Administrator and directors of Public 
Health, Education, Agriculture and Public Works were 
advertised in the Commonwealth Gazette in July 1945 and 
later in Army Routine Orders and the press, including, 
ironically, the Pacific Islands Monthly. B y  the time 
applications closed, atomic bombs had been dropped in 
Japan and the war was over.
In August 1945 Murray was visiting the main Army 
camps in eastern Australia, interviewing candidates for 
short courses at the School of Civil Affairs.20 While 
at Liverpool, near Sydney, he felt ill and was admitted 
to Concord hospital with malaria and appendicitis. While 
there he read the Routine Order advertising the 
position of Administrator, applications for which closed 
on 31 August 1945. Murray submitted a brief, rather
21poorly typed application just before the closing date.
On 16 September he was advised that he had been 
appointed Administrator of the Territory of Papua-New 
Guinea under the provisions of the Paoua-New Guinea 
Provisional Administration Act 1945.
Leonard Murray
Two obvious questions arise concerning Murray*s
19. Commonwealth of Australia, Government Gazette No. 144, 
26 July 1945; Army Routine Orders, 10 August 1945; 
P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 1, August 1945, p. 10.
20. Murray notes, p. 54.
21. The source of this information cannot at present 
be disclosed.
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appointment. Why was a man with New Guinea experience
not appointed? And, if not an experienced man, why,
particularly, Colonel Murray? It was not for want of
pressure in favour of an experienced Administrator, nor
owing to a dearth of candidates with other careers of
some distinction. Of the two candidates with pre-war
standing, Brigadier-General Sir Walter McNicoll,
Administrator of the Mandated Territory from 1934 until
the Japanese occupation, was 68 years of age in 1945 and
22too old to "be considered. In any case, his departure 
from New Guinea had occurred in unfortunate circumstances, 
and there was no indication that any section of the 
Territory's community favoured his return.^
By contrast, the last Administrator of Papua, Hubert
Leonard Murray, was in a strong position until the early
months of 1945, at which time he was 58 years old, healthy 
24and alert. His background as a colonial official was 
virtually impeccable, beginning with his appointment as 
private secretary to his uncle, Sir Hubert Murray, 
Lieutenant-Governor of Papua, in 1909. Leonard Murray, 
as he was generally known, subsequently served as official 
secretary to the Lieutenant-Governor from 1916 until 
Sir Hubert Murray's death in 1940. Leonard was not merely
22. Hasluck, op. cit., p. 669. An unofficial report in 
late 1944 stated that McNicoll had retired (P.I,M., 
Vol. 15 No. 3, October 1944, p. 7).
23. The fall of Rabaul is discussed later in this Chapter.
24. Details in this passage are drawn from Pacific 
Islands Yearbook and Who's Who, 10th edition,
Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1968, p. 694.
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a manager of social affairs and ceremonies, if only 
because there was little of either during Sir Hubert’s 
long tenure. In the manner of the impoverished Papuan 
service, he served also as master of the Lieutenant- 
G-overnor’s official yacht, the Laurabada, accompanying 
his uncle on his many tours of Papua and gaining a 
knowledge of the country second only to Sir Hubert's.
During this period he was appointed a member of the 
Executive Council and made a Commander of the Order of 
the British Empire. The office of Lieutenant-G-overnor 
lapsed at Sir Hubert's death and Leonard succeeded his 
uncle as Papua's chief executive when he was appointed 
Administrator, for a five-year term, on 16 December 1940.
By that time even the settler community had become 
reconciled to the benevolent paternalism of the "Murray 
tradition", which seemed destined to continue for many 
years, at no great cost to the taxpayers and with marginal 
benefit to the people of Papua.
Suspension of Papuan Administration, 1942
At the time Leonard Murray was appointed Administrator,
life in Port Moresby had already been disturbed to some
extent by the presence of Australian soldiers, the
25first of whom had arrived early in 1939* By the time 
the war with Japan broke out there were some 1,250 troops 
in Port Moresby under the command of Brigadier (later
25. Barry, Civil Administration, op. cit., p. 3.
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Major-General) Basil Morris, who had arrived in Papua in
p/TMay 1941. Relations between the civil administration
and the military authorities were marked by no more than
minor tensions, such as the question of the Army's use of
the Port Moresby sports ground, until additional troops
27arrived aboard the liner Aquitania in January 1942.
The soldiers were alleged to be poorly trained and badly 
equipped. Their presence in Port Moresby created some 
problems of discipline and hygiene, so that in mid-January 
Murray complained to Canberra that he was not being kept 
informed by the military authorities. On 23 January there 
was a false air raid alarm, causing most of the Papuans 
in the town to flee. An actual raid then took place in 
the early hours of 3 February, damaging a number of 
buildings, including major commercial centres such as the 
Burns Philp store. Many buildings were looted by troops 
during the next forty-eight hours and Port Moresby became 
virtually ungovernable, particularly since the civil 
administration had been disrupted by a call-up of all 
able-bodied Europeans on 27 January.
By this time Morris was anxious to assume control, 
and Murray was ready to agree, but for two factors:
Morris' peremptory treatment of civilians in general and 
the Administrator in particular; and the Australian 
government's conflicting advice on whether the military
26. Ibid.; Dudley McCarthy, op. cit., p. 42.
27. The information in this and the following passage
is drawn from Barry, Civil Administration, op. cit.,
pp. 3-26.
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noshould take charge. Murray eventually authorised an
order that outstations in Papua be evacuated, but made
no specific reference to the future welfare of the
village people. In the event, the instruction was
received at only some centres and none of the officers
pqat those places acted upon it. J Relations between the
civil and military authorities had meanwhile degenerated
to the point of chaos. Finally, on 12 February 1942 the
National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations were
gazetted, vesting authority in the "Senior Officer of the
military forces” and directing all other persons to
“50comply with his orders. After one last delay caused 
by further breakdowns in communication between the 
Administrator and Canberra, Murray and his senior officials 
left Port Moresby by flying boat on 15 February. Leonard 
Murray never again visited Papua in an official capacity.
Rejection of Leonard Murray
During the war years the Administrator of Papua spent 
most of his time apart from the centre of events. Late 
in 1942 Committees of Review were set up to advise the 
government on claims for war damage compensation lodged 
by European former residents of the Territories, and 
Murray was made a member of the Papuan group; this was
28. The events of the period are too complex to be 
detailed here, but Barry, ibid., pp. 8-9, 13-16 
discloses an extremely confused situation that was 
caused to some extent by the Canberra authorities.
29. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
30. Ibid., p. 22.
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his last formal duty. The Committees met approximately
twice a month during 1943 and rather less frequently in
•51
1944., being disbanded the following year. There is no 
evidence of direct links between the settlers and Murray 
during this period, and none of the press statements on 
Papuan affairs was attributed to him. The Pacific 
Islands Monthly went to some pains to dissociate Leonard 
Murray from anti-government comments, stating, M....the 
hon. Leonard Murray has courteously but firmly declined 
to supply any information to the newspapers”.^  Murray 
was equally removed from any association with the other 
interests dealing in Papuan affairs. He had no dealings 
with the Directorate of Research; his standing with 
Major-General Morris of Angau was low following the events 
of early 1942; he was unknown to the Minister for 
External Territories; and the Secretary of that 
department, Murray's only formal link with Papua, had 
almost no influence on events while the war lasted. 
However, Murray was a potentially important figure in the 
anti-Labor campaign being fought by the settlers. Prom 
their point of view it was far preferable to have the 
Murray paternalism extended to the whole of the post-war 
Territories than to face the avowedly anti-settler 
policies of the Minister and the Directorate. Thus from
31. P.I.M.. Vol. 13 No. 9, April 1943, p. 37.32. Occasional articles, such as "Govern or Get Out!" 
(P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 1, August 1944, p. 22) were 
attributed to a "former member of the Papuan public 
service" who was an "authoritative voice", but the 
material lacks polish and it is unlikely that Murray 
was associated with it.
33. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 3, October 1944, p. 7.
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the early months of 1944, with the whole of Papua firmly 
in allied hands, there were demands for the return of 
civilians and the restoration of civil administration 
to that Territory, with Leonard Murray resuming his post 
as Administrator.
On 30 March 1944 Mr. A.W. Fadden asked a series of
six questions in the House of Representatives on the
future government of Papua New Guinea, mentioning Leonard
Murray’s name in three of them. The direction of Padden's
criticism, and of the settlers’ concern, was indicated
in the following exchange, to which the Pacific Islands
34Monthly added its own supplementary answer:^
Padden:
Can the Minister say why Mr. Leonard Murray and certain 
members of his staff have been largely ignored by 
him in favour of unfledged Sydney University personnel, 
University professors and former members of the 
British colonial staff largely inexperienced in New 
Guinea conditions?
Ward:
Future policy in regard to the Territories has been 
entrusted to a Committee of Cabinet which will obtain 
the best advice available. All the data in the 
possession of the Department of External Territories 
and the officers of that Department will be available 
to the Committee. The Committee will also have at 
its disposal the valuable experience gained by the 
military authorities during the past two years...
Pacific Islands Monthly:
Replies which might truthfully have been made by the 
Minister:
...Mr. Leonard Murray, members of his staff and all 
experienced residents of the Territories have been 
ignored by the Minister in dealing with plans for the 
Territories, because it is feared that these persons’ 
views would almost certainly be unanimously at 
variance with those of the...clerks and politicians
34. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 10, May 1944, p. 5
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of Canberra. In the Territories there is a splendid 
opportunity to experiment with and popularise many 
new ideas of politicians, without fear of political
results....
The Minister’s reply suggests that Leonard Murray was, 
in fact, being excluded from planning, since he was 
neither an officer of the Department of External 
Territories nor one of the military authorities.
Nevertheless, he was still head of the ’Papuan Administration, 
temporarily suspended”, as Murray himself termed it,  ^
with a legitimate claim to a part in both war-time 
planning and post-war administration, according to the 
situation prevailing in 1944. Late in that year, however, 
it became apparent that Leonard Murray’s position was 
under serious threat.
The Barry Commission
In its issue of October 1944 the Pacific Islands 
Monthly reported that ”a leading Melbourne K.C.” had been 
asked by the Minister for External Territories to inquire 
into the suspension of civil administration in Papua.
The magazine continued prophetically:
Well-informed people are quite sure that the object 
of the inquiry is to blacken Mr. Leonard Murray, 
and the reputation of the Murray regime. It is 
indicated that neither the Port Moresby Brass Hats, 
nor Mr. Ward, are well-disposed towards Mr. Murray. 
Mr. Murray is a Menzies Government appointee, and
35. Ibid.
36. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 3, October 1944, p. 7. The 
Latin can be translated, ’’One word is enough for 
the wise!”
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is a member of a very famous family - two good 
reasons why he should now be hated in Canberra,
He also is one of the remaining man (sic) between 
the Brass Hats and the fat jobs which will be 
available in Australia's Pacific Territories, 
sooner or later, for out-of-work generals.
Verbum sapienti sat est!
On 17 November 1944, Ward appointed Mr, John 
Vincent Barry, K.C. as Commissioner under the National 
Security (Inquiries) Regulations to investigate:^
1 . All the circumstances relating to the suspension 
of the Civil Administration of the Territory of 
Papua in February, 1942.
2. Without restricting the generality of 1, the 
following particular matters
(a) Whether the Administrator and/or any members 
of the Legislative Council and/or any members of the Executive Council of Papua failed in their public 
duty to safeguard the Territory;
(b) Whether any action taken or omitted to be 
taken by the Military Commandant of the 8th Military 
District prior to noon on 14th February, 1942, 
contributed to any failure on the part of the Civil 
Administration of the Territory;
(c) Whether there was adequate co-operation 
between the Civil Administration and the military 
authorities in the Territory and if not who was 
responsible for the absence of such co-operation; and
(d) All other matters deemed relevant to the 
above.
The Commissioner heard evidence on eighteen days between 
12 December 1944 and 16 February 1945, sitting in 
Melbourne, Sydney, Townsville and Port Moresby, and 
submitting his report on 29 March 1945, the findings 
being made public in June. In the meantime, the Papuan 
Association of Brisbane had been formed in January 1945 
with the major objective of the "immediate restoration
57. Barry, Civil Administration, op. cit., p. iii.
38. Ibid., pp. 1, ¿0; P.I,M. ,~Vol. 15 No. 11, June 
1945, p. 3.
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of Murray Administration in Papua”, while the Anglican 
Bishop of New Guinea, Rt. Rev. P.N.W. Strong, urged in 
March that the “Murray regime” he re-established.^
Their efforts were of no avail, since the Commissioners 
report damned Leonard Murray in circuitous but 
unmistakeable terms. The Pacific Islands Monthly 
summary of the findings was, apart from an occasional 
adjective, clear and accurate:^
39
The only man whom the Commissioner criticises 
harshly - in fact, the only man whom he criticises 
at all - is the Administrator, Mr. Murray. He 
wraps his conclusions in courteous and even sugary 
language; but, in effect, he says that (a) Mr. 
Murray was thin-skinned, hypersensitive and legalistic 
in his attitude towards the Commandant; (b) Mr. 
Murray, to a degree that was deplorable in the 
circumstances, insisted upon frequent consultation with the Australian Government, at Canberra; (c)
Mr. Murray in his attitude towards the Army on his 
doorstep, was withdrawn and unco-operative; (d) Mr. 
Murray, in his communications with Canberra and 
Army, in the critical fortnight under review, 
showed no particular concern for the welfare of the 
natives, which should have been his particular care.
The Commissioner's language, by constrast, seemed to be
an exercise in obfuscation. When summing up the
Administrator's reaction to the circumstances, to "state
yt a ?the matter compendiously) Barry wrote•.
I consider the Administrator was, if I may use the 
phrase, the prisoner of circumstances, and those 
circumstances were of a kind so over whelming and 
so foreign to anything which his experience and 
training had made him familiar and the powers he had 
been accustomed to exercise enabled him to deal that 
it would be exacting an unresonably high standard to 
ascribe the necessity to make the military authorities 
supreme to any censurable failure on his part.
39* P.I»M., Vol. 15 No. 7, February 1945, p. 13.40. Sydney Morning Herald, 17 March 1945.
41. B.I.M.. Vol. 15 No. 11, June 1945, p. 3.42. Barry, Civil Administration, op. cit., p. 56.
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In other words, Leonard Murray had behaved only in the 
manner of a normal man during the crisis. Why this 
should have been reason to remove the Administrator from 
his job requires investigation.
The circumstances surrounding the setting up of the
Barry commission of inquiry were unusual and its
proceedings and findings were to some extent partial,
in the double sense that they tended to favour the
military and that, by a legal device, they dealt with
only some of the events between December 1941 and
February 1942. A further question concerned the reasons
for inquiring into events in Papua and not into the fall
of Rabaul, which led to considerable loss of civilian
life. The anomaly did not escape R.W. Robson who, on
12 January 1945, asked the Minister to add to Barry's
terms of reference the circumstances surrounding the
stranding of hundreds of civilians in Rabaul just before
43the Japanese invasion. On that occasion the M.V. 
Herstein, a cargo vessel of some 5,000 tons, was in 
Rabaul for several days before the Japanese sank her 
during their major air raid of 20 January 1942.^ The 
Administrator, Sir Walter McNicoll, was in Lae, where 
he had been taken ill, but the Government Secretary, Mr. 
H.H. Page, asked the Australian government for 
permission to use the ship to evacuate civilians. In
43. P.I»M ., Vol. 15 No. 6, January 1945, p. 6.
44. Hasluck, op. cit., p. 674. The remainder of the 
passage is drawn from this source.
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the event, the Herstein was sunk, Rabaul was bombed and
no reply was received, but even had it arrived it would
have given Page little comfort, since it merely suggested
that unnecessary personnel should be evacuated where
possible and that administrative staff should remain so
long as they had work to do. Subsequently, hundreds of
civilians died as a consequence of the Japanese invasion.
However, it was not until the announcement of the Barry
inquiry that concerted pressure arose for an
investigation into the Rabaul disaster. Not
surprisingly, R.W. Robson and the Pacific Islands Monthly
played a leading role, to be joined by Messrs. A.
Cameron and H.L. Anthony, who led the campaign in the
4-6House of Representatives. On 28 June 1946 a debate in 
the House on the fall of Rabaul, Ambon and Timor 
produced the following statement from the Prime Minister, 
Mr. Chifley:46
I see no purpose in raking over the dead ashes of 
the past. That opinion is held by men occupying 
higher positions in the world than I hold...I shall 
not order a survey of what has happened in the past, 
or be a party to the making of charges against 
people who, although they made mistakes believed 
at the time that they acted for the best.
Unfortunately, the policy was announced many months 
too late to be of any help to Leonard Murray.
The choice of Mr. J.V. (later Mr. Justice Sir John)
45. C.P.D., Vol. 187, pp. 1948-9, 1966-8, 27 June 1946.
46. Ibid., p. 1977, 28 June 1946. A military court
of inquiry into the Rabaul, Timor and Ambon 
episodes was convened on 13 May 1942, but its 
findings were not, of course, binding on any 
civil authorities involved (Hasluck, op. cit., 
p. 674). '
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Barry to conduct the civil administration inquiry was 
less than politic, in view of the questions which had 
already been asked about relations between Leonard 
Hurray and the Minister for External Territories and 
the fact that Barry had represented Mr. Ward during the 
Royal Commission into the "Brisbane Line" controversy. 
Moreover, the Commissioner’s terms of reference were 
unusual in two important respects: they ordered an 
investigation into actions taken in accordance with an 
executive direction, and aimed that investigation not 
primarily at the military authorities who may have 
hastened or hindered the carrying out of that direction, 
but at the officers who obeyed it. Since no loss of 
life occurred as a result of the acts or omissions of 
Murray and his staff and the only damage arose from 
Japanese action and looting by Australian troops, Mr. 
Robson and members of the Australian Opposition were 
justified in questioning the government’s attitude to 
both Leonard Murray and the debacle at Rabaul. The 
actions of the Australian authorities in these matters 
were extraordinary in their inconsistency.
Proceedings during the commission of inquiry were 
equally remarkable. Firstly, the hearings were held 
in camera (the Commissioner termed it "in private") since 
"the evidence would involve matters relating to national 
Security", although the effect on the war effort of 
events which had occurred almost three years earlier can
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only be guessed at. Secondly, although the Commissioner
was assisted by counsel and another officer ’’was given
leave to appear on behalf of any Army witnesses who were
required to give evidence”, the interests of the Papuan
staff were merely ’’watched” by a former legal officer of
the Territory service who was also a witness during the 
48proceedings. Thirdly, the inquiry concentrated on the 
particular matters in the terms of reference (item 2) 
rather than on ”all the circumstances” specified in item 
1. Thus it made no criticism of the Australian 
authorities, who had persisted with a system of dual 
control, through both the Ministers for the Army and 
External Territories, which had produced a series of 
conflicting and contradictory orders to the Administrator 
and the Commandant. It is worth noting that there was 
strikingly similar confusion in communications just prior 
to the fall of Rabaul.^
The thrust of the inquiry was directed at the 
conduct of the civil authorities and only incidentally 
at the Army. Of the 202 paragraphs of the report, 40 
deal with introductory and technical matters and 
conclusions, 143 concern the structure and conduct of 
the civil administration and events on outstations, and 
only 19 refer directly to the military. There are, 
moreover, two sections in the passages dealing with the
47. Barry, Civil Administration, op. cit., p. iii.
48. Ibid.
49. Hasluck, op. cit., pp. 673-4.
47
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Army that go to extreme lengths in suggesting mitigating
circumstances for the unruly conduct of the troops.
Paragraph 18, dealing with the arrival of soldiers on
the Aquitania on 3 January 1942 states, "The troops were
of the average age of 1&J- years and had received no
50proper training." It was obviously impossible for them
to be so young on average, unless their officers and
N.C.O.'s were teenagers and other ranks barely out of 
51school, and a later check of battalion records showed
that the average age among some 3,000 troops was 23 to
25 years, with an average of 8.3 months training. In
paragraph 67, one of only two dealing with looting by
the troops, some 400 words of the transcript of evidence
is quoted, with the apparent intention of showing that
the looting offences were excusable under the 
53circumstances. The subsequent paragraph of the report
is worth quoting in full to illustrate the lenient
attitude adopted towards the responsibilities of a
54military commander:
I am satisfied that the looting did not assume large 
proportions until after the second bombing raid but 
thereafter it is undoubted that the theft and
50. Barry, Civil Administration, op. cit., p. 4.
51. The assertion is repeated in Dudley McCarthy, 
op. cit., p. 44.
52. Hasluck, op. cit., p. 696.
53. The only other direct quoting of evidence occurs 
in a passage which shows Leonard Murray to have 
been excessively formal in his dealings with both 
the Commandant and the Commissioner (pp. 52-3 of 
the report).
54. Barry, Civil Administration, op. cit., pp. 25-6.
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destruction of civil property was general and 
extensive. I do not consider that it is part of 
the duties imposed upon me to examine the question 
of looting generally, but it is proper, however, 
that I should make some observations upon it. It 
must be borne in mind that there was a general 
belief in Port Moresby, which all the knowledge 
then available suggested to be well-founded, that 
the enemy would attack and invade Port Moresby.
If such an attack and invasion had been undertaken 
by the enemy at that stage it could have had only 
one outcome. The resources at the disposal of the 
Commandant were quite inadequate to enable any 
attack in strength to be repelled, and the general 
feeling was, therefore, that civilian property 
would either be destroyed by air attack or 
bombardment or fall into the hands of the enemy.
Under such circumstances it is not surprising that 
respect for private property, particularly where 
there was any appearance of abandonment, diminished 
to such an extent as no longer to act as a restraining 
influence. The civil administration was powerless 
to prevent the looting, and even if it had been 
functioning in full vigour, it could not have done 
so. Because of the lack of discipline of the 
troops under his command and the worthlessness of 
his insufficient Provost personnel, it was quite 
impossible for the Commandant, confronted as he was 
with an extraordinarily difficult and complicated 
situation, to take any effective steps to prevent 
the looting. I feel that to consider the Commandant 
blameworthy in respect of any of the looting that 
occurred between the first bombings and the departure 
of the members of the civil administration on the 
1 5th February (and it is with this period only 
that I am concerned) would be to take a completely 
unrealistic view of the matter.
The passage discloses several anomalies. The first 
is that the looting was one of nall the circumstances” 
set down for investigation in the first of the terms of 
reference. It obviously played a major part, together 
with the call-up of civil personnel, in creating almost 
impossible conditions for the Administrator, and should 
therefore have been acknowledged as a key factor in his 
defence. Secondly, the offence of looting occurs 
precisely in the conditions which are described in the
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passage: the circumstances create the offence; they 
do not excuse it. Thirdly, discipline must ultimately 
be the responsibility of a commander; there may be 
extenuating circumstances, but if in this case they 
were sufficient to exonerate the Commandant, then 
they should have gone even further towards pardoning 
the Administrator. The circumstances outlined in this 
paragraph of the report were precisely those which led 
the Administrator to order the abandonment of the 
outstations; an action for which he, by contrast, was 
criticised. Thus the only conclusion is that a 
double standard was applied to the conduct of the 
military commander, on the one hand, and to that of the 
civilian official, on the other. A second inquiry into 
the same circumstances may well have concluded that the 
Administrator did his best, albeit in an unimaginative 
way, under conditions rendered intolerable by the 
precipitate conscripting of his staff, by the looting of 
much of his capital by supposedly friendly soldiers, and 
by the inability of the Army commander to control his 
troops. It is not difficult to agree with Robson's 
contention that the inquiry was meant to "blacken" Leonard 
Murray. This was its effect: thereafter any application 
by Leonard Murray for the position of post-war Administrator 
was bound to be rejected.
Colonel J.K. Murray, Administrator
There were 53 applicants for the position of
35. Ibid.. pp. 6-7.
173
Administrator. They included five Major-Generals, an
Air Vice-Marshal, two Brigadiers, two Group-Captains,
two judges, several academics and a number of officers
of the pre-war Administrations of the Mandated Territory 
56and Papua. The applicants were reduced to a short
list of eighteen names, excluding Colonel Murray's: he
was placed well down the list on the grounds that he
lacked experience. At that point the leading contender
was a senior military officer who had played a leading
part in several of the Army's major campaigns: a former
regular soldier and solicitor. Close contenders were
the judges, an academic and Leonard Murray. Prom the
accounts of those who were close to events in Canberra
during September 1945 it seems that the recommendations
by the Department of External Territories came to the
attention of Conlon, who immediately protested to the
57Minister that they were unsuitable. The matter came 
before Cabinet on 11 September 1945. Colonel Murray's 
appointment was confirmed.
Murray has observed, "I have read that Conlon
'forced' my appointment on E.J. Ward. I doubt anyone's
ability to force something on Ward, who...came up
58through a hard school....". In ary event, the fact 
that Conlon exerted pressure on his behalf is no
56. The source of the information contained in this and 
the following passage cannot at present be disclosed.
57. Interviews with Sir John Kerr, 30 June 1969 and Mr. 
J.K. McCarthy, 8 November 1968. McCarthy said that 
Conlon "blew'his top and stormed off to Ward". Kerr 
termed the Murray appointment Conlon's "last fling" 
as Director of Research.58. Murray letter of 26 May 1969»
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reflection on Murray's suitability for appointment.
The short list was drawn up in the Department of 
External Territories, where appreciation of what was 
required in the post-war situation differed from that 
of the Minister and his advisers in the Directorate.
In seeking change, Ward was wholly consistent in 
favouring Conlon's recommendation of Murray as 
Administrator.
Murray was still recovering in Concord Repatriation 
Hospital when, on 16 September, he was advised of his 
appointment. He was eager to begin work and suggested 
to the Secretary for External Territories that he should 
aim to take over by 15 October. Murray's discharge from 
the Army was completed on 10 October and he was sworn in 
by Mr. Ward in the Minister's Sydney office on the 
following day. The appointment was for twelve months 
in the first instance but, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Papua-New G-uinea Provisional Administration 
Act, Murray held office "during the pleasure of the 
G-overnor-G-eneral". A salary of £2,500 plus £500 expenses 
was requested by the Department of External Territories, 
but approval was given for £2,000 plus £500. Leonard 
Murray's salary, by comparison, had been £1,500 plus 
£150 allowance for his also serving as navigator of the 
official yacht Laurabada. There was no income tax in
59. Murray notes, op. cit., p. 55. The rest of the
information in this passage is drawn from a source 
which cannot at present be disclosed.
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Papua New Guinea during Murray’s term as Administrator. 
The Administrator was entitled to six weeks annual 
leave and the Residency in Port Moresby was wholly 
furnished and maintained by the Administration. No 
provision was made for long-service leave or 
superannuation.
Murray arrived in Papua in the third week of 
October and soon advised the Minister that the takeover 
of the area south of the Markham River should take 
place on 30 October. On 31 October 1945 Murray began 
a term of almost seven years as Administrator of Papua 
New Guinea.
CHAPTER POUR
POST-WAR NEW GUINEA: CHAOS AND CONFLICT
Confusion in Port Moresby - Needs of civil 
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Declaration of intent - Quest for staff - 
Difficult conditions - Return of the settlers 
Unsatisfactory shipping - Cancellation of 
labour contracts - The cancellation 
controversy - War damage compensation 
Barry Committee on compensation - Differences 
on compensation - Problems of paying 
compensation - Settler opposition - 
Compensation and ’’collaboration” - Rebuilding 
Hanuabada - War surplus: its use and 
disposal - War surplus for settlers 
Commonwealth Disposals Commission investigates 
itself - Murray settles in - Tensions 
with the military - Problem at Manus 
Murray’s impressive start
Confusion in Port Moresby
Colonel Murray-arrived in Port Moresby to take 
up duty as Administrator on 23 October 1945, two and 
a half months after the first group of civilian
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officials had begun preparations for the re-establishment
iof civil administration. However, civilian organization
was such that there was no one at the airstrip to meet
2him when he arrived. One of the passengers on Murray's 
flight was Bishop Scharmach, of the Catholic Mission, and 
the new Administrator spent his first few official hours 
in Port Moresby having tea at the Bomana seminary, 
several miles from the town. "Ho one turned up from 
the Liaison Croup," Murray recalls, "...D.E.T. had failed 
to let /“them_7 know. Later someone saw my name on a 
passenger manifest and the name rang a bell of sorts... 
When being driven in to Port Moresby we met a party
from the Liaison Croup and I completed the journey with
■5it." This episode of minor confusion was a mild 
introduction to the problems Murray had to deal with 
during the next several years with a weakened and 
inexperienced staff.
The half-dozen officials of the Liaison Croup had 
been despatched by the Department of External Territories 
in some haste immediately the war ended. It was led 
by officers from the Department of the Army and included 
Mr. Robert Melrose, who had been Director of District 
Services and Native Affairs in the Mandated Territory 
at the outbreak of war.^ The partywas responsible for 
making preliminary arrangements for the restoration
1. P.A.R., 1945/46, pp. 2, 9.
2. Murray notes, op. cit., pp. 54-5.
3. Ibid.4. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 2.
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of civil control, "to determine in principle the method
of transfer...and the supplies and equipment which the
Civil Administration would require from stocks held by
the Army, and to devise means by which services essential
to both civil and military needs would be carried on so
that transfer would be effected as smoothly as possible".^
So the laboured style of the official summary put it,
but the public servant*s attitude was stated more
succinctly in a memorandum which said the problem was to
decide "who was liable for what". The Army personnel
7soon returned to Australia, and during the next two 
months Melrose carried a considerable burden of 
responsibility.
Melrose had worked in the Department of External 
Territories for most of the Pacific war. He had been in
Q
Salamaua when the Japanese occupied Rabaul, but since
he suffered from a heart condition he was unfit for
qservice with Angau. He had not been closely associated 
with the Directorate of Research, but Murray had come 
into contact with him and been favourably impressed.
"I was very glad to have Melrose," Murray has written.
"He was devoted to the Government new deal; slow to 
act, perhaps, for the conditions, but careful, hard 
working and pleasant." In the weeks before civil
5. Ibid., p. 3.
6. ORS A518, item E852/6/11, 20 August 1945.
7. Ibid.; P.A.R., 1945/46, pp. 2-3.
8. Dudley McCarthy, op. cit., p. 55.
9. Hasluck, op. cit., pp.''¿90-1 .
10. Murray notes, p. 55.
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administration was restored, Melrose showed a clear 
grasp of the priorities involved and his reports to 
Canberra give a sharp picture of the work that had to 
be done.
While Angau controlled Papua New Guinea many of
the facilities normally required by a civilian
community went unattended; were converted to military
use; or were damaged by enemy action or allied troops
(and in some cases by both). The list of requirements
compiled by Melrose was therefore a formidable one and
indicated the range of problems facing the civil
authorities. It included needs for shipping and air
transport; the currency and confidential codes to be
used in the country; the shortage of stoves and
typewriters; the handling of village evacuees; and
arrangements for taking over numerous Army installations,
including slipways, docks operating equipment, medical
stores, the old government printing office, hospitals,
the Sogeri school, the rice and coffee mills, the
telephone system, the power house, the water supply,
the gaol, the constabulary and its training depot, and
even the flora and fauna reserve at Hombrum Bluff,
11some twenty miles from Port Moresby. However, there 
was almost no civilian staff to take control from the 
Army; even had there been, they would have lacked office 
accommodation, housing, motor vehicles and even personal
11. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 20 August 1945
180
clothing and food, since commercial activity had been
1 2suspended in Papua for three and a half years. The
first post-war annual report provided a graphic summary
1 3of the position:
V/here to start was indeed a problem. The Army had 
everything, the civil authority nothing...A survey 
of the town was not encouraging. Buildings 
belonging to the Papuan Administration bore the 
traces of occupation by troops and of war; some had 
been damaged by bombs, others had fallen into 
disrepair and most of them needed a good deal of 
renovation and repair to fit them for civil use.
There were not sufficient to accommodate all 
Departments and their staffs...The area and buildings, 
which comprised the Australian New Guinea Administrative 
Unit headquarters at Konedobu about two miles from 
Port Moresby were accordingly taken over and as 
staff became available Departments moved in. It 
will be seen, therefore that administrative 
establishments and services are dispersed over a 
wide area...It is not without point in regard to 
the future to mention here that all buildings 
erected by Army were designed for Army needs and 
are therefore of a temporary nature with but a 
life of two or three years.
The annual report for 194-5/46 was the last writeen in 
the informal style of Sir Hubert Murray*s pre-war 
narratives,^ but even then it does not give a complete 
picture of the depressing situation which confronted 
those who returned to Papua New Guinea shortly after 
the war. Particularly depressing was the damage caused 
by the troops, as a Pacific Islands Monthly correspondent
12. Ibid.
13. P.A.R., 1945/46, pp. 5, 8, 9.
14. Prom 1946/47 the annual reports for both Papua and 
the Trust Territory were tailored, in Canberra,
to the format required by the United Nations 
Trusteeship Council; this involved a series of 
formal headings and voluminous statistics and 
virtually precluded any narrative.
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pointed out:.15
I will never be able to work out why the troops 
(who, after all, were human beings), who occupied 
the houses here, could so wantonly, and unnecessarily 
and callously do such damage to the places. Some 
are worse than others, admittedly - some even 
being so bad that it is a question if they are 
worth doing up...What is known as the "Top” Hotel 
was just ready for occupation when the balloon 
went up; it was occupied by troops (whose, I do 
not know), but practically everything that could 
be pulled out, in light and water fittings, basins 
and fixtures of all descriptions, were just torn 
out - not any trouble being taken to avoid tearing 
a bit out of the walls in doing so. It was fully, 
and very well furnished. Today, it is a skeleton....
The civil authorities had cause for complaint
against the armed forces, but could not do without them.
It was necessary to call on Angau, the Production
Control Board and various small units of the other
services to run the coastal vessels, provide air
transport, maintain telecommunications and postal
services, supervise labourers and run the electricity
generators and the water purification and refrigeration 
1 6plants. Civilians were in no position to provide
17for their own needs:
Apart from a store conducted by the Australian New 
G-uinea Production Control Board, which catered in
15. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 1, August 1946, p. 64. At the 
time Robson and his staff were denied entry to 
Papua New Guinea (see Chapter Two, p. 95) and the 
journal relied on reports and letters from ’’special 
correspondents”, some of whom, judging from the 
information they supplied, were public servants. 
This report refers to the Papua Hotel, owned by 
Burns Philp. The comment about the identity of the 
troops who lived there is disingenuous, for it was 
well known that the building had served initially
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a limited way for plantation and trade store 
requirements, a hostel which it had established 
in Port Moresby for the accommodation of 
civilians proceeding to and from plantations, 
and the Commonwealth Bank, which had been opened 
primarily to provide Savings Bank facilities 
for natives there was nothing in the nature of 
hotels, accommodation houses, shops and the many 
things required in civil life.
The smooth transition from military to civil control 
that had been planned in the Directorate of Research 
was clearly impossible, owing to the sudden end of the 
war and the speed of the military withdrawal from 
Papua, Nor could the civil authorities ignore settler 
interests, as the Directorate had tended to do.
Needs of civil government
The problems which confronted the civil administration 
call for some explanation: after all, military control 
had prevailed throughout the war and it might well be 
supposed that the civil authorities could resume operations 
very simply, with greatly expanded facilities available 
to them. Some of the factors which made this impossible 
have already been noted: the dispersal of Port Moresby’s 
military installations, their temporary nature, and 
the destruction of many civilian assets. There were 
other difficulties. The great allied bases at Milne
(cont.) as General Macarthur's field headquarters, although the General himself had lived at Government 
House, near Konedobu. By 1945, however, Government 
House, too, was uninhabitable and Murray lived in 
a house nearby until makeshift repairs were completed.
16. P.A.R., 1945/46, pp. 5-6.
17. Ibid., p. 5.
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Bay, Dobodura, Finschhafen and Manus were scattered
away from the main lines of civil communication and
1Rfrom the largest centres of population. To take 
advantage of the vast dumps of stores and equipment 
abandoned at the bases the civil administration required 
much labour and sea transport, but possessed neither.
In any case, the accumulations of ammunition, heavy 
trucks, drums of bitumen, oil and aviation fuel, signal 
wire and rotting bags of cement were of limited use to 
a civil government. Moreover, the bases had in most 
cases been run down months before the Provisional 
Administration was set up, so that moveable items which 
could be of value at the main centres and outstations, 
such as jeeps, typewriters, furnishings and refrigerators, 
had suffered from the climate, pilfering and cannibalizing 
long before the civil authorities were ready to assume 
control. By that time, the Commonwealth War Disposals 
Commission had sold off much of the material, using 
peculiar procedures that are discussed later in this 
Chapter. Nor were there the tradesmen, equipment and 
spare parts to maintain the more useful assets. Port 
Moresby's network of wartime roads had almost washed 
away after two wet seasons and vehicles were simply 
abandoned by the side of the track when they broke down. 
For a time Papua New Guinea was an early model of the
18. Some materials from these bases were used by the 
villagers in the immediate vicinity, but little 
of the remainder could be transported in the small 
coasters available to the Provisional Administration 
(see below). Some smaller bases, such as Vivigani 
and Kiriwina, were even more isolated.
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disposable society, except that there were no replacements 
for the items consumed. Before long, a country that had 
been transformed into a military warehouse had been 
thoroughly ransacked.
Murray assumes control
The difficulties encountered by the civil
authorities were increased by the rapid transfer of
military headquarters from Port Moresby to Lae prior to
August 1945; Major-General Morris and his Angau staff
19followed on 27 September 1945. The transfer resulted
from the Australian government's wish to resume civil
administration in the area south of the Markham River
20as soon as possible. The Angau move was particularly 
unfortunate, since the Administrator, who had to rely on 
the Royal Australian Air Force for travel by aeroplane, 
could spare little time from the many crises in Port 
Moresby to conduct full liaison with the military and 
Angau commanders. It was also apparent that the tensions 
and rivalries that had characterised relations during the 
war between the Army in New G-uinea and the various 
interests in Australia was being carried into the post­
war situation; one of the officers who observed events
throughout the period has maintained that the military
21"gave back New Guinea grudgingly and piecemeal", and
19.  P . A . R . . 1945/46 ,  p.  3 .20. The policy for resumption of civil administration and 
related matters is discussed in the next Chapter.
21. Interview with Mr. G.C. O'Donnell, 15 June 1969.
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it is possible that one of the motives for the rapid 
withdrawal to Lae was Army pique. In the circumstances, 
Murray was in an uncomfortable position when the time 
came to assume control of the area south of the Markham 
River.
Murray flew to Lae on 27 October 1945 to arrange
the transfer of control with Lieutenant-General
Robertson, the General Officer Commanding New Guinea 
22Force. The agenda for the meeting included the
takeover of the Highlands from the Army; the timetable
for transferring other areas to civil control;
demobilisation of the Pacific Islands Regiment; the
supply of shipping; the transfer of personnel from the
Army to the Provisional Administration; procedures for
clearing imports through customs; personal particulars
of Angau staff applying for post-war positions; and,
finally, the return of the official yacht Laurabada and
the Royal Papuan Constabulary Band to the Provisional 
25Administration. During the discussions it was agreed 
that, in accordance with Murray's recommendation to the 
Minister, he would assume control of the southern part 
of Papua New Guinea on 30 October. On the evening of 
29 October a dinner to mark the occasion was arranged 
at the Lae Officers' Mess, but Murray declined to
22. Murray notes, p. 55. Murray had no direct dealings 
with Major-General Morris and Angau until after 
New Guinea Force was disbanded; subsequent 
negotiations are discussed later in this Chapter.
23. This passage is drawn from P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, 
item 1-4-2, 27 October 1945.
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attend, feeling that he should be in civilian territory
24at the time of assuming control. Such a gesture may
have seemed quixotic, but it was an early indication of
Murray’s concern for protocol. Thus a small party set
off in a launch for Salamaua, some thirty miles south of
the Markham River mouth, where before the war a town
had been built to supply the Bulolo gold fields. Most
of Salamaua had been destroyed during the war and the
presence of Murray and his small staff, most of them
still in military uniform, in the ruins of the small
town, typified the uncomfortable and precarious position
of the Provisional Administration. While the generals
and their staff enjoyed dinner at the Lae mess and no
doubt joked about the attitude of the new Administrator,
the party at Salamaua ate their rations while Murray
drew up the following proclamation in sweeping layman's 
25terms:
Declaration of Provisional Administration
In order to meet the requirements of any Act, Law, 
Ordinance, Regulation or any other requirement 
whatsoever of the Commonwealth of Australia or the 
Territory of Papua-New Guinea, I, Jack Keith Murray, 
hereby assume the duties of Administrator of the 
said Territory and, should it be required of the 
Administrator, declare that the Provisional 
Government of the Territory of Paoua-New Guinea 
commenced to function this day.
J.K. Murray 
Administrator
Before: W.J. Lambden, D.O.
Witnesses: H. Ian Hogbin, Lt.Col., L.H.Q. School of
Civil Affairs
Lt. B. Wickham, Angau 
Lt. H. West, Angau
24. Interview with Colonel Murray, 12 December 1966.25. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item GH1-3-1, 30 October
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The ceremony was an unnecessary formality, since the 
restoration of civil administration had been proclaimed 
by the Australian government on 25 October 1945, but 
to Murray it was of symbolic importance in marking the 
beginning of the post-war era.
Declaration of intent
One of the new Administrator’s first concerns was
to draw the village people’s attention to the fact that
the troubled period of the war was at an end and that
new policies were to begin. On 6 November 1945 Murray
delivered the first of several ”information” broadcasts
(as opposed to the formal addresses that marked such
occasions as the Queen's birthday) by the Administrator
and his staff. Murray's concern for, and attention to
such details is illustrated by the fact that he wrote
the whole of his early talks, reading them from a series
27of large filing cards. Significantly, the opening 
theme was a Papuan song, rather than some European 
anthem. The Administrator then told the people that, 
although the war was won, many soldiers and villagers 
were dead and the survivors should remember them. He 
promised that more money would be given to the country, 
particularly to improve education, which would be the 
’’main contribution" of the government to the people.
(cont.) 1945 (the document was apparently drawn 
up after midnight; it is in Murray’s handwriting).
26. Commonwealth G-overnment Gazette No. 207, 25 
October 1945.
27. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 169, item GH1-9-6, 6 November 1945.
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This broadcast was followed by another on 4 December
1945 in which Murray thanked the people for the "grand
co-operation" they had already given him and the staff
of the Provisional Administration and concluded with a
quotation from John Stuart Mills "With small men nothing
28great can be accomplished." The broadcasts showed 
Murray's willingness to deal on even terms with whites 
and villagers alike, a quality that earned him a good 
deal of ridicule from both the settler community and 
certain members of his own Administration, who cited it 
as an example of Murray's inexperience in observing the 
rituals of colonialism.
Quest for staff
Having indicated his intentions to both the military
and the people of Papua New Guinea, Murray was faced
with the need to staff his Administration. Some steps
had already been taken, beginning as early as 13 August,
when a memorandum was circulated to several departments
of the Commonwealth Public Service and to the various
branches of Angau, requesting details of all personnel
who had been members of the New Guinea or Papua public
29services at the outbreak of war. There was little 
response from civilian departments, but by 30 August a 
list of 13 men serving in the Navy and 179 in the Army
28. P.N.G.N.A. Box 169, item GH 1-9-6, 4 December 1945.
29. CRS A518, item B852/6/11, 13 August 1945.
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(including Angau) had been compiled. A list of another
24 personnel serving with the Army was provided on 9
September, including 13 who had already served at the
level of District Officer or who could be appointed at
that level; the first of these were to be released from
31Angau by October 1945. There were also staff 
recruited by Angau during the war who wished to join 
the Provisional Administration and others who were 
completing the second orientation course at the School 
of Civil Affairs. However, by January 1946 the number 
of experienced personnel available to the civil 
authorities was considered to be "negligible" and Murray
was writing of problems he was encountering with Angau
32over the release of staff. Further action by the 
Commonwealth Department of Post-War Reconstruction was 
urged in an effort to hasten demobilization; it was 
pointed out that the position would become critical as 
the Army withdrew progressively from large areas of the
•Z 'ZTerritory of New Guinea. J Only one transfer was
completed with little difficulty: the Royal Papuan
Constabulary, which included several European officers,
34came under civil control on 6 November 1945.
Difficult conditions
Although Murray had been told that pre-war officers
30. Ibid., 30 August 1945.
31. Ibid., 9 September 1945.
32. Ibid., 21 January 1946.
33. Ibid.34. P.N.G.N.A. Box 185, item 28/3, 6 November 1945.
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were anxious to leave the Army and return to civilian 
employment in Papua New Guinea, the conditions then 
on offer to them were far from attractive. The main 
problem then, and for the next four years, was the 
uncertainty surrounding their appointments, conditions 
of service and future prospects. As long as the civil 
administration possessed only provisional status, it was 
not possible to make substantive appointments nor to 
determine a host of technical questions, such as seniority 
dates, superannuation rights, leave credits and the 
like. This insecurity created only minor tensions 
during the first few months of the Provisional 
Administration, when it was believed that problems of 
organization and establishment would receive top priority 
and be settled in the near future, but it assumed great 
importance as the years passed.
Initially, the physical conditions facing the service
were of greatest concern. The situation had been set
out uncompromisingly by Melrose soon after his arrival
in Port Moresby, where facilities were no better than
37those at an Army camp:^
Officers will be provided with essential items of 
furniture (stretcher, chair, table) and electric 
light and power (240 volt) will be available. A 
central lounge will be available and, as far as
35. Murray notes, p. 79.
36. The problems and controversies involving the public 
service are discussed in Chapter Six.
37. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 25 August 1945. The 
remainder of the passage, including quotations, 
is drawn from this document.
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possible, officers will be accommodated not more 
than two to each room...Meals will be provided and 
to conform to TNG Public Service practice, cost 
per day for accommodation and board will not 
exceed 5/3d (TNG Public Service Reg No 47). 
Assistance will be given to officers in securing 
the services of one native for personal and 
laundry duties. Wages and maintenance of natives 
to be the responsibility of the officer. Servants 
will be provided for dining room and general 
duties.
Gyclos (deck tennis) courts will be provided... 
and the nearby football and cricket ground will 
be available. It is hoped to secure the use of 
a tennis court but tennis balls and racquets are 
not likely to be available. The centre will be 
thoroughly treated with DDT prior to use and at 
intervals during use.
Conditions for female staff were similar, ’’with added 
provision for sleeping quarters, bathing and sanitary 
conveniences to be within an enclosed area of the 
residence’1. No special consideration could be given to 
married officers and their families and provision could 
be made to bring from Australia only ”items of lounge 
furniture, occasional tables, wireless sets etc., 
sufficient to meet needs on a bachelor basis” . Plans were 
being made for the construction of temporary quarters 
for officers and their families, but here again there 
was a major element of uncertainty ’’pending decision in 
regard to /”the site of the Territory's_7 future capital, 
town planning etc.” Free issues would be made of 
atebrin, for the prevention of malaria, and quinine, for 
its treatment. However, ’’purchase of liquor and tobacco 
will be extremely difficult until Stores and Hotels are 
re-established. Action should be taken...for officers 
to purchase and bring to the Territory with them one
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month’s supply of tobacco based on Army ration scale”; 
a month’s supply of liquor presumably presented too 
great a transport problem to be considered.
Paradoxically, staff who were posted to the more 
distant parts of the Territory usually faced fewer 
difficulties than those arriving in the towns, and 
particularly in Port Moresby. The procedures for handing 
over outstations were more nearly on a ”walk-in-walk out” 
basis and this term was used in a circular issued by 
Angau in January 1946, instructing that the handover of 
goods and services should be completed by 28 February in
7 Q
those areas under civil control. In such cases 
District Officers were to decide what was required, 
taking into account post-war needs, and although it was 
not clear how they would determine these requirements, 
this was a formality in some instances, where officers 
had to do little more than remove their Army badges of 
rank and remain on the job. ^
The level of destruction on outstations varied 
considerably. The Western, Gulf, Delta and South-Eastern 
Divisions of Papua had experienced almost none of the 
direct effects of the war and routine maintenance had 
been possible, using Angau stores and equipment.^ The
38. P.N.G.N.A. Box 185, item GH55/5, Angau Instruction 
114 of 30 January 1946.
39» Arrangements were made for the demobilization of
Angau staff while they remained in Papua New Guinea. 
40. Murray notes, p. 78.
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Highlands area suffered minor attacks from Japanese
aircraft, with little effect, and since the area had
been explored only in the 1930's the great majority of
buildings were still of a temporary nature, constructed
from undressed timber, thatch and plaited reeds ("kunai"
and npit pit”). The Central Division of Papua suffered,
particularly near Port Moresby, from Japanese attacks
and also from large-scale construction by allied forces.
In the rest of the country - the Northern and Eastern
Divisions of Papua and the Sepik, Madang, Morobe, Manus,
New Ireland, New Britain and Bougainville Districts of
New Guinea - there had been severe damage and many
established stations, such as Aitape, Saidor, Salamaua,
Jacquinot Bay and Sohano (to name but a few) had been
virtually razed. Nevertheless, rebuilding in a fairly
basic form was not particularly difficult. Although the
villagers were exhausted, there were sufficient available
near the established stations to begin reconstruction
under the supervision of policemen and overseers, while
"gavman" enjoyed a priority call on building materials
41from the forests and grasslands. Additionally, Angau 
was able to hand over items such as furniture and 
refrigerators which could be shared on a community basis, 
and small lighting plants that greatly improved evenings 
which would otherwise have been spent under kerosene
41. This information is based on informal talks, over 
a period of years from 1955, with such officers 
and former officers as W.W. Crellin, M.J. Healey, 
A.T. Timperley, H.H. Jackman and D. Clifton- 
Bassett.
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lanterns. This is not to say that conditions were 
luxurious, even by pre-war standards, since imported 
fresh foods were unobtainable and shipping was 
disorganized and spasmodic, while in many areas the 
villagers had not been able to re-plant the gardens nor 
obtain the seeds for "European" vegetables which had 
provided some variety for the expatriate diet before the 
war.
42
Nevertheless, conditions in the towns were in some 
ways worse, since the private and official roles of 
public servants were more clearly defined than on 
outstations and it was therefore more difficult to obtain 
personal comforts under the guise of official need. It 
was difficult to find labour in the main centres, 
particularly Port Moresby and Samarai where the population 
was relatively sparse. Port Moresby also presented 
special difficulties for constructing temporary buildings, 
since the savannah country immediately surrounding it 
provides few suitable materials. But perhaps the greatest 
limit upon rebuilding the main centres was the conviction - 
which might be termed the "European town mentality" - 
that the dwellings and possessions of the white community 
should be demonstrably different from (and preferably 
superior to) those of the local population. Whites would 
not be keeping up to the expected standards, nor setting
42. Ironically, electricity was not again available on 
most small outstations for some twenty years after 
the Angau plants expired from longevity and 
overloading.
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an "example", if they were seen living in houses built
of "native" materials. On the out stations, where such
dwellings were the rule rather than the exception, wives
and families were permitted to join their husbands
"directly transport and supply is assured. If an officer
is of the opinion that station conditions are suitable
his application will be apnroved unless some extraordinary
44circumstance demands otherwise." As a consequence,
married field staff devoted some time to rendering houses
fit for family life. Conditions were still extremely
difficult, but as a rule outstation life could be more
stable than that in the towns. The relatively early return
of white women and children to isolated government posts
helped to restore appearances of colonial normalcy and
contributed in some measure to the surprisingly orderly
45resumption of administrative control in most areas.
Return of the settlers
Civilian public servants found it extremely difficult 
to work effectively without the accustomed support of 
the private community, and particularly of the commercial 
sector, but the return of settlers was a mixed blessing, 
since it created new problems for the Provisional 
Administration. By October 1945 a limited number of
45. On European racial attitudes, see Chapter One,
pp. 55-5, 58-65.44. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 25 August 1945.
45. This passage is based on talks wiih some of the 
wives who returned at that time, motably Mrs.
L.J. Doolan and Mrs. J.K. McCarthy.
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missionaries, planters, maintenance workers employed "by
oil and mining companies, and plantation managers
working for the Production Control Board had been allowed
to return to Papua, hut they presented numerous problems
and had to be accommodated and provisioned by the Control
4-6Board, drawing on Army supplies and services. It was 
partly because of these difficulties that Angau and the 
Directorate had opposed the return of any large number 
of civilians to Papua during the last two years of the 
war.^ However, the Department of External Territories 
did not envisage that the Provisional Administration 
would continue the self-contained operation which had 
characterised the war years; one of Melrose’s first 
tasks was to draw up procedures and conditions for the 
return of certain civilians to the area south of the 
Markham River. The fact that the External Territories 
advance party in Port Moresby paid such early attention 
to the needs of settlers indicates that the changing 
pattern of influence at the war’s end, outlined in Chapter 
Two, began to affect policy as early as August 1945.
The factors limiting the return of the many hundreds 
of settlers in Australia included a general lack of 
transport, shortages of food, stores and materials of 
all kinds, lack of accommodation and a severely limited
46. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 22 August 1945.
47. The evolution of this policy is discussed in Chapter Five.
48. It is interesting that Melrose dealt with the question 
of settlers three days before he outlined reception 
arrangements for public servants (CRS A518, item 
E852/6/11, 22 and 25 August 1945).
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supply of labour. Upon their return they had no priority
in the allocation of most materials and they relied even
more heavily than the Provisional Administration on a
regular supply of labour to carry on their plantation
49and commercial activities. The intended policy was,
nevertheless, that "evacuated residents who have property
in the area be permitted entry and residence in order to
preserve and rehabilitatie such property", with "firms
and individuals previously operating in the area...
invited to re-open stores for the supply of European
needs (excepting trade goods for sale to natives), hotels
50and boarding houses". However, it was clear that 
"restrictions must continue for at least six months on 
the classes of civilians who may take up residence in the 
area".^ The restrictions were relatively severe. 
Civilians had to be assured of employment in "essential" 
undertakings, or be former residents, who had been 
principals of business firms, resuming their activities 
and able to supply their own accommodation and "the bulk 
of their maintenance supplies from Australia". Wives 
and children of these persons would be admitted if they 
could be wholly provided for. Not surprisingly, few 
members of the settler community could meet these
49. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 22 August 1945. The 
controversy surrounding the labour question is 
discussed later in this Chapter.
50. It was thought that sufficient trade goods would be 
available from Production Control Board stores, 
but this policy is still revealing in its order of 
racial priorities.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
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requirements in the initial period of civil control and 
it was not until April 1946 that the first large group, 
some 160 in number, arrived in Port Moresby aboard the 
Qrmiston. Prom this time, the official and private 
communities complemented each other in re-establishing 
European interests in the Territory, although the 
difficulties and tensions that remained were to flare up 
spasmodically and add to Murray's problems during the 
ensuing years.
Unsatisfactory shipping
One of the main factors which undermined public
service morale during this period and led to growing
unrest among the settler community was the chaotic state
of shipping services, both with Australia and within
Papua New Guinea. Before the war the Australia-New
Guinea shipping service had been conducted by Burns Philp,
who had faced very little competition and been one of
the main targets of Mr. Ward’s attacks against "monopoly"
54interests in the islands. Burns Philp also owned a 
number of inter-island and coastal trading vessels, as 
did such smaller firms as W.R. Carpenter and Colyer 
Watson. There were, in addition, numerous small craft 
owned by planters, traders and recruiters: probably 
some three hundred in both Territories.^ During the
53. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 9, April 1946, p. 12.
54. Stanner, op. cit., pp. 101, 103, 117.
55. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 12, July 1947, p. 17.
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war the four largest Burns Philp vessels were
requisitioned by the Commonwealth Directorate of Supply
and Shipping. One was sunk, one severely damaged and
another remained in government service until 1948, so
that at war’s end only one passenger ship and some
smaller freighters were on the regular Australia- New
Guinea run, aided by vessels occasionally re-directed
56from overseas services. These ships had inadequate
capacity to supply New Guinea and further problems arose
from the waterside strikes of the post-war period, delays
in repairs owing to dockyard strikes and shortage of
materials, and slow turnaround in New Guinea ports because
57of labour shortages.
But perhaps the greatest difficulties arose from
policy and management in Australia. The government
controlled the movement of ships but lacked the staff to
operate them, so that for practical purposes they were
sailed by their original owners, who were thereby assured
of a return on the marginal New Guinea routes and showed
58little desire to improve their efficiency. There were 
further organizational problems in arranging supply from 
Australia. The Department of External Territories had 
set up a Sydney office in 1943 as a purchasing agency, 
initially to supply the Papua New Guinea Production
56. P.I,M., Vol. 17 No. 10, May 1947, p. 10; Stanner, 
op. cit., p. 117; P.A>R. 1945/46, p. 18.
57. Settlers blamed stevedoring problems, along with 
much else, on the policy of ’’spoiling the natives” 
(P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 3, October 1946, pp. 16, 45).
58. Stanner, loc. cit.
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Control Board,  ^ but the complex accounting procedures
between Australia and New Guinea delayed payment of
accounts and "it was said that suppliers often
fiodiscriminated against Government". This was one of 
the initial problems creating dissatisfaction in Port 
Moresby at the operations of the Department of External 
Territories.
Within Papua New Guinea the inter-island shipping 
services were equally unsatisfactory. Here, too, the 
Australian government brought shipping under official
r a
control, except for vessels of 25 tons or less. The
authorities in Australia presumably believed that the
nucleus of a government fleet was available in Papuan
waters from among the vessels requisitioned during the
war; initial reports listed three substantial coasters,
f) ?and over 100 launches, cutters, ketches and luggers. 
However, few of these were suitable for official use 
and most were unfit for service: "....vessels which were 
plying on the coast during the war period had been 
required to give the utmost service without adequate 
repair or overhaul. These vessels were found to be
65unserviceable when Civil Administration was resumed."
59. D.E.T., Notes on history etc., op. cit., p. 1.
60. Stanner, loc. cit.
61. Even the smallest vessels could be used only for 
the owners’ passengers (mainly labourers) and 
freight (P ,I .M ., Vol. 17 No. 2, September 1946, 
p. 9). Access to the main file on this subject - 
CRS A518, item G904/1 - was denied.
62. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 17 August 1945. The 
count even included the 25 luggers of the Thursday 
Island pearling fleet.
63. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 29.
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It was recommended that almost all the small ships he
sold by the War Disposals Commission or returned to their
owners. ^ However, the military had so depreciated the
assets it had commandeered that, when handed back, they
were of only marginal value, and the Territory lacked the
slipways, stores and skilled tradesmen to maintain even 
65small vessels. Nevertheless, the Australian government
persevered with "socialised shipping", as the Pacific
66Islands Monthly termed it, and in May 1946, after six 
months in which Angau provided all coastal facilities, 
the Papua-New Guinea Coastal and Inter-Island Shipping 
Board was set up, under the guidance of the Commonwealth
67Directorate of Shipping.
Urgent measures were required of the Board, for the
situation had become desperate. In March 1946 Murray
complained to Canberra of an acute shortage of ships and
of Angau’s attitude, stating, "....military personnel...
68have lost interest now that the war is over". This 
was followed in June by a request that the Navy repair 
the Dregerhafen slipway, and by a cable stating that the 
position v/as "extremely bad": Kikori and Misima stations 
were unable to carry out urgent field work owing to a
64. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 17 August 1945.
65. P.A.R., 1946/47, p. 38. One of the main problems 
involved repairing "short life" wartime engines, 
spare parts for which could be obtained only in 
America (P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 44).
66. P.I,M., Yol. 17 No. 2, September 1946, pp. 2, 9 
and No. 3, October 1946, p. 45.
67. P.A.R., 1945/45, p. 29.
68. P.N.G.N.A., Box 185 item GH35/2, 14 March 1946.
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lack of sea transport, while the Army had still not
released the necessary vessels from its pool at Rabaul,
where the boats' equipment was being stolen by the people
in the area. ^ The Shipping Board provided little
relief, however, owing to long delays in recruiting
staff. It was not until October 1946 that the Board
advertised for personnel, and even then it was able to
offer them only twelve months tenure in the first instance.^0
The Board's staffing situation reflected the uncertainties
prevailing in the public service proper. This was one
of several cycles of frustration that affected the work
of the Provisional Administration: public servants who
felt insecure about their conditions of service became
more dissatisfied because of poor communications and
supply, but their living conditions could be improved
only slightly because the same insecurities made it
difficult to man the ships. By neither allowing private
shipowners to operate freely nor establishing an efficient
government service, Ward created the worst possible
situation for the Territory at a critical time; shipping
71services remained very poor until the early 1950's. 
Cancellation of labour contracts
An even greater controversy, encountered by Murray
69. P.N.G.N.A., Box 185, item GH38/4, 20 June 1946; 
item G-H35/2, 10 July 1946.
70. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 3, October 1946, p. 6 9.
71 . The Australia-New Guinea service was resumed by private 
owners in 1948. The coastal service remained in 
government hands until the Liberal-Country Party 
coalition came to power.
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from the moment of his arrival in Port Moresby, stemmed 
from another of Ward's policy decisions. On 15 October 
1945 the Minister had a proclamation issued in Port 
Moresby, and broadcast in the Pidgin and Motu lingua 
franca over radio station 9AA, directing that all labour 
contracts should cease from that date, although all 
labourers who wished to re-engage for employment were 
free to do so. This was Ward's personal decision and 
one that was contrary to the advice he had received 
from Port Moresby and from the Directorate of Research. 
The initial direction from Melrose was that, while the 
policy should be to "avoid, as far as possible, the carry 
over to Civil G-overnment the employment of labour 
impressed by the Army", there should be a "slow rundown"
rJ 'K
of contract labour to ensure stability in the country.
This recommendation was endorsed in a full report
submitted by the External Territories liaison group on 
7420 August 1945. However, on 18 September the Secretary
for External Territories advised Melrose that all
contracts would have to be cancelled.-^ Melrose replied
that the order had created an "atmosphere of gloom" in
Port Moresby and that it was considered by the Europeans
7 f)there to be an "injustice to employers". During the 
same period the Directorate of Research queried the 
decision and was advised by telegram, "Minister considers
72. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 4, November 1945, pp. 7-8.
73. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 14 August 1945.
74. Ibid., 20 August 1945.
75. PJTG-.N.A. , Box 185 item GH21/1 , 18 September 1945.
76. Ibid., 3 October 1945.
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that with full co-operation all concerned it should be 
possible to minimise dislocation that is inevitable 
when transfer from compulsory to voluntary labour is 
effected no matter when that is done stop No matter what 
the inconvenience may be Minister unable to countenance 
a continuation of employment of forced labour under
77civil administration even for a limited period stop.”
As in several later instances, Ward's action was correct 
in principle, but was not followed by support for the 
officials who had to put his policy into effect.
The suspension of labour contracts completely
disrupted work throughout the area which came under civil
control on 30 October and proved a major handicap to
the new Provisional Administration. However, the attitude
of the workers themselves provided complete support for
the Minister's rejection of compulsory employment. Only
a very small proportion continued at their jobs -
probably fewer than five per cent, on the estimates that 
78are available - and most of these were overseers, semi-
79skilled tradesmen and personal servants. Work at 
government centres, and on the plantations that had been 
brought back into production, came to a halt. At that
77. Ibid., 8 October 1945.
78. The sketchy annual reports for this period give no
figures for re-engagements, but state that almost 
the entire labour force had been returned home by the 
end of 1945. (P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 11). An employer
reported that 12 of 339 labourers stayed on at 
Mariboi Estate (Central District), while others 
reported a retention rate of only 2-J- per cent.
(P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 4, November 1945, pp. 7-8).
79. For further details see Stanner, op, cit., pp. 134-5 
and P .I .M ., Vol. 16 No. 4, November 1945, p. 7.
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point the shortage of coastal shipping compounded the
labour problem, while the cancellation of contracts
increased shipping difficulties, since most of the boats*
crews also wished to cease work. Between 15 October and
51 December 1945, more than 21,000 labourers returned to
their villages, over half of them requiring sea transport,
80sometimes for hundreds of miles. Many more waited some 
time for boats, then after jamming the ports decided to
walk home, creating unrest and occasionally meeting
0 - 1
hostility from traditional enemies on the way. Many
were dissatisfied with the terms of their repatriation.
They received only a few pounds in accumulated wages;
there were very few trade goods to be bought for relatives
at home; all equipment with which they had been issued
was taken back; and any gifts or spoils they had
acquired from the troops were confiscated during searches
82as they boarded the boats. Upon their arrival in the 
villages the men were drawn into the work of
07
rehabilitation,  ^ but it was not long before many of them 
decided to re-engage; the Labour department reported 
that at the end of 1945 there were a Hconsiderable number 
of labourers available for recruitment" in Papua. ^ Pew 
could be transported to places of employment, however, 
since all available coasters were occupied in repatriating
80. Stanner, op. cit., p. 79. A table of labourers 
employed by Angau provides figures from which the 
rate of repatriation may be calculated for each month.
81. Robinson, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., p. 17.
84. P.N.G-.N.A., Box 185 item GH21/6, 2 May 1946.
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paid-off labourers. The position in the Territory of
New Guinea was more serious, owing to widespread damage
and dislocation, but it was expected that conditions
even there would be satisfactory by the second half of
1946; in the meantime, the Labour department suggested
that planters might consider working their holdings on
a share basis, calling on the people living nearby for 
86assistance. This recommendation was ignored by the 
settlers, who had no intention of entering into 
partnership with villagers.
The settler reaction to the cancellation of contracts
was one of predictable rage. However, by the end of
1945 the Pacific Islands Monthly had vented so much of
its spleen against Ward that the labour issue apparently
found Robson without words adequate to the latest
enormity: the situation was merely described as one of
R7"chaos” . To the settlers, convinced that Papua New 
Guinea had survived in the past mainly through their 
efforts and would continue to rely on them for generations 
to come, the Minister's proclamation was but one 
incredible episode in a series of decisions by which 
Ward intended to destroy private interests in the country.
85. Ibid., 12 and 23 November 1945, et a l .; the file 
contains a good deal of correspondence which 
discloses a major problem and a serious lack of 
resources to deal with it.
86. Ibid., 2 May 1946.
87. The impression of an editor bereft of words is 
heightened by the appearance of the word "chaos" 
three times in four consecutive sub-headings in 
the November 1945 issue of the magazine (P.I.M.,
Vol. 16 No. 4, November 1945, pp. 7-8.)
85
207
Robson proclaimed: 88
Mr. Ward - in his famous role of "Eddie, Protector 
of the Underdog" - has espoused the cause of 
Fuzzy-wuzzy. He has decided to make Hew Guinea a 
Happy Home for High-Minded Natives, and protect 
them for evermore against that Ruthless Exploiter, 
the white man...Fuzzy-wuzzy gets all possible 
attention - and publicity, of course - but the 
claims of the unfortunate Europeans are determinedly 
and systematically ignored...large numbers of men, 
of the finest individualist and pioneer types, are 
kept kicking their heels in Australia, while Mr.
Ward plays happily with his Socialistic toy in New 
Guinea. In pre-war days, the Territories...asked 
Australia for little in the way of public funds... 
Now, under the rule of this Trades Hall genius 
from King’s Gross, the Territories are absorbing 
hundreds of thousands of pounds of money torn from 
Australian taxpayers in the guise of war taxation, 
and giving us in return nothing except this 
delightful picture of Eddie Ward, being cooed over 
by happy anthropologists....
There was no doubt in the minds of correspondents to the 
Monthly that the first task should be to restore 
production, and even a writer as sympathetic to Labor 
as Lucy Mair stated subsequently that the affair of the 
labour contracts had been handled i n e p t l y . S t a n n e r ,  
the "apostate" former Assistant Director of Research, 
sought motives for the cancellation:^
Evidently four factors induced this surprising and 
costly decision on the resumption of civil administration. 
The indentures of the military period, it was said, 
were no longer legally binding, though this was a 
matter of fairly simple remedy. It was desired to end 
the thoroughly unsatisfactory conditions of the later 
military phase. It was desired to offer the natives 
an opportunity to go home, if they wished, or to 
re-employ for a further period. Cancellation must 
have seemed compatible with the other administrative 
intentions. A full allowance for each factor still 
fails to make the decision seem reasonable.
88. Ibid., p. 3.
89. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 210.
90. Stanner, op. cit., p. 134.
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Stanner made the further point that many of the contracts
had been entered into only a few months before they were
cancelled and stated, "It was a mistake to have treated
the labour force as if it had all been at work continuously 
91since 1942". In his view, the most important factor 
was that the "embitterment of the civilian and planting 
community against Government policy became fixed at this 
point"
The cancellation controversy
Murray approved of Ward's decision and has since 
noted, "The cancellation of contracts made resumption 
of village life possible, and rehabilitation and 
maintenance of commerce and plantations difficult. What 
was good ¿“for the_7 Australian was good for the Papuan 
and New Guinean: return to his home country if he so 
wished it, and both did. The consequences had to be 
put up with and, in the long view, the action was just, 
humane, wise and paid dividends in subsequent amicable
0*5labour-employer and -government relations."
The wartime labour contracts had been authorised by 
the National Security Regulations and so would in any 
case have been voided by the gazettal of the Papua-New
91. Ibid., p. 135. Nevertheless, the "contracts" were 
compulsory, and this was in itself a contradiction 
in terms; under the circumstances, it was of little 
consequence how long they had been in force.
92. Ibid.
93. Murray notes, pp. 78-9.
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Guinea Provisional Administration Act on 25 October.
They could have been extended by the legal device of
including a legitimating Section in the Act, but as far
as Ward was concerned this would still have amounted to
forced labour;^ he had no intention of continuing a
system, of military origin, which even Stanner was to
95term "extremely unsatisfactory". The blame for the
situation was placed on the Army, rather than on Ward, by
one of the planters severely affected by the cancellation 
96of contracts:
....the Army's voracious demand for labour resulted in 
conscription of such numbers for so long that the 
natives have "had it". After, say, mid-1943, this 
conscription should have been cut in half. Had that 
been done the boys then released would now be 
available as volunteer workers under the new civil 
contracts. And a lot less than half the enormous 
number still under compulsory indenture at the 15th 
of this month would be more than sufficient to man 
all Papua's normal activities - planting, shipping, 
Government and all the rest. Pew will agree with 
my idea as to where the blame for this disaster 
rests, but that is my opinion for what it is worth... 
Look for it in the bone-headedness of Army brass-hats.
The most important factor, and one that has in the 
past been ignored, was the attitude of the workers 
towards their contracts. This was clear from the very 
large proportion who elected to return home. Both Stanner
94. See pp. 205-4 of this Chapter.
95. W.E.H. Stanner, Reconstruction in the South Pacific 
Islands: A Preliminary Report. Part I , Hew York, 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947, p. 93. This 
was a mimeo booklet including much of the material 
later published in The South Seas in Transition 
(op. cit.); the words used in the latter were 
"thoroughly unsatisfactory" (p. 134).
96. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 4, November 1945, p. 8.
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and Mair later suggested that more opportunity should 
have been given to employers to explain the situation
0 7to their workers, but in view of the situation that 
had prevailed under the military, efforts to re-engage
labourers could well have been interpreted as extra
98coercion. The problem of implied or direct coercion 
ruled out the main alternative to mass cancellation -
a phased run-down of labour - suggested by Melrose in
99August 1945 • There was no guarantee that the workers 
would have been given a genuine option, nor that those 
whose names were missing from repatriation ballots 
would have stayed on the job. The mass cancellation 
aided the rapid restoration of village life and may 
have greatly reduced the tensions which could otherwise 
have hampered the work of the Provisional Administration. 
The sudden cancellation of labour contracts brought, in 
a rush, problems that might in other circumstances have 
been spread over many years, creating new difficulties 
as a consequence. In any event, this was the first 
decision made concerning Papua New G-uinea that could be 
proved to meet the wishes of the people.
War damage compensation
Another policy decision that created short-term
97. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 134. Mair, 
op. cit., (1948), p. 210.
98. Ironically, difficulties in communicating in the 
lingua franca were given by settlers as an explanation 
for the small proportion of workers who re-engaged 
(P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 4, November 1945, p. 7).
99. See p. 203 of this Chapter.
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problems, but which helped to reduce any tensions
existing in the villages, was the payment of compensation
for war damage. In this matter, too, settlers objected
to the policy and its implications, although by the end
of the war their own compensation was assured. The
settlers’ campaign for compensation was launched within a
few months of the fall of Rabaul, but it encountered a
number of problems before payment was finally made.^^
Compensation for European-owned assets was to be paid
from the War Damage Insurance fund, set up within
Australia to pay for destruction caused by the enemy at
Darwin, in Papua New Guinea and during the few other
isolated instances of direct enemy action against 
101Australia. The compensation scheme involved several
technical and legal problems which were the subject of
recommendations to the government by an inter-departmental
102committee of Australian officials. In summary, the
committee concluded that compensation should be paid only 
for damage resulting from direct action by the enemy or 
from deliberate destruction by Australian forces intended 
to stop the assets in question falling into enemy hands.
The committee maintained that property requisitioned by 
the forces, or "irregular impressment", to use the 
committee's euphemism, was not the Commonwealth's 
responsibility. The recommendations were approved by
100. The public campaign was launched by the Pacific 
Islands Monthly as early as March 1942 (P .I.M.T 
Vol. 12 No. 8, March 1942, p. 9.)« It was one of 
the main concerns of the Pacific Territories 
Association (P.I,M., Vol. 13 No. 1, August 1942, p. 7) 
101 . P.I.M., Vol. 13 No. 8, March 1943, p. 7.
102. Details in this and the following passage are 
drawn from Hasluck, op. cit., p. 142.
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War Cabinet on 6 April 1942. This meant that most of the 
European property in Papua could not be restored under 
the War Damage Insurance scheme and that assets in the 
Territory of hew Guinea which had been abandoned could 
attract compensation only after investigation, in which 
it would be difficult to establish that damage had been 
caused by Japanese action rather than through looting or 
by deterioration owing to lack of maintenance. Further 
details of the controversy are not of direct relevance 
to this discussion, but it was only after a High Court 
decision and a prolonged campaign by the Pacific 
Territories Association that the Australian government 
finally agreed, in November 1944, to extend the 
compensation provisions to include "consequential"
103damage caused by depreciation and military occupation. 
After this struggle, the settlers were even further 
convinced that the government was discriminating against 
them when the terms of the compensation scheme for war 
damage in the villages was announced
Barry Committee on compensation
Action on village war damage came much later than 
the scheme to compensate Europeans. It was not until 
26 October 1944 that the Minister for External 
Territories set up the Native War Damage Compensation 
Committee, whose function was to "recommend a just and
103. P.I.H., Vol. 15 No. 4, November 1944, p. 7.
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practicable plan for compensating natives in Papua and
New Guinea for loss of or damage to land and property and
death or injury arising from military operations or
arising out of causes attributable to the existence of a
state of war in the Territories, If found necessary or
desirable the Committee in recommending measures for
native compensation /”should_7 bear in mind particularly
the connection between compensation and rehabilitation in
native societies. The members of the Committee
represented the major interests then controlling Papua
New Guinea. The Chairman was the ubiquitous Mr. J.V.
Barry, K.C., assisted by Dr. H.I. Hogbin, the anthropologist,
who was at that time a member of the Directorate of
Research, and James L. Taylor, the explorer of the New
Guinea Highlands, then a Major in Angau, who had taken a
radical position on a number of issues at the Unit's
105conference in February 1944. The Committee listed the 
names of 62 European witnesses - whom it interviewed - 
and made passing reference to "a large number of natives" - 
who remained anonymous. The Chairman spent less than
eight days in Papua New Guinea during this inquiry, so 
that most of the work fell to Hogbin, who visited one of 
the centres of his pre-war field work at Busama, between 
Lae and Salamaua; and to Taylor, who joined Hogbin on a 
tour of fourteen centres, and the British Solomon
104. Barry, Compensation, op. cit., p. 1.
105. See Chapter Two, p. 117.
106. Written reolies were received from another sixteen 
Europeans (ibid., pp. 54-5).
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Islands Protectorate, during February 1945. Barry
visited only Lae and Port Moresby. Thus the major part
of the investigation and the bulk of the report stemmed
from a member of the Directorate and the Angau officer
10ftmost closely linked to it. The report was submitted
to the Minister in August 1945, more than nine months
109after it had been commissioned. It made twenty-one
recommendations on compensation and the restoration of
village life. Some were concerned with matters of detail,
such as the setting up of "government piggeries" and
nurseries and the establishment of a trust fund for
reafforestation; some were far-reaching, notably in
relation to "village councils and village treasuries";
and the majority were expensive, involving cash
compensation for death, injury, incapacity, deterioration
in the quality of land (from airstrip construction and
similar works), damage to property and destruction of
110possessions, food and livestock.
Differences on compensation
The compensation scheme was instituted in the 
general terms proposed by the Barry committee, but there 
was little or no action on several key recommendations. 
The adoption in principle of the report marked the first
107. Hogbin's visit to Busama was one of several which 
formed the basis of his book Transformation Scene: 
The Changing Culture of a Hew G-uinea Village,
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951.
108. See Chapter Two, p. 134, footnote 156.
109. Barry, Compensation, op. cit., p. 52.
110. Ibid., pp. 1-3.
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action by the Australian government to implement a major 
segment of its reformist policy for New Guinea, while 
the problems encountered in the execution of the detailed 
recommendations illustrated the lack of resilience in the 
Territory bureaucracy. The most obvious feature of the 
scheme was its cost: the initial estimate was £2,210,000, 
an unbelievable figure in comparison with the £42,500
111that the Commonwealth had granted as recently as 1940.
The report, together with the estimated cost, were 
submitted on 5 December 1945 to Cabinet, which set up an
112inter-departmental committee to make final recommendations.
It was also to examine a proposal from the Department of 
External Territories that the "total funds required to 
meet the cost of the proposals...be obtained from the 
surplus funds of the Commonwealth War Damage insurance
113scheme". The question of finance was a delicate one.
If the amount paid to Papua New Guinea villagers was 
anywhere near the total estimated, it would mark a clean 
break with the pre-war "pay as you go" policy and have a 
substantial influence on the Territory economy. Moreover, 
distribution of such sums would render the people less 
dependent on manual labour as a source of cash income and
111. P.N.G.N.A. Box 805 item CA6/150, 5 October 1945.
The pre-war grant had gone to Papua. The Mandated 
Territory received no grant. The compensation 
estimate was drawn up by Mr. W.R. Humphries, a 
Resident Magistrate of the Papuan service, later the 
Director of Native labour. His calculations were 
astonishingly accurate: final payments totalled a 
little more than £2 million.
112. CRS A518, item 520/3/1, 5 December 1945. The 
committee comprised Messrs. J. Brack (External 
Territories), R.A. Battersby (War Damage Commission) 
and L.P. Crisp (Post-War Reconstruction).
P.N.G.N.A. Box 805 item CA6/150, 5 December 1945.113 .
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therefore less reliant on Europeans; this would constitute 
an important shift in the balance of power in the colony.
The inter-departmental committee decided that village
compensation should be financed directly from Commonwealth
revenue, by inclusion in the annual grant to Papua New
G-uinea, rather than from Australians’ contributions to
the War Damage Insurance scheme, no doubt owing to
the political implications of spending funds levied for
use in Australia on Territory villagers. The committee
also recommended that the sums for compensation suggested
in the Barry report - up to £60 in the case of the death
of a mature man with dependants - should be increased by
50 per cent. The recommendation was supported by Mr.
Ward and by Mr. Dedman, the Minister for Post-War
Reconstruction, but was questioned by Mr. Chifley, Prime
115Minister and Treasurer. Upon receiving Chifley's
query, Ward directed that compensation should be paid
at the rates originally recommended "to avoid more delay";
it was then June 1946 and more than five months had
passed since increases had been supported by Ward and 
116Dedman. There the matter rested. It was perhaps 
thought difficult to prove that a "native" life was worth
£90 rather than £60.
114 . The material in this and the following passage
is drawn from CRS A518, item A320/3/1, 7 February 1946.
115. Ibid., 7 February, 7 March and 7 June 1946.
116. Ibid., 18 July 1946.
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Problems of paying compensation
The delayed decision on the village compensation
scheme caused concern, since an early announcement to
the people was desirable, as part of the effort to
restore confidence in the Administration. Following
requests from Murray, a copy of the reoort by the Barry
committee was received in Port Moresby in February 1946,
when some preparations for payment were begun. Further
delays were inevitable, however, for as Murray has
pointed out, "personnel of District Services were on the
stretch in so many ways", rebuilding outstations,
dealing with returning labourers and village evacuees,
assisting the settlers and re-establishing contact with
the people. The main problem was the time taken up by
compensation work: not merely in visiting villages to
assess and pay claims, but in the large amount of paper
work that was involved. Other problems were encountered
in dealing with the large amounts of cash being
distributed. The Barry report had recommended that
"provision should be made for the immediate deposit of
1 1 Rall siims into Savings Bank accounts", but this was not 
done and the omission was later criticised by Stanner and 
Hogbin. J However, tile work entailed in issuing many 
thousands of passbooks, recording initial deposits and
117. Murray notes, p. 77.118. Barry, Compensation, op. cit., p. 2.
119. Stanner, Transition, op, cit., pp. 119-20; Hogbin, 
Transformation Scene, op. cit., pp. 22-3.
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arranging subsequent withdrawals, would have placed such 
a burden on the field staff as to prejudice the 
compensation scheme itself; in any case, it is doubtful 
whether all the materials involved could have been 
transported, safeguarded and checked adequately under the 
rudimentary transport and banicing organizations then 
existing in Papua New Guinea.
The Barry committee also recommended that stores
controlled by the Administration, ‘’stocked with approved
goods of standard quality”, should be established
throughout the Territory as soon as possible and that
1 20prices in all trade stores should be controlled. The
Administration was unable to introduce these measures, 
for the same reasons that precluded the introduction of 
compulsory banking: the necessary resources were simply 
not available. Supplies of any kind, far less the 
paternalistic category of ’’approved” goods, were almost 
unobtainable for at least a year after the war; the 
Production Control Board was then providing the maximum 
service possible under the limitations of staff, shipping 
and supply. The Provisional Administration was in no 
position to construct, staff and stock additional trade 
stores. Efforts to control prices were equally 
unsuccessful, largely because there were higher priorities 
for the available staff. Murray recalls, ”An endeavour 
to fix prices by regulation met with mixed success and
120. Barry, Compensation, loc, cit.
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was resisted by big firms and those selling to native 
people throughout the Territory...The Administration 
found...coping with the voracity of the big firms, greatly 
profiting from policies they condemned, tough and
patchy."^
Settler opposition
The reaction among settler and commercial interests
to the village compensation scheme was predictably
selfish. Having finally gained all the conditions they
had sought for their own compensation, the settlers gave
lavish praise to the War Damage Commission, which had
assessed and paid their claims. The Pacific Islands
Monthly maintained that the Commission "provided the only
leavening in an otherwise dark and demoralising
situation.. ./"C/la-ims.. .were met fairly and even generously
1 22by the Commission." Similar generosity towards the
villagers was considered reprehensible, however. A
Rabaul correspondent complained of the shortage of labour
in the town and attributed it to the compensation 
1 2 "3payments:
....the G-overnment has commenced to pay out thousands 
of pounds in war damage compensation to the natives - 
and they will not work while the money lasts. 
Indications are that it will not last long - it is 
being spent in the usual native style on bread, 
tinned meat, biscuits, tobacco, European clothing
121. Murray notes, p. 77.
122. P « I .M ., Vol. 19 No. 10, May 1949, p. 31.
123. P.I.M.. Vol. 17 No. 7, February 1947, p. 24.
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(boots, shoes, sox, etc. which are worn for the 
novelty and then discarded)...Decked out like 
Christmas trees, they ride around in hired ex­
military trucks...It needed no great knowledge 
of New Guinea native psychology to prevent the 
needless waste. The native has, and always has 
had, only one method of dealing with a sudden 
influx of unearned wealth - to get rid of it as 
soon as possible.
Under the sub-heading ’’Europeans Eight to Restore
Fortunes While Officialdom Pampers the Natives”, another
correspondent complained, ”If poor old White Brother
could only get a tithe of the love and attention and money
lavished upon Black Brother by Australian officialdom...
i 04.what a different story it would be!” No doubt. But
in their efforts to level every possible criticism at
village compensation the settlers contradicted themselves,
maintaining also that villagers were ’’hiding away” their 
i 25money: ’’already scores of thousands of pounds are
'socked away' by natives - and the money is still rolling
1 Pinin”. The money, whether spent or saved, posed the
first general threat to white dominance and its 
distribution was therefore resisted.
Compensation and "collaboration”
A particular point of controversy concerned 
compensation payments to villagers who had allegedly 
helped the Japanese. The Barry committee had anticipated 
such criticism in recommending that compensation "must
124. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 12, July 1947, p. 60.
125. P .I .M ., Vol. 19 No. 4, November 1948, p. 8.
126. P .I .U ., Vol. 18 No. 8, December 1947, p. 62.
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embrace and apply to all natives except those who have
assisted the enemy actively, voluntarily and with a
1 27realization that it was wrong to do so”. In reaching
this conclusion the committee gave its "full assent and
concurrence” to the views of Mr. Chief Justice J.B.
Phillips of the Territory of New Guinea, who summed up the
confusing situation in which the people found themselves
1 PRduring the occupation:
In the middle eighties of the last century they were 
subjected...to government by Europeans - the Germans.
They found, after some disastrous clashes, that the 
newcomers were too strong to be resisted. After 
approximately thirty years of German rule the 
Germans were... supplanted by Australians who bore 
arms...After nearly thirty years...the Australians... 
were ousted by the Japanese. / The people_7 
completely lacked the knowledge and experience which might 
have enabled them to judge just when a de facto 
government should be recognized as one de jure.
This view received Murray's full support and instructions 
were issued to field staff enlarging on the Barry 
committee's recommendations: to be denied compensation 
a villager must have known his actions in assisting the
1 29Japanese were wrong at the time, and not just subsequently.
The instructions suggested that such a situation could
i 30have arisen only in areas under prolonged occupation; 
but in these places there would clearly be extenuating 
circumstances. Murray thus intended the compensation 
scheme to be administered in the most liberal manner
127. Barry, Compensation, op. cit., p. 24.
128. Ibid .^, jrW .------ -----
129. P.N.G.N.A., Box 805, item CA6/150, 30 October 1946. 
The instructions comprised Department of District 
Services and Native Affairs Circular 27 of 1946/47.
130. Ibid.
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possible: in particular and as "a matter of general
policy all Field Staff are instructed that police
investigation of alleged misdeeds by natives during the
war with a view to prosecution as indictable offences
1 31will be discontinued". The object was to avoid
directing people "back to the past"; instead, patrol
officers were advised to direct their own "thoughts and
action to constructive native welfare and development and
inculcating a similar outlook in the native population".
Proceedings should be taken only in cases of "exceptional
heinousness or depravity" where, if action were not taken
by the Administration, there was a danger that the
community might take the law into its own hands. The
Barry committee had recommended that compensation be
denied only upon the decision of the Director of District
1 "52Services and Native Affairs, but the Administrator's 
instructions went further by directing District Officers 
to pay claims unless they were "convinced" there had been 
a case of collaboration, in which instance they were to 
report their doubts to the Director. In administrative
terms this meant that payment was almost never withheld, 
even temporarily, owing to the additional work and delay 
involved in submitting a case to Port Moresby.
This situation met with disapproval from a number 
of Europeans, particularly in the Territory of New Guinea,
131. Ibid. This and the following two sentences are 
based on the Circular.
132. Barry, Compensation, op. cit., p. 26.
133. P.N.G.N.A., Box 805 item CA6/150, 30 October 1946.
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where the majority had lost friends at the hands of the
Japanese and found it difficult to adjust their opinions,
following the propaganda and patriotism of the war years,
to new realities. However, there were no recorded
instances of Papua New G-uineans taking action against each
other for supporting the Japanese during the war and the
situation was certainly not as portrayed by one European
who maintained, "What is...hurtful among natives is the
fact that their own tribesmen, who joined up with a
Japanese Police Force and caused the deaths of hundreds
of natives and Europeans, are treated the same as those
who were loyal to us. No effort is being made to punish
those who were traitors, not only to us, but to their own 
1 34people." Exaggerated statements of this kind ignored
the complex relationships between different language 
groups and the fact that all interlopers had 
traditionally been regarded as enemies. They mainly 
demonstrated the gulf between settler opinion and the 
attitude of the Administrator.
Rebuilding Hanuabada
The most publicised controversy over village 
compensation surrounded the rebuilding of Hanuabada 
village, a settlement of several clans of the Motu people 
which, before the war, comprised a large number of 
houses, built in traditional styles and material, out
134. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 5, December 1947, p. 62.
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over the waters of Port Moresby Harbour near Government 
1 35House. Owing to the village’s proximity to Port
Moresby, many of the Papuan Administration’s workers
had been drawn from Hanuabada and its people had achieved
prominence, such as was attainable by villagers, out of
proportion to their numbers. To the critics of Sir Hubert
Murray's policies, Hanuabadans epitomised the "arrogant
natives" who had been "spoiled" by paternalism; to
Europeans from the Mandated Territory they were typical
of "big-headed Papuans". When the Japanese bombed Port
Moresby the people of Hanuabada were evacuated to Manu
Manu, a malarious area along the Papuan coast. During
this time their village was destroyed by a combination of
neglect, enemy action and vandalism.  ^ As soon as they
were able, the people of Hanuabada sought to return to
their lands, rebuilding with whatever scraps of material
were available: the result was described as "the worst
1 37kind of tropical slum". During their exile, and in
the conditions to which they returned, the villagers 
contracted a variety of serious diseases, while the 
incidence of malaria increased and a health check 
immediately after the war revealed that 18 per cent of 
the population were suffering from a severe and 
particularly infectious form of tuberculosis. J While 
other villages in Japanese-occupied areas no doubt
135. In Hiri (formerly "police") Motu, the lingua franca 
of Papua: hanua, village; bada, big. A detailed 
history is C.S, Belshaw, The Great Village, London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957.
136. Eor the various accounts see P .I♦M ., Vol. 16 Ho. 8, 
March 1946, p. 21.
137. Ibid.138. Interview with Dr. J.T. Gunther, 4 December 1968.
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suffered as much or more, Hanuabada’s location close to 
Port Moresby made its plight embarrassingly obvious to 
visitors. In his suggestions for implementing the Barry 
report, W.R. Humphries noted, "The houses have to be 
rebuilt; why not build well and put up houses that will 
not be out of place near the capital of the country?
Why not use sawn timber?" The proposal met with 
approval in Canberra, presumably because it would produce 
a material illustration of the government’s determination 
to promote village welfare, and in June 1946 Mr. Ward 
announced that £118,000 would be spent on rebuilding 
Hanuabada, using "permanent", or European-style 
materials.1
The Minister’s announcement was met by predictable
scorn and criticism from the European community. The
Pacific Islands Monthly sought to lead the campaign
but was in an awkward position, since it had first drawn
1 41public attention to the situation at Hanuabada. This
was no particular handicap, however, for it quoted with 
approval the statement of the Australian Country Party 
leader, Mr. Eadden, that Aborigines should receive 
attention before the people of Papua New G-uinea, but 
that none of them would appreciate it: "....a somewhat 
similar ateempt was made some years ago in Queensland,
139. P.N.G-.N.A., Box 805, item CA6/150, 27 September 
1945. It is interesting that Humphries, a Papuan 
officer, referred to Port Moresby as the capital 
when so many of the post-war arrangements for 
the combined Territory were still undecided.
140. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 11, June 1946, p. 12.
141. P.I.H., Vol. 16 No. 8, March 1946, p. 21.
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and the natives immediately left the model houses and
14-2built their own gunyahs outside”. Further complaints 
were that the work would have to be done Mat the 
expense of Australian taxpayers" and that there were 
too few building materials, in any case, for Europeans 
returning to "blasted plantations and 'kunai' houses".
The decision to rebuild Hanuabada in a style
resembling European construction epitomised, for officials
as well as settlers, the Labor government’s challenge
to white supremacy, and so the public service’s
response to the decision was significant in determining
the European community's attitude towards the post-war
service. Moreover, the majority of public servants
were themselves poorly housed. The file dealing with
the reconstruction of Hanuabada contains little that
could be construed as direct opposition from officials,
but it discloses a marked lack of enthusiasm in
i 4 3supervising arrangements. Meetings with the villagers 
produced conflicting reports as to whether they supported 
the rebuilding programme,1^  and Murray experienced 
difficulty in having a field officer assigned to the 
work, so that for a time his Official Secretary
1 43supervised operations. The village was eventually
142. The material in this and the following passage is 
drawn from P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 11, June 1946, p. 12.
143. P.N.G.N.A., Box 163 item GH1-3-4, folios from 
September 1946 to December 1950.
144. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 12, July 1946, p. 9.
145. P.N.G.N.A., Box 163 item GH1-3-4, 24 July 1950.
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rebuilt, the end result being something of an 
architectural disaster that would now be dismissed 
as an example of excessive paternalism. Yet in the 
1940's it possessed considerable symbolic importance.
It also indicated Murray's willingness to persist with 
policies he knew to be lacking support even from his 
own staff.
Y/ar surplus: its use and disposal
Problems of obtaining building materials for the 
Administration, for settlers and for such special 
projects as the reconstruction of Hanuabada could have 
been reduced if the disposal of surplus war materials 
had been better managed. Some of the stores abandoned 
by the Allied forces were of little value for civilian 
purposes, others deteriorated very quickly, and a 
considerable proportion posed a substantial and 
continuing threat to public safety, 4 but there were 
large quantities of other materials, and many buildings 
of a more or less temporary nature, which had obvious 
potential for post-war use. The main bulk materials 
were Marsden matting (used initially for runways and 
bridge decking and later adapted to a wide range of 
uses), A.R.C. mesh (intended as reinforcing for the 
light concrete constructions of wartime standard but
146. Enormous quantities of ammunition were dumped in 
shallow holes and many areas were unsafe for 
ten years or more after the war.
228
useful for walls, windows, security screens and fences),
transmission poles and signal and fencing wire, as well
as the more usual items such as corrugated iron, nails 
14.7and tarpaper. Flimsy buildings in a variety of 
styles - barracks, administrative blocks, hospital wards, 
storehouses and hangars - were scattered in a dozen major 
locations throughout the country. Those at Port Moresby 
and Lae could be used by the Provisional Administration, 
even though some were inconveniently located.  ^ Most of 
those at Manus, Milne Bay and Finschhafen were surplus to 
local requirements, while those at such places as Nadzab 
and Dobodura were of no conceivable use in situ.
The civil authorities possessed neither the personnel 
to dismantle the surplus buildings nor the shipping to 
transport them and the unused materials to suitable 
locations. Nor could they exercise control over the 
disposal of the materials, which were either Commonwealth 
property or American property assigned to the Commonwealth 
by the United States military command. Nevertheless, 
the Provisional Administration was obliged to accept 
responsibility for safeguarding the property immediately 
it assumed control for particular areas from the military. 
The Australian government had decided in May 1945 that 
M ....it is a matter of paramount importance that surplus 
stores should be cleared while a demand for them exists
147. The information in this and the following passage is 
drawn from CRS A518, item F809/1/1, folios from April to July 1950.148. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 9.
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in the civil economy rather than that they should he 
released later and cause a glut.""'^ The reasoning was 
simplistic but the instruction unmistakeable, particularly 
in the case of Papua New Guinea, where there/added fears 
that delay would cause deterioration of stores. Murray 
recalls the attitude: "Rapid sale, rather than hard 
bargaining was necessary to get material into use before 
’decay' set in."^^
By ordering such high priority for the disposal of
war surplus materials the government created further
problems for its Administration in New Guinea. The formal
arrangements were that the Army first handed over surplus
151items to the Commonwealth Disposals Commission. The
Provisional Administration had no direct claim on stores 
and equipment; rather, it was the Army's responsibility 
to "declare" items likely to be needed after the war.
The War Disposals Commission then "allotted" these 
materials to the civil authorities. This procedure was 
necessary until the Provisional Administration was 
established, but it led to predictable problems, since 
the military were not the best judges of what would be 
required in peacetime. Thus the Administration was 
eventually forced to bid against private buyers for 
certain stores: it purchased the Engineers dump at Lae,
149. Hasluck, op. cit., p. 521.
150. Murray notes, p . 76.
151. The material in this and the following passage 
is drawn from P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 7.
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together with such items as 200 tons of corrugated iron 
and 20 tons of nails, for £60,000. Tenders of this 
size caused consternation in both Port Moresby and 
Canberra. The Lae bid alone was 40 per cent greater than 
the total grant to the Territory in 1940 and the officials 
responsible for authorising such payments had not yet 
adjusted to the new levels of expenditure; Murray was 
forced to appeal to the Minister to have his approval of 
the Lae tender sustained. This episode marked one of
the earliest clashes between the Administrator and the 
Department of External Territories over the two basic 
issues which created tension between Port Moresby and 
Canberra for the next twenty-five years: the pace of 
adjustment to new realities in Papua New Guinea, and the 
allocation of authority between the Administration and the 
Department.
War surplus for settlers
Most settlers were at a serious disadvantage in
acquiring war surplus. Early in 1946 the great majority
were still in Australia because they v/ere unable to meet
the conditions set down for their return to Papua New 
1 54Guinea. They were unable to bid for materials to 
repair their properties, but until some repairs were 
carried out and their residences made habitable, many were
152. CRS A518, item F809/1/1, 5 May 1950; P.N.G.N.A.,
Box 185 item GH55/2, 15 February 1946.
153. Interview with Colonel Murray, 12 December 1966.
154. See pp. 197-8 of this Chapter.
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denied entry to the country. In the meantime, parties of
buyers from Australia were being conducted on tours of
Papua New G-uinea by staff of the Commonwealth Disposals
Commission, using a Catalina aircraft supplied by the
Air Force, and taking up valuable shipping space when
1 55exporting their purchases. The "Southern buyers", as
the settlers called them, were able to bid for large
amounts of material following their comprehensive tour of
the wartime dumps and there were complaints that the
"small buyers" were being kept away from the market
deliberately, so that the Commission could clear the dumps
1 56m  the shortest possible time. The matter developed
into one of the several post-war conflicts that
characterised relations between government and settlers.
In the case of the Army vehicle park at Lae, for example,
it was alleged that 900 vehicles were sold to an
Australian tenderer for only 38 shillings each. Moreover,
on removal of the vehicles, the number was found to be
less than 900, whereupon the officer in charge of
disposals had commandeered town vehicles in running order
1 57to make up the deficit.
In April 1946 it was agreed that European residents 
in the Territory would receive priority in their tenders
^55. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 4, November 1946, p. 12. A
photograph of the Catalina accompanies the article.
156. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 9, April 1946, p. 9. It was 
not generally realized by the settlers stranded in 
Australia that much of the material had been dumped 
almost two years before the Commission began full- 
scale operations.
157. Ibid. Civilians in Lae could easily have been 
responsible for the deficit.
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for surplus materials, although, it was not until November
that the arrangement was confirmed publicly by the
1 58Ilinister for Supply and Shipping, Senator Ashley. The 
Minister maintained that there had always been a policy 
of giving priority to the Territory; the government had 
also made special arrangements for the Production Control 
Board to purchase materials on behalf of settlers still 
in Australia. In any case, Territory residents enjoyed 
an advantage over Australian buyers, who had to pay 
freight in transporting their purchases to southern 
markets. These assurances did not satisfy the settlers, 
and the Pacific Islands Monthly claimed that the Minister 
had been misled on the Commission’s practices. The 
disposals sales continued, as did the complaints, and by 
the time the Commission ceased operating in Papua New 
Guinea on 30 June 194-7 its critics had accumulated a good 
deal of evidence tending to indicate considerable 
inefficiency: confusion over the timing of sales, so
that settlers missed their opportunity; multiple sales 
of the same goods to different buyers; incomplete records 
of materials sold; and loosely-worded sales agreements 
that allowed purchasers unlimited time to clear scrap from 
areas over which they had gained salvage rights. ' J The 
disposals issue provided the white community in the 
Territory with yet another trauma to add to its collective 
persecution complex.
158. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 5, December 194-6, p. 57.
159. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 5, December 1946, p. 27 and No. 6,
January 1947, p. 71; Vol. 18, No. 9, April 1948,
pp. 33-4.
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In fact, there were gains as well as losses for
settlers from their dealings in war surplus materials.
For those who were in the Territory immediately after the
war speculation could bring big gains, if only because
control was extremely lax. In a court case arising from
the theft of disposals goods the Chief Justice later
stated that, in the period from late 1945 to 1947, ’’people
really thought they had licence to confiscate any 
1 60property”. It was also alleged that European landowners
who had returned to New G-uinea concealed dumps on their
properties from Disposals Commission inspectors, and in
some cases moved materials from village-owned land to
their plantations, subsequently buying salvage rights over
their land for very small amounts and making huge profits
from the sale of the stolen goods. Similar profits
could be accumulated by legitimate speculation. Sam
Marshall, one of the first cost-war settlers in the
Kainantu area, recalled, ”1 bought the telephone line from
Lae to G-usap. Copper was worth a lot of money in those
days. I paid £350 for it, and I made about £20,000, after
I sold it as scrap to America. I also bought about 50
trucks for £25. I gave a few away, picked the eyes out
” 162of the others and left the rest there.
Profits decreased and risks mounted with each 
succeeding transaction involving the same dump or salvage 
right. The Milne Bay area was a typical example. In
160. CHS A518, item F809/1/1, 24 October 1950.
1 6 1 . Ibid.
162. Papua New G-uinea Post-Courier, 26 May 1972.
234
addition to the usual vehicle parks and dumps of assorted
stores and building materials, the Milne Bay base was the
site of a large American field hospital, two airstrips
and the American naval base at G-amadodo. The Army’s
method of dealing with much of this equipment was
described by the Disposals Commission as "something
approaching a scorched earth policy; M.T. had been
wrecked, water-craft sunk, machinery sprayed with acids
or cut with oxy-acetylene torch and then bull-dozed into
the ground”.  ^ Even after this treatment, however, there
was still much to be salvaged from the millions of
dollars worth of material that had been on the site.
Various items were sold (sometimes more than once) and
in December 1946 bids were taken for salvage rights over 
1 65the whole area. These were bought by the firm of
John Stubbs (Papua) Ltd. on behalf of the Australian 
syndicate of Hornibrook, McKenzie and Clark for a total 
of £11,500. In a letter detailing the Administration's 
dissatisfaction with disposals practices, Colonel Murray 
noted:
The subsequent history of this transaction is that 
John Stubbs and Son (Papua) Ltd., after dealing in 
the area for some time, sold out to Vacuum Oil Ltd. 
for an amount believed to be about £85,000. This 
company removed oil installations and other equipment 
and then sold out to a company known as Milne Bay 
Merchants Ltd. for a sum believed to be in the vicinity 
of £68,000. Milne Bay Merchants Ltd. then sold a 
large amount of equipment from the area and in the 
process issued for the guidance of buyers a 35 page 
catalogue of material available for sale. Milne
163. P.I.M., Vol. 16 Do. 10, May 1946, p. 66.
164. CMS A518, item F809/1/1, 24 October 1950.
165. This passage, including the quotation, is drawn from 
ibid.
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Bay Merchants Ltd. then sold certain rights in 
the area to another firm who traded as Milne Bay 
Merchants, for a sum believed to be £16,500.
This last firm is still in the Milne Bay area and 
have (sic) recently offered pipeline in the area, 
approximately 4,200 tons, to the Department of 
Works and Housing for £3,000. A check of the 
Treasury records shows that amounts paid by the 
Treasury, Port Moresby, to the Milne Bay Merchants 
Ltd. and Milne Bay Merchants are £25,155*•• 
practically all for goods the title to which was 
acquired in the original auction sale.
Thus during the latter stages of the disposals 
transactions some of the settlers - often associated with 
new arrivals in such ventures as "Milne Bay Merchants" - 
made extraordinary profits from a minimum of effort. The 
blame for this situation was levelled not at the 
profiteers, but at the officials who allegedly allowed 
them to operate as they did.
Commonwealth Disposals Commission investigates itself
The settler complaints culminated in charges that
large quantities of equipment - variously estimated at
between £200,000 and £500,000 in value - had been stolen
166or misappropriated. Rumours of this kind circulated
from early 1948, but the Labor government ignored them.
It was not until April 1950, shortly after the Liberal- 
Country Party coalition came to power, that an inquiry 
into the Hew Guinea operations of the Commonwealth 
Disposals Commission was ordered, possibly with a view to
1 7embarrassing the previous government. An investigation
166. P.I.M., Vol. 18 Ho. 8, March 1948, p. 10.
167. CRS A518, item F809/1/1, 12 April 1950.
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began in May 1950, but it was conducted by a sub-committee
1 68comprising members of the Commission. Not surprisingly, 
the sub-committee refuted the charges made against its 
parent body, relying heavily on extenuating circumstances 
that applied equally to all activities during the post-war 
years: shortages of staff and labour, poor communications,
lack of shipping, widespread destruction and general 
dislocation of services caused by the Army’s rapid 
withdrawal. The full Commission therefore had no hesitation 
in endorsing the conclusions of its own sub-committee 
that:^ ^
(a) There was no evidence of dishonesty or suspicion 
of the integrity of the Commission’s officers.
(b) There was no reason to doubt that the Commission’s 
officers had, at all times, acted in good faith and in the best of their judgement.
It was suggested that the disposals auctions at Milne 
Bay could have been conducted in a more satisfactory manner, 
but that owing to ’’extreme pressure” and poor conditions 
this had been impossible.
In November 1950 the Commission’s findings were
referred to the then Minister for External Territories,
Mr. Spender, with a suggestion that they be ’’discussed”.
They were later minuted to the new Minister for
Territories, Mr. Hasluck, as one of the matters outstanding
1 70at the time of his assuming the portfolio. No further
168. Ibid., 5 May and 24 October 1950.
169. Ibid., 24 October 1950.
170. Ibid., 17 and 24 July and 14 November 1950 and 13 
June 1951.
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action was taken on the matter. Thus the Commonwealth 
Disposals Commission was able to defend itself by means 
of an inquiry whose objectivity must have been in 
question. The difficulties which the Commission’s 
operations created for the Provisional Administration, 
and their impact on relations with the settler community, 
went unremarked.
Murray settles in
During his first few months as Administrator,
Murray encountered a series of major problems, most of
them inter-related, which led to cycles of frustration:
lack of preparation for civil rule; military petulance;
a debilitated country; severe shortages of personnel
and equipment; and several decisions by the Australian
government, notably those concerning labour contracts,
shipping, war damage compensation and war surplus
disposals, which placed severe limitations on the work
of the Provisional Administration. Every step Murray
took to implement the Labor government’s policies
increased the opposition among the influential white
community to the Administration generally and to Murray
in particular. Perseverance with the policy required
both courage and conviction. The pragmatic course would
have been to counsel delay, using the arguments later
1 71advanced by Stanner:
171. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 86.
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It was an error to have ended the military "period” 
so soon. The civil authority remained for several 
years under-equipped to maintain, let alone rival, 
a large part of the work of an organization which 
had taken nearly four years to build. The nature of 
the tasks was badly under-rated. Ho other inference 
from the preparations which were made seems to be 
allowable. The loss of most of the senior officers 
of the Mandated Territory was a particularly heavy 
handicap.
This assessment can now be shown to be completely wrong,
i 79in view of the villagers’ alienation from Angau. In
Murray, the people had an Administrator far more 
sympathetic towards their situation than any Army officer.
Hurray's activities until the final takeover from
the military in June 1946 show that he had no intention
of delaying the resumption of civil administration. During
those months he travelled almost continuously, mainly
in the Territory of New Guinea, familiarising himself with
conditions, interviewing staff who were, or soon would
be, working with him, and negotiating the transfer of
control. During his journeys Murray made entries in a
journal, the only time in his adult life that he kept
173anything like a diary. The entries reveal the scope of
Murray's energies and responsibilities, as well as an
incisiveness in assessing people and the ability to make
174firm decisions. Some of the notes read:
172. See Chapter Two, pp. 110-12.
173. Interview with Colonel Murray, 31 May 1968. The 
journal is "scrappy", according to Murray's note 
(of 4 December 1966) on the flyleaf, "but relates 
to a difficult time in a theatre of war then being 
taken over by Civil Government". Murray added 
some margin notes and the extracts used here have 
had the more cryptic abbreviations filled out.
174. Murray journal, pp. 67-8.
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Lae Conference 14— 15 January with First Australian 
Army...General Robertson in hospital; saw him 
before conference. Brigadier General Staff represented 
G.O.C. in C. Offered chair, but I asked him to 
accept, which he did. He spoke about Army view.
Wish First Army out of mainland New Guinea by 28 
February. Possibility of Civil Administration taking 
over? I spoke next, said policy take over as soon 
as possible. Personnel most difficult problem. 
Supplies, buildings, probably O.K., shipping doubtful. 
Went on with an appreciation along the lines: object, 
factors, causes, and plan left to Army and Civil 
Administration representatives to put into effect 
when factors fully known. Finished with, "The 
impossible is that which has not yet been done."... 
Melrose and self went to Salamaua at 5 p.m. in... 
boat and slept at S. - within P.-N.G. territory...
15 January...Robertson wanted matter of takeover 
clinched for 28/2 and Angau to Rabaul area; clean­
up to be left to Lae Base...Think he must have 
given an undertaking to Prime Minister when latter 
at Lae. Gesture of offering me chair again.
General R. took it but gave me chance of suggesting 
that he should! General worked conference around 
to view that we wanted to take over by the 28th Feb. 
and it would be impertinence (partly in fun of course) 
for them to tell us how to do it! I countered that... 
we were anxious to take over if both parties could 
so work as to make it possible.
As well as manoeuvering with General Robertson, Murray
also used the opportunity of the Lae conference to
observe his own staff in action and to learn something
of the attitudes in the public service. On 28 January 
175he noted :
Looking back: An interesting sidelight on the 
dominance of T.N.G. in the thoughts of T.N.G. 
officers was the reaction of Melrose when first 
discussing the matter of a takeover by the 28th Feb. 
M., who had opposed the taking over of the Highlands 
in February because the time was not ripe for 
additional responsibilities, made no comment on the 
difficulties but said, "You will be able to shift 
your Headquarters." Now I had no desire to shift 
them - there is no existent town on the other 
side.
175. Murray journal, p. 71. On the other hand Humphries, 
the Papuan officer, had referred to Port Moresby as 
the "national capital" (see p. 225 of this Chapter).
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The Territory of hew Guinea also had support within the 
military, although Murray observed that this had definite
limits:^ ^
Sturdee was very pro Lae as capital; Robertson 
didn't seem to care at all. I think his main 
interest is becoming Adjutant General....
Later in January 1946 Murray held conferences with 
representatives of the Commonwealth Disposals Commission,
177about which he made some brisk observations and decisions:
The C.D.C. have a staggering job and want to clean 
up Aitape, Wewak, Torokina and Jacquinot Bay in 
six weeks...Think our people are a bit staggered...
G - - - - requires break in Australia and is not 
really aware of the picture...worried about the 
largeness of his own share in the total governmental 
job...Told McMullen to replace old District Services 
vessels which have had it by new vessels, standardise 
on types and spares. Told all to take over 2 years 
supplies whenever they will not deteriorate unduly 
in this climate.
The Disposals Commission wished the Administration to
take most of the stores and "declare" those it could not
use at a later date, but Murray was adamant: "....we
could not possibly accept except under conditions of
178caring for, but no responsibility".
In February 1946 Murray made an extensive tour of
179the centres to be taken over from the military:
176. Ibid., T>. 72.
177. Ibid., P* 73.178. Ibid., P. 78.
179. Ibid., PP . 80-1.
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Went to Lae-Madang-Wewak-Aitape-Hollandia-Madang 
(Hagen, Kar Kar, Bagabag)-Lae...Woodman / District 
Officer, Madang 7 seems to Have things in hand and 
is full of confidence; and will obviously get 
things done W's way. Saw Maxwell there and reminded 
him Admin, would have priority on Production Control 
Board stores for disposal. Told him this in Woodman's 
presence...Niall at Wewak was assured also. He and 
Woodman know their districts and have...little 
anxiety. Niall has plans and will I think implement 
them...Stores and material a headache.
Aitape...native hospital site O.K. but the latrine 
on the sand not so good and no immediate effort to 
make it satisfactory. Major 0 - - -, D.O. Angau 
didn't seem disturbed or issue any orders. Store 
for drugs has roof like a sieve, though no great 
worry about this either. Hope things improve when 
M - - - takes over...Police looked well and moved 
well.
Dutch doing things in big way at Hollandia. They 
bought base, strips, roads. Liberty ships unloading 
cargoes and 3 Land Ships (Transport) came in while
there...
McMullen seems a little jaded but resolute and 
doing things. T.N.G-. District Services jealousies - 
maybe the senior fellows won't help him too much 
unless interests coincide.
Progress in Port Moresby was less satisfactory, particularly 
since Murray was sometimes forced to spend valuable time 
on problems which should have been solved by his 
subordinates. The town's building programme, for example,
was being delayed by an inability to decide on sites for
. 180houses:
9/3/4 6. Housing dragging. A couple of months at 
least since a committee or Board was appointed in this 
matter... contract finalised months ago and only four 
sites available...no progress in the way of declaring 
sites to the contractor up to yesterday. At 2.30 
went with / several officials / in Jeeps and took 
until 5 .3 0 p.m. inspecting siLes and modes of ingress. 
Finalised 16 sites of which 12 can be stated to the 
contractor to be ready for the commencement of his 
work.
180. Murray journal, p. 43 (some entries are not in 
chronological order).
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The limitations of his staff increased the burden on 
Murray and detracted from such larger projects as the 
clarification of policy with the Australian government,^8  ^
and the resumption of civil administration throughout 
the Territory.
Tensions with the military
The final takeover from the military was complicated
by the fact that General Robertson departed for
Australia shortly after the January conference at Lae,
leaving Major-General Morris once more in command of the
182Army in New Guinea. Morris immediately moved his
headquarters to Rabaul, where he could again conduct a
self-contained operation. Murray was not impressed with
the Army’s attitude during this period: ’’Had luncheon...
with General Morris: all medals, photogravures of His
Majesty and pictures of their presentation.” J Murray
formed the impression that the Army was no longer making
a determined effort to remove the wartime dangers from
1 f t lthe areas still under its control. J He raised the 
question of the large quantities of rifles and ammunition 
which, through abandonment or deliberate distribution, 
were spread through the villages. ’’The G.O.G. said it 
was the aftermath of the war, and would have to be faced 
as best possible.” Murray lacked the authority to 
extract further effort from the military in overcoming
181 . 
182.
183.
184.
Murray's work in Australia is discussed in Chapter Five. 
Long, op. cit., p. 594.
Murray journal, p. 78.
This passage, including quotations, is drawn from 
P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item'1-4-2, 28 April 1946.
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the problems that remained and it seemed for a time that 
he might be taking a risk in resuming civil administration 
according to the timetable agreed upon, particularly when 
rumours of impending uprisings began to spread.
Pears and false alarms
In March 1946 the District Officer at Lae, Mr. K.C. 
McMullen, received a report from an Australian who had 
recently been discharged from the Pacific Islands Regiment 
at Rabaul that disturbances had occurred in the town
1 ssbetween Papua New G-uinean soldiers and the civil police.
The report went on:
The trouble appears to be that the natives of the 
/"New Guinea Infantry Battalion_/ have the idea that 
they and they alone were responsible for the defeat 
of the Japanese. They believe that this gives them 
the right to be a law unto themselves and they 
resent the Government simply for the fact that it 
represents Law and Order. Another favourite theme 
is that the Government hid in Australia whilst the 
war was on and ANGAU only came in after the N.G.I.B. 
cleared the Japanese.
Natives of the N.G.I.B. have stated that on return 
to their villages they will train other natives as 
soldiers and be a law unto themselves...
I am of the opinion that these natives will cause 
considerable trouble and in their present organized 
state present a serious menace, particularly when 
AMP troops evacuate New Guinea.
While the basic facts in the report were correct, the 
conclusions drawn from them might normally have been 
dismissed as a combination of old-style settler racism, 
officers’ mess gossip and tales spread by New Guineans
185. The McMullen memorandum and its attachments, dated 
4 April 1946 but unreferenced, was kept in his 
journal by Murray. The passage is drawn from these 
documents.
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about members of rival language groups. However, the 
views in the report were generally supported by McMullen, 
who argued, "The War has had a marked effect on the 
natives of New Guinea, but the real reaction is not yet 
apparent." He saw the reaction flowing from the occupation 
of the country by "a coloured race" and the consequent 
loss of face by whites; from the establishment of the 
Pacific Islands Regiment, which had "aroused the latent 
desire to kill for killing’s sake"; and from the fact 
that "ANG-AU was forced to continually break faith with the 
natives". This had led to:
The present stage, when Law and Order seems to have 
been discarded - where troops, civilians, asiatics 
and natives struggle together in the looting of 
dumps and camps as troops vacate them; when natives 
(discontented and with cause), threatened violence 
when they did not get satisfaction.
Making a special plea for his own service, McMullen 
criticised:
Pour years of Military Administration, during which 
the authority of the District Services staff has 
been undermined by a Native Labour Organization and 
the Royal Papuan Constabulary. A military Administration 
in which each service or department endeavoured to 
be a separate and water-tight Unit, with non-co- 
operation and no common policy: ANGAU, approximately 
2000 strong, with only a small number of experienced 
men.
In summarising the position, as he saw it, McMullen 
stated, "The natives have lived in a reign of force and 
violence for four years; many are trained killers and 
jungle fighters...The country is full of abandoned 
firearms and ammunition. No one knows the quantity in
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the hands of the natives."
In retrospect, it is obvious that McMullen's fears 
were exaggerated; indeed, his letter to Murray suggests 
that he was disgruntled and unable to accept changing 
circumstances; this may account for his resignation from 
the Administration, to join the W.R. Carpenter group, at 
the end of the year. Nevertheless, Murray had to 
regard the report as important, particularly since he had 
until then considered its author "not a jumpy 
individual".^ ^  He noted that it could affect the 
takeover from the military, but reacted calmly in 
referring it to his senior field staff. After consultations 
with them he directed that the takeover should proceed 
as planned. In the event, no serious disturbances 
occurred, so that the risks that existed at the time were 
later overlooked. Yet the episode illustrates the 
strains and uncertainties under which Murray had to operate: 
had there been unrest, the evidence of the Administrator's 
misjudgement would have been overwhelming.
It is important to note that the rapid progress 
towards rehabilitation at this time occurred when Murray 
was still exercising a great deal of personal authority 
as Administrator, relying on the broadest policy 
guidelines from Australia and accepting enormous
186. P .1.M., Vol. 17 No. 6, January 1947, p. 8.
187. rIhis passage is drawn from Murray's journal,
pp. 133-5.
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responsibilities in the process.
Problem at Manus
An issue which involved more complex political
factors was the takeover of the American base at Manus
Island from the United States Navy. The base had been
built as one of the ”spring-boards" for General Macarthur's
advance on Japan and was estimated to have cost $156 
188million. It was by far the biggest base south of the
equator during 19 4 4 /4 5 and was strategically located for 
any post-war operations in South-East Asia. The 
Australian government was faced with a difficult decision 
about the future of the base, which the Americans wished 
to retain, but which was located in an area shortly to 
come under United Nations Trusteeship. In the event, the 
United States did not hand over the base until August 
1948, and during the immediate post-war months Murray had 
no information about its possible fate. In April 1946 
he paid his first peacetime visit to Manus in company 
with Major-General Morris (following their Rabaul 
conference on the transfer of military control).^^ On 
22 April Murray was forced to cable Canberra for advice, 
since the U.S. Navy Captain in charge of the base was 
reluctant to enter into any negotiations for a handover.
188. An Australian’s impressions of the establishment of 
the base are in P .I,M., Vol. 17 No. 3, October 
1946, pp. 22-4.
189. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 22 April 1946. During several 
tours Murray had the use of an Australian Navy 
corvette. The level of negotiations at the time
were unprecedented for an Administrator or 
Lieutenant-Governor.
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The matter was referred to Dr. Evatt, the Minister for 
External Affairs, who was in London at the time, but the 
reply, while flattering to Murray, provided no practical 
guidance; the Minister suggested that negotiations should 
proceed, in the knowledge that Murray possessed the "utmost 
tact and courtesy".1^0 The Administrator eventually 
secured an agreement from the base commander that the 
Americans working there would in future be subject to the 
laws of Papua New Guinea, but had then to return to Port 
Moresby, to wait more than two years for the government's 
final decision on the matter.
Murray's impressive start
During his first months as Administrator Murray 
worked under great pressure and at all levels - from 
international negotiation to deciding sites for public 
servants' houses - with a range of responsibilities and 
problems far greater than those imposed on any previous 
civil governor. He demonstrated, in addition to his 
obvious awareness of change and his sensitivity to 
situations, an ability to get things done. This was more 
impressive because his own position was far from secure.
His initial appointment had been for one year only, and 
the opponents of the post-war policy regularly referred 
to the limits imposed on the Provisional Administration 
and to the rumour that the two Territories might be legally
190. Ibid., 24 April and 3 and 6 May 1946.
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obliged to revert to ’’separate and more or less independent
1 Q 1administrations” . In addition, Murray’s application
for secondment from his positions in Queensland, although 
supported by the Prime Minister, had been refused by the 
State government, so that his resignation as Professor of 
Agriculture and Principal of Gatton College became effective 
at the end of 1945.^2
Meanwhile, Murray was making an impression in Papua 
New Guinea affairs. At the time of his appointment the 
Pacific Islands Monthly had avoided attacking him directly, 
but had pointed out, ’’Colonel Murray.. .will be under the 
handicap that he is a Ward appointee. Nothing good is 
expected of the Minister who produced the Provisional 
Government plan, the Production Control Board and the new 
Native Labour Regulations." During the following months 
Murray’s energy and personal conduct began to impress 
observers. In March 1946 a journalist noted:^ 4
The Administrator of Papua-New Guinea (Colonel J.K. 
Murray) has sketched in outline to me a possible 
future of hydro-electric power; of copra, coffee, 
cocoa and rubber plantations processing their products 
with that power; of native agriculture being 
improved through scientific research, and a million 
natives, rising in literacy, health and technical 
skill.
It is a level-headed concept - a 50 years plan. 
Meanwhile, the man who voices it lives in an ancient
191. P .I.M. , Vol. 16 No. 2, September 1945, p. 5; No.
7, February 1946, p. 41; No. 12, July 1946, p. 10. 
This matter is discussed in the next Chapter.
192. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
193. P.I.M'., Vol. 16 No. 2, September 1945, p. 5.
194. P.I ,M. , Vol. 16 No. 8, March 1946, p. 26. The article 
fails to make the major point that electric power was 
to be used to mechanise plantations; this was in turn 
to free villagers from indentured labour and allow them to develop their own areas (see Chapter Eight).
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Government House where Papuan painters and carpenters 
are frugally patching. He lives simply. The one 
sadly battered car that was saved for him from the 
lavish transport of Moresby's military days is now 
unusable. The Administrator must go by Jeep when 
he tours his "capital".
Even one of the settler "special correspondents" to the
i 05Pacific Islands Monthly gave grudging commendation: ^
Rehabilitation of European settlement and industry... 
is now proceeding at a steadily accelerating pace.
The position has improved considerably, compared with 
December last...As a result of four months practical 
experience of Territories conditions, Colonel Murray 
has been able to make many administrative 
rearrangements, the benefit of which should be 
felt in the next few months.
At the time of his appointment Murray was paid a tribute
that was both prophetic and ironic, in view of his later
dealings with the non-Labor government, by the leader of
196the Country Party, Mr. Fadden:
I...commend the Government upon its appointment of 
Colonel J.K. Murray as Administrator of the Territory 
of Papua-New Guinea. I am confident that Colonel 
Murray brings to this important post the special 
qualifications which it requires. For many years 
he has been principal of the Gatton Agricultural 
College in my electorate...Colonel Murray - or 
Professor Hurray as he is better known in Queensland - 
...is a man of deep convictions, and a fearless 
administrator. He is well fitted to discharge the 
trust which the Government has now reposed in him, 
and I am confident that he will carry out the 
duties of his new office without fear, or favour.
Murray soon showed that his convictions could indeed be 
uncompromising. For example, R.W. Robson wrote to Murray 
at the time of his appointment, commending him to a
195. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 9, April 1946, p. 10.
196. C.P.P., Vol. 185, pp. 5854-5, 25 September 1945.
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"task of extraordinary difficulty" and offering
congratulations, to receive a rebuke in reply. "You
will of course understand," Murray observed, "that my
receipt of this courtesy must be tempered by the
intemperate, unjust article with regard to the School
of Civil Affairs and my friend, Colonel A.A. Conlon,
for whose invaluable work and qualities I have a most 
107high regard." The attack would eventually be 
directed against Murray himself, as he sought to 
implement the labor government’s post-war policy. The 
question was whether the principles for which Murray 
was admired could withstand the pressures of transforming 
broad policy into firm administrative action.
197. P.N.G.N.A., Box 185 item G-H27/2, 13 September 1945.
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Planning frustrated
Cabinet sub-committee, 1944
Colonel Murray was responsible for executing a 
policy which was set out in only the very broadest 
terms. Formal planning began for the post-war 
development of Papua New Guinea with the establishment 
of a standing sub-committee of Cabinet in February 194 4.
1. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 31 May 1944. The
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The sub-committee comprised the Ministers for the Army 
(Mr, F.M. Porde), External Affairs (Dr* H,V* Evatt, who 
was also Attorney-General and required to advise on 
matters of constitutional and international law), Post- 
War Reconstruction (Mr. J.B. Ghifley, who was also 
Treasurer), Health and Social Services (Senator J.M. 
Fraser, who had served as Minister for External 
Territories from 1941 to 1943) and External Territories 
(Mr. E.J. Ward, who was also Minister for Transport).
In addition, the Gommander-in-Chief, General Blarney, and 
the Director of Research, Colonel Gonlon, were appointed 
permanent members of the sub-committee, with Mr. J.R. 
Halligan, Secretary for External Territories, as its 
executive officer. The Cabinet sub-committee established, 
in turn, an inter-departmental committee representing 
all of the departments for which the sub-committee*s
Ministers were responsible, with Halligan as its
2chairman. It had taken the Australian government more 
than two years, from the outbreak of the Pacific war, to 
set up this elaborate structure and its membership 
reflected the balance of forces influencing Papua New 
Guinea affairs at the time: the Department of External 
Territories and the Directorate of Research enjoyed 
direct representation, the pre-war public services and 
the settlers were ignored and Angau appeared rather
(cont.) sub-committee is referred to in the published 
accounts (Stanner, Transition, op. cit., pp. 93,
104, 107; Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 203). but 
without members from outside the Cabinet; in fact, 
this was not an orthodox Cabinet sub-committee.
2. CRS A518, item B927/7, February 1944 (full date not 
shown).
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remotely through the Commander-in-Chief. Owing to the 
governments preoccupation with Australian domestic 
affairs, the main planning activity stemmed from its 
advisory groups.
Anzac pact
There was little to guide the planners, beyond the 
knowledge that, as James McAuley expressed it, ”before 
the war it was accepted by all parties that the Territories 
should be self-supporting”. Nor was there any recent 
indication of political interest in New Guinea; apart 
from matters concerning military operations in the 
general South-West Pacific theatre, New Guinea was not 
once mentioned in Parliament during the whole of 1943. 
However, the Territories figured in Dr. Evatt's design 
for Australian international role in the post-war world, 
finding particular expression in the Australia-New 
Zealand Agreement, or ”Anzac Pact”, signed in January 
1944.4 There were three features of the agreement that 
held significance for Papua New Guinea. Articles 5, 13 
and 15 expressed a determination to co-ordinate the 
defence of the area between Australian and New Zealand 
interests, while omitting reference to Great Britain and
3. J.P. McAuley, ”Trusteeship in Practice: New Guinea, 
Nauru, Western Samoa”, in A.H. McDonald (ed.), 
Trusteeship in the Pacific, Sydney, Australian Institute 
of International Affairs, 1949, p. 36.
4. The accounts of the agreement set out in Stanner, 
Transition, op. cit., pp. 96-7 and Legge, op. cit., 
pp. 191-2 suggested that it would have greater 
significance than it finally possessed.
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the United States. Article 30 proposed the establishment 
of a South Seas Regional Commission; this eventually- 
emerged as the technically-oriented, politically 
ineffectual South Pacific Commission, whose formation 
is discussed later in this Chapter. For planning purposes, 
the operative clause was Article 31, which set out the 
broad guidelines for the Commission without providing 
specifications for detailed action:
5
31. The two Government agree that it shall be the 
function of such South Seas Regional Commission as 
may be established to secure a common policy on 
social, economic and political development directed 
towards the advancement and well-being of the native 
peoples themselves, and that in particular the 
Commission should
(a) recommend arrangements for the participation 
of natives in administration in increasing measure 
with a view to promoting the ultimate attainment
of self-government in the form most suited to the 
circumstances of the native peoples concerned;
(b) recommend arrangements for material 
development, including production, finance, 
communications and marketing;
(c) recommend arrangements for co-ordination of 
health and medical services and education;
(d) recommend arrangements for maintenance and 
improvement of standards of native welfare in 
regard to labour conditions and participation of 
natives in administration and social services;
(e) recommend arrangements for collaboration in 
economic, social, medical and anthropological 
research...•
In this Article the agreement went considerably beyond
5. The regional arrangement was foreshadowed by Dr. Evatt 
in a statement to the House of Representatives in 
October 1943 (C.P.D. Vol. 176, pp. 572-5, 14 October 
1943). Both the statement and the agreement itself 
seemed to leave the U.K. and U.S. out of account and 
were later attacked for this reason (for the Mislands” 
point of view, see P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 4, November 
1943, pp. 11, 35; No. 7", February, 1944, pp. 3-4 
and No. 8, March 1944, pp. 1-2). The significant 
feature for this study is that the later involvement 
of these other powers limited the functions of the 
Commission.
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the terms of the MCW Class Mandate under which the 
Territory of New Guinea had been administered, anticipating 
the conditions of trusteeship by making specific reference 
to political development, self-government and participation
gin administration. Additionally, it committed Australia
to applying the same conditions to the Territory of Papua
and thereby removed the main formal objection to unified
7peacetime administration of the two Territories.
Scope of the sub-committee
The Australia-New Zealand Agreement seemed to provide 
the Cabinet sub-committee with clear, if generalised, 
principles upon which detailed programmes of action could 
be based, but constraints upon long-term planning 
remained. One was the proposal for regional co-operation 
itself: although the Commission was to have ’’advisory" 
powers only, there was a possibility that its mere 
existence would impose restrictions on independent action 
by either of the parties. Of greater importance were 
the limitations inherent in the sub-committee*s own terms 
of reference. Both Mair and Stanner later implied that 
these gave the sub-committee a wide role: Mair stated 
that it was intended ”to deal with the future administration 
of the territories” and Stanner that its function was ”to
6. The Mandate merely provided, in Article 3, ’The Mandatory 
shall promote to the utmost the material and moral 
well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants
of the territory subject to the present mandate.”
7. The main factors in the debate about unified 
administration are set out later in this Chapter.
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Qconsider future administrative policy”. They no doubt
based their assessments on Mr, Curtin*s statement that
the sub-committee would ’’deal with all future civil
qadministration”, but this phrasing was intended to make 
explicit the contrast between military and civil rule.
The specific terms of reference set out in departmental 
records disclose the true position: the sub-committee 
was primarily intended ”to deal with civil affairs and 
plan rehabilitation and reconstruction” in Papua New 
Guinea.10 This indicated definite limits on the 
responsibilities of the sub-committee and the time during 
which it would exercise them. In any event, the group 
interpreted its functions in the narrower sense and limited 
its recommendations to the resumption of civil 
administration and associated short-term problems.
Sub-committee recommendations
The Cabinet sub-committee made its recommendations 
11in two stages. In February 1944 Cabinet approved its
8 .
9.
10.
11 .
Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 203; Stanner, Transition, 
op. cit., p. 104. It is necessary, in discussing this 
and some later developments, to consider the studies 
published at about this time, since most subsequent 
accounts draw their assessments in turn from these 
sources, which were limited by their proximity to the 
events which they discussed and their authors* 
involvement in those events.
P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 8, March 1944, P. 3.
¿RS A518, item A800/1/7, 31 May 1944.Stanner (Transition, op.^ cit., p. 93) stated that the 
sub-committee was established in February 1944, when it 
was announced by Curtin. However, it had already met 
on an ad hoc basis, making the recommendations Curtin 
outlined on 22 February, including the proposal that 
it be set up permanently.
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proposals that it should continue as a standing sub­
committee; that there be close collaboration between the 
Department of External Territories and the Directorate of 
Research; that the Minister for External Territories be 
responsible for all matters concerning civil administration 
in, and attend War Cabinet discussions concerning New 
Guinea; and that his Department provide executive services
i pto the sub-committee. In addition to these procedural
matters, Cabinet also decided that the School of Civil
Affairs be established; that limited numbers of civilians
be allowed to return to Papua; and that ”substantial
financial provision...be made available by the Commonwealth
13Government” for the Territories. The last of these 
decisions marked the clear break with pre-war practice, 
but there was no firm indication of the next steps to be 
taken. The sub-committee had discussed the question of 
resuming civil administration but, on being advised that 
General Macarthur opposed an early resumption, decided that 
the matter be deferred for another six months.1^ The 
question of transfer was next discussed in September 1944, 
when General Blarney agreed to a handover being conducted 
in stages, but this meant that there had already been a 
considerable delay in implementing earlier proposals.
The responsibility for settling the details of
12. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 31 May 1944. Note that much 
of the executive work was in fact carried out by the 
Directorate (Chapter Two, pp. 131-5, particularly p. 
134, footnote 157).
13. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 8, March 1944, p. 3.
14. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 4 February 1944.
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post-war administration was then delegated to the inter­
departmental committee, which accepted as its framework 
certain "determinants of development policy" which hore 
a close resemblance to the recommendations contained in 
the position papers prepared for the Cabinet sub-committee 
by the Directorate of Research* The "determinants" 
included the requirements of the future defence of 
Australia and New Guinea; Australia's international 
obligations; the political consideration that, if
Australia should be slow to develop the country, "someone
16else will"; and concern for the economy of the country*
The inter-departmental committee was reminded that the 
government would have to be prepared to "spend large sums 
of money on the Territories without the prospect of any 
comparable economic return".
Inter-departmental committee and Provisional Administration
The second stage of planning for the resumption 
of civil administration began on 23 February 1945, just 
a year after initial preparations had begun, when the 
inter-departmental group made several recommendations to 
the Cabinet sub-committee. These were that the separate 
administrations for New Guinea and Papua should not be 
reconstituted; that they should be replaced by a 
combined administration for the immediate future; that
15. See Chapter Two, pp. 134-5.
16. This and the following passage are drawn from 
CRS A518, item B927/7, undated February 1944.
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the combined service be staffed, for the present, by 
temporary appointees; that no Legislative Council be 
appointed during the interim period; that the separate 
laws of New Guinea and Papua continue in operation, unless 
superseded by new legislation; and that an Australian 
Territories Research Council be set up to continue post­
war planning.1  ^ In a statement to the House of Representatives 
on 9 March 1945 Mr* Ward announced the government’s 
decision to establish a combined Provisional Administration 
in terms almost identical with those of the inter­
departmental committee's recommendations, omitting reference
18only to the Research Council. Thus neither the Cabinet 
sub-committee nor Cabinet itself added anything of 
substance to the immediate post-war arrangements proposed 
by the officials.1 ^
The Minister's announcement of the Provisional 
Administration in March 1945 gave few details of the 
planning that had taken place and gave no reasons for the 
decisions reached by the government. Referring to the 
proposal for a combined administration, Mr. Ward merely 
stated:
Although the Government does not propose at this 
stage to consider the question of a combined Public 
Service for the two Territories, it considers that
17. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 23 February 1945.
18. C.P.D., Vol. 181, pp. 529-30, 9 March 1945.
19. Successors to the Cabinet sub-committee and the 
inter-departmental group were set up in later 
years; their efforts are discussed in Chapters 
9 and 10.
20. C.P.L.. Vol. 181, p. 529, 9 March 1945.
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it would not be desirable immediately to re-establish 
the two entirely separate services. It has, therefore, 
been decided to continue the suspension of the 
officers of the two services and make temporary 
arrangements for the performance of functions of civil administration in the Territory of Papua and 
the portion of the Territory of New Guinea south 
of the Markham River....
Besides casting doubts on the employment security of
pre-war public servants, the statement led to speculation
about the motives for establishing a combined civil
administration on a temporary basis only. For the previous
two year settler interests had condemned the delay in
restoring civil control and had attributed it to Angau's
21desire to continue its rule. However, Angau had too 
little influence in Cabinet for its future to cause notable 
concern; although Generals Blarney and Macarthur both 
wished to prolong military rule for a time, there is no 
evidence of a serious proposal that it should continue for 
a period of years. A second argument, put forward by the 
Pacific Islands Monthly, was that the Minister intended 
to confine power to Canberra and deny European private
interests to the Territory in order to plan a Msocialist
22utopia” for "brown brother". The magazine maintained 
that the "Brass Hats", including the senior officers of 
both Angau and the Directorate, wished to retain control 
by indirect methods after being denied the continuation 
of full military rule. It was also difficult to sustain 
this argument, since it ignored the fact that the two
21. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 3, October 1944, pp. 6-8.
22. P.i.M., Vol. 15 No. 12, July 1945, pp. 6, 41-5.
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groups were openly antagonistic towards each other 23
Problems of unified administration
The obvious explanation for the adoption of interim 
measures in the immediate post-war period was that 
Australia could not make final arrangements until the 
status of the Mandated Territory and the role of the 
United Nations were settled. Yet there had already been 
significant pressure for permanent unification. Some 
time before the Minister*s statement of March 1945 
papers were prepared within the Directorate of Research 
suggesting strongly that there was no operative legal 
barrier to combined administration.^ One of the papers 
supported the view that "in Mandate C at any rate 
international law not only permits but, indeed, commends 
combined administration in just such cases as New 
Guinea. Certain limitations on unification are clearly 
admitted in this view, but they are only limitations, 
not prohibitions.*’^  The limitations arose from the 
terms of the Mandate which provided that "unification 
must not go to the point of calling the Mandatory’s
23. See Chapter Two, pp. 135-9.
24. The papers are unsigned, undated and carry no file 
numbers: merely the handwritten notation, 
"Directorate of Research". One is headed, "Note
on legality under international law of proposals for 
combined administration of Papua and the Mandated 
Territory" and the other, "Note on the report of 
the Eggleston Committee on combined administration 
of Papua and New Guinea of 1939 in its relation to 
Australian strategic security". They were almost 
certainly prepared by Dr. T.P. Pry.
25. Directorate of Research, "Note on legality etc.", 
op. cit., p. 1.
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control over the territory * sovereignty*M; that any
arrangement was subject to Australia’s obligation
eventually to Memancipate” the Territory; and that
'•unification must leave it possible to account separately
for the income and expenditure of the Mandated area”.
A second paper analysed the findings of the 1939
Eggleston Committee, which had investigated administrative
union but recommended against it: not, according to
the paper, on legal grounds, but for reasons of a "trivial
27nature" with "their roots in private economic interests"; 
that is, objections to union during the pre-war period 
had come not from international or legal sources but 
from internal pressure groups.
Attempts to create a unified administrative 
structure after the war were more likely to meet with 
international objections, mainly on the grounds that 
Australia might attempt in this way to assert full 
sovereignty over the Territory of New Guinea. However, 
any claims of this kind could be rejected by reference 
to the terms of the Australia-New Zealand Agreement and 
to Dr. Evatt's policy speeches on Pacific affairs. Yet 
the circumstances were sufficiently complex to require 
a clear directive from Cabinet if the planning of a
26. Ibid., pp. 1-4.
27. Directorate of Research, "Note on Eggleston etc.", 
op. cit.. p. 2. The committee comprised Mr. F.W. 
Eggleston, Mr. H.O. Townsend, Treasurer, Territory 
of New Guinea and Mr. Leonard Murray, representing
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permanent administration were to be completed quickly. 
Nothing so definite appeared in the "determinants of 
development policy” presented to the inter-departmental 
committee which, under Halligan*s chairmanship, was thus 
left without firm guidance on the matter.
During the discussions on unified administration, 
tensions between the Department of External Territories 
and the Directorate reached their height, with Halligan
and his staff being accused by Conlon of obstructing
28change. The Department was well aware that the 
Eggleston Committee had found no support for amalgamation 
among the European community of the Territories; and 
that the settler evacuees were even then campaigning, 
through the Pacific Territories Association and the
Pacific Islands Monthly, for a return to the status quo
20ante. Halligan faced the prospect of having dealings 
with the settlers for years to come, so that any 
obstruction was probably less deliberate than 
circumstantial, particularly since Halligan lacked the
(cont.) Papua (Report of Committee Appointed to 
Smryey the Possibility of Establishing a Combined 
Administration of1 Papua and îJew Guinea. Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Paper No. 230, Vol. 3, 1937-40). 
Different accounts have been given of the findings. 
Stanner (Transition, op. cit., pp. 40-1) states that 
"legal difficulties" were "crucial", while Legge 
(op. cit., p. 189) maintains they were not a source 
of opposition. In fact, Leonard Murray, in a minority 
report, expressed legal doubts, while the majority 
did not. Stanner*s peculiar interpretation was 
apparently intended to support his argument that 
separate administrations might be desirable; this was 
part of his contradiction of most post-war policies.
28. See Chapter Two, p. 138.
29. P.I.M.,
February
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freedom of action of the Directorate staff and had 
received little attention from his Minister, By this 
time Ward was receiving advice of widely different 
scope from two rival sources: the Directorate, working 
on long-term issues; and the inter-departmental 
committee, concentrating on immediate arrangements that 
seemed far more practical. When the nature of the post­
war administration came to be decided, the decisive 
role fell to the formal bureaucratic structure, which 
adopted the cautious approach of taking into account all 
the considerations of supposed international law and of 
public service and settler interests: matters that had 
been largely dismissed or ignored by the Directorate.
This inevitably created further delays in the
30establishment of a combined permanent administration.
The Ward statement of 1945
Mr. Ward announced the Provisional Administration
proposal on 9 March 1945, stating that military rule
would end "as soon as it is practicable to re-organize
31the civil administrative service”, but it was almost 
four months before he introduced the enabling 
legislation to Parliament. The delay could hardly have 
been excused by difficulties of drafting, since the 
Bill incorporated only the most basic machinery provisions
30. The permanent administrative structure did not become 
operative until 1 July 1949 (see Chapter Nine).
31. C.P.D., Vol. 181, p. 529, 9 March 1945.
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to give effect to the recommendations of the inter­
departmental committee; it suspended much of the Papua 
Act and the New Guinea Act, while allowing the laws of 
the separate Territories to continue in force, and 
provided for the appointment of a temporary public 
service (Section 15), a Supreme Court (Section 16) and 
an Administrator (Section 9).^2 Mr. Ward’s second- 
reading speech on the Bill lasted for less than twenty 
minutes. In setting out the machinery provisions of the 
legislation he repeated his statement of 9 March, while 
giving no further explanation for the government’s 
reaching the decisions it had. Yet the speech has 
received a remarkable amount of attention, presumably 
because it was the only one of substance the Minister 
ever made on New Guinea policy. One section, in particular, 
has been quoted or paraphrased in each of the published 
accounts of the period.^ It reads
This Government is not satisfied that sufficient 
interest had been taken in the Territories prior 
to the Japanese invasion, or that adequate funds 
had been provided for their development and the 
advancement of the native inhabitants. Apart from 
the debt of gratitude that the people of Australia 
owe to the natives of the Territory, the government 
regards it as its bounden duty to further to the 
utmost the advancement of the natives, and 
considers that that can be achieved only by 
providing facilities for better health, better 
education and for a greater participation by the 
natives in the wealth of their country and 
eventually in its government.
52. The Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act 
contains only 17 Sections.
53. Stanner, Transition, op. cit.. p. 100; Mair, op. cit. 
(1948), pp. 207-8; Legge, op. cit.. p. 192.
54. O.P.D.. Vol. 185, p. 4052, 4 July 1945.
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This was a direct expression of the views of the 
Directorate, just as the machinery provisions of the 
Bill had been provided by the inter-departmental 
committee. The Minister’s speech contained nothing that 
had not already been stated in the Australia-New Zealand 
Agreement or by Dr. Evatt during the United Nations 
Conference and following his return from San Francisco. 
Ward, although a sincere supporter of the principles he 
expressed, was not the first to apply them to New Guinea 
and it is doubtful whether he appreciated, then or later, 
the amount of effort required to transform principles 
into action. His main concern in New Guinea appears to 
have been labour conditions, about which he held the 
strongest of views, but although his interest in this 
matter was entirely laudable, it tended to obscure affairs 
of equal importance. Thus he devoted more than one-third 
of his second-reading speech to the labour question, 
directing much of the ensuing parliamentary debate in
35* It is not proposed to discuss Australia’s
foreign policy except insofar as it gave clear 
direction to policies and programmes in Papua 
New Guinea. In this respect, Dr. Evatt*s role 
at San Francisco was significant for his support 
for a strong system of trusteeship supervision, 
on the one hand, while on the other he argued 
forcefully in favour of sweeping powers for 
Australia over the Territory of New Guinea; in 
this latter respect he differed little from 
Hughes at Versailles. His attitude, and 
Australia’s continuing obsession with the defence 
of the islands, is particularly clear in his 
speech on the second reading of the Charter of 
the United Nations Bill (C.P.D., Vol. 184, pp. 
5016-39, 30 August 1945), during which he answered 
numerous questions on the provisions of the 
United Nations Charter, including matters relating 
to trusteeship.
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the same direction. The controversy over the labour 
policy eventually commanded so much public attention 
that it created a false impression of the major concerns 
of the Provisional Administration, though perhaps not of 
the Minister, and so to indicate the significance of the 
issue it is necessary to discuss its origin.
36
36, C.P.D., Vol. 183, pp. 4050-5, 4 July 1945. The speech was some 3,000 words in length. About 1,000 words 
concerned machinery provisions, so that the labour 
question received a full half of the attention 
devoted to substantive matters: clearly disproportionate, 
under the circumstances. The ensuing debate, including 
committee stages, occupied more than ten hours of 
the parliament’s time; some hours in the House 
of Representatives and two hours forty-five minutes 
in the Senate (C.P.D., Vol. 183, pp. 4200-18,
4282-4325 /“House of Representatives^/; 4593-8,4671-86 /"Senate 7). The debate concentrated mainly 
on defence, settlers* rights and representation, 
and the pre-war "record” of Australian administration, 
in addition to the labour question, which, as in 
Mr. Ward’s speech, occupied about one-third of the debating time. Two speeches made during the 
debate are of particular relevance to later 
developments in Papua New Guinea: those of Mr.
Haylen, who used such terms as ’new order” (p. 4206) 
and ”new deal” (p. 4210), thereby adding heat to 
the contemporary argument and providing material 
for much debate in later years; and Mr. Spender, 
the future Minister, who confessed his "abysmal 
ignorance" of New Guinea affairs (p. 4210). Of the 
remainder, only five Members of the House spoke 
during the debate-in-chief on the Bill and eight 
on an amendment moved by Mr. White (Liberal) that 
the Bill be referred to a Select Committee for 
advice on the "best methods" of restoring civil 
administration (p. 4282), a motion which was 
defeated by 36 votes to 14 on the division (p. 4306). 
Twenty Members spoke during the committee stages 
of the Bill, the main contributors being Mr.
Archie Cameron (six speeches) and Mr. White (five 
speeches). No amendments were passed. Seven 
Senators spoke during the debate-in-chief. There 
was no debate during the committee stages of the 
Bill in the Senate. The Bill received assent on 
3 August 1945. A summary of the debate is provided 
in G. Gray, "The Passing of the Papua-New Guinea 
Provisional Administration Bill’* in U.U. Kelson, N.
Button and S. Robertson (eds•), 06: Select Topics 
in the History of Papua and New Guinea, Port Moresby, 
University of Papua New Guinea, 19"7ti("?), P* 37.
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Origins of the labour controversy
The easily exploitable wealth was removed from Papua 
New Guinea almost before government control could be 
established. The pearlshell from the shallower reefs, 
the beche de mer, the sandalwood and the alluvial gold 
were mostly taken by the turn of the century and the 
”kanaka trade” in labourers was forbidden,^ After a 
short period of freehold sale, the alienation of land was 
controlled, so that labour became the most important 
exploitable resource for European entrepreneurs in the 
islands. Yet the country was not heavily populated, and 
so the supply of labour dwindled: villagers near towns 
found other sources of income and the administrations in 
the two Territories increased their efforts to control 
recruitment and to improve labourers’ conditions. As 
labour became scarcer and relatively more expensive, 
employers became obsessed by the i s s u e . A s  they chafed 
under the restrictions of their war-time exile in 
Australia, the settlers grew even more apprehensive as 
pressure mounted in favour of transforming the system of 
employment in Papua New Guinea.
The public debate on post-war employment began with 
statements by representatives of the Papua New Guinea
37. A succinct account of these early activities is 
Gavin Souter, New Guinea: The Last Unknown, Sydney, 
Angus and Robertson, 1963, Chs. 1-2.
38. The best account of pre-war labour conditions, 
policies and European attitudes towards them is in 
Mair, op. cit. (1948), Chs. 6-7.
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missions on the future of the country* In November 1943 
Bishop Strong of the Anglican Mission urged caution, after 
the war, ”against the men who planned to make money in 
New Guinea because of the cheap native labour” At the 
end of that month an Anglican conference adopted a 
"Christian Charter for Melanesian Peoples” drawn up with 
the assistance of Professor A*P* Elkin* This document 
expressed sentiments similar to those of Bishop Strong, as 
did a paper by the Rev. Dr. J.W. Burton, secretary of 
the Methodist Overseas Mission, entitled ”The Atlantic 
Charter and the Melanesian People”.^ The gulf between 
this attitude and that of the employer was apparent in the 
statement by the chairman of New Guinea Goldfields Ltd. 
at the company's annual general meeting in January 1944:^1
In pre-war days the boys /“workers_7 were virtually 
wards of the Administration, and were well cared for 
from an industrial, health and recreational standpoint. 
They received ample food and clothing allowances, and sufficient wages to provide extras and some 
luxuries. It is common knowledge that the boys 
employed in industry so developed physically and 
mentally that one would hardly recognize them as 
the same race of natives...That the former policy was 
satisfactory was evidenced by the growing development 
of the agricultural and mining resources of the 
island just prior to the war...The problem of 
restoring the highly satisfactory pre-war conditions 
to the native boys should be entrusted to persons 
thoroughly trained and experienced in such matters.
Almost immediately, the debate came to centre on the 
long-standing controversy over the "indenture” system of
39* This and the following passage are drawn from P.I,M.. 
Vol. 14 No. 5, December 1943, pp. 10, 34-5.
40. Burton expressed similar views in a letter to the 
Pacific Islands Monthly in November 1943 (Vol. 14 
No. 4, p. 16).
41. P.I.M.. Vol. 14 No. 7, February 1944, p. 12.
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employment, under which labourers could be engaged on
4-2contract for terms of several years. The pernicious 
feature of the system was that workers who broke their 
contracts could be gaoled for months at a time. The 
proposal to ‘'abolish” indenture, put forward many years 
previously and supported by Ward and his advisers, mainly 
involved the substitution of civil remedies for the long­
standing penal sanctions. Supporters of indenture argued 
that civil remedies, such as damages for breach of 
contract, would be of little consequence if applied against 
a person with no realisable assets, so that workers would 
"desert” whenever they wished. This was a tacit admission 
that employment conditions were such that labourers stayed 
at work mainly through fear of gaol, although it was more 
usual to blame the situation on the "unreliability of 
the native”. However, even relatively disinterested 
observers maintained that indenture had the advantage of 
placing certain obligations upon employers in their 
treatment of workers; settlers were sometimes prosecuted 
for breaches of the employment regulations. Yet similar 
controls could have been exercised under a system which 
did not involve penal sanctions against workers. In fact, 
indenture was symptomatic of the colonial economic 
system and of the assumptions underlying it: development 
could occur only through European "enterprise", which had 
to be attracted by easy access to Papua New Guinea's
42. A summaiyof the system and of the debate surrounding 
it appears in Legge, op. cit.. pp. 155-67, from 
which a good deal of the following passage has 
been drawn.
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most readily exploitable resource, labour. Abolition of 
indenture threatened the very presence of Europeans in 
the country.
Nevertheless, the missions continued their campaign 
and on 2 February 1944 a deputation, supported by the 
views of the anthropologists Elkin and Hogbin, presented 
the case for the abolition of indenture to the Minister for 
External Affairs, Dr. Evatt.^ The deputations 
submission was passed to the Department of External 
Territories, where the Secretary, Mr. Halligan, revealed 
the gulf between the bureaucracy*s views and those of the 
mission-academic group. In replying, Halligan supported 
the indenture system on the grounds that it developed 
”character” and the "habit of industry”; improved the 
labourers* knowledge of agriculture; provided instruction 
in sanitation and personal hygiene; exposed workers to 
discipline and law and order; illustrated the practical 
application of the "principles of contract”; and 
established the habits of a "regular life" as against an 
irregular one.^ While Halligan*s comments revealed a
43. CRS A518, item C213/3/2, 2 February 1944. The deputation waited on Evatt rather than on Ward because 
the latter had been Minister only since October 1943, 
while Evatt*s views were already well known from his 
statements on the Atlantic Charter; he was also 
acquainted with members of the group. Hogbin had 
joined the debate during a talk at Sydney University 
in October 1943, provoking a savage attack from 
Robson (P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 3, October 1943, p. 15).
44. CRS A518, item C213/3/2, 2 March 1944. It is tempting 
to recount many of the extraordinary arguments put 
forward in support of indenture: one statement in 
particular shows the futility of pre-war paternalism. 
Mrs. MoHie Lett, wife of Sir Hubert Murray*s
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remarkable ignorance of life both in the villages and on 
plantations, they were not reactionary, but the 
conventional wisdom of the time. They are of significance 
mainly because they were expressed at exactly the time 
when the anthropologists who opposed indenture were 
beginning their association with the Directorate of Research.
The government’s attitude to indenture was still
not clear. In April 1944 a statement was drafted in the
Department of Information for release by Australian
representatives abroad suggesting, ”It should be borne
in mind that the majority of New Guinea natives are
nearer to the primitive type than most other races
inhabiting the earth. They are centuries behind sem-
45civilized natives....” It is probable that the 
statement was not released, but the fact that it should 
even have been prepared - presumably with the advice of 
the Department of External Territories - indicated that
(cont.) eulogistic biographer, contributed the 
following: ”The abolition of...indentured labour was
a measure Sir Hubert Murray feared would be 
introduced before the natives were ready for it... 
With the abolition of penal sanctions, settlers will 
have to be prepared to allow natives to break 
contracts with impunity; for, as a defendant in a 
civil action, a native is worthless...Sir Hubert 
wrote on the subject only a short time before he died. 
’Personally,’ he stated, ’I should be glad to see 
indentured labour replaced by free labour, but I do 
not think that this will come about until the native 
has developed a sense of responsibility that will 
hold him to his contract without penal sanctions; 
and it appears to me that when we can do without 
penal sanctions, we can do without indentured labour 
altogether.*” (P.I>M., Vol. 15 No. 1, August 1944,
P* 19).45. CRS A518, item C213/3/2, 19 April 1944.
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the bureaucracy would have to revolutionize its thinking
if major reforms were to be introduced in New Guinea.
Meanwhile, the Directorate of Research had joined the
campaign against indenture and on 3 August 1944 its staff
leaked information to the press that the system would be
abolished after the war.^ This brought a quick reaction
from the Pacific Territories Association, whose executive
presented a petition, accompanied by twelve pages of
signatures, to Mr. Ward on 26 August, requesting that
4-7indenture be retained. However, the Cabinet sub-committee
on New Guinea decided on 8 September that indenture could
no longer be supported and shortly thereafter the Minister
informed the House of Representatives that the system
48would probably be abolished. The decision was publicly 
confirmed by the Minister for Supply and Shipping, Mr. 
Beasley, at the September conference of the International 
Labour Organization in Philadelphia.^
Conference on labour, 1944
Owing to the strong support for the indenture system,
it was decided to call a conference of the interested
46. Ibid., 3 August 1944.
47. Ibid.. 26 August 1944.
48. C.P.D.. Vol. 175, p. 1268, 22 September 1944.
49. Cr'S A518, item C213/3/2, undated September 1944 (press 
release). Beasley had earlier joined Ward in 
condemning indentured labour and the two had been 
labelled by the Pacific Islands Monthly "typical 
products of the now degenerate democratic system” 
(P.I.M.. Vol. 14 No. 10, May 1944, p. 3).
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parties in Sydney on 1 December 1944. This was the only
occasion during the war when the government entered into
direct consultation with the European interests
associated with Papua New Guinea. It was unfortunate
this was not done more often, for there was an obvious
need for increased communication on both sides. The labour
conference, for example, represented a wide range of views:
from the Department, the Directorate, the Territories*
public services, the missions and the Pacific Territories
Association.^1 It was intended, according to Mr. Ward’s
opening address, to plan the steps involved in putting
52the government’s decision into effect. However, many 
of the delegates who attended were more concerned to have 
the decision reversed than to help in implementing it; 
most of the others advised the government to proceed 
with extreme caution in introducing changes; and the 
meeting broke up after lengthy but inconclusive 
discussion,^ It was not re-convened. This left the 
field to the mission-academic group favouring abolition,
50
50. ORS A518, item C213/3/2, 4 December 1944.
51. Among the representatives were Messrs. Halligan, 
Leonard Murray and Melrose; Professor Elkin and Dr. 
Hogbin; Mr. E.W.P. Chinnery, anthropologist, former 
Director of District Services, Territory of New 
Guinea and at that time Commonwealth Adviser on 
Native Matters; Lt.-Col. E. Taylor, former Assistant 
Director of District Services, T.N.G.; Lt.-Col.
J. Mullaly and Mr. J. Bretag, former Members of the 
Legislative Council of New Guinea; and Messrs. G. 
Aumuller and T. Nevitt, former M.L.C.’s from 
Papua. The Methodist, Lutheran, Catholic, Seventh 
Day Adventist and London Missionary Society 
missions were also represented (ibid.).
52. Ibid., 1 December 1944. For a summary of the 
conference, see Stanner, Reconstruction, op. cit., 
pp. 62-3.53. Ibid, and P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 5, December 1944,
p. 8.
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whose proposals were endorsed by the Minister in his 
speech on the Provisional Administration Bill. ^
Mr. Ward announced that, immediately civil 
administration was re-established, a new Native Labour 
Ordinance for the combined Territory would be enacted.
It was the governments policy that indenture should be 
abolished "within a period of five years or at an earlier 
date”.  ^ In preparation, it was proposed to neliminate” 
professional recruiters; tighten controls over levels of 
employment and consequent over-recruitment in certain 
villages; increase wages, pending an inquiry into the 
matter; introduce a greatly improved scale of rations; 
reduce working hours to 44 a week (from 55 in New Guinea 
and 50 in Papua); increase the minimum employment age 
from 14 to 16; ban the employment of women under indenture; 
limit the period of employment to 12 months, followed by 
a compulsory three-month break (compared with a maximum 
of seven years in New Guinea and four in Papua); provide 
for repatriation at the employer’s expense; establish a 
Court of Labour and Arbitration, in lieu of the courts of 
criminal jurisdiction, to deal with a limited range of 
penal provisions against workers, with reduced penalties; 
give limited encouragement to non-indentured labour, who 
would have the same conditions as contract workers; provide 
for workers* compensation; and establish a separate
54. For the substance of the proposals, see ibid, and
P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 6, January 1945, p. 12.
55. C.P.D.. Vol. 183, p. 4052, 4 July 1945.
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Department of Native Labour. In this area, at least,
the Minister*s speech provided the Provisional Administration
with a fairly detailed programme of action.
Vagueness of the Ward statement
Had proposals in similar detail been made in the many
other areas requiring attention - health, education,
village agriculture, local government, technical instruction,
political education, communications, status of women,
administrative structure, mission relations, financial
policy - then the task of the new civil administration
would have been immeasurably easier. Yet even the labour
measures, which in most cases were little more than
amendments to long-standing practices, stand in marked
contrast to the Minister’s vague statements on other
policies. On development: ”In future, the basis for the
economy of the territory will be native and European
industry with the limit of non-native expansion determined
57by the welfare of the natives generally.” On public
service staffing: ”To carry out the plans of the Government,
an efficient and energetic administration will be required,
and, although many of the experienced officers...will be
available, other officers will be required to fill vacancies
that have been caused by war casualties and retirements
58from the services.” These statements were far from
56
56. Ibid., pp. 4052-3
57. M .. p. 4054.
58. TETd.
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the ’’comprehensive programme...for the rehabilitation 
and development of the Territories” promised by the 
Minister earlier in his speech, and he had to conclude by 
saying, ’’Naturally, many of the plans of the Government 
affecting native education, health, &c., are in the 
formative stage. From time to time statements will be 
made to the Parliament of decisions taken in respect of 
various matters.” But the statements were not delivered, 
because comprehensive decisions were never reached.
Pressures on policy
Colonel Murray was aware of the impact of Ward’s
statement. He observed, ’’The Minister made his policy
clear in parliament and it certainly received a great deal
of publicity; the humanitarian aspects made their
greatest popular appeal in Australia; and the economic
60/^“aspects created_7 'commercial* animosity.” But New 
Guinea still lacked an administrative programme and 
Murray had little to refer to apart from his observations 
at the School of Civil Affairs: ”1 had attended most of 
the lectures in the School...by people like Hogbin, Mair, 
Piddington, Wedgewood, Andrews and thus knew the attitude 
to development and administrative policy and procedures 
discussed by them with the classes.” These were lectures 
delivered mainly to the men who were ”to be the junior
59. Ibid., pp. 4052, 4055.
60. This and the following quotations are drawn from 
Murray's notes, p. 61.
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officers at the commencement of administration in *45”: 
the highest and lowest echelons of the public service 
thus had something in common. However, attitudes at the 
intervening levels had been conditioned by experience in 
New Guinea rather than by formal lectures; the staff of 
the school represented only a narrow spectrum of 
contemporary opinion. Since Murray had little opportunity 
of broadening his network of informants before taking up 
his post, he had a limited appreciation of the acceptability 
of the Ward proposals among his senior staff.
Prior to his swearing-in on 11 October 1945, Murray
had met Ward only once, at Finschhafen during the war.
There was little time for formal discussion during the
twelve days between his appointment and departure for New 
61Guinea. It was this haste that led to criticism of the
6?sudden transition to civil administration; after all, 
it had taken the government seven months, from the 
announcement of the Provisional Administration, to appoint 
its Administrator, so that another few weeks delay could 
hardly have mattered. By that time, however, Murray*s 
future was being dictated by pressures that had grown out 
of earlier delays: the unexpected ending of the war; 
the need for Australia to keep to its promises made in the 
Anzac Pact and at San Francisco; the desire to end 
military rule; and the determination to deny the appointment 
to a pre-war officer, particularly Leonard Murray. The
61. Murray letter of 26 May 1969*62. See, for example, Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 86.
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new Administrator was obliged to take up duty with a 
minimum of formal support and preparation.
Instruments of planning
In the absence of pre-determined, detailed programmes 
for colonial development, the Australian government had 
several possibilities open to it. The first major 
alternative was to establish a public service body to 
draw up, albeit belatedly, the necessary plans. The 
orthodox structure for this purpose was the Department of 
External Territories, but during the 1940*s its few staff 
were confined to rehabilitating their own status and New 
Guinea - probably in that order - and its permanent head 
had shown little sympathy for the changes proposed by 
the Minister. A second alternative was to delegate the
authority for planning to the Administrator: but the 
Territory public service was no better equipped for this 
role than the Canberra Department, and its tasks in 
reconstruction were even more urgent. Moreover, any such 
move would have run counter to the established hierarchy 
of Canberra-Port Moresby relationships and therefore been 
strongly opposed by the Department. * A third alternative 
was suggested, some years after the event, by Professor 
Stanner:
63. See, for example, p. 271 of this Chapter.
64. See Chapter One, pp. 39-44. Post-war relations 
between Canberra and Port Moresby are discussed in 
Chapters Nine and Ten.
65. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 118.
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It is possible that a separate authority for physical 
reconstruction after 1945, and a special development 
authority at a later stage, might have freed the 
Provisional Administration for concentration on 
administrative re-consolidation, including social 
service, welfare and development schemes requiring, 
by their proposed nature and scale, very detailed 
study and deft introduction.
This proposal had some merit, but it did not overcome the
problems confronting New Guinea. Post-war conditions made
it impossible to staff a separate authority, except by
weakening the Provisional Administration, and a third
structure would have created additional tensions and
problems of co-ordination between Canberra and Port Moresby.
Moreover, conflicts between planning and execution were
acute in post-war New Guinea: reconstruction problems
were so pervasive that a planning authority would probably
have become enmeshed in them, to the detriment of its
major functions. If, on the other hand, the authority had
tried to observe a strict planning role, there would have
been accusations that the planning process was divorced 
66from reality. A fourth alternative was to establish a 
service organization, staffed from new sources and based 
in Australia, capable of providing detailed guidance, as 
requested, for those groups exercising administrative 
authority in Canberra and Port Moresby. It was a body of 
this kind that had been proposed, under the title of
66. Ironically, Stanner discerned similar problems in 
the much more modest planning activities of the 
Provisional Administration in early 1947 (Reconstruction, 
op. cit., p. 104). It is possible to combine 
planning and executive structures, but Stanner*s 
proposal seemed to envisage separate roles for 
each.
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Australian Territories Research Council, by the inter«
departmental committee in February 1945, following a
67recommendation by the Directorate of Research. '
Pacific Territories Research Council
The Australian Pacific Territories Research Council,
as it was eventually called, was seen by Conlon as the
68peacetime successor to the Directorate of Research. As
such, it was to continue the initiatives begun by the
Directorate; and also, presumably, to ensure that Conlon
retained some influence upon New Guinea affairs. The
functions proposed for the Council, and even at one stage
approved by Cabinet, were exceptionally wide: "to promote
research and learning in any matter that may affect the
development, welfare or advancement of the External
6qTerritories of the Commonwealth of Australia". To this 
end, but subject to Ministerial approval, the Council was 
empowered to "initiate, finance, organize, supervise, 
assist, co-ordinate, and in any other way promote research 
and learning; control its staff; allocate funds 
available to the Council; ¿ “ a n d J  assist the Minister
67. CRS A518, item R815/1/1, 19 June 1945. The proposal 
was originally made to the Cabinet sub-committee on 
15 September 1944 and then referred to the inter­
departmental committee for consideration.
68. The proposal was set out in Agendum No. 104 of 15 
September 1944, noted in ibid.69. Ibid., 6 July 1945. Papers on the establishment and 
early meetings of the Council do not appear in 
departmental files, presumably because the matter 
originated in the Directorate. This information is 
drawn from reports on meetings by Halligan and his 
staff.
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in the establishment, advancement and supervision of 
educational institutions, especially an Australian 
School of Colonial Administration”.^ The Council first 
met in mid-1945, while the Directorate was still 
functioning, with Conlon as Chairman and a membership
71drawn largely from the Directorate's staff, comprising:'
Professor R.C. Mills, Professor of Economics,
University of Sydney, representing the Commonwealth 
Office of Education
Professor K.S. Isles, Professor of Economics, 
University of Adelaide 
Professor E.S. Hills, Professor of Geology,
University of Melbourne
Professor J.K. Murray, Professor of Agriculture, 
University of Queensland
Lt.-Col. Hon. C.M. Wedgewood, Directorate of Research 
Professor Harvey Sutton, Director, School of Public 
Health and Tropical Medicine, University of Sydney, 
representing the Department of Health 
Professor R.D. Wright, Professor of Physiology, 
University of MelbourneMr. W.D. Forsyth, Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Section, 
Department of External Affairs 
Mr. W.C. Thomas, Assistant Secretary, Department of 
the Treasury
Dr. H.C. Coombes, Director-General, Department of 
Post-War Reconstruction 
Mr. J.R. Halligan, Secretary, Department of 
External Territories
In retrospect, it is extraordinary that approval could 
have been given for a body whose functions and powers 
so obviously duplicated those of other organizations, 
notably the Office of Education and Department of External 
Territories, and the majority of whose members represented 
the Directorate and its allies. By its very nature the 
Council was bound to create opposition within the formal
70. Ibid.
71# Ibid.. undated July 1945
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bureaucracy, which proceeded to thwart its operations.
The Secretary for External Territories neglected to
attend the Council*s early meetings, but his departmental
delegate gave a succinct view of its nature and possible
72relations with the Departments
This Council appears to have its genesis in its English 
equivalent (designed to give effect to the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act) and is based primarily on 
English practice but with a difference...it goes 
further than the British idea. Whereas the British 
Research Committee is advisory in character...and 
executive only in respect of co-ordinating the 
general pattern of research into colonial problems, 
the Australian Pacific Territories Research Council 
is both advisory and executive in character. It 
assumes...control of finance and staff matters more 
properly the province of the Department.
There appeared to be dangers in this situation:.73
If the powers contained in the constitution are 
exercised /“the Council_J7 may d° anything it wishes 
in regard to research subject only to the limitation 
of funds made available to it. As the Council is 
responsible directly to the Minister the only 
association it has with the Department is by means 
of the Secretary of the Department being a member 
of the Council. By these means the way is open for 
the Council to exert considerable pressure on the 
Minister in the making of policy. Should it develop 
along that line there will be two organizations with 
/"“the 7 same purpose, but with bilateral approach to 
the Minister. This may become very embarrassing to 
the Department and to the Minister....
There were already a number of bodies to advise the 
government:
72. Ibid.. 19 June 1945.
73. The material in the remainder of this paragraph, 
including quotations, is drawn from ibid., 6 July 
1945.
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The Australian Pacific Territories Research Council 
is just another and I believe the establishment of 
it to be an error. It would have been better to have 
tied the question of research...to the Department of 
External Territories...Executive functions except in 
technical matters should remain with the Department.
While the proposal for the Council was in need of 
refinement, it promised to fill a serious gap in the 
government's sources of advice on New Guinea policy. By 
contrast, the Department's counter-proposal was 
unimaginative and largely redundant. As a substitute for 
the Council it recommended a "planning committee", 
comprising the Secretary for External Territories as 
chairman; the officer-in-charge of the Departments Planning 
and Research Branch - which had not yet been established; 
representatives of the Departments of the Treasury and 
Post-War Reconstruction; "an ex-Administrator or a retired 
senior officer of the Territory Service...and for the time 
being the Administrator of the Provisional Administration". 
It was not made clear why this additional body was required 
when the inter-departmental committee set up in 1944 was 
still nominally in existence. The Department and the 
Directorate each seemed intent on out-manoeuvering the 
other by setting up a new structure in its own image.
Demise of the Research Council
The Department of External Territories could not 
control the structure and operations of the Research 
Council so long as the Directorate remained in being and
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while Gonlon exercised influence over the Minister, During
the latter half of 1945 all of the Council’s business
was controlled by the Directorate and its meetings were
held in the military college at Duntroon, site of the
74-School of Civil Affairs. By early 1946, however,
Conlon had resigned to resume his medical studies and the
75Directorate was soon to be disbanded. Conlon then
stepped down from chairman to deputy chairman of the
76Council, being replaced by Professor Mills. The venue
for the meetings was changed, usually alternating between
Melbourne and Sydney for the convenience of members; it
was perhaps appropriate, in view of the esoteric nature
of some of the discussion, that in March 1946 the Council
77met in the Theosophical Society Building in Melbourne.
At this meeting the new balance of post-war forces 
became apparent and the animosity between Halligan and 
Conlon assumed a new character, with the Secretary now 
in the position of strength. The significance of the 
encounter was apparent from the fact that Mr. Ward took 
the chair. He immediately dealt a blow to Conlon's 
aspirations when he "stressed the advisory nature of the 
Council's functions and explained that the Prime Minister 
desired that it remain an advisory body attached to the 
Department of External Territories, to which its staff 
would belong. He suggested that the Council might 
consider including the word 'Advisory' in its title."
74. Ibid.
75. See Chapter Two, pp. 139-40.
76. CRS A518, item R815/1/1, 15 February 1946.77. Ibid., 28 March 1946. The remainder of this passage, 
including quotations, is drawn from the minutes of the meeting.
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It gays something for Conlon*s influence over the 
Minister that Ward found it necessary to invoke the Prime 
Minister*s authority in announcing the terms of the 
Council*s establishment. Nevertheless, Conlon still 
argued that the Council should have its own staff, 
preferably officers seconded from the Papua-New Guinea 
public service. Professor Wright suggested a compromise, 
in which **for administrative purposes the staff might be 
under the Department of External Territories, but for 
practical purposes should operate under the direction of 
the Council," Halligan then intervened, with the full 
authority of the formal executive of government, stating 
that the staff of the Council would be officers of his 
Department and that the Council secretariat would be 
located there. This decided the fate of both the Research 
Council and research generally: responsibility was 
effectively returned to the Department, which was incapable 
of discharging it; it was not until 1947 that a Research 
Section under a Senior Research Officer began operating, 
while a Division of Research and Development, under an 
Assistant Secretary, was set up only in September 1 9 4 9 . ®^
For another year Conlon continued a sporadic, futile 
campaign for his original concept of a Research Council.
The main questions concerned the control of staff and 
funds: in May 1946 the Minister had announced that 
£30,000 would be made available to the Council for "inaugural
78. D.E.T., History and Functions, op. cit.. p. 2. The
subsequent planning operations of the Department 
are discussed in later Chapters.
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work”, so that it seemed as if the body would have
79resources worth capturing. J However, the matter was 
resolved unequivocally in favour of the Department of 
External Territories when the Minister approved the 
establishment of a committee, dominated by public service 
representatives, to consider the relationship between the 
Research Council and the Australian School of Pacific
80Administration, successor to the School of Civil Affairs.
In April 1947 the Research Council met, for the last 
time, to consider a recommendation that it transfer its 
functions to the School*s new governing body, which would 
have a majority of public servants among its members.
Conlon saw this as an effort to obstruct rather than 
encourage his proposal for research and spoke in bitter 
terms:81
....as far as most people around this table are concerned, we are interested in encouraging research, 
wherever it may occur. Our real problem is that 
most of us have known for a long time what ought to 
be done. There is no danger of us committing any 
mistake because there is no danger of us getting 
anything done, under the present circumstances...
We want this new governing body of the school to be 
a body that can do something, that might initiate 
and carry out projects••.When we transfer these 
functions to the governing body of the school...it 
should be given the power to do something.
It was not. The Research Council was disbanded and the 
Council of the School, which replaced it, was empowered
79. The material in this and the following passage is 
drawn from CRS A518, item R815/1/1» folios from May 
1946 to April 1947. The money was not allocated.
80. The School*s activities are discussed in the next 
Chapter.
81. CRS A518, item R815/1/1, 19 April 1947.
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only to ”conduct research activities in the subjects 
appropriate to the courses of the School and for the
needs of the Territory as approved by the Minister”.
In effect, this precluded the staff of the School from 
conducting applied research on contemporary New Guinea 
problems, since the Secretary had already reserved this 
function for the proposed Research Section of his 
Department. In the following years some members of the 
School staff published articles on Territory affairs, 
but their activities were otherwise confined to conducting 
training courses.
With the demise of the Research Council, and with 
the Department of External Territories unable to provide 
planning support for the Provisional Administration, a 
situation was reached that should have prompted Cabinet 
to further action. However, no initiatives came from the 
Minister, who could no longer draw on the Directorate of 
Research for advice; and his Department, having finally 
regained the control it had lost during the war years, 
was determined that formally correct administrative 
procedures should once more be observed. These could 
not encompass long-range planning, owing to the Departments 
shortcomings, and so the burden of policy formation and 
planning fell upon the very limited resources then 
available in Papua New Guinea. During the remaining years
82. Australian School of Pacific Administration, Monthly
Notes. Vol. 1 No. 9, May 1947, p. 7.
0 0
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of Labor government Murray and the Provisional Administration 
sought to discharge this de facto responsibility, but 
without the delegation of Ministerial or Departmental 
authority necessary to ensure acceptance and execution 
of such programmes as were formulated.
Direct action by Murray
Murray received no directives on the powers of the 
Administrator in matters of planning and policy, and so 
his role in these areas evolved through a series of 
ad hoc decisions and conferences during the first eighteen 
months of his tenure. He found himself in a curious 
position, severely limited in many spheres by the need 
to seek Canberra approval on issues for which precedents 
existed, but with considerable freedom in matters that 
were new in the experience of the Department of External 
Territories. Murray created a limited field of independent 
action, making use of his informal network of personal 
contacts in direct initiatives. Murray acted independently 
for two reasons: he wished to achieve quick results; 
and he believed that the position of Administrator was of 
considerable status, providing access to the higher 
executive levels in Australia. His role in deciding the 
details of policy at this time are illustrated by Murray’s 
visits to Australia, during which he provided such 
initiatives as existed.
In March 1946, following his familiarisation tours
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of the Territory, Murray visited Australia for a series
of meetings with the Minister, He observed, "Took up a
list of about 40 matters with him. Substituted 2nd page
as numbers grew. Minister fairly shrewd, able in
assessment of desirability of action from varied viewpoints:
political, Department of External Territories and
Administration. Halligan present at all meetings but took
two opportunities of discussing points /“alonewith the 
_ 3 3Minister^/.” Murray was deeply concerned at the 
immediate problems of re-establishing civil administration, 
but his proposals extended considerably beyond these 
matters: to the supply of currency in the Territory; the 
attitude of Australian trade unions to the importing of 
finished timber products; the future policy concerning 
grants to missions; and the need for unequivocal 
assurances that the combined administration would 
continue. * Even in matters where powers should have 
been delegated to the Administrator, such as the question 
of missions* subsidies, details were referred by the 
Minister to the Department for advice or subsequent 
approval; Ward was reluctant to give the Administrator 
direct authority to implement even those schemes of which 
Ward himself approved.
In matters for which few precedents existed, or in 
which the Department had no apparent interests to preserve,
83. Murray journal, p. 137.
84. The material in this and the following passage is
drawn from Murray journal, pp. 19, 20, 139.
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Murray negotiated arrangements directly with senior
officials, in a number of cases with neither Ward nor
Halligan present. He approached the Department of Post-
War Reconstruction for skilled tradesmen to assist in the
rebuilding of Rabaul and Kokopo; the Department of Air
concerning improvements to internal air services in Papua
New Guinea; the Victorian Department of Education
requesting the release of Mr. W.C. Groves for appointment
as Director of Education in the Territory; and the
Chairman of the Australian Broadcasting Commission, Mr.
85Boyer, to arrange peacetime broadcasting.
Murray*s most important talks during this period 
were undoubtedly those he had with the Prime Minister and 
Treasurer, Mr. Chifley. Murray had met Chifley 
occasionally during the war and the contact came to have 
particular significance when the Administrator visited 
Parliament House during his trips to Canberra. Murray 
recalls, **0n several occasions he sat alongside 
when I was listening to a debate and he on his way out 
of the House; he was an informed cicerone on Australian 
policy re P.N.G." In mid-1947 Murray visited Canberra 
to seek additional finance after "the Treasury indicated 
to me that the grants and other Commonwealth expenditure 
were not to continue to increase in the way we of the
85. Murray journal, pp. 5, 19, 25, 158.
86. Murray letter, 5 October 1967.
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Administration thought essential”. ' After interviews 
with senior Treasury officials, Murray asked to see the 
Prime Minister, and an appointment was arranged for the 
late afternoon. Just as Murray began to put his case he 
was interrupted by the arrival of the Leader of the 
Opposition, Mr. Menzies, who wanted the Prime Minister 
present on the floor of the House. Murray recalls, ”When 
Mr. Chifley left with Mr. Menzies, he paused at the door 
and said that I should come back during the evening when 
we would not be disturbed. /“When our talks resumed_7 be 
was courteous, helpful in comment, but critical in relation 
to the submissions I made - a sort of third degree by an 
open-minded executive. I was given all the time I desired, 
perhaps an hour. When I left he accompanied me to the 
door and said that he didn’t think that lack of finance 
would be my greatest worry. The appropriation for Papua- 
New G-uinea continued to increase.” The Labor government’s 
New Guinea policy thus withstood its first test, partly 
owing to Murray’s intervention against the Commonwealth 
Treasury. During the remaining years of Labor rule the 
implied guarantee that Murray received from the Prime 
Minister was of far greater significance than any assistance 
provided by Ward; Murray later stated, ”The meetings I 
had with Mr. Chifley led me to believe that he was the 
most likeable political personage and personality I have 
met. ”
87. The information in this and the following passage,
including quotations, is drawn from notes accompanying 
Murray’s letter of 3 October 1967.
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Murray's Macrossan lectures
In the field of broad policy Murray's role during 
the immediate post-war years was far greater than his 
formal authority as Administrator would have suggested.
This situation arose partly from Ministerial default, 
but also because Murray was anxious to support and explain 
the post-war policy. His main opportunity came when he 
was invited by his old university to deliver the John 
Murtagh Macrossan Memorial Lectures in Brisbane on 22 and 
24- April 1947. Murray had been appointed Macrossan 
lecturer in 1945, before he assumed the position of 
Administrator, and in requesting that he continue with the 
lectures he suggested to Mr. Ward that the topic be the
OQwork and policy of the Provisional Administration. The
89Minister expressed "much pleasure" in granting permission. 
The Administrator was following the practice of Sir Hubert 
Murray, who had delivered numerous papers in Australia and 
overseas during his many years as Lieutenant-Governor, 
creating for himself something of an international 
reputation as a colonial administrator and adding to the 
status of his position. It is significant, in the light 
of later changes in the relationship between the 
Administrator and the Canberra authorities, that Murray's 
Macrossan lectures were the last non-official public 
addresses delivered by a serving Administrator. In the 
published version of his talks, Murray virtually usurped
88. CRS A518, item 1800/1/7, 23 September 1946.
89. Ibid., 16 October 1946.
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the function of the Minister in stating policy on New 
Guinea.
The Macrossan lecture is notable for the frankness
of its statements and its accuracy in assessing influences
on Australian policy. While paying tribute to the work
of Sir William MacGregor and Sir Hubert Murray, the
Administrator criticised the narrow base of policy, as
90that was understood in Australia:
Strategic interests have throughout been paramount, 
although somewhat narrowly conceived...Security may 
well be wrapped up, to an extent quite unappreciated 
by the Australian public, in an adequately conceived 
and vigorously implemented policy of native welfare... 
Public concern was allayed too easily by the bare 
legal occupancy of the two Territories....
The narrowness of Australian interest, together with the
failure to provide financial assistance, produced
91inevitable consequences:
....the tendency was to place the tiny European 
community*s economic activities in the centre of 
the picture because of their importance to internal 
revenues...An increase in revenue depended on 
expansion of European enterprise, but such an 
expansion...might merely place the native at a 
greater economic, social and political disadvantage 
in his own country.
Murray pointed out that the Chifley government had provided
the means for solving the dilemma of past years by granting
92finance for a ”dynamic policy”. He acknowledged that
90. J.K. Murray, The Provisional Administration of the 
Territory of Papua-New Guinea: Its Policy and 
Problems, Brisbane, University of Queensland, 1949,
pp. 11-12.
91. Ibid., p. 16.
92. Ibid.
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much of the policy was based on British concepts as 
expressed in the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts 
of 1940 and 1945; and that it had been applied to hew 
G-uinea by the staff of the Directorate.^ This was only 
part of the process, however: there was a need for a 
’positive programme” based on extensive research.^
On several occasions during his lectures Murray
indicated that much more extensive information would have
to be gathered on almost every aspect of Papua New Guinea
life and resources, in order to provide programmes based
on realistic assessments of need and potential; there
can be no doubt that he was already disturbed by the lack
of continuity from the wartime schemes that had been
proposed by the Directorate; and by the fate of the
Pacific Territories Research Council.^ Murray again
referred to British precedents where, he said, policies
"are guided and supported by research programmes embracing
the physical, biological and social sciences. The
British Government is not making phrases: it has got
down to the task of providing the executive machinery
96for carrying out its intentions."^ The clear implication 
was that the Australian authorities had not. The 
Administrator further expressed concern that such 
machinery might not be developed for New Guinea, owing to
93. Ibid., pp. 16, 1-2.
94. Ibid., p. 16.
9 5 . tbid. ,  pp. 16,  22,  64.
96. Ibid., p. 64. This passage made it clear that Murray 
was particularly interested in policy-oriented, 
"applied" research.
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the relationship that was developing between Canberra
07and Port Moresby:v
The exercise of legislative powers by the Commonwealth 
Government at the present time naturally increases 
the centralisation of initiative and responsibility 
in the Department of External Territories in 
Canberra, A similar increase in Departmental 
power is indicated by the conferring upon the 
Minister, instead of as before upon the Government 
as a whole, of the power to issue instructions to the Administrator. The future distribution of 
powers between Port Moresby and Canberra must take 
into account conflicting factors. On the one hand... 
the tendency which existed even before the war to 
concentrate control in Canberra impaired the 
initiative of the Papuan Administration and left 
it unable to act decisively...On the other hand, 
the enormously increased dependence of the Territory 
financially upon the Commonwealth is bound to 
strengthen the centralising tendency.
Murray left no doubt as to his opinion of this trend,
saying, "The greater the financial dependence upon the
metropolitan country becomes, the more earnestly must we
strive to strengthen the forces of responsibility and
QQinitiative within the Territory."^
The Administrator went on to outline the difficulties 
that had been encountered by the Provisional Administration, 
notably in rehabilitating devastated areas and in 
obtaining sufficient personnel, materials and shipping.
He then sought to indicate the particular action that was 
proposed in such areas as health services, education, 
agricultural extension, forestry and petroleum exploration. 
At that point the gaps in Australian policy became apparent. 
Murray’s statements on several issues were much more
97. Ibid., p. 58.
98. Ibid., p. 59.
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detailed than anything announced by the government, but
still lacked the definition that detailed planning should
have provided, A complete section of Murray*s address,
dealing with the key areas of health, education, labour
and race relations, was headed ’’Some Problems of Social
Policy** and comprised little more than a catalogue of the
q qAdministration's difficulties; only in the matter of
labour policy was the Administrator able to give details
of action already taken, and these related to measures
that had been approved before the end of the war.1^  In
a section entitled **The Economic Problem" Murray was able
to provide some specifications for agricultural policy,
but these came mainly from his own expertise and war-time
101survey of New Guinea. In other areas he made informed
guesses as to future development: the growth of forestry,
the wide extension of village cash-cropping, the
establishment of the co-operative movement and the
102eventual role of local government councils. It was 
clear that the only plans available were those that had 
survived the Directorate or been suggested by Murray's 
own experience.
Murray's greatest contribution to post-war policy 
was made during his analysis of race relations in the
99. Murray did not mention that he had already set up
planning committees in Port Moresby in an attempt to 
overcome these problems; their recommendations are 
discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight.
100. Ibid., pp. 27-39.
101. Ibid., pp. 48-53.
102. T H d .. pp. 43, 53-4, 59-61 .
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Territory, during which he rejected the hypocrisy of
103paternalism. He first criticised
....a disposition to believe that the natives have 
no importance except as workers in European industry, 
and that they ask nothing better than to be allowed 
to remain under conditions of employment which have 
not substantially changed since the time of 
MacGregor...1 wish, therefore, to make two things 
very clear: first, that the Administration treats 
the native as an end in himself, not as a means for 
the use of others, in other words, as a person, not 
a tool; second, that there can be no progress in 
the Territory if labour relations are frozen at a 
primitive level.
He saw this situation stemming partly from the existing 
balance of power in Papua New Guinea, which had to be 
changed by the example of his own staff:
The Europeans are a small dominant minority with a 
monopoly of political and economic power and social 
prestige...Cultural differences and differences in 
economic patterns tend to close off the members of 
one group from easy access to other groups. On the 
European side, this sense of difference becomes 
frozen into the ugly and irrational prejudices of 
racialism.. .Although the Europeans as a whole act as 
an exclusive caste, there is not complete solidarity 
of prejudice...It is above all the duty of 
administrative officers to combat by their example 
the perpetuation of...damaging illusions....
The Administrator served notice that he would not allow
white domination to continue through political 
103institutions:
It is worth raising the question whether the 
Legislative Council, as it existed in both Territories 
before the war, is an appropriate device for the 
discharging of our trust at this stage. We have 
few, if any, natives capable of handling the business
103. Ibid., p. 35.
104. Ibid., pp. 38-9.
105. Ibid.. p. 59.
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of such a Council without a further period of tutelage; 
yet to confine the unofficial membership to Europeans 
carries the implication, which must be avoided, that 
New G-uinea is a white-settler country.
Murray summed up:10^
We cannot continue to use the word native as if it 
meant something less than the word man. The interested 
and ignoble doctrines of racialism which have 
penetrated deeply into the life of New Guinea and 
constitute an irrational obstacle to future progress, can only be expelled by showing that a liberal and 
humane...policy works when it is backed by knowledge 
and skill. There is a danger that unless that 
knowledge and skill is concentrated upon the task, 
there may be a failure which will discredit liberal 
policies...New Guinea is pitifully dependent upon 
the willingness of Australia to provide the means of avoiding such a disaster.
The Macrossan lectures received little publicity in 
107Papua New Guinea, mainly because there was no newspaper
in publication there at the time. The Pacific Islands
Monthly printed a brief resume of the talks, concluding
with an "editorial note” by Robson: nWhat is wrong with
the policy of encouraging the Europeans to develop the
Territories' wealth during the period (at least 25 years)
in which anthropologists, educationalists and well-
meaning theorists generally are trying to make a peasant
108farmer out of 'Euzzy-Wuzzy'?" To ensure that his
106. Ibid., p. 55.
107. Wlien discussing the draft of this section, Mr. H.H. 
Jackman (a co-operatives officer in the 1940's and 
later Assistant Director of Business Development), 
observed that it was just as well there had been 
little publicity, otherwise "the Europeans would have 
hung Murray for calling them racists".
108. P.I.M.. Vol. 17 No. 10, May 1947, pp. 59-60. The 
relative mildness of Robson's reaction to Murray 
is again worth noting.
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attitude to policy was made clear to the staff of the
Provisional Administration, Murray therefore circulated
a pamphlet entitled Memorandum on the Policy of the
Administration, a twelve-page summary of his Macrossan
l e c t u r e s . T h e  document emphasised that the peopled
interests were paramount in any policy of the Administration
and stressed the need for research in establishing
110priorities and determining programmes; in effect,
Murray served notice that change would continue,
111notwithstanding the difficulties being encountered:
It has been suggested that /“rehabilitation / could 
be more readily accomplished if all new features of 
policy were postponed...The Administration has not 
accepted this view. It does not believe it either 
possible or desirable to make such a separation 
between rehabilitation and future development...
What is done now determines in large measure the 
future pattern...Post-war basic rehabilitation of 
the native economy by the native people necessarily, 
rightly and naturally has taken precedence over 
the rehabilitation of European interests.
It was at about this time that Murray, owing to his 
espousal of villagers* interests and his alleged bias 
against Europeans, became generally known among whites 
as ”Kanaka Jack".^1^
Australian School of Pacific Administration
Murray’s growing concern for research and planning
109. Port Moresby, mimeo, 1947. The specially-printed 
cover bears the notation, ’’Government House, Port 
Moresby, 8 September 1947”.
110. Ibid., pp. 1,3, 6-10.
111. Ibid., p. 3.
112. In fact, Murray has always used, and been known by, 
his second Christian name, Keith.
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was reflected in his letters to Canberra. He corresponded
with Halligan on the matter for several months, without
result, then in exasperation addressed a terse note to
the Minister in April 1947, stating bluntly, "Your policy,
and really anything better than a mid-Victorian colonial
administration, is impossible without an adequate research
and training institution of the kind envisaged in the
/"Directorate_7.1,11 ^ The Australian School of Pacific
Administration was producing little of consequence, since
Murray lacked the authority to direct the activities of
its staff; any advice he received from them was confined
114to personal correspondence. The School’s relationship
with New Guinea was unclear for several years, while the
Department of External Territories maintained that a
clear role would emerge from the legislation to set up a
11 Spermanent administrative structure for the Territory.  ^
Further delays resulted, and Murray’s frustration in 
attempting to secure action can be illustrated by tracing 
the fate of the School as a research support for the 
Administration.
The Papua and New Guinea Act of 1949 finally gave 
statutory recognition to the School, its Council and its 
Principal, but generally restricted its activities to 
what the annual report summarised as ’’special courses for
113. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, item GH7-5, 2 April 1947.
114. The School’s training role and Murray’s relations 
with its staff are discussed in the next Chapter.
115. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, item GH7-5, folios from 
September 1947 to February 1949.
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the education of officers and prospective officers of
the Territory”. As part of the discussion of the
draft Bill, an inter-departmental committee was set up
in June 1949 to ’’examine the activities of the Australian
School of Pacific Administration and to submit
recommendations for its organization and the draft
regulations to be made under the Papua New Guinea Act 
1171949”. The committee comprised the Assistant Secretary
(Administration), Department of External Territories;
the Director of Research, Commonwealth Public Service
Board; and representatives of the Commonwealth Office of
Education, Commonwealth Public Service Inspector (Sydney),
Commonwealth Treasury, the School and the Papua New Guinea 
1 1 RAdministration. Halligan asked the Administrator for
his views on the functions of the School, for presentation 
to the committee, and received a stinging reminder of all 
the proposals made in earlier years that had emphasised 
the importance of the School to Papua New Guinea. Murray 
pointed out that the functions of the Pacific Territories 
Research Council, which had been ’formed for the purpose 
of getting a move on”, had been transferred to the School 
Council and that nothing further had happened. ’’Provision 
really must be made for research both in relation to 
teaching, and...to meet the pressing development needs of 
the Territory,” he concluded.
116. K.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 12.
117. P.N.G.N.A. Box 192, item CA1/4/1/14, 14 June 1949.118. The information in this and the following passage 
is drawn from ibid., 16 July 1949.
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In its report, submitted in August 1949, the inter­
departmental committee noted the Administrators comments 
and observed, "It was felt that no special reference to 
teaching research is necessary, as this is inherent in 
teaching itself. In regard to the Administrators 
reference to *the research requirements of the Territory*, 
the Committee considered that whilst this may be a very 
important question, it is outside the scope of the terms
of reference and is not germane to the organization of 
119the School.” Thus one of the main reasons for the 
founding of the School was rejected, in a manoeuvre which 
ensured that the Department of External Territories* 
ineffectual "research” section would become the only
official source of information for the Papua New Guinea
1 20Administration.
Influence of Trusteeship
Two other factors reinforced Australian policy during 
this period, without providing detailed guidance for the 
Provisional Administration. The first was the Trusteeship 
Agreement for the Territory of New Guinea, the terms of 
which were presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister 
on 7 August 1946. In his statement to the House, Mr. 
Chifley made little reference to the obligations placed 
on Australia by the terms of the draft Agreement, although
119. Ibid.. 22 August 1949.
120. Interview with Dr. J.T. Gunther, 4 December 1968.
121. C.P.D.. Vol. 188, pp. 3853-5, 7 August 1946.
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he observed, ’....we shall recognize and gladly accept
the general duty...to promote the welfare and advancement
122of the inhabitants of New Guinea." He dwelt mainly
on the rights that Australia would enjoy as the administering
authority, particularly in providing for the defence of
the area and in exercising ’’full powers of legislation,
123administration and jurisdiction over the Territory".
He felt that nothing but "absolute control" could be 
accepted by any Australian government.
The Trusteeship Agreement, and the government’s 
statement on it, added nothing to the factors, including 
the U.N. Charter and the Australia-New Zealand Agreement, 
which had already been taken into account as guiding 
principles for the administration of Papua New Guinea.
Its most immediate effect was to create further delays.
Mr. Chifley noted in his speech that the U.N. General 
Assembly would not begin its first session until September 
1946, so that legislation to give effect to the Agreement 
would have to be submitted to a later session of 
Parliament.12  ^ This, in turn, delayed the creation of 
a permanent administrative structure for the Territory, 
since the government would not proceed until it was 
assured of the necessary trusteeship terms. These were 
approved by the General Assembly on 14 December 1946, and 
had then to go before the Trusteeship Council, which met
122. Ibid., p. 3854.
123. Ibid., p. 3853.
124. Ibid., p. 3854.
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for the first time on 26 March 1947.1^  It then took
the Australian government more than fifteen months -
until 8 July 1948 - to submit the Agreement to the
Trusteeship Council, which approved it on 2 August 1948.
Similarly, it was not until 18 June 1948 that the Papua
and New Guinea Bill was presented to Parliament. The
delay resulted more from the low priority accorded Papua
New Guinea by the government than from Australian concern
for its international obligations. W.J. Hudson has
pointed out that criticism of administrative union, which
was the only source of major friction, became heavier
after the Agreement was approved than before; and at no
time did Australia’s U.N. representatives pay attention to 
127it. So far as the enforcement of trusteeship 
conditions was concerned, Australia rejected any United 
Nations role in the formation and implementation of
policy, thereby denying the Territory Administration help
1 ?8of this kind from the international body. Australia
was determined to preserve New Guinea as its exclusive
sphere of influence and adhered to that policy for another
1 29twenty-five years.
South Pacific Commission
The second factor reinforcing Australian policy in
125. Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 5, January 1947, p. 14 
and No. 8, April 1947, p. 11.
126. P.I.M.. Vol. 19 No. 1, August 1948, p. 8.
127. Hudson, Colonial Question, op, cit., pp. 82-8.
128. Ibid., p. 112.
129. It was not until the late 1960*s that U.N.D.P. funds 
were accepted for use in the Territory.
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New Guinea was the establishment of the South Pacific 
Commission, the body which was originally proposed by the 
Australia-New Zealand Agreement of 1944 under the title 
of the South Seas Regional Commission. This organization 
was given a prominent place in the 1944 Agreement as an 
example of the determination of the two governments to 
observe the principles of trusteeship. Some of the war­
time enthusiasm faded as other parties became involved, 
however. The political advisory function was dropped: in 
a statement on 26 September 1946, Dr. Evatt ’’emphasised 
that the proposed Commission would not deal with questions
of defence or security and would not interfere in
1 *50political matters”. The British government was later
reported to be ’’lukewarm” on the subject of the Commission
131and there was opposition to it among Fiji’s Europeans.
At the first meeting of the Commission, which began in
Sydney on 11 May 1948, further problems arose over the
selection of its Secretary-General and the site of its 
132headquarters. The Australian delegates argued that,
in view of their country’s major role in proposing the
Commission, its first Secretary-General should be an
Australian. ^  The only reason why this should be of more
than incidental interest is that the first Australian
1 34nominee was none other than Alfred Conlon.  ^ At this
130. Monthly Notes. Vol. 1 No. 2, October 1946, p. 13.
For further details, see T.R. Smith, South Pacific 
Commission, Wellington, Milburn, 1972, Chs. 2-5.
131. CftS A518, item 100/1/1, 17 May 1948; Monthly Notes, 
Vol. 1 No. 12, August 1947, p. 17.
132. South Pacific, Vol. 2 No. 8, May 1948, p. 158.
133. Cfe'S' A518, item 100/1/1, 17 May 1948.
134. Ibid., 14 May 1948.
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session Australia's Senior Commissioner was Mr. Halligan, 
with Rev. Dr. J.W. Burton as Commissioner; and Mr. E.W.P. 
Chinnery and Colonel Murray as alternates. Halligan 
was outnumbered by the other Australian representatives 
in the nomination of Conlon, which was approved by both 
Ward and Evatt.  ^ This represented one of the last 
attempts by those formerly associated with the Directorate 
to revive the influence of their colleagues and find a 
role for Conlon within the formal structure of post-war 
planning. It did not succeed: in September 1948, Mr. 
W.D. Forsyth, an Australian representative at the United 
Nations, was appointed Secretary-General, with Mr. H.E. 
Maude as his deputy.
The functions of the South Pacific Commission were
confined almost entirely to areas of technical advice,
mainly because the member countries were jealous of the
powers they exercised over their colonies. Australia made
relatively little use of the organization's expertise, and
then only in narrow fields, owing partly to the nature of
the Commission's research: its first 28 projects were
devoted to such matters as epidemiology, infent food,
139tropical grasses and building types. Such investigations
135. Ibid.. 11 May 1948.
136. Ibid.. 14 May 1948.137. A last attempt is discussed in the next Chapter.
This meeting of the Commission was held at the 
School of Pacific Administration, where such former 
Directorate personnel as Kerr, Hogbin and Macauley 
were available for lobbying on Conlon's behalf.
138. CRS A518, item 100/1/1, 9 September 1948.
139. South Pacific. Vol. 3 No. 10, August 1949, pp. 208-9.
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were far removed from the policy-oriented research and 
planning needs of New Guinea; and even had the Commission 
been able to provide such assistance it is most unlikely 
that the Canberra authorities would have allowed Murray 
free access to it, in view of their demonstrated policy of 
concentrating power in the Department of External Territories.
Planning frustrated
In the immediate post-war years, then, the Administrator 
and some of his former colleagues from the Directorate 
attempted to maintain the open, wartime approach to planning, 
only to be frustrated by a formal bureaucratic structure 
that had regained its influence with the return of stable 
peacetime conditions. Murray*s demands for continued 
research had been met by the ploy of setting up a unit in 
the Canberra Department that was to prove wholly 
ineffectual for several more years. The only remaining 
avenue for Murray was the establishment of planning 
groups under his own control to provide the initiatives 
and data essential for the introduction of a dynamic 
policy. It has already been observed, however, that the 
personnel resources in New Guinea were severely limited.
The extent of these limitations will be apparent from 
an examination of the staffing and structure of the 
Provisional Administration.
CHAPTER SIX
THE NEW GUINEA BUREAUCRACY
A demoralised service - Doubts and divisions 
Papua versus New Guinea - Continuing 
uncertainties - Murray and his service - 
Murrayfs many roles - Need for investigation 
Growth of committees - Administrative 
structure and co-ordination - Murray*s 
advisers - The Buttsworth report -
Administration counter-proposals - Reaction
to Buttsworth proposals - Influence of junior 
staff - Staff training and A.S.O.P.A.
Conlon's final appearance - Decline of A.S.O.P.A.
A demoralised service
The public service over which Colonel Murray 
assumed control in October 1945 had been weakened and 
demoralised by a number of forces mostly beyond its 
control: the losses from the Japanese invasion; the 
suspension of the Papuan administration; the rivalry 
among officers of the Mandated Territory and Papuan
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services; tensions between Angau and the Directorate; 
and, most of all, insecurities resulting from the 
rapidly changing policies and shifts in the balance 
of power during the war years. During the post-war 
period, continuing rivalries, together with prolonged 
uncertainty about the form and conditions of the 
combined public service, created even great difficulties 
for Murray and the Provisional Administration. The 
magnitude of these problems can best be illustrated by 
tracing the early developments which specifically 
affected administrative personnel.
Most public servants from the Territories suffered 
losses during the war, and only a few gained advantages 
useful for their later careers. All were displaced from 
their accustomed positions, and for almost four years 
their conditions of service and long-term career 
prospects remained frozen at the point they had reached 
in 1941. This had a damaging effect on the morale of 
men used to according great significance to questions 
of employment security and status. For, example, those 
officers who survived the Japanese invasion and were 
subsequently absorbed into Angau had little opportunity 
to negotiate conditions of service or future prospects 
while they remained within a system of military 
administration and discipline. The burden of this 
concern therefore fell to the officers who were 
classified as unfit or too old for military service
311
and who spent the war years in Australia. These men 
were for the most part given temporary wartime 
appointments in the Commonwealth Public Service, with 
the largest single group concentrated in Sydney. Their 
conditions of service, set by regulation in April 1942, 
were generally similar to those relating to the 
Commonwealth service and gave rise to anomalies when 
applied to officers of a colonial administration who would 
normally have been eligible for retirement after twenty 
years of continuous service. Thus a number of men who 
wished to retire during the war years, particularly as 
their future employment became less certain because of 
changes proposed for the post-war period, could not do 
so because they forfeited half their pension if they 
then accepted employment with a government instrumentality; 
they were dissatisfied because this condition did not
2apply to officers who had left the service before 1942.
In addition, those who had been transferred temporarily 
to the Commonwealth service were, by a curious calculation, 
allowed to contribute at only two-thirds of their normal 
rates towards superannuation funds, on the grounds that
1. The provisions, under the National Security Regulations, 
were contained in Regulation 200 of 1942, gazetted
on 27 April 1942. The discussion in this Chapter 
seeks to avoid technical details of such public 
service personnel matters as establishment, promotion, 
staff postings, superannuation and salary fixation, 
but assumes a broad acquaintance of the principles 
involved in each. It should not be inferred from the 
relative lack of detail that these matters were 
insignificant to the officers affected by them: the 
importance of security of tenure and promotion 
prospects to these public servants cannot be 
overemphasised.
2. P.I.M.. Voi. 13 No. 6, January 1943, p. 5.
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they would otherwise have expected early retirement.
These were exactly the kinds of apparent injustices 
which could add to the insecurities of the Territories* 
bureaucrats.
Doubts and divisions
The situation of Papua New Guinea’s public servants 
was far from serious in fact, but was made to appear 
so by their isolation and their suspicions about the 
intentions of the Labor government. They therefore 
decided to press their case by reviving pre-war industrial 
organizations. Thus the Papuan Public Service 
Association reconstituted itself in Sydney in late 1945 
and the Territory of New Guinea Association held its 
first Australian meeting, also in Sydney, on 9 February 
1944.^ The public servants were disturbed at the 
announced changes in Australian policy towards New Guinea, 
much like their private-sector compatriots in the
5Pacific Territories Association, but they were neither 
as vocal nor as aggressive as the settlers, partly owing 
to their special obligations under public service 
legislation and partly because most of their leaders 
were serving in New Guinea or had been killed. They 
merely selected deputations to wait on the Minister for
5. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 9, April 1945, p. 47. This 
anomaly was later corrected (ihd.).
4. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 8, March 1944, p. 7 and No. 9, 
April 1944, p. 12.
5. See Chapter Two, pp. 94-8.
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External Territories, the New Guinea association
resolving to clarify the “rights, privileges and
future of the members of the Service, irrespective of
whether that future lies only in New Guinea or in any
combined service that may be set upM. The Papuan
association further decided to “continue to work in
close harmony“ with the New Guinea group, but it is
significant that it reported on the deputation in
exclusively Papuan terms, as if a combined administration
7were not even under consideration. It was clear that 
the public servants were not about to give up their 
cherished autonomy if anything could be gained by 
separate action.
Their concern increased with the rumours and 
tensions which surrounded Angau personnel. It was 
feared that staff who had served with Angau would 
enjoy advantages over those who had left the Territories 
during the war; a soldier who had taken war leave 
from the Papuan service in order to enlist wrote to 
the Pacific Islands Monthly, in officially correct 
terms, seeking information: “Are the rights of officers 
who...volunteered for military service...being 
preserved and considered in the planning of Papua’s 
future? With many years* service behind me, and the 
future welfare of my young family at stake, any
Qinformation would be greatly appreciated." The enquiry
6. Vol. 14 No. 9, April 1944, p. 12.
7. P'.T.I., Vol. 14 No. 12, July 1944, p. 15.
8. P.I.M.. Vol. 14 No. 11, June 1944, p. 19.
provided R.W. Robson with an opportunity to further
Qhis anti-Angau campaign:
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When ANGAU was first established, some two years 
ago, the comment of Territorians was: "These lads 
will dig in, with everything they've got, and will 
try to get a lien on the fat jobs of the Civil 
Administration when it returns." Colour is given 
to that belief, now, by the facts that (a) nearly 
all senior administrative officials of both 
Territories have been consistently ignored by the 
Army set-up...and pushed into the background;
(b) certain senior officials who have reluctantly been 
admitted to the ranks of ANGAU appear to have lost 
all the seniority rights which they had gained by 
long and good civil service in the Territories... 
Present indications are that ANGAU will hold office 
for a long time yet; and then, that the present 
ANGAU organization will be transformed and 
modified to become the new Administration of the 
combined Territories.
The "facts" alleged by Robson were incorrect, but with 
encouragement from reports of this kind public servants 
were ready to believe the worst about the people with 
whom they would eventually have to work.
Tensions within the ranks of public servants were 
becoming increasingly complex. By 1945 the basic 
division between the public services of Papua and the 
Mandated Territory had been multiplied by four new 
factors, each arising from the different conditions 
under which various officers had worked during the war 
years. Those men who had joined, and stayed in, the 
armed forces (other than Angau) wished to protect 
their post-war careers. Their concerns differed, to
9. Ibid
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a degree, from those of officers who had initially
joined the services and had later been recalled to
Angau. There were also the groups, from both the
Territory of New Guinea and Papua, who had served with
Angau from 1942, and the others who had spent the war
years in Australia, These amounted, in effect, to
eight identifiable factions whose future careers could
be affected by the way in which their wartime activities
were viewed by the Australian authorities. If the men
who had transferred to Angau in 1942 were considered to
have gained superior experience to those who had gone
to Australia, the latter might claim to have been
disadvantaged through circumstances, such as age and
health, beyond their control. The Angau group, on the
other hand, could maintain that their war service,
involving vital field work in New Guinea, was far more
relevant to career prospects than, say, a period spent
10as a clerk in Sydney. To these eight groups could be 
added two others: men with New Guinea experience in the 
various fields of private enterprise who had joined 
Angau and later wished to continue with the Provisional 
Administration; and young soldiers who had joined 
Angau from the Army, usually in response to advertisements 
placed by the School of Civil Affairs during the last 
years of the war. It was on this fragmented base that 
Murray was required to build a unified administrative 
organization.
10. There were genuine animosities. Referring to a
contemporary, a decorated ex-Angau man said, "Oh, he 
frigged around in Canberra or somewhere during the 
war.”
3 1 6
Papua versus New Guinea
The early signs were far from encouraging for,
following the relaxation of wartime controls and the
removal of censorship, traditional tensions between the
Papuan and Mandated Territory services came to the
surface. They were freely reported by the Australian
press, together with complaints about poor conditions,
to substantiate charges of inefficiency against the
Labor government. In December 1945 the Sydney Sun
quoted a letter from a former Papuan officer which, it
claimed, had been leaked to the press by a Canberra
public servant. The letter complained that there was a
lack of co-operation between the military and the
returning civil administration and that public servants
were consequently being relegated to living quarters
1 1which were known locally as ’’Belsen”. The report
continued, ’’Former Papuan officials are being ignored
and men of the Mandated Territory of New Guinea are in
control of a country whose natives they do not 
12understand.” In the following month an article in
11. Sydney Sun. 9 December 1945.
12. Ibid. This recurring theme of Papua New Guinea 
administration is treated chronologically throughout 
this study. In the pre-war years (see Chapter One, pp. 47_58; Papuan officers believed they followed
a more enlightened policy, although they lacked 
the resources to put much of it into effect, while 
M andated Territory staff considered themselves 
more pragmatic and efficient. During the war the 
Territory of New Guinea officers gained prominence 
(see Chapter Two, pp. 77-81) from active service 
in occupied areas, while Papuan staff were 
relegated to the more mundane and unpopular tasks 
of labour recruitment.
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the Sydney Telegraph maintained that the administration 
was "finding difficulty in reconciling the sharply 
differing creeds of former officers of the separate 
territories of Papua and New G-uinea, now sharing jobs in
i  *5the combined service". The reports caused concern in 
Canberra and, in response to an enquiry from Mr. Ward, 
Murray suggested: "While there is some difference in 
the approach of Territory of New Guinea and Papuan 
officials to the native problem there is no essential 
difference between the best men in both services.”^
The Administrator later sought an opinion from
Professor A.P. Elkin on this question following the
anthropologists 194-6 visit to Papua New Guinea. Elkin
believed that New Guinea officers, whom he saw as the
dominant group, were starting to admit that Papua had
some good qualities: "Of course, the Papuan administration
was slow and it did not do this and it did not do that,
15but it had no gold royalty...." However, deep 
antipathies persisted within the public service for 
years. In late 1951 Mr. J.H. Jones, Director of District 
Services and a former New Guinea officer, made his 
sympathies clear when asked for an opinion on the merits 
of officers with pre-war experience. He believed there 
was considerable significance in the fact that field 
officers of the Mandated Territory "had to pass
13. Sydney Telegraph, 18 January 1946.
14. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-16, 22 January 1946
15. P.N.G.N.A. Box 167, item GH1-9-2E, 31 July 1946.
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examinations before being eligible for advancement to
senior Patrol Officers, and to Assistant District
Officer...and that it usually took 10 years in the
Territory of New Guinea Service before an officer could
be appointed as Assistant District Officer. Another
point /“was_7 that a junior Assistant District Officer
in the pre-war Papua Service was actually equal only to
a senior Patrol Officer in the Territory of New Guinea 
16Service." Besides being disloyal to a number of his 
staff, the Director was displaying his ignorance, since 
the rank of Assistant District Officer had not existed 
in Papua.
Murray*s personal attitude towards the Papua versus
New Guinea dichotomy was somewhat different Prom the
official opinion he expressed to the Minister. He later
stated that the New Guinea officers were "a mixed lot"
and characterised a former Mandated Territory public
servant who subsequently rose to a very senior position
in the post-war administration as "too much T erritory
17of New Guinea, not enough Papua". He belie ved that 
certain officers who had served in the Mandated 
Territory retained "too much of the old GemaJi attitude". 
This did not mean that Murray was biased agai.nst all 
New Guinea staff, for he praised such men a3 Melrose,
16. P.N.G.N.A. Box 887, item GH47-13, 5 November 1951 
and undated letter of the same period ididressed to 
the Public Service Commissioner under ?e3ference 
J/5.
17. This material in this and the following passage, 
including quotations, is drawn from ani.nterview 
with Colonel Murray, 12 December 1966.
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Taylor, McCarthy, Niall and McMullen, Yet he had a 
high regard for these officers not only for their 
efficiency but also for their "progressive’* attitude; 
it was this combination of qualities that the Administrator 
wanted in his staff. However, Murray was not always in 
a position to gauge the performance of public servants.
In the few months after the resumption of civil 
administration he was in relatively close contact with 
the handful of senior officers who were then exercising 
power in what was essentially an emergency situation.
As the public service grew more stable, with increasing 
numbers of men being demobilised from the armed forces, 
the Administrator’s relations with most of his officers 
became more distant and more formal. The personal 
relationships formed by Murray with staff who returned 
immediately upon the resumption of civil administration 
were denied those who resumed duty even a few months 
later. Since the Administrator knew almost none of 
the men in the latter group, his view of the total 
public service was necessarily restricted and this 
contributed to the administrative problems he faced 
in the following years.
Continuing uncertainties
The difficulties which Murray encountered in 
establishing working relationships with his staff were 
accentuated by the haphazard release of personnel from
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the services. Demobilisation began in August 194-5, but 
the location and availability of officers were the main 
considerations in deciding the order of release, rather 
than factors of greater significance for the orderly
resumption of civil administration, such as rank and
1 fiexperience. Reviewing the situation some years later, 
J.H. Jones pointed out that, because staff resources 
were so limited in 1945, officers had been posted to 
the best advantage, as they became available.  ^ Many 
of those who were first released continued in their 
initial postings even after more experienced men returned 
from war duty. As a consequence, relatively junior 
field staff were sometimes given charge of large districts, 
while in other instances senior men could be allocated 
only limited responsibility. There were also problems 
concerning the Territories to which officers could be 
posted; it was thought inadvisable, for example, to 
appoint a Territory of New Guinea man to the post of 
District Officer in Papua. Several anomalies were 
adjusted between 1946 and 1948, but others remained until 
a full review was carried out following the creation 
of a permanent public service under the Papua and New 
Guinea Act of 1949. In addition to the jealousies 
created by apparent injustices in appointments, there 
was the more important factor that postings could be made 
in acting capacities only, pending the creation of a
18. CRS A518, item B852/6/11 , 13 and 30 August and 8 
September 1945.
19. The information in this and the following passage 
is drawn from P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item 1/2, 8 
March 1949*
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permanent establishment for the public service; officers 
in such positions were wary of taking decisive action 
lest any mistakes might jeopardise their substantive 
rank when final gradings ultimately were decided.
The insecurity of staff arising from the delay in 
establishing a permanent combined service was increased 
by other circumstances relating to the provisional basis 
of the total administrative structure. There were 
persistent rumours that the Provisional Administration 
could run for only six months from the end of the war; 
that it would certainly end after twelve months, since that 
was the limit of the Administrators appointment; or that, 
alternatively, the staff were being held on temporary 
appointments deliberately so that men from Angau and the
School of Civil Affairs could be placed over them, when
20ready. Further uncertainy was created by administrative
oversights in Canberra. There were delays in extending
Murray*s authority to the areas of the Territory of New
Guinea handed over by the military, and no action was
taken to empower the Administrator to make even temporary
appointments to the public service; in a cable to the
Minister Murray stated that he was being "seriously
embarrassed” by such omissions, which were creating
21"anxiety among personnel”. When acting status was
20. Reports on "public service unrest" were minuted to 
the Administrator from December 1945; P.N.G.N.A.
Box 162, item 1-3-16, all folios; also CRS A518, 
item B800/1/7, 23 November 1Q45, 15 November 1946.21. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-16, 16 November 1945.
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finally accorded a number of officers there were rumours 
that permanent appointments had in fact been made, without
ppprior advertisement, contrary to public service practice. 
Many of the rumours which circulated may later have 
seemed ridiculous, but they indicated a major problem of 
morale, stemming from insecurity and poor communications 
and gaining further strength from the continuing 
uncertainites of the period.
Murray and his service
The dissatisfaction within the public service which 
had been reported in the Australian press was soon 
brought to the attention of the government, although the 
Public Service Associations of the Territory of New 
Guinea and Papua continued to act separately in industrial 
matters.2-5 They complained that senior positions were 
being filled from outside the public service: "Public 
servants resent apparent influence of former members 
Directorate Army Research detriment other public servants 
stop." There were objections that junior officers were 
supervising the takeover from the military in the New 
Guinea mainland area; and that nothing had been done to 
grant salary increases or to establish arbitration 
machinery, both of which were considered essential in
22. Ibid., 6 February 1946.
23. The material in this and the following passage, 
including the quotation, is drawn from P.N.G.N.A.
Box 162, item 1-3-16, 6 February 1946.
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view of the high living costs being encountered in the
Territory. Murray urged the Minister to give urgent
attention to all outstanding administrative and personnel
matters and sought advice from the most experienced men
who had so far resumed duty in Port Moresby.^ The 
*
most revealing reply came from Mr. E.B. (later Mr. Justice) 
Bignold, a former Papuan officer of the Crown Law 
Department, who wrote, "I regret to say that in regard 
to appointments to the Service I believe that you are 
being ill advised by some advisers whose views are not,
I think, generally shared.” Apart from the fact that most 
appointments were being made as a result of circumstance 
rather than design, it was ironic that Bignold*s 
criticims were directed as they were: for the responsibility 
for personnel lay with the acting Government Secretary,
Robert Melrose, who was supported by Murray precisely 
because he possessed what the Administrator considered to 
be the "Papuan outlook”.
Such differences of perception between Murray and 
his staff arose largely because the Administrator was a 
stranger to the Territory and suffered from the further 
disadvantage, in the eyes of many of his subordinates, 
that he had worked in the Directorate of Research; and 
for Papuan officers particularly, that he had usurped the 
position of Leonard Murray. There were further
24. The information in this and the following passage,
including the quotation, is drawn from ibid.,
8 February 1946.
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difficulties. Murray's incisive manner could overwhelm 
people not accustomed to disciplined thought; a public 
servant who had been baffled by Murray's trenchant
questioning described him, many years later, as "starchy".
A man of Murray's intellect, committed to implementing 
change as rapidly as possible, was a different personality 
from the majority of his senior staff, particularly those 
whose outlook remained narrow and who were accustomed to 
the more leisurely pace of the pre-war period. Murray 
associated more easily with the professional men in the 
public service, many of them post-war appointees, whose 
background more closely resembled his own. Such an 
attitude was strengthened by the fact that Mrs. Murray, 
also an expert in tropical agriculture, was one of the 
few well-educated white women in Papua New Guinea at that 
time.
25
The Murrays' Government House was a different
establishment from that presided over by the ex-Army
officers who administered the Mandated Territory before
the war. Its relationship to the rest of the community
was similar to that which existed under MacGregor and
26Murray, both men of some intellectual force. To offset 
any aloofness, Murray's manner was exceptionally courteous, 
almost old-wofdly in its attention to people of all kinds.
25. Interview with a former senior officer of the 
Department of the Public Service Commissioner,
17 July 1968.
26. See P.J. West, Sir Hubert Murray, op. cit. and R.B. 
Joyce, Sir William MacGregor, op. cit.
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Murray has said that he believed in extending the same
courtesies to everyone and saw no point in changing his
manner to fit allegedly different social circumstances;
27for example, when he was meeting villagers. Ian Hogbin, 
who accompanied Murray on some of his officials tours, 
says that he was never at all 11 stiff” with Papua New 
Guineans, treating everyone with the same ”common
O Qpoliteness”; the point is, of course, that Europeans 
were not expected to behave in such a manner towards 
’’natives”. However, Murray’s behaviour might have seemed 
inconsistent. For example, he sometimes dressed in a
tropical uniform similar to that worn in the British
2QColonial Service. Yet Murray was being neither pompous
nor vain in dressing in this way; he later observed
that, if the people were willing to dress ceremonially
when he was present, as was the invariable custom at the
time, then he felt obliged to extend the same courtesy 
30to them. Nevertheless, these were apparent 
contradictions in the behaviour of a man who, while 
supporting a wholly progressive policy, was also willing 
to adopt the trappings of an old colonialism on certain 
occasions. In fact, most of Murray’s social attitudes 
stemmed from an earlier generation, while his intellectual
27. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
28. Interview with Dr. Hogbin, 21 December 1973.
29. This was the colonial uniform ’’second class”, worn 
by such senior officials as Colonial Secretaries. 
Unlike his successor, Brigadier Cleland, Murray 
did not wear military uniform in the Territory, 
since he wished to make it clear that his was a 
civil post.
30. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
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convictions were far in advance of those held by most 
of the community. It was only to be expected that his 
behaviour sometimes seemed paradoxical to those who 
worked with him.
Murray's many roles
Murray formed few close friendships in Papua New
Guinea, but he is remembered with great affection by
those who knew him well; most of the associations he
formed at that time have lasted for many years.^ He
was a fairly distant figure to the great majority of his
staff, however, and he seems to have been viewed
generally with respect rather than liking. Some of his
personal mannerisms were far removed from usual New
Guinea practice: for example, his habit of addressing
everyone but his closest friends by surname only -
"Thank you, Jones" - in a country where Christian names
were the universal rule. He did not smoke, drank little,
and took as much pleasure in visiting villages,
particularly to inspect gardens and agricultural projects,
as he did in European company of the kind generally
5^2available in the Territory.
There was little empathy between the Administrator 
and Papua New Guinea's Europeans, but Murray worked hard
31. Gunther interview, 4 December 1968.
32. This passage is based on conversations with people 
associated with Murray and on semi-personal 
correspondence in P.N.G.N.A. Boxes 163 and 168.
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for all of them. He travelled a great deal, rather in 
the pre-war manner of Sir Hubert Murray, and certainly 
more than any of his successors. He spent an average of 
one day in four, or one-third of his working time, on 
tour. ^  In the financial year 1949/50, for example, he 
made twelve separate visits to centres in the Territory 
of New Guinea, from the Highlands to Manus Island, in a
total of 56 days, and spent half that time again touring
34.Papua. Hogbin recalls that during a cruise in the
Milne Bay District aboard H.M.A.S. Condamine, Murray
visited "all the missions, all the plantations and all
35the villages" where the ship called. After these visits
a stream of brief memoranda flowed from Government House
to the office of the Government Secretary, requiring
information or action on a peculiar variety of matters:
replacement of a saw at Samarai, the rate of pay for a
mixed-race tradesman, repairs to a freezing unit,
correspondence studies for outstation children, enquiries
of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company on the best method
36of storing sugar in the tropics. When he was in Port 
Moresby Murray kept up a similar barrage of minutes, on 
the average of twenty to thirty each month, about many 
kinds of official matters that came to his attention in 
the files or from visitors; as well as on everyday 
community affairs, such as water supply or car parking,
33. P.N.G.N.A. Box 164, item 1-6-1, undated July 1950.
34. Ibid.
35. Hogbin interview, 21 December 1973.
36. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item L621, folios from September 
1947 to January 1948.
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which he noticed in the town. These must have caused 
a good deal of work, and presumably some exasperation, 
among the Government Secretary*s staff; it is probable 
that some of them were never dealt with, although 
reminders were occasionally sent from Government House.
Murray provided the main outlet for the complaints 
and concerns of both the public service and the white 
community generally, since at the time there were no 
formal bodies representing European interests, such as 
the Legislative Council or the Town and District 
Advisory Councils established in the 1950*s.^ The 
office of Administrator thus became the focus, within 
the Territory, of much of the post-war discontent. This 
was something Murray appeared willing to accept. Within 
a few months of his appointment, for example, the Port 
Moresby public servants called a meeting to air their 
grievances and discuss action that might be taken to 
remedy them. The main issue was the low standard of 
housing in the town. Murray, who was better acquainted 
than anyone with the even worse situation on the wrecked 
New Guinea outstations, was sceptical about some of the 
Port Moresby claims; as he observed later, "The top 
level of staff, better housed than most, were much less
37. P.N.G.N.A. Box 185, item 58/2, all folios.
38. The degree of follow-up is not clear, owing to the 
destruction of the Government Secretary*s files, 
but Government House records contain a number of 
reminders.
39. Jinks, op. cit., pp. 110-12, 152-3. Murray was, of 
course, more concerned at the problems of the 
villagers, but whites could exert more pressure. 
Village representation is discussed in Chapter 
Seven.
37
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affected.. . . In any event, Murray attended the
meeting, to the consternation of those present.^-1 There
were objections that the Administrator was not a public
servant, but Murray pointed out that the invitation had
been addressed to "officers”. ”0n this term," he recalls,
"I succeeded in persuading the chairman that I had a
4-2right to attend." The meeting agreed to protest to
the Australian government at the delay in providing
"reasonable accommodation" for public servants; Murray
would no doubt have enjoyed adding his name to the
complaint, had that been possible. The positive feature
of the meeting was that, after some discussion in which
Murray took part, senior officers of the Department of
Public Works agreed to build emergency houses, with walls
of tar paper over a sawn timber frame, each to be
43completed in about a week. Murray believed that the 
houses "notably relieved the accommodation problem and 
improved the morale of the Civil Service".^ However, 
there were many other issues causing dissatisfaction and 
certain of those who attended the staff meeting supplied 
highly critical reports of it to the press. On 15 
September 1946 the Sydney Sun carried an account of the 
meeting, saying that it had been called to take "strike 
action" and that Murray*s presence had been an "attempt 
to intimidate" those who attended. The report brought
40. Murray notes, p. 74.
41. P.N.Gr.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-16, 24 August 1946.
42. Murray notes, p. 76.
43. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, loc. cit.
44. Murray notes, p. 76.
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an enquiry from the Minister, who was coolly advised 
by Murray that he had attended the gathering because 
"all members of the Administration” had been invited; 
it had, wrote Murray, been an "orderly meeting".^
Even the Pacific Islands Monthly agreed with Murray1s 
assessment of the meeting, reporting that the press 
account was "exaggerated".^ With grudging respect the 
magazine noted : ^
¿"The chairman_7 suggested that, as the Administrator 
was a busy man, the meeting be adjourned while he 
addressed those present; later he (the Administrator) 
could leave and the business of the meeting could 
proceed. The Administrator, however, was not so 
lightly disposed of; he said that as a member of 
the Provisional Administration he insisted upon 
being permitted to remain, and the chairman, 
probably out of his depth, consented...Opinion is 
divided in the Territory on the appearance of the 
Administrator at a meeting called for the purpose 
of discussing and dissecting him and his 
administration. But whether it was or was not 
etiquette his presence certainly cut the ground 
from under the feet of the rank and file, although 
he in turn was forced to listen to some frank 
criticism.
In fact, Murray attended the meeting out of a desire to 
assist rather than embarrass his staff, as the decision 
on emergency housing showed. This was simply an example 
of his personally confronting issues in an effort to 
achieve quick results. Particularly during his early 
period in office he acted on the assumption that the 
main authority to settle administrative details rested
45. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-5-16, 20 September 1946.
46. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 2, September 1946, p. 8.
47. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 3, October 1946, p. 8.
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with him and as if matters affecting policy primarily
required consultation between him and the Minister, with
the Canberra Department playing a supporting role; or,
in his own words, Murray ”did not want to have to refer
4-8every last thing to Canberra for approval”. This 
became one of his major concerns as the Canberra 
authorities proved themselves notoriously slow to act, 
thereby adding to such problems as the dissatisfaction 
within the public service. For example, salaries and 
entitlements for public servants came under Ministerial 
determination, and so could be improved only by decision 
in Australia. In mid-1946 Halligan had visited Port 
Moresby, promising a complete review of the public service 
in the near future; but nothing had been heard by the time 
of the August protest meeting, despite enquiries and 
prompting by Murray, who remained in a frustrating
4.Qposition at the centre of the dispute. J 
Need for investigation
It was not until 8 November 1946, almost six months
after the undertaking by Halligan, that an investigation
50into the public service was begun. It was to inquire 
into both the conditions and organization of the service, 
although by that time the Provisional Administration
48. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
49. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-16, 20 September 1946; 
P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 2, September 1946, p. 8.
50. D.E.T., Report on the Public Service of the Provisional 
Administration of Papua New G-uinea by Mr. C.J. 
Buttsworth, Canberra, typescript, 1947, p. 1.
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had been in operation for more than a year and many 
ad hoc decisions had created precedents that could not 
easily be changed. Moreover, certain senior officials 
had manoeuvered themselves and their departments into 
influential positions which they wished to retain. To 
appreciate the limitations of the 1946/47 inquiry it is 
necessary to examine the events preceding it and the 
personalities and organizations involved.
Since there had been no planning for a post-war
administrative structure for the Territory, hurried
arrangements on the basis of pre-war practice had to be
made when the early end to the war caught the authorities 
51by surprise. As the annual reports put it, "At its
inauguration on 30th October, 1945, the Public Service of
the Provisional Administration of Papua-New Guinea was
tentatively classified on the basis of classifications
in the pre-war Public Service of the separate Administration
52for Papua and New Guinea." This was misleading, as the 
peculiar choice of words in the singular to describe what 
had actually been two organizations indicated. In fact, 
the Provisional Administration followed the Mandated 
Territory pattern in both terminology and organization, 
with the addition of two departments to make a total of 
ten in 1945/46.^ Conditions of service also followed
51. See Chapter Three, pp. 155-6.
52. N.G.A.R.. 1946/47, p. 13.
53. P.A.R.. 1945/46, p. 10. Adoption of the Mandated 
Territory structure produced important administrative 
effects, which are discussed later in this Chapter.
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pre-war patterns for some time; married officers were
paid an allowance only if their annual salary was less
than £400; child allowance was payable only to officers
with salaries of less than £600; and staff had to pay
54for most of their leave passages. These terms compared
most unfavourably with later practice and even with the
pre-war situation, since without salary increases, staff
were forced to cope with the inflation of the war period
on wage scales that had been set six years previously;
the only concessions were that the minimum amount paid to
single officers was raised from £300 to £354 and to married
55staff by £70 to £400 by interim Ministerial decision. ^
When these facts are considered in conjunction with the 
uncertainty surrounding officers* careers, the poor 
housing and the lack of shipping and supplies, it is not 
hard to understand the unrest in the public service.
Under the circumstances, the delay of over a year in 
instituting the first review of the service showed a lack 
of responsibility on the part of the Minister and his 
Department.
G-rowth of committees
The government also failed to set up a formal policy 
and executive structure for the Territory, even on an 
interim basis. The Papua—New Guinea Provisional 
Administration Act 1945 suspended the Executive and
54. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 42
55. Ibid.
3 3 4
Legislative Councils of the pre-war Territories and vested
legislative power formally in the Governor-General; in
practice, many of the early Ordinances were proposed in 
56Port Moresby, then passed to the Department of External 
Territories for consideration by the Minister, following
which there were usually long delays before gazettal was
57approved. The Administrator was empowered to make 
regulations under Ordinances that had come into effect, 
but lacked any formal consultative machinery to advise 
him on future requirements for legislation and executive 
action. For several months there was little opportunity 
to think beyond the moment; but as conditions became 
more stable, and particularly as the planning activities 
of the Pacific Territories Research Council and the 
Council of the School of Pacific Administration were 
stifled by the Department of External Territories, the
5ftneed for a policy group in Papua New Guinea became urgent.
In 1946 Murray therefore approved the setting up of an
Advisory Committee ”to report on matters referred to it
5Qby the Administrator”. It was intended that the 
committee should meet weekly under the chairmanship of 
the acting Government Secretary. Its members included 
the acting Treasurer and the acting Directors of Public
56. The information in this and the following passage 
is drawn from Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
57. This situation continued for more than five years, 
until Hasluck became Minister.
58. See Chapter Five, pp. 281-9» 300-3.
59. P.N.G.N.A. Box 192, item CA1/4/1, undated (early 
1949; the original papers were probably destroyed: 
this file contains a review of the situation).
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Health, District Services and Native Affairs, Native
60Labour, Education and Agriculture.
The matters initially referred to the Advisory
Committee mainly concerned the reconstruction phase of
the Provisional Administrations work, following the
completion of the rehabilitation phase by the latter
half of 1946. These included such things as improvements
to urban services, conditions on outstations, and
problems of shipping, air services and supply: that is,
61matters which concerned several, or all, departments.
However, the Advisory Committee had also to concern itself
with questions which, like labour supply, leasing of
land and the expansion of schooling, seemed to fall within
6?the ambit of a single department. This was because 
almost every question held implications for other areas 
of policy. The problem of housing, for example, soon led 
to such considerations as the availability of urban land, 
which opened up questions of town planning. With almost 
everything in Papua New Guinea in a state of flux and 
without a plan from which to work, it was impossible to 
fix the parameters of administrative action.
As the Advisory Committee sought to resolve the 
issues confronting it, its discussions became both more
60. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 23 October 1946. The 
committee also had power to co-opt. The state of the 
public service is indicated by the fact that none of 
these senior officials held a permanent appointment.
61. P.N.G.N.A. Box 169, item GH1-9-6, folios November 
1946 to March 1949.
62. P.N.G.N.A. Box 164, item GH1-4-3, folios November 1946 to July 1949.
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detailed and less conclusive, until members began to
63complain about the length of meetings. These gradually
became less frequent: from weekly in 1947 to monthly by
early 1949.^ The committee was often forced to refer
matters back to the Administrator, usually requesting
clarification of policy from the Australian government.
On other occasions it recommended further study of certain
questions by specialised groups, with the result that by
1949 a total of 25 committees and advisory groups had
65been established. Of these, the Advisory Committee,
Water Board, Land Boards, Public Service Appointments
Board and Inter-Departmental Committee on Native
Development and Welfare had relatively defined areas of 
66concern. The functions of several others overlapped 
to a degree and suggested a need for rationalisation: 
the Stores Purchases and Supply Board, Tenders and 
Disposals Board, Patrol Equipment Committee and Petroleum 
Advisory Committee were concerned with stores; the 
Housing Committee, Building Board, Building Priorities 
Committee and Town Planning Advisory Committee considered 
urban affairs; and the Economic Planning Committee,
Rural Production Advisory Council, Fisheries Committee 
and Transport Investigation Committee advised on 
development matters. Other committees were concerned 
with finance (the Estimates Revision and Finance Committees)
63. Buttsworth, op. cit., Appendix "A", p. 1.
64. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 192, item CA1/4/1, undated.
65. Ibid.
66. The material in this and the following passage is 
drawn from P.N.G.N.A. Box 169, item G-H1-9-6 and 
Box 192, item CA1/4/1.
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and reconstruction (the Regional Re-establishment and 
Re-employment and Regional Reconstruction Training 
Committees).
A final group of advisory bodies grew out of the
Committee on Native Development and Welfare, which was
established in October 1946 with the aim of providing
advice more relevant to village requirements, and with
longer-term goals, than was the case with the Advisory 
67Committee. The Development and Welfare body comprised
most of the members of the Advisory Committee: the
acting Directors of District Services and Native Affairs
(chairman), Native Labour, Agriculture, Education and
Public Health. It discussed any matter relating to Papua
New Guineans and covered an enormous range in the process:
air freight allowance for employees on isolated
outstations, artisans' wages, prices in trade stores
68and individual cases involving "destitute persons".
The Development and Welfare group, too, became enmeshed 
in details and recommended the establishment of 
subsidiary committees to conduct further enquiries; these 
emerged as the Committees for Social Development, Native 
Welfare, Broadcasting and Amenities, and Recreation
67. The material in this and the following passage is 
based on P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 12-7-2 and Box 
187, item PD8/5.
68. The members themselves found difficulty remembering 
committee names and functions; the acting Director 
of District Services at one time referred to a 
"Destitute Persons Committee", which may have been 
an unrecorded offshoot of the Development and Welfare 
group (Buttsworth, op. cit.. Appendix "A", p. 1.)
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Facilities for Women. These groups were intended to 
achieve results when earlier attempts had failed, although 
they were rarely successful. There were several reasons 
for this impasse, most of them stemming from the 
Australian governments failure to establish clear policy 
objectives. Firstly, none of the policy-oriented 
committees possessed statutory authority and there was 
little in the way of formal power that could be delegated 
to them by the Administrator, who was in turn obliged to 
refer many matters to Canberra for decision, against his 
wishes. Secondly, committee members were heavily 
committed to departmental work, for which there were 
serious shortages of staff. Thirdly, there was almost 
no support staff for the committees themselves, apart 
from a few officers undertaking basic secretarial duties 
in addition to their normal work.
A situation thus arose in which the same basic group 
of senior staff threshed around with similar sets of 
interrelated problems, approaching them from a slightly 
different viewpoint in each committee. Some progress 
was made with immediate problems: finance allocation, 
housing needs, service conditions for Administration 
employees (i.e., Papua New Guineans). However, the fact 
that such matters had to be dealt with by senior 
committees indicated that much more power needed to be 
delegated to, and then within, the Provisional 
Administration. Efforts at long-term planning, in turn,
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were obscured by essential, but recurring, requirements 
for co-ordination; it was tempting to deal with the 
more routine affairs first, by which time there was little 
opportunity to discuss the less tractable problems.
Hence the establishment, by the major groups such as the 
Native Development and Welfare and Advisory Committees, 
of yet more offshoots responsible for planning: notably 
the Social Development Planning Committee and the Economic 
Development Committee. Both of the latter groups produced 
lengthy reports which were intended to form the basis for 
future policy; they are discussed, according to their 
particular concern, in the next two Chapters.
Administrative structure and co-ordination
Problems of co-ordination and planning were increased 
by the structure of the Provisional Administration, 
particularly in relation to the roles of :t.s major 
administrative organizations, the Departments of District 
Services and Native Affairs, and Government Secretary. 
District Services was staffed largely by :'i eld officers 
responsible for a wide range of general aimiinistrative
and service functions in the main centres amd out stations
69of the Territory. The department conta_med by far the
69. Field staff possessed both police anl magisterial
powers and acted as bankers, postmas^eirs, construction 
overseers and in any other capacity vhiich seemed 
indicated by the circumstances. The?e> has been no 
detailed study of the administrative aispects of 
Australian control, although two forneir District 
Commissioners, Messrs. I.P.G. Downs mid J.P. Sinclair,
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largest number of officers with pre-war experience; and, 
owing to the nature of colonial administration, with its 
need to spread a limited number of staff over a large 
area, it enjoyed a virtual monopoly of formal legal and 
administrative authority and of sources of information.
In pre-war Papua the field staff had been members of the 
Department of the Government Secretary, which provided 
the executive group to the Lieutenant-Governor and effected 
the delegation of his authority, in the limited degree 
he considered appropriate, to Resident Magistrates. It 
was a simple and direct method of control, reasonably 
suited to the conditions at that time. It was never put 
to the test as a system of co-ordination and development, 
since the Papuan Administration possessed few professional 
officers and the majority of those whom it could employ 
were based in Port Moresby. In the Mandated Territory, 
on the other hand, the Department of the Government 
Secretary was a small organization responsible for 
co-ordinating affairs on behalf of the Administrator, 
with the field staff serving in a separate Department of 
District Services under their own Director. The Government 
Secretary remained the senior public servant in the 
Territory, but the de facto power of the Director of
(cont.) are presently compiling separate versions.
Such works as Mair, Legge, Stanner (Transition),
West (Sir Hubert Murray) and Joyce, op. cit., 
concentrate on the history of expressed policy and 
pay some attention to actual performance in some key 
areas, such as labour and welfare. However, it is 
possible, by examining these accounts, to discern an 
outline of administrative practice; for example, see 
Mair ( 1948) ,  Chs. 2- 7 , Legge, Chs. 9-12 and Stanner, 
Gh. 2 . The most useful material is in Reed, op. cit., 
pp. 164- 71. See also P.A.R., 1938/39, pp. 10-13 and 
N.G.A.R., 1939/40, pp. 9-15, for broad outlines of 
public service structure.
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District Services was considerable because his staff 
occupied such vital positionsin the country. It was the 
latter system, in which the field staff were separated 
from the Administrators executive group, that was adopted 
for the combined administration in 1945.
Within the Provisional Administration the Department 
of the Government Secretary was formally responsible for
70the “co-ordination of the activities of all Departments". 
The Government Secretary had also to provide a channel 
of communication between the Administrator and the 
Department of External Territories, arrange the compilation 
of statistics and preparation of reports, and supervise 
the Police Branch, Library Service, Grown Law Office, 
Registrar General's Branch and Supreme Court Registry. To 
carry out these duties he had an effective staff of only 
twelve, all but two of whom (the Assistant Government 
Secretary and an Administrative Assistant) were in clerical 
and typing categories. Thus a great deal of the actual 
work of co-ordination necessarily fell to the senior 
officers of the other departments, meeting in committee.
In the absence of detailed oversight from the Government 
Secretary's office, the "co-ordination" effected through 
committee more closely resembled a bargaining process 
between officials with the strongest personalities and 
representing the most influential departments.
70. The material in this and the following passage is
drawn from N.G.A.R., 1946/47, p. 14 and P.A.R.,
1945/46, p. 10.
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Murray*s advisers
The importance of personalities within the Provisional
Administration was emphasised hy the restricted role of
the Administrator's own staff. The only personnel
assigned specifically to Government House were an Official
Secretary (paid at the rate of Chief Clerk) and a 
71typist. This was very different from the "staff”
concept Murray had encountered in the army and far removed
from the notion of an academic community which had
influenced relationships at Murray's university and within
the Directorate of Research. By comparison with the
earlier phases of his career, Murray as Administrator was
isolated, not only from people of similar background,
but from almost all contact, through formal channels,
with officers who could provide him with a conspectus of
the Papua New Guinea situation. This placed a heavy
responsibility, in addition to all his other duties, on
the Government Secretary, who as senior department head
should ideally have been both the Administrator's executive
officer and chief adviser; in the absence of Executive
and Legislative Councils, there was no other formal source
of information for the Administrator to draw on. In
Robert Melrose, his acting Government Secretary, Murray
found a man whom he considered "thoroughly on-side", rather
slow to make decisions, "but not because of the possible
72consequences to Melrose". However, Melrose was unwell
71. N.G.A.R.. 1947/48, p. vii.
72. Murray interview, 12 December 1966. See also 
Chapter Pour, pp. 177-9.
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and a heart condition which had persisted from the pre-war 
period forced him to leave the Territory in 1949.^
Because of his health and personality, Melrose was not 
the commanding figure required for the almost impossible 
tasks confronting the Government Secretary. Even had he 
been, Murray would still have used informal channels to 
gain the information and intellectual stimulation that his 
office and personality demanded.
The other top officials, with whom Murray associated
in varying degrees, were a mixed group indeed. Nine of
the heads of the eleven departments functioning in 1946/47
can be broadly categorised in three groups. The first
group, which worked to some effect but without attracting
particular attention, included the acting Director of
Forests, J.B. McAdam, the acting Chief Collector of
Customs, T.P.M. Byrne, and the acting Treasurer, W.N.M.
Chester. Two other senior officials, in charge of Public
Works and Lands, Surveys and Mines, were unable to cope
with the urgent demands made upon them and were later
replaced. A third group was in general sympathy with
post-war policy and could be considered to have a
"progressive” outlook on development. It included Melrose;
74W.R. Humphries, the acting Director of Native Labour; 
the acting Director of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries,
73. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 168, item GH1-9-2M, 19 July 1949.
74. The first acting Director of Native Labour was J.L. 
Taylor, who returned to the Highlands at his own 
request in 1946; his work in the position is 
discussed in Chapter Eight.
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W.E. Cottrell-Dormer; and the acting Director of
Education, W.C. Groves. Of these, Humphries was a
former Papuan Resident Magistrate with more than thirty-
years service whose views on Papua New Guinea were
sensitive, if rather paternalistic. He was one of the
Papuan field officer-authors, having written Through
7SWildest Papua in 1923. His position proved to he both
difficult and frustrating and he lacked the personal force
76to carry his views through the various comnittees.
Cottrell-Dormer, at Agriculture, was a friend of Murray
and the similarity of their professional backgrounds gave
them interests in common. Cottrell-Dormer was particularly
interested in agricultural extension and its social
effects but he, like Humphries, proved largely unsuccessful
in a senior administrative post; he eventually accepted
77demotion in order to continue his work in the field.
Groves had wide experience in New Guinea and in the field 
of education generally. After service in World War I he 
had been Supervisor of Native Education in the Mandated 
Territory until 1925, had carried out anthropological 
research there in the 1930's, besides being Director of 
Education in Nauru and adviser to the Eritish Solomon 
Islands, and had served in Papua New Guinea with the Army 
Education Service during the Pacific war.^8 With his
75. London, Eisher Unwin,
76. Gunther interview, 4 December 1968. Humphries' 
later work is discussed in Chapter Eight.
77. Cottrell-Dormer's later work is discussed in Chapter
Eight.
78. The material in this passage is drawn from P.I.M.,
Vol. 16 No. 10, May 1946, p. 9*
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detailed knowledge of social issues in the Territory,
Groves was potentially the most commanding figure in the 
Provisional Administration. However, like several of his 
colleagues of that period, he had not been tested in the 
administration of a rapidly-developing situation, such as 
the one he encountered in post-war Papua New Guinea.
The performance of the "progressive” group of senior 
officers was of great importance for the success of the 
Provisional Administration, for it was largely in their 
areas of responsibility - labour, agriculture, education 
and the co-ordination of development - that judgements of 
the post-war achievement would be made. However, until 
the specialist departments could be expanded by recruiting 
professional and technical staff, much of the responsibility 
for executing development programmes would fall to the 
field staff. Moreover, only limited participation could 
be expected from the villagers until there was a general 
improvement in their health, which had received only 
limited attention before the war, and had then been 
seriously affected by the privations resulting from the 
military occupation. A great deal thus depended on the 
Departments of District Services and Native Affairs, and 
Public Health, and on their Directors. At the establishment 
of the Provisional Administration both of these 
departments were headed by senior pre-war officers from 
the Mandated Territory, District Services by Edward 
Taylor and Public Health by Dr. B.A. Sinclair; both 
resigned in 1946. Taylor*s replacement during most of
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the Provisional Administration period was J.H. Jones,
another Territory of New Guinea officer, Jones had
reached the rank of District Officer in 1934, serving in
several areas, hut came to prominence only after joining
Angau, in which he received rapid promotion to the rank
7°)of Lieutenant-Colonel, In April 1945 he was appointed 
Angau commander of its Northern Region, and Director of 
District Services and Native Affairs for the area still 
under Angau control (parts of the New Guinea islands) in 
November 1945, He returned to the civil administration 
in September 1946, when he was appointed acting Director 
of District Services and Native Affairs for the combined 
Territory. "Bert” Jones was a tall, powerfully-built man 
with pronounced features and a strong personality. His 
competence was obvious from his rapid rise in Angau, but 
this very background had isolated him from the major 
policy changes proposed during the war; he represented 
the conventional in the field service, just as J.L.
Taylor represented its more progressive aspect. Jones’ 
experience and proficiency, in the District Services 
field at least, set him apart from the other department 
heads of the immediate post-war years.
Another commanding figure in the senior ranks of 
the Provisional Administration was Dr. John Thomson 
Gunther, a specialist in tropical medicine who had worked 
in the British Solomon Islands before the war and had
79. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item 1/2, undated August 1949
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later served as a malariologist with the Royal Australian
Air Force, attaining the rank of Wing Commander in charge
of a unit conducting research into the aetiology of scrub
typhus; in the latter capacity he had for a time been
stationed near Port Moresby and become interested in the
80situation in Papua New Guinea. Gunther*s abilities
can be appreciated from a resume of his career: after a
decade spent as Director of Public Health, he was
Assistant Administrator for several years and finally
served as the first Vice-Chancellor of the University of
Papua New Guinea from 1966 to 1972. During most of this
period he was the most outstanding single figure in New
Guinea development. Ironically, Gunther was Murray’s
second choice for the Public Health position and the
relationship between the two men, which later became
81extremely close, began coolly. It was inevitable, 
however, that their substantial professional backgrounds 
and the similarity of their social values would bring 
Murray and Gunther together. Gunther possessed a most 
forceful personality, which he could use to dramatise 
his own demands, and in all his work he accomplished 
something rare in Papua New Guinea: setting clear 
objectives and working, with sometimes ruthless dedication,
80. Gunther interview, 4 December 1968.
81. Following Sinclair’s resignation, Murray sought advice 
on a suitable appointee from doctors he had known in 
the Directorate. Approaches were then made to senior 
medical men through the Department of External 
Territories, without result. Murray was then advised 
that his remaining candidate was unsuitable for 
appointment to a senior administrative post (Murray 
journal, p. 19). Gunther was recommended through the 
Minister and, like Murray before him, found no one
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towards them. At a time when many of the plans for 
Papua New Guinea were unformed, this ability in the 
Director was to prove of enormous benefit to the public 
health effort, although it sometimes meant that other 
projects went short of scarce materials when their 
proponents were unable to withstand Gunther’s demands. 
Gunther could be blunt to the point of rudeness and 
never hesitated to voice his opinions, which were both 
liberal, for the time, and pragmatic; he believed that 
achieving results was the best way of supporting a
opprinciple. He, like Jones, occupied a special place 
among the senior officials.
The only other official group of major significance 
comprised the senior legal figures. Of these, Mr. P.B. 
(later Sir Beaumont) Phillips, formerly Chief Justice 
of the Mandated Territory, served in the same capacity 
in the combined administration. Phillips had very long 
experience in the islands for, after service in World 
War I, he worked as a Land Commissioner in the British 
Solomon Islands until 1925, when he was appointed a 
Stipendiary Magistrate for the Territory of New Guinea, 
moving to the Supreme Court in 1928 and gaining the
(cont.) to meet him upon his arrival in Port Moresby. 
He was given an appointment to see the Administrator 
in two days time, but "forced the issue" and had 
dinner with him that night (Gunther interview).
Two strong personalities thus had an early 
opportunity of sizing each other up.
82. This passage is based, in part, on personal 
experience of working with Dr. Gunther.
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position of Chief Justice in 1933; in 1940 he rejoined 
the Royal Australian Air Force and saw service in the 
United Kingdom. J Phillips, like Jones, had thus been 
isolated from the planning for post-war New Guinea, but 
was in a most influential position, since he acted as 
Administrator during Murray*s frequent absences from
o /Port Moresby. Phillips observed all of the ceremonies
of his office and, when Murray was away, those of the
Administrator's position as well, ’’sitting in the chair”,
85as Gunther has termed it. In some other respects the
Chief Justice seems to have been given to pomposity,
considering the circumstances of the Territory: he was
strongly opposed to traditional Melanesian ways of
settling disputes and was prolix in his judgements,
reports and memoranda. However, he added weight to the
dominant Territory of New Guinea group forming within
the Provisional Administration. The other senior legal
men were Mr. Justice R.T. Gore, formerly a colleague of
Sir Hubert Murray in the Supreme Court of Papua, a big,
bluff raconteur who was not involved in policy matters;
and Mr. E.B. Bignold, Crown Law Officer, a former Papuan
official who had been disturbed at conditions in the
post-war public service, but who was soon to be appointed
87to the Supreme Court.
83. P.I>M.. Vol. 14 No. 3, October 1943, p. 6.
84. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4, 1 July 1947, et. al. 
This, too, followed Mandated Territory precedent; in 
Papua the Government Secretary had usually acted.
85. Gunther interview, 4 December 1968.
86. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4 and Box 887, item GH42/1.
87. See p. 323 of this Chapter.
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When the 1946/47 inquiry into the public service
began, Murray*s active advisers were divided into two
groups. One element, including Groves and Cottrell-
Dormer, was close to the Administrator in terms of
background and convictions, but lacked the experience
required to deal with the machinery of the bureaucracy.
The other, whose major figures were Jones and Phillips,
had little in common with Murray or with the post-war
approach to Papua New Guinea development. Their influence
stemmed from their knowledge of the pre-war administrative
practices that were being adopted in many important
spheres of the Provisional Administration. The latter
group was further strengthened by the return in 1946 of
Mr. S.A. Lonergan to the combined service. Lonergan had
served in the secretariat at Rabaul before the war and
had worked with both Angau and the Department of External
88Territories between 1942 and 1946. Upon his return to 
New Guinea he was appointed acting Assistant Government 
Secretary, displaying the direct approach that was to 
some extent lacking in his superior, Robert Melrose; 
this gave Lonergan influence beyond that which would 
normally have attached to his position. The relationship 
between Murray and Lonergan was an uneasy one and this 
was doubly unfortunate because Lonergan was eventually 
appointed the first substantive Government Secretary 
after Melrose left the Territory. Murray has said that 
he and Lonergan ’’got on”, but they had little in common
88. Lonergan had been one of the *'Ghan brothers” reviled 
by the Directorate staff (see Chapter Two, p. 138) 
and this no doubt affected Murray's attitude towards 
him.
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and this lack of rapport eventually damaged Murray's 
attempts to pursue the policies he favoured.®^
In the first year of its existence the Provisional 
Administration thus evolved as a clumsy instrument, 
unsuited either for planning or for executing the changes 
proposed for Papua New Guinea. A good deal of 
administrative authority rested with individual 
departments, and the Department of District Services and 
Native Affairs in particular, while the function of 
co-ordinating their efforts was assigned to a skeleton 
organization in the Government Secretary's office. As 
a consequence, a plethora of committees grew up, 
compounding rather than reducing the problems of planning 
and co-ordination. The weaknesses in organizational 
structure were accentuated by the uneven quality of 
senior personnel and by the tensions which existed among 
them. It was against this background that the 1946 
inquiry into the public service began.
The Buttsworth inquiry
The public service inquiry, begun in November 1946, 
was conducted by Mr. C.J. Buttsworth, a retired senior 
officer of the New South Wales public service, and Mr. 
A.G.M. Bums, Assistant Secretary (Administration) in 
the Department of External Territories. Neither of
89. Murray interview, 14 December 1966. This matteris discussed further in Chapter Nine.
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these men had worked in Papua New Guinea, hut the
Department of External Territories made no formal
provision for assistance or advice to their inquiry by
members of the Territory public service. The investigation
had been instituted in response to the protest meetings
in Port Moresby earlier in the year and it seemed as if
the Provisional Administration’s staffing problems were
at last receiving urgent attention in Canberra; Buttsworth
and Burns arrived in the Territory on 11 November, only
three days after receiving their commissions, allowing
the Port Moresby authorities no time in which to prepare
a detailed case. It thus appeared that the inquiry was
intended to effect rapid adjustments in the specific
areas of salaries and conditions of service, but it was
qoin fact charged with much broader terms of reference:^
To inquire into the conditions of the Public Service 
and submit recommendations as to -
(a) the organization of the Service and the functions 
of the various branches;
(b) the positions necessary, and duties and salary 
ranges of such positions.
In making these recommendations...to consider two 
things in particular -
(1) the actual present requirements of the Territory; 
and
(2) the funds to be made available by the Commonwealth 
towards carrying out the functions of government in 
the Territory.
Finally...to report on any organizational aspects 
/“apparent from the_7 inquiries.
Clearly, this was far from being an orthodox exercise in
90. Buttsworth, op. cit., Introduction, p. 1.
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reorganization and reclassification. Such an investigation, 
although sometimes complex in detail, begins from a 
known position: the basic objectives of the organization 
under review, which in the case of a public service are 
the policies of the government. Prom that point, it 
provides, in consultation with those involved, a structure 
capable of achieving the set objectives. Finally, the 
investigation determines the categories of staff required 
for the structure agreed upon, setting their salaries in 
relation to similar position in the public service as a 
whole.
Such an exercise for the Provisional Administration 
posed major problems, however. V/ith the possible exception 
of labour policy, post-war plans were so vague as to give 
no clear guidance for the establishment of organizations 
and classifications. Moreover, the Australian government 
controlled no other colonial service of significance 
with which staffing in Papua New Guinea could be compared. 
This meant that the public service inquiry had two main 
alternatives open to it: either to propose short-term 
ameliorative measures, pending a full statement of plans 
and programmes by the government; or to assume certain 
parameters of policy within which a total organization 
could be established for the long run. In this respect 
the inquiry*s terms of reference were of limited use, 
owing to their ambiguity. A good deal depended, firstly, 
on the construction placed on the words **actual present
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requirements in sub-paragraph (1); if these were
interpreted as involving all recent policy considerations,
then the inquiry was faced with an enormous task beyond
the capacity of just two men. In addition, the reference
to finance in sub-paragraph (2) might possibly have
suggested that a certain level of funding had been approved
by the government, and that the public service was to
be established with this in mind. This was not the case,
however; Commonwealth Treasury was anxious to contain
spending in the Territory, but Colonel Murray1s intercession
with the Prime Minister later in 1947 secured further 
91increases.
In effect, the Buttsworth inquiry was being asked 
to deal with a set of variables far beyond the scope of 
a normal public service investigation, including structure, 
classification, objectives and finance. In order to 
reduce the task to manageable proportions, Buttsworth 
therefore assumed that funds should remain approximately 
at the level of the 1946/47 financial year and further 
determined that "actual present requirements” should 
be interpreted within this framework. Such a narrow 
view necessarily imposed severe limitations on the 
Provisional Administration's future activities. This 
approach had serious implications for Australian government 
policy and it is possible that the Department of External 
Territories endorsed, or even encouraged it, out of a
91. See Chapter Five, pp. 291-2.
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desire to curb the far-reaching ambitions of Murray and 
his staff.
The Provisional Administration had proceeded on a
set of assumptions completely different from those
implied by the Buttsworth inquiry's terms of reference.
The major departments had drawn up development plans
for presentation to the Administrator and the Advisory
Committee, and these involved, for such agencies as
Health, Education and Agriculture, massive expansions of
their activities to meet the goals suggested by the
92Minister's policy statements. It was therefore 
inevitable that the investigating team would clash with 
the Territory's senior officials.
Before leaving Australia, Buttsworth and Burns had 
little time to discuss their responsibilities with the 
authorities in Canberra, and there is no indication that 
they were specifically briefed on the likely impact of 
the government's proposed policy on the requirements of 
the Territory public service; the tenor of their findings 
suggests, on the contrary, that such factors were never 
considered. They made some effort to acquaint themselves 
with Papua New Guinea conditions, remaining for two 
months in the Territory. However, apart from a one-week 
tour of major centres in seven districts, they spent 
their time in Port Moresby, ' thereby receiving a restricted
92. These proposals are discussed later in this Chapter 
and in Chapters Seven and Eight.
93. Buttsworth, op. cit., Introduction, p. 1 and Section
2, pp. 1, 3» 5, 7 •
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view of a most complex situation. Indeed, Buttsworth 
appears to have enjoyed his temporary status, addressing 
his correspondence from ’’Re-classification Office,
QA
Government House, Port Moresby”. He and Burns later
visited the headquarters offices of the departments and
there investigated the proposals for reorganization and
reclassification that had already been prepared. During
the inquiry Buttsworth devoted himself to what Murray
later described as a ’’general critique” of the public
service, while Burns dealt with the details of
qc
reclassification.  ^ Buttsworth emerged as very much 
the dominant figure of the team, and he alone signed the 
final report.^
Conflict over the inquiry
After first reviewing written submissions from
departments, Buttsworth sought an interview with the 
Q7Administrator. It is clear from Buttsworth’s report 
that he had already encountered hostility from some 
officials and that he had also been drawn into the internal 
bickerings of the Port Moresby bureaucracy. He expressed 
concern that individual departments had drawn up their 
own proposals for expansion with only ’’certain broad 
functions” as a guide; and that their plans had not
94. Ibid., Section 2, p. 11b.
95. P.N.G.N.A. Box 168, item 1-9-3C, 18 February 1949.
96. Buttsworth, op. cit.. Conclusion.
97. Murray does not recall the interview (letter of
26 May 1969); Buttsworth’s account seems intended 
to place the Administrator in a poor light.
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been reviewed "by the Administration", by which he
presumably meant a co-ordinating group representing a
98broad view. In fact, this stage had not been reached 
by the time of Buttsworth*s arrival, and it is very 
likely that this criticism had been suggested to him by 
pre-war officers envious of the schemes of the new 
developmental departments. He revealed his entanglement 
in the internal rivalries of the public service when he 
professed to be particularly disturbed at the far-reaching 
proposals of the departments of Agriculture and Health, 
noting that "several heads of departments, while probably 
being competent in the specialised functions of their 
departments, did not possess a wide knowledge of the 
conditions and pecularities of the country and its
Q Qpopulation". He therefore recommended that their plans 
should be "closely examined by senior officers possessing 
such knowledge" and suggested that Jones and Melrose, in 
particular, should be given this duty.100 This was 
clearly a case of the old guard, having gained Buttsworthfs 
support, attempting to obstruct the plans of the newcomers. 
This was exactly the situation Murray wished to avoid 
and he maintained ingenuously that such men as Melrose 
and Jones could not be released for special projects of 
that kind.101 However, far more serious in Murray1s 
view was the fact that Buttsworth had not observed the
98. Buttsworth, op. cit., Appendix "A", p. 1.
99. Ibid. It does not seem to have occurred to Buttsworth 
that he was even less qualified to comment on such 
matters.
100. Ibid.
101. TETcT.
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proprieties, making personal criticisms of some of the 
Administration’s senior staff. f,He had,” he told 
Buttsworth, ”complete confidence in the Heads of the 
various Departments and it would he a reflection on his 
own intelligence if any unpracticable propositions of the 
’wild cat’ kind were to he promoted hy any of them. The 
plans should be regarded only in their broadest sense and 
would be varied as time went on in the light of 
experience.” There was now even less chance of the 
inquiry proceeding smoothly, since in identifying himself 
with the conservative group within the public service, 
Buttsworth had alienated the Administrator.
After reviewing the written departmental submissions 
and interviewing Murray, the inquiry team visited 
departments, where they further antagonized senior staff 
by questioning the functions they intended to carry out 
and making severe criticisms of their performance to 
that time. Several of the criticisms were vague and 
unsupported by relevant evidence: at one point the 
report seemed to question the need to provide health 
services and schooling as a general entitlement of the 
people of the Territory; it made disparaging references 
to a scheme to improve subsistence fishing; suggested 
that there was no need for specialist medical services; 
and castigated all organizations involved in the control
102. Ibid., p. 2
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of funds and stores. While there were obvious 
deficiencies of administration, the report gave a distorted 
impression of the actual situation, omitting any reference 
to problems of staffing and supply and making no direct 
acknowledgement of the rehabilitation priorities arising 
from the war. For the departments, however, the most 
irritating feature of the team's inquiry was the willingness 
of its members to report particular instances of what 
they considered to be inefficiency to the Administrator, 
including such things as the arrangements and costs for 
stevedoring at Madang, the security of war surplus stores 
at Lae, and the costing of sawmilling operations at 
Yalu.10^ In this respect Buttsworth, at least, seems to 
have taken it upon himself to conduct a grand inspection 
of the Provisional Administration and this had an adverse 
effect on his relations with most of its officers. He 
also showed a tendency to compare practices and 
organizations in Papua New Guinea with those in New South 
Wales, albeit inconsistently: on occasions he criticised 
such things as financial control and co-ordination 
because they did not resemble Australian methods; and 
at others claimed that departmental structures and the 
plans for agricultural staffing, for example, followed 
Australian precedents too closely. In general, the
conduct of the inquiry and the tone of the report were 
provocative, owing to Buttsworth's ignorance of, and
103. Ibid., Section 1, p. 2; "Agriculture", p. 2;
"Health", p. 7; Section 1, pp. 3-7.
104. Ibid., Section 2, Appendix "B", pp. 2-3; "Forests", p.
105. TTxlcT. , Section 1, p. 2, 4-6; "Agriculture", p. 2.
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insensitivity to, the complex issues that were involved. 
Buttsworth report
The Buttsworth report met a hostile reception at 
all levels of the Territory public service, and so marked 
a further stage in the deterioration of relations between 
Canberra and Port Moresby. It made one or two sound 
recommendations concerning changes in administrative 
structure, but these were eventually lost to sight in 
the storm of criticism levelled at its proposals for 
minimal salary increases and inadequate levels of 
departmental staffing. Buttsworth adopted, although 
without sufficient examination, a useful scheme put 
forward by the Department of District Services and 
Native Affairs for strengthening the executive and 
co-ordinating machinery of the Administration by the 
creation of a central Secretariat. This was to be headed 
by a Chief Secretary, as senior officer of the public 
service, and would include Secretaries for District 
Services and Native Affairs, Administration and Finance. 
There was nothing novel in the proposal, which was 
modelled on the purely structural aspects of the great 
majority of British colonial services. It promised to 
increase control and efficiency by bringing the key 
field personnel directly under the Administrator and his 
chief executive, thereby giving them a major role in
106. Ibid., Section 1, p. 3; Section 3, Appendix "A", 
pp. 1-2. The origin of the proposal is discussed 
later in this Chapter.
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the planning and co-ordination of development. At the
same time, the arrangement would he successful only if
officers received comprehensive training in the principles
107and techniques of colonial development.
Unfortunately, the Buttsworth report did not
acknowledge its debt to British precedent in recommeding
the Secretariat organization and made no reference to the
very considerable difference in personnel and environment
between the British and Australian colonial services.
The British concept of the Secretariat was based on two
major features which had not even been considered for the
Australian system: the Administrative Class, with all
that it implied in terms of education, training and
socialisation; and regular, planned interchange of
10Rpersonnel between the Secretariat and the field. While 
there was nothing sacrosanct about the Administrative 
Class concept, it at least provided its members with much 
of the background necessary for effective co-ordination at 
Secretariat level. The Buttsworth report, however, made 
no reference to the heavy training programme that would 
be required to fit the Papua New Guinea field staff for 
the more sophisticated role that would be required of them 
if the Secretariat system were adopted. Nor was there any 
explicit reference to the tensions between “specialists"
107. The actual training provisions through the School of 
Pacific Administration are outlined later in this 
Chapter.
108. A succinct statement of the Secretariat system appears 
in Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Empire and its 
Civil Service, Cambridge, C.tf.P., 1938, Ch. 10.
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and "generalists" that would need to be overcome under
the revised arrangement; the question of providing
additional experience for co-ordinating officers was
dealt with in a manner that typified the pre-war outlook
of the bureaucracy in both Australia and Papua New Guinea:
senior officials should have "thorough knowledge of the
Territory" and of the "policy aims of the Government" as
well as "practical knowledge and experience of public 
109finance". These were precisely the qualities to be 
found in an officer who had worked his way up the clerical 
grades of an Australian public service; and, not 
surprisingly, in a senior member of the Papua New Guinea 
field staff. Whether they were the qualities needed by 
the staff of a co-ordinating Secretariat based on British 
structures was a question not pursued in the report.
As it stood, the Buttsworth report placed the field 
staff in a potentially powerful position without providing 
them with the background needed to carry out their 
proposed functions effectively. Such qualities could be 
acquired only in the long term; in the meantime, the 
concentration of field staff of pre-war vintage in such 
a powerful body as the Secretariat could threaten the 
aspirations of the expanding departments of Agriculture, 
Education and Health. Such a possibility was made more
109. Buttsworth, Section 1, p. 2. The qualifications 
were listed for members of the Planning and 
Revising Council (see next page), who were in fact 
the Chief Secretary and his senior colleagues.
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likely by Buttsworth*s recommendation that a Planning
and Revising Council be set up to carry out close
110examinations of departmental proposals. The Council 
was presumably to perform some of the functions of an 
Executive Council, pending the establishment of that body 
by legislation, although the report did not say this. 
Buttsworth proposed that the Council comprise the Chief 
Secretary and his three Secretaries. Since the 
co-ordinating role had already been assigned to the 
Secretariat, the Council appeared to be redundant; its 
most significant effect would have been to strengthen 
even more the formal authority of the pre-war officers 
who were bound to dominate the Secretariat.
Buttsworth1s recommendations for re-organization
attracted little criticism from the specialist departments,
mainly because other aspects of the report drew their
immediate attention: its condemnation of existing practices,
its reduction of the staff establishments proposed by
departments and, most particularly, the low salary levels
it recommended for many positions. The salary question
was of first concern: basic rates had not been changed
since the pre-war period; it was almost eighteen months
since the Provisional Administration had been set up; and
the protest meeting by public servants in late 1946 had
111disclosed a serious state of unrest. The means of
110. Ibid., Section 1, pp. 2-3.
111. See pp. 328-31 of this Chapter.
364
getting salary scales, and the counter-arguments to the
Buttsworth recommendations, are too detailed to be
112examined in this study, but the principle followed
in the report1 s calculations should be noted, since it
set the trend of the future relationship between conditions
of service in the Commonwealth and Territory bureaucracies.
Salaries were based on the rate paid at equivalent levels
of the Commonwealth public service - with minor adjustments
to allow for such things as Australian child endowment
payments - plus two added factors, one a "tropical loading"
and the other a relatively small allowance for higher
113living costs in the Territory. In the absence of 
official data on post-war living costs, the inquiry refused 
to make substantial additions to Australian figures, even 
though a quick tour of Port Moresby shops would have shown 
that fresh food, in particular, was enormously more 
expensive than in Australia. The final recommendation 
was for a minimum salary of £372, compared with a minimum 
actual salary of £356 in the Commonwealth public service 
at that time - and the £300 minimum that had been set in 
the Territory of New G-uinea as long ago as 1922! No 
minimum salary for married officers was set and the payment 
of marriage allowance was discontinued.11 -^ So far as 
the investigating team was concerned, conditions for the 
Territory's public servants were simply an extension of 
those in Australia, with minor technical adjustments to 
take account of location.
112. An accurate and relatively objective summary is set 
out in P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 1, August 1947, pp. 33-5.
113. The main problem arose because calculations were
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Administration counter-proposals
The Buttsworth report was received in Port Moresby
in April 1947, but Colonel Murray refused to release its
contents to the public service because he considered
them to be unacceptable; instead, he advised the Minister,
"I called together my advisers, including all heads of
Departments, and directed that, making such use of the
Buttsworth report as they could, they produce for me in
the light of their long and specialised knowledge of
native administration, and the conditions of the Territory,
an organization and classification of the Public Service
which would, in their view, produce the maximum of 
115efficiency.11 Murray had no authority to determine the 
organization of his Administration nor the service 
conditions of his staff, but his action in presenting a 
counter-proposal was by no means quixotic: he was seeking 
Ministerial intervention against the bureaucracy in 
Canberra.
The counter-proposals to the Buttsworth recommendations 
were prepared in less than a month and sent to the
A A C
Minister on 24 May 1947. They occupied some 200 pages 
of typescript and ranged from a long and very detailed
(cont.) based on Commonwealth base salary levels, 
rather than on actual levels including cost of living 
adjustments.
114. See pp. 332-3 of this Chapter.
115. Un-referenced memoranda accompanying the Buttsworth 
counter-pronosals (see next page), 27 April and
24 May 1947^ .
116. Territory of Papua-New Guinea, Government House, 
Reports on the Buttsworth Report, Vols. 1 and 2,
Port Moresby, mimeo, 1947.
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submission from the rapidly-expanding Department of Public
Health to a brief statement on relatively minor matters
from the Department of Police; Murray sent them on with
his personal endorsement, including a special cover bearing
the inscription "Government House*'• The material was
prepared rather quickly and showed a lack of co-ordination,
thereby giving some force to one of Buttsworth's main
criticisms of the Provisional Administration. It also
revealed something of the differences in approach between
certain senior officers: Gunther seized the opportunity
to present an exhaustive case on behalf of the health
service, while Groves felt unable to submit Education
Department proposals "owing to the pressure of other
117duties...connected with the Mission conference". Each 
department was required by Murray to prepare a statement 
of its functions, accompanied in most cases by objections 
and adjustments to the Buttsworth proposals; from these, 
there could be no doubting the departmental reaction to 
the report. It was "not acceptable" to the Departments 
of the Government Secretary, Public Health and Public 
Works; contained "misstatements and misconceptions" 
and proposed "unsatisfactory and inadequate organization" 
in the opinion of the acting Director of Agriculture; 
and, according to the acting Director of District Services, 
revealed that the inquiry team were "out of their depth 
when dealing with the organization and special
117. Ibid., Vol. 1, "Education", pp. 1-2.
367
11 Rrequirements of a Colonial Service”. The acting
Treasurer pointed out, "Mr. Buttsworth has overlooked 
the fact that more than half of the Territory was 
devastated by war; whole towns have been wiped out and 
all records have been lost. All this is totally different
1  I Qto anything experienced in Australia." 17 The criticisms 
of the report also revealed something of the tensions 
within the Territory public service. Complaining that 
the inquiry team spent only two hours in his department 
before preparing their recommendations, the acting Chief 
Collector of Customs noted, "I now learn for the first 
time of factors which governed the report on this 
department. The Acting Director of District Services and 
the Acting Government Secretary made statements to the 
Classifying Officer on the needs of this department which 
were apparently accepted as authoritative, /“and on that 
basis 7 the Classifying Officer considers that my views 
on the needs of the department have been expressed
1 20without an adequate regard for economic organization."
The counter-proposals from the Administration demanded
an overall increase in the salary scales recommended by
the Buttsworth report. These were moderate, proposing a
minimum actual salary of £426, pending an investigation
121of living costs in the Territory. The proposals involved
118. Ibid., Vol. 1, "Government Secretary", p. 1; Vol. 2, 
"Public Health", p. 2; "Public Works", p. 1; 
"Agriculture", p. 1; Vol. 1, "District Services", p. 6.
119. Ibid., "Treasury", p. 1.
120. Ibid., Vol. 2, "Customs", p. 2.
121. The moderate nature of the proposals is apparent
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an increase of twenty per cent over the minimum scale 
proposed by Buttsworth, grading down to a 7.5 per cent 
increase at the top level (the Government Secretary) .
In giving first priority to salary increases, the counter­
proposals recognized the major problem confronting the 
public service at that time* They also gave high priority 
to increases in staff establishment, objecting in almost 
every case that the Buttsworth proposals represented 
severe reductions in the departments' original plans and 
left them unable to cope with the rapidly increasing 
demands upon them; as Gunther noted, "The approach of 
/“the investigators_7 was, in their interview, towards 
what was needed at present. This was explained to them 
and given to the best of our ability, and expansion was 
discussed. However, no real figures appeared to be
required by Messrs. Buttsworth and Burns for the greater
1 23expanded Service....". The acting Director of
Agriculture pointed out, "It will have to be realised
that this Territory will go ahead and that native pressure
is being brought to bear on the Administration for real
action so that a growing need for staff will be felt for 
1 24some time." This reaction from Cottrell-Dormer was
(cont.) from the fact that at the time the minimum 
actual salary for Commonwealth public servants working 
in the Territory was £476 (P.I.M., Vol. 18 Ho. 1, 
August 1947, p. 34.)
122. In forwarding the proposals to the Minister (letter of 
24 May 1947) Murray urged that senior officers' 
salaries be further increased; his department heads 
had set their salaries in relation to his own, and
he could see no reason why this relationship should 
be maintained.
123. Report on Buttsworth, op. cit., Vol. 2, "Health", 
Appendix 3, p. 1.
124. Ibid., Vol. 2, "Agriculture", p. 4.
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particularly mild, in view of the fact that his department’s
proposals had been termed ’’laughable” in the Buttsworth 
1 25report. Even the Department of District Services and 
Native Affairs, which had received relatively generous 
treatment, urged that additional establishment positions 
be provided.
Reaction to Buttsworth proposals
In their anxiety to press for increases in salaries
and staff establishments, most departments paid little
attention to Buttsworth's proposals for reorganizing the
public service; these were dealt with explicitly only
by the Director of District Services and the Government
Secretary. There were no objections in principle to
the proposed Secretariat; the main paper from J.H. Jones
confined itself to arguing for higher salaries for
field staff on the grounds that their responsibilites
would be increased upon the formal recognition of their
1 27co-ordinating role. However, Jones attached to his
submission a paper by C.J. Millar, one of the field 
staff who had travelled overseas immediately after the 
war. Millar drew on his observations of Nigerian
administration in pointing out that the Secretariat
125. Buttsworth, op. cit., Section 1, p. 1; ’’Agriculture”, 
p. 3.126. Report on Buttsworth, op. cit., Yol. 1, ’’District 
Services”, p. 2; Appendix ”B”.
127. Ibid., pp. 3-6.128. See Chapter Two, p. 107. The following passage is 
drawn from Ibid., Appendix ”A”, pp. 1-3.
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system involved regular, and preferably compulsory, 
transfer of staff between the Secretariat and the field. 
However, in referring to "Administrative Officers" in 
the British Colonial Services, Millar made no reference 
to the particular educational and sociological background 
of the Administrative Class, although he did emphasise 
the need for training officials of the New Guinea service.
In forwarding Millar*s paper, Jones drew no conclusions 
from the points it made. He, like his colleagues, seemed 
to view reorganization as entirely a matter of structural 
adjustment and made no reference to the special 
recruitment and training provisions needed to make the 
system effective. Lonergan, the acting Government 
Secretary, objected only to the proposals to include 
financial control within the Secretariat and to the 
establishment of a separate Planning and Revising Council. J 
He gave no reasons for preferring a separate Treasury, 
but in reference to the Council pointed out that "planning 
and co-ordination is a normal function of the 
Secretariat....".  ^^
The Provisional Administration thus provided the 
Canberra authorities with major problems in reconciling 
New Guinea demands for salaries and establishments with 
those recommended by the inquiry team, but with no serious 
objections to the reorganization proposals. Ironically, 
it was the salary and establishment provisions of the
129. Ibid., Vol. 1, "Government Secretary", p. 2.
130. Ibid.
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Buttsworth report that were finally adopted, while the 
Secretariat reorganization was never put into effect.
The reaction aginst the salary recommendations was so 
strong that it continued to draw attention away from the 
reorganization question. Since the two emerged as 
distinct questions, it is best to examine separately the 
later developments in each.
The Buttsworth report was eventually released to 
the Public Service Association in July 1947. There 
followed further protests to the Australian government 
until, in May 1948, some additional salary increases were 
approved, notably a "temporary" provision that married
A ^ 1officers would receive a minimum of £500 per year.
However, the concessions were considered unacceptable,
and on 10 June 1948 Papua New Guinea saw its first stop-
work meeting by public servants in Port Moresby, with
1 32"more than 250 officers" attending. Murray then called 
another meeting of department heads and advised the 
acting Minister, Mr. Chambers, that he was more than ever 
disturbed at conditions and morale in the public service, 
urging action particularly on salaries, superannuation 
and the creation of a public service Conciliation 
C o m m i s s i o n . Y e t  another "investigation" by an officer 
of the Department of External Territories was announced, 
and again in July the Minister approved a three-man
131. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 11, June 1948, p. 11.
132. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 162, item GH1-3-16, 11 June 1948.
133. Ibid., 17 May and 26 June 1948.
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committee of officials (two of them Commonwealth public
servants) to examine costs of living in the Territory.^ ^
This failed to mollify the Public Service Association,
which called further meetings to protest at delay and
confusion in announcing the findings of the various
inquiries, until at the end of the year the Minister
announced a second full-scale investigation into the
Papua New Guinea service, to be conducted on this occasion
by Mr. R.F. Archer, Commonwealth Public Service Inspector
1 35for New South Wales. Two years had thus passed since 
the Buttsworth inquiry began, while relations between 
Canberra and Port Moresby deteriorated even further. No 
Public Service Ordinance had been promulgated and all 
senior appointments continued on an acting basis only.
It would have been difficult, even by intentional 
sabotage, to have produced a situation more destructive 
of an organizations effectiveness.
In contrast to the dispute over salary scales, there 
was a remarkable level of agreement between the Canberra 
and Port Moresby authorities on Buttsworth's reorganization 
proposals. In May 1947, commenting on the report, Murray 
supported the establishment of a Secretariat, to include 
District Services as well as general co-ordinating 
functions, but opposed the incorporation of financial
134. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 12, July 1948, p. 28; Vol.
19 No. 1, August 1948, p. 10.
135. This inquiry also encountered several delays; it 
is discussed, in the context of the permanent 
Administration, later in this study.
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control, and responsibility for labour inspection, within 
a single organization; he favoured the retention of 
separate Departments of the Treasury and Native Labour. 
While Murray*s proposals were being drafted, the 
Department of External Territories was reaching similar 
conclusions, and Ministerial decisions on the Buttsworth 
recommendations reached Port Moresby in early June.1^
These gave formal approval for a Secretariat and agreed 
with Murray's view that a separate Treasury was required. 
The main difference was that the Department of External 
Territories saw no need for a separate Labour department, 
endorsing Buttsworth*s proposal for an Inspectorate only.  ^
To ensure that this edict was observed, Halligan's 
memorandum on the subject claimed that the Minister had 
given nspecific directions" that there was to be no 
"basic change" from the approved departmental structure. 
However, in view of Ward's commitment to reforming the 
Territory's employment system, it is unlikely that he 
would have approved, in specific terms, reducing the 
control of labour from departmental to "inspectorate" 
status. In any event, Murray objected to the
136. Memorandum of 24 May 1947 (see p. 365, footnote 115).
137. This and the following passage is drawn from CRS 
A518, item AJ852/6/11, 4 June 1947.
138. Control of labour had been a District Services 
function in the Mandated Territory, and this 
recommendation by Buttsworth was almost certainly in 
response to pressure from J.H. Jones and his staff. 
The matter is discussed further in Chapter Eight.
139. CRS A518, item AJ852/6/11 contains little useful 
information on discussions between the Minister and 
the Secretary on this point.
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incorporation of labour control in the Secretariat,1 -^0 
and the separate department was eventually allowed to 
remain.
The initial Ministerial approval for reorganization 
required Murray to report on progress made in establishing 
the Secretariat, but there is no further reference to
A A Aaction on the matter in the surviving files. 4 In 1952, 
following Murray's departure, Jones reported, "....I have 
been pressing for the replacement of the Departments of 
the Government Secretary and District Services and Native 
Affairs, by a Secretariat...for some years", but the new 
Administrator's Official Secretary noted in a position 
paper on the subject that the proposal had been "shelved": 
"Generally speaking the heads of Departments did not 
favour any alteration to the existing organization."1^
In this instance, the specialist departments prevailed 
against the influence of the field staff group, maintaining 
a considerable degree of freedom from centralised control. 
They may thus have succeeded in protecting their development 
programmes from further obstruction, but in the process 
blocked effective co-ordination of the Administration's 
work. This set the pattern of fragmented, compartmentalised
140. P.N.G.N.A. Box 210, item CA1/9/11, 10 September 1947.
141. CRS A518, item AJ852/6/11, 4 June 1947. Relevant 
papers may have been destroyed in the 1949 fire
in the Government Secretary's Department, although 
the following passage suggests that the matter was 
obstructed, and eventually lost sight of, in Port 
Moresby's numerous committees.
142. P.N.G.N.A. Box 245, item GH2-3-3, 29 September 1952.
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bureaucracy that has plagued Papua New Guinea to the 
i 43present day.
The Buttsworth inquiry may have met with greater 
success had it made provision for the review and 
implementation of its recommendations by a personnel 
authority within Papua New Guinea. It made no reference 
to such a need, however, and the Department of External 
Territories retained control of all staffing matters of 
consequence: establishment, salaries and general
conditions of service. Yet the Department was unable to 
deal with these questions effectively, owing to its own 
staff shortages and its remoteness from the Papua New 
Guinea situation. As unrest in the Territory public 
service increased, the Canberra authorities had even less 
chance of dealing with the complex problems which they 
had themselves largely created. It was not until a 
semi-autonomous Public Service Commissioner was appointed 
to the Territory in September 1949 that a semblance of 
order was introduced into the s i t u a t i o n . B y  that 
time, the public service had been demoralised by almost 
four years of unrelieved bungling.
Influence of junior staff
Murray appreciated, more than Buttsworth or the
143. The initial entrenchment of this system under 
Hasluck is outlined in Chapter Eleven.
144. Certain problems persisted, nevertheless; they are 
discussed in Chapter Eleven.
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majority of his own staff, the value of training and
encouraging junior officers. He was also accustomed to
recognizing younger men of ability in academic institutions
and saw nothing amiss in accepting, and even seeking,
policy suggestions from junior staff of the public service
whose ideas showed promise. Among these were G.C.
O ’Donnell, who had the unusual characteristic, for New
Guinea at least, of being a member of the Australian
Labor Party; C.J. Millar and D.M. Penbury, who had visited
Africa and the United Kingdom while members of Angau
and become interested in the co-operative movement and
local government councils, respectively; and J.R. Black,
one of James Taylor’s companions during his 1930*s
explorations of the Highlands who shared many of Taylor’s 
145ideas. O'Donnell and Penbury prepared papers on the 
implications of the War Damage Compensation Scheme, 
O'Donnell concentrating on the shorter-term problems of 
rehabilitations and the supply of goods and materials, 
and Penbury extending his inquiry to considerations of 
community development and area authorities. ^ Penbury's 
proposals, and those on co-operatives by Millar, are 
discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight. Por the present, 
the main interest in these proposals is that their 
acceptance by the Administrator marked a radical departure 
from accepted norms in a bureaucracy as hierarchical as
145. It is worth noting Gunther's view that Taylor was 
considered a "red ragger" by his colleagues. Gunther 
classfied J.H. Jones as "the opposite of Jim Taylor" 
(interview, 4 December 1968).
146. Gustaf O'Donnell, "Native Compensation", Monthly 
Notes, Vol. 1 No. 3, November 1946, p. 1 and No. 5,
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the Territory's. Moreover, through publication in South
Pacific, the Journal of the Australian School of Pacific
Administration, they began a public discussion of the
views of young officers that was unprecedented in Papua 
i 47New Guinea.
The most interesting short-term phenomenon was the
appointment of J.R. Black, a junior Assistant District
Officer of the former Mandated Territory service, as
acting Assistant Director of District Services and Native
Affairs in mid-1946, a position he held for just over
a year before his resignation from the service. In
that time he presented his views directly to the
Administrator on the policy and organization of the
1 4-8Provisional Administration. His proposals have two
main points of interest: in July 1946 he suggested the 
strengthening of the Secretariat and the co-ordinating 
role of the field staff, several months before these 
steps were recommended to the Buttsworth inquiry. And 
the fact that this proposal did not stem from a desire 
to limit change is shown by the uncompromising language 
he used to describe Australian colonialsim of the pre­
war vintage. "The New Guinea and Papuan Services,” he
(cont.) January, 1947, p. 3; D.M. Fenbury, The 
Barry Report Compensation Scheme, Port Moresby, 
typescript, 1947.147. As noted in Chapter One (pp. 50, 70), relatively 
junior field officers of the Papuan service wrote 
books about their experiences, but these had no 
effect on policy, which remained the concern of
Sir Hubert Murray's even more numerous publications.
148. J.R. Black, The Implementation of Policy in Papua- 
New Guinea, Port Moresby, typescript, 1946.
378
maintained, "...will have to shed the garments of
prejudice and irrational practice associated with the
era of exploitation in colonial administration with
all its concomitants of colour bar, racial discrimination,
racial inferiority and other notions that we have lately
accepted as essentially fascist in character.”  ^ Not
surprisingly, Black's appointment brought complaints
from other public servants accustomed to the principle
1 50of appointment on the basis of seniority:
Mr. J.R. Black was an obscure officer in the TNG 
services; but suddenly he was attributed with 
great tropical experience and administrative 
ability, and was appointed Assistant Director of 
District Services. As Public Servants, we cannot 
understand why, and we naturally resent it.
Black's views, and his presentation of them to the 
Administrator, went against all precedent, and it was 
indicative of the returning strength of orthodox forces 
within the service that before long both he and his 
mentor, James Taylor, left the Administration.
Murray still had high hopes of his junior staff.
Prom the time of his appointment to the School of 
Civil Affairs, he had placed special emphasis on training, 
as a means to increase awareness of changes in colonial 
administration and the demands of development. He 
believed that this role could be filled by the School
149. Ibid., Appendix A, p. 3.
150. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 12, July 1947, p. 72. The 
tortuous syntax of the last sentence, and the 
unconscious humour it contained, went unremarked 
by Pacific Islands Monthly editors.
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of Pacific Administration, even though the research and
planning function of the institution had been obstructed
1 5 1by Halligan and the Department of External Territories,
New appointees to the service were to be acquainted
with modern approaches to colonial affairs during
introductory courses at the School, while officers with
1 52pre-war experience would attend ’'refresher'’ courses.
This combination of training would, it was hoped, create 
a shared attitude towards development throughout the 
public service. Unfortunately, the first few years of 
the School's history as a training institution were 
scarcely happier than its efforts at research and planning.
The School retained many of its staff following 
its transfer from the control of the Army to the 
Department of External Territories early in 1946, and
1 5 5Murray kept up a correspondence with several of them.
He also visited the School whenever he was in Sydney
and on several occasions gave lectures to the students,
emphasising among other things the importance of the
1 5 4 -School in the schemes for New Guinea development. ^
His intention was that everyone appointed to the public 
service should attend the School: clerical and other 
staff posted to main centres taking an orientation course 
of a few days; and all field staff, including patrol 
officers, agriculture personnel, school teachers and
151. See Chapter Five, pp. 300-3.
152. Murray notes, pp. 58-60; Murray interview, 12 
December 1966.
153. P.N.G.N.A., Boxes 168-70, particularly items GH1-9-3C, H, K, M.
154. Monthly Notes. Vol. 1 No. 1, September 1946,
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medical assistants, receiving several weeks of 
i 55instruction. Mission workers were also invited to
attend, and a number were included in the early courses.
At the same time, the School staff were preparirg a 
two-year Diploma course which, it was intended, would be 
taken by officers of all departments with field 
responsibilities, qualifying them for appointmer.t to 
senior administrative positions. Provided that the Diploma 
was completed by a substantial number of officers within 
a reasonable length of time, it would provide tie 
sophistication and unity of approach to administration that 
was essential for the co-ordination of development in the 
Territory. There was never a serious suggestion that 
the Papua New Guinea field service should be staffed by 
graduates, but the effect of the School Diploma would 
have been to provide something of the educational 
background and experience shared by the senior officers 
of the British Colonial Service. It was initially intended 
that the School would teach at university standard and 
for this reason a largely academic staff, as opposed to 
a vocational training group, was recruited. Conlon had 
proposed that the School should establish a formal 
association with a university and that its courses should 
provide recognized tertiary qualifications, including 
such things as credit towards degree courses. 5 All of
(cont.) p. 2; No. 3, November 1946, p. 8. South 
Pacific, Vol. 2 No. 6, March 1948, p. 121.
155. This and the following passage is based on Murray 
notes, loc. cit. and interview of 12 December 1966.
156. The University of Queensland eventually granted 
credit for three Arts subjects to officers who 
completed the two-year Diploma course.
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this presupposed a certain degree of autonomy for the 
School, preferably through statutory recognition
Staff training and A.S.O.P.A.
The Australian School of Pacific Administration was
regarded with some suspicion by the Department of
External Territories, owing to the fact that it had its
roots in the Directorate of Research. With the
establishment of the School Council,1 the Principal
was made clearly responsible to the Secretary of the
Department and from that time there was no possibility of
the School’s achieving autonomy, despite regular
promptings from Conlon. This, in turn, was taken to
preclude any formal association with a university, for the
School was legally a mere section of a Commonwealth
1 58public service department. The School was permanently 
established by the Papua and New Guinea Act 1949, but its 
Council was given advisory functions only. The sole 
practical effect of the Act was to allow School staff to 
become permanent officers of the public service, but since 
this also tended to restrict their academic work, a 
number retained relative freedom as temporary employees, 
while others resigned.
The School also experienced difficulty in its relations
157. See Chapter Five, pp. 301-2.
158. It would have been possible to overcome this technical 
barrier, as in the case of the School of Public 
Health and Tropical Medicine, University of Sydney; it 
was allowed to remain because the Department wished to 
retain control of the School.
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with both the Department of External Territories and
some senior officers of the Provisional Administration,
J.R. Kerr, who had served as Assistant Director of Research,
assumed control of the School upon Colonel Murray1s
departure for New Guinea. Kerr visited Port Moresby in
September 1946 to outline his plans for training and to
hear the views of the departmental heads in the Territory 
159service. J Murray believed that Kerr was well received
and that he produced some "converts'1 among the senior
1 finofficers, notably Melrose and Bignold. However, Kerr
gained the impression that the ’’old hands" were generally
opposed to the School and still favoured the pre-war
1 fi imethod of learning by experience. Similar attitudes 
prevailed in the Canberra Department, where the lack of 
enthusiasm posed particular problems. At the time plans 
were being prepared for the establishment of a prestigious 
School of Pacific Studies within the proposed Australian 
National University. The School of Pacific Administration, 
lacking powerful support in academic and government 
circles, was handicapped by relatively low admission 
standards and its status as a public service instrumentality 
Kerr was further exasperated by his dealings with Halligan, 
which were influenced by the old antagonisms of the war 
years. In 1947 he submitted his resignation to the 
Minister in what he has termed a "two-page attack on
159. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, item GH7-5, 5 September 1946.
160. Ibid.
161. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969. The information in 
the remainder of the passage, including quotations, 
is drawn from this interview.
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Halligan”. "Ward nearly died,” Kerr recalls. Kerr 
withdrew his resignation at the request of the Minister, 
but declined to remain as Principal for longer than 
necessary and eventually set his departure date at 20 
August 1948.162
Conlon* s final appearance
Murray was not particularly close to Kerr, but was
impressed by his work at the School and concerned that
he might be succeeded by a nominee of Halligan who
163would not support New Guinea interests. After some 
debate among former members of the Directorate, it was 
decided that the most suitable candidate was Alfred 
Conlon; in August 1948, Murray wrote virtually offering 
him the position, although it was not within the
A £ . AAdministrators power to make the appointment. ^
Conlon, who was then attempting to complete his medical
studies, was somewhat reluctant, but cabled Murray, nWilling
1 65accept if required.”  ^ Conlon’s appointment as acting 
Principal of the School on 20 September 1948 marked his 
last period of formal association with New Guinea affairs 
and the final attempt by the Directorate group to re-assert 
its influence in a key area of Territory development.
The Council of the School would agree to Conlon*s 
engagement in an acting capacity only, and for a period
162. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, item GH7-2, 13 August 1948.
163. Murray interview, 12 December 1966.
164. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, loc. cit.
165. Ibid., 19 August 1948.
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of twelve months in the first instance.
Conlon's appointment was unwise, under the
circumstances. The stimulus of the wartime emergencies
had long faded and Conlon's haphazard methods of
administration were unsuited to the needs of a teaching
institution, particularly an insecure one under the control
of a sceptical public service department. Moreover,
Conlon's subordinate position under his old adversaries
in the Department of External Territories merely created
further resentment and distrust. Other tensions soon
appeared, this time between Conlon and the School staff,
who were less willing than they had been in the days of
the Directorate to tolerate his occasionally abrupt manner
1 ( ' t iand his blunt language. After a time Conlon withdrew 
from most contacts with his staff, until they virtually 
went on strike over a complex dispute that had its origins 
in the use of the School's library funds and books. Kerr 
was then called in to negotiate between the staff and the 
School Council, with Conlon eventually agreeing to
1 fc iP ileave. This episode marked the break-up of the 
Directorate group. Conlon returned to his medical studies 
and had little further involvement with New Guinea.
Murray's links with the School became weaker, while Kerr 
returned to the Bar. Most of the former School of Civil
166. Ibid., 20 September 1948.
167. The following passage is based on an interview with 
Mr. V.H. Parkinson, 16 September 1970.
168. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969»
1
385
Affairs staff left the School of Pacific Administration 
during the following two years, only McAuley and Parkinson 
staying for any time. Eventually C.D. Rowley, who had 
worked in the Army Education Service in New Guinea and 
later in the Commonwealth Office of Education, was appointed 
Principal and the School began a period of steady, if 
unspectacular, training for European public servants from 
the Territory. However, the early hopes of creating a 
major research and educational institution for the whole 
of the Pacific were ended, with the School remaining 
firmly under the control of the Department of External 
Territories.
Decline of A.S.O.P.A.
As the fortunes of A.S.O.P.A. declined, so did the 
hopes of Murray and the School staff that it would be 
capable of changing public service attitudes towards 
colonialism. The change from a centre of lively inquiry 
into New Guinea affairs towards an institution for public 
service training can be traced in the journal of the 
School. In its early years the journal featured articles 
by the School’s staff, papers by officers of the Provisional 
Administration, reprints of material on comparative 
colonial administration, and other items thought to be of 
interest in the Territory. For some ten years the journal 
was distributed widely throughout Papua New Guinea, 
performing a valuable service when the country’s communications 
were extremely poor. It was during this period that the
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articles by such field officers as D.M. Fenbury and G.C. 
O'Donnell, mentioned earlier in this Chapter, were 
brought to the attention of the public service in general. 
Participation of this kind soon decreased, however, partly 
because officers became more involved in routine work in 
the Territory and partly owing to the weakening of links 
between the Provisional Administration and the School: 
formal bureaucratic procedures supplanted the more open 
system of the immediate post-war period. Thus of 37 
articles contributed to the first volume of the Schools 
journal, fourteen were by serving officers of the Provisional 
Administration; but the third volume carried only two 
articles by Territory personnel, of a total of ten, while 
repflnts increased from seven in Volume 1 to twenty in 
Volume 3.169
The School was able to carry out much of its training
programme during the post-war years, despite the problems
it encountered, but it was unable to reach the standards
originally proposed and encompassed only a few of the
occupational groups in the Administration. In 1948, W.C.
Groves, the acting Director of Education, proposed that
the School should train school teachers for Papua New
Guinea and received strong support from Kerr, who agreed
that the maximum number of officers should receive the
170'‘highest standard tertiary education ". As in many 
other instances, however, there were long delays and it
169. Monthly Notes, Vol. 1; South Pacific, Vol. 3: Indexes.
170. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, item GH7-5, 28 January and 17 
February 1948.
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was another ten years before the first teacher education
171programme began. In the meantime, the School came
under attack for its relatively low entry standards, and
for the part played by its staff in defending Labor
policy. W.E.H. Stanner summed up these points in a general
172criticism of his former colleagues in 1947:
The staff of the School have taken part in a number 
of public controversies, and have explained and 
defended the course of policy in the Territories, 
and expounded the Commonwealth’s responsibilities and 
intentions. The degree of authority to be attached 
to such statements is not clear. An assiduous 
campaign has also been carried out on behalf of the 
School to have it incorporated with the National 
University at Canberra, although the status of its 
studies at present is well below undergraduate 
level, and its permanent staff, while being graduates, 
for the most part lack research or teaching 
experience in institutions of recognized standing, 
and have no personal experience as colonial 
administrators.
Territory public servants had similar doubts, particularly
concerning the political sympathies of the School staff
173and their lack of ’practical knowledge”. Nevertheless,
planning for the two-year Diploma course continued,
although there were problems in providing sufficient 
174students for it. The major developmental departments,
notably Health, Agriculture and Education, were staffed 
by officers who obtained qualifications at a higher 
educational level than that achieved by District Services 
field staff and they saw little need for additional
171. Several hundred teachers for primary and secondary 
schools were trained between 1958 and 1971.
172. Stanner, Reconstruction, op. cit., pp. 70-1.
173. This conclusion is based on personal association with 
field staff between 1955 and 1966.
174. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 186, item PD1/7-1, 1 August 1949.
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training. There was also a serious staff shortage in
the Territory and all departments were loath to release
officers for two years; even District Services, which had
most to gain from the course and eventually provided all
of its students, was unable to send officers in 1951,
owing to the tensions between Holland and Indonesia over
Dutch Hew Guinea. ' In the event, the Diploma course
became the preserve of District Services staff, gradually
evolving into an entirely academic study conducted by
177staff with little or no experience of New Guinea.
The problems and obstructions encountered by the
School of Pacific Administration nullified many of the
benefits it might have provided the Territory Administration.
There was no chance of its effecting a general change in
attitude among public servants, as Murray had first hoped.
Indeed, by 1949 he was arguing for the very survival of
the institution in its original form, urging that it be
kept open to all residents of Papua New Guinea and that
every appointee to the public service should take at least
one of its courses; he even went so far as to suggest
that much of the School's budget should be deducted from
the allocation to the Provisional Administration, if its
costs could not be met by the Department of External 
1 78Territories. By that time, however, the School had
173. The entry level for District Services staff was the
Victorian Leaving Certificate (i.e., sub-matriculation), 
although ex-servicemen were admitted with the 
Intermediate Certificate.
176. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, item GH7-2, undated 1951.
177. This course became a one-year "certificate" in 1956 
and ceased altogether in 1966.178. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item PD1/7-1, 16 July 1949.
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become increasingly remote from everyday New Guinea 
affairs and bad adapted itself to a minor quasi-academic 
role, aided in its survival by its location in Sydney: 
it offered an attractive break from the Territory for 
field staff selected to attend its "long courses".
The fading of the original hopes for the School of
Pacific Administration owed something to Halligan and his
Department, but Ward gave no help. Kerr has said that he
found great difficulty in gaining decisions from the
Minister, so that the Department was free to interpret
policy as it saw fit.^^ The staff of the School had the
same impression; when the Papua and New Guinea Act was
being drafted, Murray offered support for the School’s
campaign for statutory recognition, to which McAuley
replied, "The only point on which you might make
representations for us at present is on the major difficulty
1 80of getting the Minister to act at all." Even the
Department protested that it had been unsuccessful in
urging Ministerial action and this brought another of
Murray’s exhortatory letters to Ward, pointing out that
it was "essential to finalise details" of the School’s
1 81leadership and status. It was by no means the
atmosphere for introducing changes in policy and attitudes.
By the time the Papua and New Guinea Act established 
179* Kerr interview, 30 June 1969.
180. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, item GH7-5, 18 October 1949.The emphasis appears in the original.
181. Ibid., 22 October 1949.
390
a permanent Administration for the Territory in mid-1949,
much of the flexibility that had marked the public service
of 1946/47 had been replaced by orthodox procedures
emanating from the Department in Canberra and the pre-war
staff in Port Moresby, or by a general malaise caused by
the years of tension and insecurity during which staff
remained unsure of their appointments and conditions of
service. The concerns of the Territory1s public servants
had inevitably come to centre upon their own problems.
Murray was aware of this narrowing of vision and suggested
that there should be an interchange of staff between
Canberra and Port Moresby, and between Papua New G-uinea
officers and those of other colonial services, summing up
his major problem in introducing change: "The present
1 8?system has been alluded to...as 'in-breeding1." It 
was apparent that he could not hope for major innovations 
outside his own service; and even within it, mainly from 
junior officers like Penbury and Millar and from such 
senior post-war appointees as Gunther and Groves. These 
men were the dominant members of the planning committees, 
set up between 1946 and 1948, which produced recommendations 
for development programmes for the Territory. These 
programmes, together with the problems of putting them 
into effect, require further examination.
182. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item GH1/3/2, undated mid-1950
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Planning by committee
Several major programmes for development were 
introduced to Papua New Guinea during Colonel Murray's 
term as Administrator. They are considered in two 
groupings. Firstly, there are those programmes which 
aimed to provide benefits for the people of Papua New
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Guinea and affected European interests only indirectly. 
They include the extension of Administration control in 
relatively isolated areas, improvements in the fields 
of health and education, and the establishment of a 
form of local government. Secondly, there are programmes 
having a much greater influence on white settlers, 
notably plans for agricultural extension, for economic 
development in general and for the control of the labour 
force.
The clearest expression of the Provisional
Administration's approach to the development programmes
is contained in the reports of the Committees for
Social Development Planning, Native Welfare Planning,
and Economic Development, whose establishment as
advisory bodies to the Administrator was noted in the
2previous Chapter. It has also been pointed out that 
these committees were set up only after Murray had 
exhausted other planning sources in Australia. Thus the 
advisory bodies did not report until the latter half of 
1948, by which time their findings were influenced to 
a considerable degree by the events, delays and problems 
of the preceding years. Several of the major influences 
have been discussed: policy statements, and the 
difficulties of giving them concrete form; disruption 
caused by the war; tensions within the Territory and 
between Port Moresby and Canberra; and the consequent
1. The former grouping is considered in this Chapter 
and the latter in Chapter Eight.
2. See Chapter Six, pp. 334-9.3. See Chapter Five, pp. 281-9.
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difficulty of establishing a permanent administrative 
structure. Additional influences arose from the attempts 
by various departments to establish their own development 
programmes. These post-war efforts must be outlined, 
in order to place the recommendations of the Committees 
in perspective.
Two aspects of the work done by the departments of 
the Provisional Administration between 1945 and 1949 
must be considered. Firstly, essential details of 
departmental operations indicate the precedents which 
had either to be followed or changed by the committees 
that were seeking to establish co-ordinated programmes.^" 
Secondly, development proposals during the immediate 
post-war years disclosed differences of approach between 
key departments; in seeking to reconcile differing 
views, the planning committees attempted to overcome one
5of the Provisional Administration's greatest problems. 
Post-war finance
Three major factors determined the scale of
4. Accounts of the Provisional Administration’s intentions 
in the fields of social welfare and economic 
development have been published in the narrative 
accounts of the period. These include Mair, op. cit. 
(1948), Ch. 10; Stanner, Transition, op. cit., Part
I, Chs. 8-10; Legge, op. cit., Chs. 14-15'; Mander, 
op. cit., Gh. 4. Details already known are not 
repeated at length in this study.
5. The reports by the Provisional Administration's 
Committees were submitted to the Commonwealth Inter- 
Departmental Committee on New Guinea (see Chapter 
Five, pp. 257-9). The later operations of this
latter Committee are discussed in Chapters Nine and Ten.
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departmental operations and the plans for co-ordinated 
development: finance, personnel and the availability
of supplies. The Provisional Administration was provided 
with much more money than its predecessors, but remained 
restricted in its operations by shortages of staff and 
materials. The following table compares funding during 
the immediate pre-war years with the Provisional 
Administration period:
£ millions
Separate Territories
Year Papua New Guinea
Internal Grant Internal Grant Total
Revenue Revenue
1937-8 .140 .042 .506 Nil .690* *
1938-9 .123 .042 .461 Nil .627*
1939-40 .135 .042 .497 Nil .675*
Territory of Papua-New Guinea
Year Internal Revenue Grant Total
1946-7 .464 2.018 2.482
1947-8 .914 2.269 3.183
1948-9 1.233 3.197 4.430
* Discrepancies in additions are owing to rounding of 
figures and carry-over of surpluses from preceding 
financial years.** Complete figures for the 1940-41 financial year 
were not published, owing to the outbreak of the 
Pacific war.
Sources: Papua Annual Report, 1937-8 to 1939-40;
1946- 7 to 1948-9.New Guinea Annual Report, 1937-8 to 1939-40;
1947- 8 and 1948-9 (no separate Report for 
this Territory was published in 1946-7 and 
figures in the Papua report for that year 
give combined totals for the Territories).
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Two main features are apparent from the table. It was 
an indication of the debilitation of the Territory, 
and the problems facing its administration, that internal 
revenue in 1946-7 was so far below the pre-war level.
And the post-war increase in administrative activity 
clearly stemmed from the large increases in direct 
Commonwealth grants: during the first full year of the 
Provisional Administration these represented an increase 
of 4,500 per cent over the immediate pre-war figures, 
rising to a 7,000 per cent increase in 1948-9. Adjustments 
must be made to take account of wartime inflation, 
but on available figures this still gives a budget of 
£1.91 million, at 1940 values, for 1946-7 - a three-fold
7
increase on total pre-war annual expenditure. The 
budget for 1948-9 - £2.62 million at 1940 values6 78 -
6. Adjustments should normally take account of population 
trends, as well, but there is no clear information
on them for this period. It is extremely doubtful 
whether population increased in those areas having 
regular contact with the Administration, owing to 
the rigours of war, while in some regions, such as 
Bougainville, population declined dramatically (see 
Chapter Nine). Thus no adjustment has been made for 
this factor.
7. Again, no statistics on inflation in the Territory 
are available for this period. However, most goods 
were imported from Australia, where wartime inflation 
was officially calculated at 23 per cent (Commonwealth 
Yearbook, 1955, p. 252). The figure given here allows 
for Territory inflation of 30 per cent. Statistics 
are based on the retail price index for the period
in question. Since public service salaries, which 
made up much of the budget, increased at a much slower 
rate than the price index, a relatively higher 
proportion remained for spending in other areas, such 
as village welfare services and war damage compensation.
8. Inflation in Australia in the post-war has been 
officially calculated at 16 per cent (ibid.). An 
overall allowance of 50 per cent for the preceding 
decade has been made for the Territory.
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represents a 400 per cent increase in total expenditure, 
compared with 1939-40. Financial increases of this size 
presented opportunities for considerable expansion to 
those departments able to take advantage of them, as 
well as creating problems of adjustment for officials 
accustomed to the smaller scale of pre-war operations.
The allocation of finance among the main developmental 
departments gives an initial indication of the direction 
of the Provisional Administration's efforts. The 
following tables set out expenditure for the departments 
dealing primarily with the village people - District 
Services and Native Affairs, Public Health, Education, 
and Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries:
£ Australian
Department of District Services and 
Native Affairs
Year Salaries and 
Contingencies MiscellaneousServices
Total
1946-7 368,540 - 368,540
1947-8
Papua 179,679 —T.N.G. 357,111
536,790 536,790
1948-9
Papua 190,352 1,039 191,391T.N.G. 447,884 896 448,780
638,236 1,935 640,171
Total 1946 to 1949 - 1,545,501
Sources: P.A,,R. 1946-7 to 1948-9: N.G.A.R. 1946-7 to
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Department of
Year Salaries and 
Contingencies
1946-7 173,191
1947-8
Papua 31,340
T.N.G. 60,067
91,407
1948-9
Papua 45,055
T.N.G. 86.396
131,451
Total 1946 to
Department
Year Salaries and 
Contingencies
1946-7 36,695
1947-8
Papua 50,752
T.N.G. 52.256
103,008
1948-9
Papua
T.N.G.
65,287
81,950
147,237
Public Health
Miscellaneous
Services
Total
- 173,191
70,976
163,680
10 2 ,3 16
223,747
234,656 326,063
115,022
359.262
160,077
445.658
474,284 605,735
949 - 1,104,989
of Education
Miscellaneous
Services
Total
- 36,695
- 50,752
52.256
103,008
- 65,287
81,950
147,237
Total 1946 to 1949 286,940
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Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries
Year Salaries and Contingencies
Miscellaneous
Services
Total
1946-7 15,037 31,761 46,798
1947-8
Papua 12,799 30,987 43,786T.N.G. 19.434 28,347 47,781
32,233 59,334 91,567
1948-9
Papua 23,547 57,277 80,824T.N.G. 32,444 77.648 110,092
55,991
Total 1946 to 1949
134,925 
- 329,281
190,916
Expenditure under ”salaries and contingencies” was 
generally devoted to the internal functioning of the 
departments, while "miscellaneous services” were usually 
those provided for the community: for example, medical,
9hospital and hygiene services from the Health department.
Spending by these four departments accounted for an
average of 40 per cent of the Provisional Administration's 
10total budgets, and 48 per cent of recurring
11departmental expenditure in the period 1946 to 1949. 
Although there are no statistics on the proportion of 
departmental effort directed exclusively towards the 
village people, it was the intention of senior officials 
that villagers should receive the greatest post-war
9. See, for example, N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 117.
10. Excluding exceptional payments for disposals materials 
and village war damage compensation; the latter 
amounts, totalling £947,096 to 30 June 1949, went 
directly to the people.
11. That is, excluding charges for capital construction 
and maintenance.
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benefits, as indicated by the programmes outlined later
in this Chapter, Certainly, the Territory*s Europeans
believed that an excessive amount was being spent in 
1 2the villages, and some measure of their discontent
can be gauged from the fact that, compared with the large
share of the budgets allocated to the developmental
departments, only 3.2 per cent of expenditure between
1946 and 1949 was devoted to town reconstruction and
13the building of European accommodation. Europeans 
comprised a very small part of the total population, of 
course, but they had been accustomed to receiving a large 
share of available services. Thus it was the relative 
change in allocations that was most significant, and in 
this respect there was no doubt that the Provisional 
Administration was carrying out its stated intention of 
directing a substantial part of its resources towards 
benefiting the people of the country, rather than the 
white community.
Departmental expenditure
The statistics of departmental expenditure suggest
12. See Chapter Pour, pp. 219-20 and 223-7; settler 
opinion is examined further in Chapter Nine. A final 
comparison might also be noted. Between 1946 and 
1949 the four developmental departments spent 
£3,266,631, by far the greatest proportion in the 
rural areas. This compared with total budgets for 
all departments, in both Territories, between 1937 
and 1940, of £1,993,000.
13. The total amount was £143,972 - half the amount spent 
on education, and one-eighth of the health total.
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trends in the direction and effectiveness of development 
that are investigated in later sections of this Chapter. 
The tables on pages 396-8 show that, of the four major 
departments, District Services required the largest 
single allocation of funds to re-establish contact 
throughout the country and to perform a variety of agency 
functions on its outstations. By 1949, however, it had 
almost been overtaken in expenditure by the Health 
department, whose expansion was on a dramatic scale. In 
the field of agriculture there was a similar expansion, 
beginning from a smaller base. Education, by contrast, 
failed to sustain its growth rate, as shown in the 
following table of percentage increases in departmental 
budgets:
Year
1946-7
District Services Health Education Agriculture
to
1947-8 
1947-8
45 90 180 95
to
1948-9
20 90 43 108
A further measure of departmental performance for Health, 
Education and Agriculture can be calculated by comparing 
the amount of finance provided for services with that 
required for salaries and contingencies.1  ^ This ratio
14. See page 398 for these categories. This is only an
approximate measure, since a department's contribution 
to development cannot be judged only by tangible 
services it provided at a certain time; District 
Services, for example, relied on the personal 
administrative contributions of individual field staff 
in fostering change. Nevertheless, the ratios for 
the other departments reveal such wide variations 
that they suggest a basic difference in the effectiveness 
of their efforts in dealing with post-war problems.
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indicates, in broad terms, the degree to which the
community at large gained a direct return from each
1 Runit of internal departmental expenditure. In 1949 
the ratios for the three departments were:
Health - more than 3 to 1 
Education - ,25 to 1 
Agriculture - more than 2 to 1
Thus of the three indicators listed - total expenditure,
percentage annual increase and ratio of services
provided to internal spending - the Health department
showed the most consistent expansion; Agriculture
achieved notable gains; and Education lagged behind.
A fourth indicator, applicable only to Education and
Health, reveals a similar picture. Of the 1949 Education
budget, some 29 per cent was not spent by the department
1directly, but went in grants to missions for schooling.
The Health department, by comparison, set aside only 7
17per cent of its funds for mission aid; but this was
a proportion of a much larger budget, so that the gross
1 Bamount exceeded that for aid to mission education.
15. In the finance segment of reports, Education listed
spending under "salaries and contingencies” only, but 
provisions for services can be calculated from other 
tables (P.A.R.. 1948/49, p. 91; H.G.A.R.. 1948/49,p. 161). The amounts were - services: £22,968; 
salaries etc.: £83,844.
16. The actual amount was £43,205 out of the Department's 
total budget of £150,017 (jJaid.; the discrepancy between this and the main finance table noted on p. 
397 was not explained).
17. The actual amounts were - aid: £43,728; Department 
budget: £605,735.18. The grant-in-aid for health in 1948/49 was £43,728, 
and that for education was £43,205 (ibid.).
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Moreover, during 1948/49 the missions received a little
more than eleven shillings for each pound of their own
money spent on schooling, compared with £1-6-0 for
1Qevery £1 they allocated to health services. Here again, 
the Health department seemed relatively more effective 
than the Department of Education. Performance cannot be 
measured solely in terms of expenditure, but the big 
differences in the scale of operations by the departments 
require explanation. They can be partly attributed to 
some obvious factors, such as the medical facilities the 
Health department gained from Angau, but by 1949 the 
Provisional Administration had been functioning for almost 
four years and the continuing disparities between 
different kinds of development were a cause for concern.
In order to examine them more fully, it is first necessary 
to trace events from the end of the war.
District Services
During the immediate post-war years the largest 
single provisions of finance and staff, and the most 
urgent tasks of reconstruction, were allotted to the 
Department of District Services and Native Affairs. In 
each full year of the Provisional Administration, the 
Department spent more money, much of it in war damage 
compensation payments to villagers, than had been budgeted 
in the whole of the Mandated Territory and Papua in any
19. Ibid. In 1949 the missions spent £34,470 on health 
services and £76,092 on education.
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one year before the war. By 1949 the Department
employed 308 officers, twice the permanent staff of the
21Papua public service in 1940; with an approved 
establishment of 421 in 1949, District Services would
22have employed more staff had it been able to recruit them.
Its employment rate was relatively good, since it had
been able to recruit 73 per cent of its establishment at
that time, compared with a rate of 65 per cent for the
23public service as a whole. Nevertheless, the Department
faced great staffing difficulties, owing to the loss of
many New G-uinea officers during the war and the retirement
24of several senior Papuan officers between 1944 and 1946.
In 1949 District Services employed 211 field staff, only
40 per cent of whom possessed substantial experience;
25they were listed as:
20
Officers with pre-war experience 54
Officers with 4 to 6 years experience 30
(including service with Angau)
Officers with 3 to 4 years experience 58
Officers with 2 to 3 years experience 27
Officers with 1 to 2 years experience 23
Officers with 6 months to 1 year experience 19
Total 211
20. The amounts were - 1946-7: £1,028,081; 1947-8:
£825,821; 1948-9: £1,008,657 (P.A.R., 1946/47-
1948/49; N.G.A.R., 1946/47 - 1948/49). Compare 
these sums with those in the table on p. 394.
21. P.A.R., 1948/49, p. 46.
22. Ibid., p. 42.
23. Ibid., pp. 10, 46.
24. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 186, item PD1/4, 25 October 1949.
25. Ibid.
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Officers served a two-year Cadetship, during which,
according to the regulations, they were not permitted
26to lead patrols. Moreover, during the first four years 
of their service, they were intended to enter Restricted 
Areas only with patrols led by senior officers. Since 
approximately one-fifth of the Territory was then 
classified as Restricted, including almost the whole of 
the heavily-populated Highlands areas, the formal
27limitations on the deployment of staff were often ignored. 
Moreover, at a given time about 40 of the 84 senior field 
staff would be involved with office work at the various 
district headquarters and at Konedobu, or assigned to 
special duties, or on leave, so that the burden of contact 
and patrolling during the rehabilitation and reconstruction 
phases of post-war administration inevitably fell upon
the young, inexperienced and sometimes immature junior
28staff. Officers who in the pre-war years would not 
have been permitted to patrol ’solo” were occasionally 
placed in charge of outstations for months at a time.
26. Regulations governing field work were consolidated in 
Departmental Standing Instructions, Vol. 1: G-eneral 
Field Administration (Port Moresby, government Printer, 
1 9 6 2), which incorporated instructions issued since 
1945. The Restricted Areas concept was introduced
in the post-war period to control the movements of 
non-field staff and private citizens, notably 
missionaries, recruiters and traders. In "uncontrolled" 
areas a patrol might be liable to attack by the local 
population, while in areas "under influence" villagers 
were arrested for crimes. An area was "under control" 
when a police constable could effect an arrest without 
danger from attack; it was then "de-restricted".
27. Talks with Messrs. L.J. Doolan, B.B. Corrigan and 
W.W. Crelling between 1955 and 1960.
28. Some recruits were ex-servicemen and perhaps more mature 
than the 18-year-olds recruited in the 1950*s and *60*3.
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Under stable conditions the emergence of a new,
young group of field staff to relative prominence may have
produced salutary results by injecting new approaches
and attitudes into a vital sector of the public service.
It was with this intention that the School of Civil
Affairs had been established; and Murray has always been
of the opinion that field staff recruitment by Angau and
the Provisional Administration produced this general 
29effect. In the absence of a contemporary study of the 
post-war field service, it is difficult to reach definite 
conclusions about it nature, although the officers
themselves have few illusions about their role at that
30time. In a period of makeshift solutions to urgent 
problems, junior officers had few opportunities to form 
opinions about long-term policies; the reaction of many 
to the difficulties, delays and poor conditions of the 
period was to develop a deep and lasting cynicism. They 
rarely came into contact with a cross-section of their 
contemporaries, so that the senior officers under whom they 
worked in their first years of service had great influence 
on their attitudes. The senior men, too, were often 
cynical, if not reactionary, in their attitudes, helping 
to perpetuate ill-founded beliefs: about the behaviour 
of villagers, who were referred to by the majority of
29. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
30. The following passage is based on talks with numerous 
officers between 1955 and 1965, including Messrs. R.M. 
G-eelan, H.H. Jackman, J.G. Baker, G-. Smith and B.M. 
O'Neill, in addition to those listed in footnote 27; 
and on personal experience, in a similar situation,
a decade later than the period discussed here.
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field staff as "kanakas"; about missionaries, with 
whom almost every field officer was in a state of 
perpetual conflict; about the respective merits of the 
Territories of New Guinea and Papua; about the 
trustworthiness or otherwise of their populations; and 
about the methods, real and fancied, adopted by their 
pre-war field staffs. Such conditioning overwhelmed the 
fleeting impressions created by an introductory course at 
the School of Pacific Administration; and by the time 
officers returned to the School for the two-year Diploma 
course, attitudes had usually become too fixed to yield 
to academic entreaties for reform. Any changes in the 
approach to field administration in New Guinea could occur 
only slowly and as a result of evolving circumstances, 
rather than as a consequence of new personnel being 
introduced into the service.
Re-establishing contact: tensions and changes
Concerning one administrative method there was no
doubt: in contacting the people, field staff were to
follow the practice of "peaceful penetration", which had
been publicised to such effect by Sir Hubert Murray that
32his exact instructions were re-issued in 1947. It was
31. The word "native" was rarely used by field staff, and 
such terms as "coon" and "nig" mainly by settlers. 
"Boong" was not used after the war. In later years 
"oli" ("they"), another pidgin word, tended to replace 
"kanakas" among field staff and was itself supplanted 
by "locals" in the late 1960's.32. Department of District Services and Native Affairs, 
Circular Instruction No. 8 of 1947, 1 December 1947.
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expecting a good deal of inexperienced staff to use this
method, not only in newly-contacted areas, but also in
districts where the reaction to the Japanese occupation
was unknown; and in the extensive regions, such as the
hinterland of the New Guinea islands and the interior of
the Sepik, Madang and Morobe Districts, which had not been
visited by patrols for several years. It was remarkable,
in retrospect, that contact was re-established with
relative ease. Concerned mainly with restoring the status
quo in the districts, field staff in Papua reported from
the outset that conditions were rapidly returning to
normal. MIn many areas little rehabilitation has been
or is necessary...and those men who were away now wish
to settle down in their villages, build new houses and
restore the gardens.”^  In parts of New Guinea the war's
34effects were much more serious:
The war had caused serious loss to native life and property and it has been established that in some 
areas the native population has been reduced very 
considerably. The loss over the whole Territory is 
not yet known but reports indicate that there have 
been alarming decreases in certain areas with large 
populations.
Nevertheless, village society proved remarkably resilient, 
so that by 1948 the authorities in the Morobe District 
were able to report that "reconstruction of villages 
devastated by the war and the general rehabilitation of 
the people is now practically complete”. There was
33. P.A.R.. 1945/46, p. 13.
34. H.S.A.R.. 1946/47, p. 10. Clearly, the war devastated 
village society. This fact has so far been ignored
by writers who have celebrated Australian and allied 
"victories”.35. M.&.A.R.. 1947/48, p. 13.
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also dramatic progress in Bougainville, which Mas a whole
probably suffered more from the Japanese occupation and
consequent operations than any part of the Territory.
Rehabilitation has been so rapid that conditions now are
36almost back to normal.” The state of normalcy could be
construed very narrowly, however, and reports submitted
to the United Nations from Canberra sometimes presented
outdated and callous views of the people’s situation.
Referring to the depopulation of certain areas, one passage
noted that this would cause difficulties with the supply
of labour, which had posed problems ’’even under favourable 
37conditions” . This concern for old norms, in reports 
prepared by the Australian government for international 
scrutiny, provided direct contrast to the pious 
sentiments about social, economic and political benefits 
for the New Guinea people expressed in the same documents. 
Given this example, it was hardly surprising that many 
field officers developed or retained an air of cynicism.
Meanwhile, tensions between the field staff and the 
people were rarely far below the surface. Nor some months 
there was concern that discharged soldiers and former 
policemen would disrupt village life and ’’would be inclined
70
to take charge and foment strife”. It was later 
reported, almost with surprise, ’’Nothing like this has 
happened. On the contrary their return has done good.
36. Ibid., p. 14. See Chapter Nine for further details 
of the Bougainville situation.
37. N.&.A.R.. 1946/47, p. 10.
38. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 15.
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They have set an example in many villages with their
hygienic methods (sic) and general cleanliness. At
that time a little "strife” would have been a good thing,
in helping the Provisional Administration to achieve a
general, popular advancement in village conditions; but
even in the 19 4 5 /4 6 report, the last prepared wholly in
Port Moresby, there was an obvious conservatism. This
arose not only from the narrow outlook of many of the
staff, but also from a genuine nervousness about the
reception that the people would accord Europeans*
Throughout New Britain, for example, thousands of rifles
and other infantry weapons were collected from the
villagers, and as late as December 1948 tribal fighting
in the Morobe District ended with six of the combatants
killed by shots from Japanese rifles.^ During the same
month a former Assistant District Officer was killed by
villagers of inland New Britain when he attempted to
41recruit them for plantation work. These were no more
than isolated incidents, but they limited the application
of progressive policies. The 1947 annual report noted,
"Shortage of trained staff, changes of personnel due to
exigencies of war service, investigation and payment of
War Damage claims and pre-war wages as well as the
problems of rehabilitation have precluded any material
42advances in native administration."
39. Ibid.40. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 12 April 1946; 
N.&.A.R., 1948/49, p. 15.
41. N.G.A.R., 1948/49, loc. cit.
42. P.A.R., 1946/47, p. 14.
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Officers on patrol were aware, however, that distinct
changes in the people’s attitudes and aspirations had
4. *5occurred as a direct result of the war:
Possibly the greatest result of the war has been the 
vociferous and widespread demand for education 
generally, and, in particular, the reading and 
writing of English.
A new attitude towards their economic role seemed to be
44emerging among the people:
Generally speaking, natives do not show the same 
desire to work for Europeans as evinced before the 
war...Another outcome of the war, although it was 
manifest in a minor degree in the more sophisticated 
areas before 1942, is the desire of the natives to 
possess articles previously regarded as ’’European 
goods”. All District Officers have been instructed 
to assist natives to purchase vehicles and vessels 
from stocks held by the Commonwealth Disposals 
Commission in the Territory. It is interesting to 
note that some of the native-owned vehicles were 
hired to the Administration from time to time... 
assisting the Government at times when heavy demands 
were made on Administration transport.
Patronising though the reports might have been, they 
recognized the new interest in economic activity and 
pointed to the need for support in the establishment of
4(5both co-operative societies and individual enterprises; 
the extent and effectiveness of that support are 
discussed in the next Chapter. In addition, there was 
official recognition that much greater opportunities had 
to be provided for general participation in government, 
even if at a relatively low level in the first instance. 
These sentiments were borrowed mainly from the Directorate
43. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 13.
44. Ibid.
45. p X T R .. 1947/48, pp. 43, 46-8
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of Research, and particularly from such people as Hogbin 
and Mair, but they had a certain precedent in some 
pre-war administrative methods.
Local government
Most aspects of the establishment of local government
councils in Papua New Guinea have been discussed at
length by Dr. A.M. Healy in his thesis, Native Administration
46and Local Government in Papua 1880-1960. There is 
little point in repeating its details in this discussion, 
which is confined to the salient features of the local 
government programme.
Before World War 2, Village Councillors were elected
in a number of Papuan villages, while in the Gazelle
peninsula of New Britain an association of villages
47formed a council in 1937, All of these bodies were
referred to as "unofficial” councils, since they lacked
statutory recognition and powers, and their effectiveness
depended to a large extent upon the attitudes of field
48staff towards their merits as advisory bodies. During
the war certain Angau officers sought to develop a more
orderly system of consultation and the first post-war
49report for Papua recorded:
46. Ph. D. thesis, Australian National University,
Canberra, 1962. The title is misleading, since the 
study deals also with developments in the Territory 
of New Guinea.
47. Mair, op. cit., pp. 50-2, 56-7.48. Stanner, Transition, op, cit., p. 25; Legge, op. cit.,
49. E i i ? ? - ? 945/46, p. H .
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It was expected that the Councillors, freely 
elected by the people, would assist the village 
officials, especially in the difficult period of 
rehabilitation and readjustment. Arrangements 
were made for bi-yearly meetings of village 
officials and Councillors belonging to the same 
tribal group at which matters affecting natives 
in the area were discussed.
Between 1945 and 1948 regular reference was made to
"village councils", which in some cases were identified
50with the traditional meetings of clan elders; and to
"experimental village councils", which in the Madang
District were operating satisfactorily "in a purely
advisory capacity", and in New Ireland in such a way that
"the natives are expressing appreciation of their 
51value". The field staff recognized that post-war
policy was in favour of developing councils; the major
problems were to find a suitable model and to define the
relationship between councils and the field staff, who
v/ere accustomed to "direct" administration on a village-
52by-village basis.
Healy’s study of local government points out that an 
important influence on the establishment of formal or 
"official" councils was the work of Dr. Ian Hogbin, who
50. P.A.R., 1946/47, pp. 16-17, 19.
51. ti.G.A.R., 1947/48, pp. 13-14.52. The debate on "direct" and "indirect" methods of 
administration descended directly from Lugard's 
principles, variously interpreted, in his The Dual 
Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Edinburgh, 
Blackwood, 1922). The largely irrelevant concern 
for these principles in Papua has been noted in Mair, 
op. cit. (1948), pp. 44-5. In general, the method of 
"direct" administration was considered necessary in 
Papua, in the absence of traditional authorities to 
whom minor powers could be delegated by the 
Administration.
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had worked in the British Solomon Islands in the 1930's
and been impressed by the loosely-structured councils
53being established there. Hogbin proposed the adoption
of a similar system in Papua New Guinea, publishing his
. 54recommendations in 1946. It was still necessary to 
engage the interest of Territory field staff, and in
(T  Cthis respect a vital part was played by D.M. Fenbury. 5
In 1946 Fenbury, still a Captain in Angau, was
selected to gain further experience through travel
overseas. Upon his return to Australia, after visits
to East Africa and the United Kingdom, he was posted to
the School of Pacific Administration while awaiting
demobilisation. At about this time articles by G.C.
O'Donnell on the war damage compensation scheme, published
56in the School Monthly Notes. attracted the attention 
of the Administrator. Murray wrote to the acting 
Director of District Services that O'Donnell seemed to 
have "rather definite ideas on the matter. I should be 
very pleased if you would discuss the matter with him 
by letter at an early date and let me have some
53. Healy, op. cit., pp. 266-70.
54. H.I. Hogbin, "Local Government for New Guinea", 
Oceania, Vol. 17 No. 1, September 1946, p. 38.
55. Healy has not provided all the details of Fenbury's 
developing interest in local government, and so 
these are set out in the following pages. This 
episode also illustrates some of the points made
in earlier Chapters about Murray's relations with 
his staff and the attitudes of certain senior 
officers towards changes in policy. See also 
Chapter Six, pp. 375-8.
56. Vol. 1 No. 3, November 1946, p. 1; No. 5, January 
1947, p. 3.
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recommendations concerning it." In the meantime,
O'Donnell had returned to the Territory and the
correspondence found its way to Fenbury, who seized the
opportunity to propound the views on field administration
and local government which he had developed during his 
, 58overseas tour.
Fenbury's main contention was that the compensation
scheme could not fulfil the Barry Committee's intentions
of restoring village life and improving general welfare
because it was based on a European concept of individual 
59cash payments. These placed an unwarranted burden on 
field staff, who had many other tasks requiring urgent 
attention; were open to abuse through false claims; and 
were being wasted, owing to high prices for the few 
goods available. "The logical inference," stated Fenbury, 
"is that the methods of payment must be reconsidered."
It was of vital importance to build up the communal 
element in village life, which he considered to be "fast 
disappearing". Fenbury considered that the only suitable 
remedy would be the establishment of co-operative
60enterprises, "native treasuries" and "native authorities".
He made a number of specific recommendations concerning 
the method and direction of payment for war damage and 
sent his report direct to Government House. Murray then
57. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 805, item 6/150, undated mid-1947.
58. His report, ibid., is dated 3 December 1947.
59. The following passage, including quotations, is 
drawn from ibid.
60. Fenbury was still using African terms at the time.
57
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referred the proposals to his advisory committee on
Native Development and Welfare, supporting them in
principle and requesting action on a key recommendation
of the Fenbury report: where no compensation payments
had yet been made, the Administrator proposed, attempts
should be made to have them credited to "tribal
treasuries" operating through the Commonwealth Savings
61Bank, with the District Officer as trustee. He 
recommended that selected field staff be specifically 
allocated to war damage compensation work and the 
developments to be associated with it, arguing that such 
specialisation of effort could eventually reduce the 
total effort required from District Services.
Murray's attitude towards village councils was 
already well known, for he had instituted conferences 
of councillors from the villages near Port Moresby in
ip1946. As a representative or advisory body the
gathering had only symbolic importance, since the full
group totalled only 107 councillors from 22 villages,
of whom about two-thirds attended each meeting. Since
the gathering occasionally took place on the G-overnment
House lawn, and was sometimes followed by afternoon tea,
63it was viewed with scorn or horror by most Europeans.
61. P.N.G.N.A. Box 805, item 6/150, 30 January 1948.
62. The following passage is based on P.N.G-.N.A. Box 
163, item G-H1-4-4, which contains minutes of the 
meetings.63. A major shock came when on one occasion Murray told 
the Director of Public Works to stand when addressing 
the gathering of councillors (P.I,M., Vol. 16
No. 9, April 1946, p. 11).
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This may help to account for the unfavourable reaction 
to the proposals made by Penbury and the Administrator 
when they were considered by the Committee on Native 
Development and Welfare. In reporting to Murray, the 
committee's chairman, J.H. Jones, stated that the express 
intentions of the Barry Committee were being carried out 
"as far as present circumstances and facilities make 
possible" and that there could be no major changes in 
the compensation scheme, since it had been adopted by 
the Australian government.  ^ He further believed that 
the people had become familiar with the scheme and that 
changes might have "undesirable repercussions" among 
them. While agreeing that certain of the details of 
Penbury's proposals were practicable, Jones argued that 
their broader implications, involving local authorities, 
were not "officially directly linked with War Damage 
payments" and therefore not "directly related" to them.
The Penbury proposals were half-formed and too 
sweeping for the immediate circumstances, but it is 
significant that they were dismissed in such an offhanded 
manner by Jones. In this respect, and in invoking 
"adopted" procedures, he behaved in a similar manner to 
the Canberra authorities when they stifled the
66development of research functions in Australia. In
64. The following passage, including quotations, is
further based on P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item GH1-4-4,
2 April 1948.
65. See Chapter Pive, pp. 284-9»
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each instance, proposals for change were rejected for
shallow, formalistic reasons in a manner that would serve
as a model for bureaucratic obstructionism. Even more
important for the future of local government, and for the
fate of other new schemes proposed during this period,
was the prominence of Jones in the deliberations of the
major committees, in addition to his very considerable
influence as administrative head of the field service.
G-unther, who served on many of the Provisional
Administration's committees, has contended that Jones
worked actively against many of the recommended programmes,
66abetted by Lonergan at the Government Secretary's office. 
Using his apparent expertise in New Guinea affairs, Jones, 
in Gunther's words, "got to" the Administrator before 
committee reports were presented. Evidence later in this 
study shows that Murray did not change his basic views 
on development, but that he faced major problems in 
having new programmes put into effect.
That this situation placed severe limitations on 
the development of local government is made clear in
67Healy's study. Penbury was posted to Rabaul as Senior 
Native Authorities Officer in 1948, building on the 
foundation of the pre-war "unofficial" councils of the
66. Gunther's views (from an interview of 4 December 
1968) are self-interested to a degree, but supported 
by written evidence noted here and later in this 
study and by the observations of W. Grainger and 
H.I. Hogbin (interviews, 12 and 21 December 1973).
67. The following passage is based on Healy, op. cit., 
pp. 309-49 and 351-60.
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G-azelle Peninsula. However, he faced strong and sometimes 
bitter opposition from certain of his colleagues, both 
at Konedobu and in the field, and it was not until 1955 
that the policy of extending local government v/herever 
possible was accepted by senior field staff, and then 
only after considerable prompting from higher authorities. 
In the meantime, the first councils to be established 
were not always set up on the merits of the situation; 
only two of the first four were near Rabaul; another, 
at Hanuabada (which bordered Konedobu), was largely a 
show-piece; and the fourth, at Baluan near Manus Island, 
was intended to counter the influence of a "cult” led 
by Paliau Maloat. Penbury fought a continuing battle
68. For an outline of the development of local government 
see Jinks, op. cit., pp. 112-7. Much of the contemporary material is contained in P.N.G.N.A.
Boxes 316 and 317 in the old GA series (Civil 
Affairs, i.e., Government Secretary) of files in 
the sequences 35/5 and 35/6, which in some cases 
contain additional information to that investigated 
by Healy in District Services records. The material 
on the reaction to, and treatment of, leaders such 
as Paliau is particularly interesting, although 
much too detailed to be dealt with in this study;
I am presently using it in a separate investigation 
of self-help movements in Papua New Guinea. One 
facet of the Paliau situation, however, brings out 
clearly the basic difference in approach between 
Murray and the field staff. Paliau was eventually 
imprisoned, and upon his release the acting Director 
of District Services, I.P. Champion, recommended that 
he be deported to another area for a year (Box 317, 
item CA35/6/38, 12 September 1950). Murray, who had 
been uneasy for some time at Paliau's treatment, 
directed on the contrary that he should be conducted 
on a tour of selected parts of the Territory to 
increase his awareness of developments and "to give 
him a clear understanding of the useful part he can 
play in the gradual evolution of the indigenous 
people of the Territory" (ibid., 19 September 1950). 
This was anathema to the field staff, and the records 
indicate that they did not observe the spirit of 
Murray's instructions.
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with his superiors in District Services headquarters 
and eventually left the field in disgust in 1956. To 
some extent Fenbury's problems - and, consequently, those 
of local government - were of his own making, for he 
was fluent, blunt, self-confident and sometimes 
vitriolic. Healy has underestimated this factor, but 
it was far from being the most important in accounting 
for the opposition to local government. The basic 
difficulty arose from the reluctance of the field staff 
to share power with the village people.
Village courts
Similar opposition was directed towards another
programme, in which Fenbury again played a key role -
69the institution of a village courts system. The
intention was to increase village participation, as in
the case of local government, by establishing a method
of settling disputes using traditional practices as a
foundation. Under the system of acephalous control and
kinship found in most parts of Papua New G-uinea, decisions
had been reached traditionally after open debate among
adult members of the clan, with leaders who had acquired
authority through personal skills and qualities seeking
70to exert their influence. Certain matters concerning 
such things as ritual observances were often settled in
69. The following passage is based on Healy, op. cit.,
pp. 279-36.
70. For a brief account of traditional decision-making, 
see Jinks, op. cit., pp. 8-16.
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secret by gatherings of leaders and elders. There was
a clear link between activities of this kind and the
deliberations of representative bodies such as local
government councils, and Fenbury considered that village
courts should be set up simultaneously, in order to
complement them. One of his main arguments was that many
disputes were, and would continue to be, settled among the
people themselves and not by reference to courts patterned
on Western law. It was better that this situation be
recognized and brought within the framework of government
than continue in a clandestine and, in the strict sense,
illegal way. The position was officially admitted in
711949, when the New Guinea annual report stated:
There are no judicial tribunals exclusively composed 
of indigenous inhabitants recognized as a part of 
the judiciary system of the Territory. Village 
Courts do exist, however, but they are not mentioned 
in the laws of the Territory. They are given no 
statutory authority but only the authority of local 
Native law and custom.
The report noted that the Papua and New Guinea Bill 
included provision for the establishment of formal village
$» 7 pcourts as well as local government authorities. This 
situation had come about following approval of the court 
scheme, and also of a re-drafted local government 
proposal, by the Committee on Native Development and 
Welfare. On that occasion Jones had succumbed to the 
pressure of his colleagues, but the village court scheme
71. N.G.A.R.. 194-8/49, p. 24.72. Ibid.
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was then criticised by the Chief Justice, Mr. Beaumont
Phillips. He and Penbury were utterly lacking in
sympathy for each other's reasoning and a bitter struggle
on the issue continued until 1956, when the scheme was
75finally vetoed by Hasluck.  ^ As a consequence, Papua 
Hew Guinea established what Penbury considered to be 
only a partial local government system, owing to the 
narrow Western views of legal and political processes 
held by the senior authorities of the period. It was not 
until the formation of the first National Coalition 
government in 1972 that formal approval for a village 
courts system was finally granted.
Field staff attitudes
The Penbury proposals for an integrated system of 
councils and village courts threatened the foundations 
upon which the work of the field officers rested: an 
effective monopoly of administrative, police and 
magisterial authority in their areas. Along with this 
power went a heavy responsibility for the maintenance of 
"control" in the villages, as well as for the introduction 
of appropriate development programmes. But owing to 
the restricted nature of pre-war experience and the 
limitations placed upon the School of Pacific Administration, 
field staff lacked the training in community development
75. Healy, op. cit., p. 291.
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and extension methods which would allow them to operate 
on the "basis of popular participation rather than 
direction - and, frequently, coercion. They were also 
imbued with the notion that villagers were generally 
incapable of responsible spontaneous action. Moreover, 
in the immediate post-war years they were faced with 
enormous tasks, so that there was little sympathy for 
time-consuming administrative methods based on voluntary 
participation and delegation of responsibility, such as 
the extension of local government. Thus for reasons which 
can be understood, if not supported, the great majority 
of field staff resisted immediate changes in their 
functions on the pragmatic grounds that they could achieve 
greater results in the immediate future - the period most 
affecting their career prospects - by following accepted 
methods of ‘’direct'1 administration. This attitude 
among the field staff, expressed with the authority of 
experience through Jones, their Director, became a most 
important factor governing the deliberations and 
conclusions of the special advisory committees responsible 
for recommending programmes of development to the 
Administrator.
Public health
In comparison with the Department of District Services 
and Native Affairs, the health authorities possessed a 
major advantage. Unlike the multi-functional
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responsibilities of the field staff, the duties of the 
medical service were relatively specialised, being 
directed towards fairly clear objectives determined by 
the expertise and ethics of their senior professional 
staff. The main aims were to prevent disease wherever 
possible and to treat it where it could not be prevented, 
with special campaigns against major problems: malaria, 
tuberculosis, leprosy and yaws, in particular^
Acceptance of these objectives led directly to the 
creation of a large but relatively uncomplicated 
department structure, with Divisions of Medical Services, 
Medical Education and Hygiene, together with specialists
75in malariology, leprology, venereology and tuberculosis. 
Gunther's initial plans, submitted to the Buttsworth 
inquiry, called for a staff establishment of 511* but by 
1949 only 288 of these positions had been created; they
rjrcomprised some 16 per cent of the public service. The
Department was able to achieve one of the best employment
rates in the public service by filling 211 of these jobs,
accounting for 76 per cent of establishment, at 30 June
1949.^ Of these staff, 93 were European Medical
Assistants with some training, and 40 were qualified
nurses: a total no greater than that employed by Angau,
78for a considerably smaller area, four years previously.
74. N.Gr.A.R.. 1946/47, p. 26.75. Report on Buttsworth. o p. cit., Vol. 2, ’’Health”,
T ab1e 1 .
76. N.G.A.r !, 1948/49, pp. 101-2.
77. Ibid., p. 17.
78. Ibid.; Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 160. There 
were many Papua New Guinean staff, but they were not 
classified as public servants and had relatively 
little training.
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The recruitment of physicians and surgeons was the greatest 
70problem.'-^ Only eleven were employed in 1947 and
ROeighteen in 1949, although this, at least, represented
81an improvement on wartime services.
The Health department faced equal difficulties in 
acquiring sufficient buildings and supplies. By late 
1946 only the Port Moresby hospital was in a fit state 
to be re-occupied and at all other centres every 
building was of temporary construction, while many of 
the drugs and other medical supplies purchased from the 
Disposals Commission had deteriorated or proved
Q Ounsuitable for civilian use. G-unther thus proposed 
a massive building programme, costing many millions of 
pounds, to provide the most basic essentials of an 
effective health service.8  ^ Minimum requirements by 
1952 required the construction of three base hospitals 
with a total of 1,005 beds, sixteen sub-base hospitals 
with 5,600 beds and over one hundred outstation or 
"native" hospitals. Proposals on this scale - the
79. U.G-.A.R., 1946/47, p. 25.80. N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 146; P.A.R., 1948/49, p. 79.
81. This is not the impression given in Stanner 
(Transition, op. cit., p. 160), the only published 
account containing a range of statistics on Angau 
health services. He suggests that Angau employed 
50 doctors at its peak strength, which would have 
given a remarkable ratio of professional to support 
staff, since only 115 medical assistants were then 
in the service (see Chapter Two, p. 106 for 
details). However, Angau1s Report (op. cit., p.44) 
states that ten doctors were serving with the Unit 
in mid-1944. Stanner may have confused Angau 
medical officers with those serving the whole military 
establishment in the Territory.
82. P.A.R., 1945/46, pp. 27-8.
85. Report on Buttsworth, op. cit., Vol. 2, "Health", Introduction.
84. Ibid., p. 5.
425
total for base and sub-base hospital construction alone 
was £4 million at 1946 prices - proved incredible to 
Buttsworth, who made only basic provisions for the 
department, on the grounds that future patterns of finance 
were u n c l e a r . The public health service was eventually 
granted staff and finance greatly exceeding the pre-war 
scale, but it could not operate at the level envisaged 
by its Director until the mid-1950’s.
In addition to clear objectives, the medical service
also had certain foundations upon which to build its
post-war programme. Of the relatively few services
provided before the war, health had received most attention
and it has been noted that Angau increased medical
treatments, often for its large labour force but also
86in a number of the villages under its control. In 
addition, the ’’miracle” drugs that had come into full 
use during the war were available to treat the people 
of New G-uinea. The sulfa drugs, penicillin and the early 
antibiotics, and the anti-malarials succeeding atebrine, 
notably Paludrine and the chloroquin group, wrought a 
revolution in health care, particularly for people in 
the tropics; diseases which had been virtually incurable 
among people living under village conditions, notably 
yaws, dysentry and the venereal infections, had become 
relatively easy to treat, and all within a space of six 
years. It was as well that the revolution occurred, for
85. See Chapter Six, pp. 354-60.
86. See Chapter Two, pp. 106-7.
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war conditions had caused a serious decline in the health
of the people. There were two main causes for this:
poor nutrition, housing and hygiene among evacuees and
those villagers deprived of adult male labour; and the
spread of infection resulting from the influx of troops
and the increased mobility of certain sections of the
village community. During the war dysentry and malaria
were introduced to the Highlands and such imported
diseases as measles, chicken pox and mumps, all potentially
lethal to a people with no resistance to them, became
87endemic over large areas of the country. '
Dr. J.T. Gunther
Much of the credit for dealing with the massive 
health problem must go to Dr. G-unther, who exhibited a 
singleness of purpose that was largely lacking in other 
sectors of the Provisional Administration. Gunther 
took direct action at any level and in any location 
where this was possible, using his European Medical 
Assistants much in the way that District Services relied 
upon its field staff, to re-build on the outstations
and to contact the people through a programme of regular
88patrolling. This led to inevitable clashes with the 
field staff over spheres of jurisdiction and the 
allocation of scarce resources; and marked the beginning
87. P.A.R.. 1946/47, pp. 28-30.
88. This and the following passage are based on an 
interview with Dr. Gunther, 4 December 1968.
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of Gunther’s antipathy for the relatively untrained but 
apparently omnipotent Patrol Officer. Nevertheless, the 
Director’s methods produced results. Prom what Stanner 
has termed the ’’calamity” resulting from the withdrawal 
of Angau medical staff, the Department of Public Health by 194 
had extended the wartime level of services throughout 
the Territory, operating 54 hospitals and 100 clinics 
and village aid posts, with 265 wards and 9,047 beds; and
treating 134,989 non-European patients, or some 15 per cent
89of the enumerated population. J
In pursuing the medical programme, Gunther and his
staff either set or extended important precedents in the
recruitment and training of staff. The Territory of New
Guinea retained the pre-war system of appointing medical
tul tuls in the villages, but with little or no training
they were ’’not expected to provide attention for other
90than the most minor ailments”. In addition, a number
of medical orderlies had gained on-the-job experience
in the hospitals of both Territories, but little formal
91training had been available. Operating from this 
base, the health service began a vastly increased training 
programme in 1946 and within three years had set up 
five Medical and Hygiene Training Schools with a total 
enrolment of 426 students. In addition, Papua New
89. P.A.R., 1948/49, p. 79; H.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 147.
90. N.G.A.R., 1946/47, p. 26.
91. Mair, op. cit. (1948), pp. 176-7.
92. N.G.A.R.. 1948/49, p. 69.
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Guinean students had begun practitioners' courses at
the Medical School in Suva, Fiji; and planning was in
progress for setting up the Papuan Medical College. y
By 1949 the Health department employed 961 non-European
staff with technical qualifications suited to the positions 
94they occupied. The shortage of doctors continued, 
however. In seeking a solution to this problem Gunther 
freed his department from Australian practices by appointing 
"D.P. doctors", as they were called.
Migrant doctors
Under the Australian immigration programme all non-
British arrivals, regardless of qualifications or
experience, were required to undertake two years of
assigned work. Professional people wishing to practice
were then required to qualify according to Australian
standards, and particularly to show proficiency in English
commensurate with the profession they wished to re-enter.
When it became clear to Gunther that there was no
possibility of recruiting sufficient doctors from
Australia, he proposed that carefully-selected European
practitioners be allowed to begin work immediately in
the Territory; that is, that the period of assigned work
and the English proficiency test at Australian standards
95be waived for those considered suitable. The first
93. Ibid.
94. P.A.R.. 1948/49, p. 79; N.G.A.R.. 1948/49, p. 147.
95. Department of the Public Service Commissioner, file 
A5/3/2/1, 22 December 1948.
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approach was made in 1948 to the Commonwealth Department
96of Immigration, which initially refused permission.
A request was then made directly to the Minister for
Immigration, A.A. Calwell, who gave his approval early
in 1949; Gunther took a direct part in these negotiations
97and he achieved the results he desired. Within the
next few months he further demonstrated his effectiveness
in handling such issues. By April 1949 he was in regular
contact with the head of the Australian medical service
at the Military Mission in Cologne, seeking information
on refugee doctors, and in the same month interviewed
98applicants from among migrants already in Australia.
As a consequence, twelve doctors began work in the 
Territory early in 1950, after completing a special
9cintroductory course at the School of Pacific Administration.
By 1952 the Administration employed 48 physicians and
surgeons, an increase of 250 per cent in three years.
Clearly, this was the kind of innovative scheme required
for New Guinea, although it was not without opposition
101in both Australia and the Territory. As Murray later 
observed, "Dr, Gunther arranged accession of great
96. Ibid., 30 March 1949. Murray has referred to the 
Australian desire "to protect...the vested interests 
of the locally qualified practitioners" (Murray 
notes, p. 83).
97. Murray notes, p. 84; Gunther interview, 4 December1 9 6 8 .
98. Department of the Public Service Commissioner, file 
A5/3/2/1, 26 and 30 April 1949.
99. P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 5, December 1949, p. 8; No. 8, 
March 1950, p. 21.
100. P.A.R., 1951/52, p. 129; N.G.A.R.. 1951/52, p. 84.
101. Por scathing white criticism in New Guinea, see P.I.M., 
Vol. 20 No. 5, December 1949, p. 8. The appointments 
were also depicted as a blow to the Medical Association 
in Australia - see C.P.D., Vol. 205, p. 2184 for Calwell*s views on the matter.
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strength by the acceptance, for the territory's requirements,
of many European immigrants to Australia with full
medical qualifications who were refused registration
for purposes of practising in Australia. The services
of these doctors were of incalculable value in the many
102districts of the territory in which they served." The
health programme was well on the way to achieving its 
objectives.
Education: a broad base
The introduction of an effective education programme
posed greater problems. The most serious of these was
the lack of a base from which to work. In pre-war
Papua, for example, all schooling had been conducted by
the missions, which received a few thousand pounds each
103year in grants from the Territory's administration.
The Mandated Territory possessed six Administration 
schools for New Guineans, but no subsidies were paid to 
the German-dominated missions, whose relations with the 
authorities were usually tense. Owing to the lack of 
finance and trained staff in both Territories, instruction 
was at a low level, with only the Administration schools 
in New Guinea and the better mission schools providing 
even a minimum level of competence in English, the only 
language ever considered by the Administrations to be
102. Murray notes, p. 83.
103. The following passage is based on Mair, op. cit.
(1948), pp. 161-73 and Stanner, Transition, op. cit., 
pp. 30-1 and 40-2.
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a suitable medium of official communication. The effect
was to deny Papua New Guineans access to any but the
lowliest positions in government, business or the
church. At the outbreak of World V/ar 2 the education
system, if it could be so termed, virtually collapsed,
with only a small number of missionaries able to continue
rudimentary teaching in the areas least affected by the
war. However, Angau required semi-skilled workers to
maintain its large establishment, and in 1944 set up a
training school at Sogeri, in the ranges above Port
Moresby. The school produced a number of partially-
trained tradesmen, who were to prove invaluable in the
reconstruction phase of the post-war years. It also
established the precedent of direct official involvement
in the education of Papuans and on this account drew
105complaints from the missions. However, the government's 
limited capacity in this field was apparent from the 
fact that the first Sogeri headmaster was a missionary.
The education planners had only the broadest of
government aims to guide them. For example, Mr. Ward's
second reading speech on the Papua-New Guinea Provisional
1 nAdministration Bill in mid-1945 had merely stated:
104. There were exceptions, such as Father Yangeke of the 
Catholic mission and Rev. Ambo of the Anglican 
mission, as well as some Papuan medical trainess, 
but they were so few in number as to prove the rule. 
For examples of white reaction to such training, see 
Jinks, Biskup, Nelson (eds.), op. cit., pp. 132-6.
105. For details of the mission attitude towards 
government schooling, see P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 1, 
August 1944, pp. 10-11.
106. C.P.D., Vol. 183, p. 4054, 4 July 1945.
432
It will be the aim to improve the health of the natives 
generally and by education to improve their conditions 
and the standard of living. In the past much of the 
education of the natives has been in the hands of 
the missionaries. Our plans provide for a vigorous 
programme of education in its broadest sense 
controlled and directed by the Administration. This 
does not mean that the Missions will be excluded 
from that field. They have performed valuable 
services in the past and can continue to do so within 
the framework of the educational programme that is 
being developed.
The annual report for 1946 was scarcely more specific
when it quoted with approval the recommendations of
107international experts:
The broad principles upon which native education will 
be developed are those enunciated by the British 
Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, 
namely, that -
Education should be adapted to the mentality, 
aptitudes, occupations and traditions of the various 
peoples, conserving as far as possible all sound 
and healthy elements in the fabric of their social 
life, adapting them where necessary to changed 
circumstances and progressive ideas, as an agent 
of natural growth and evolution.
The sentiments were very much those of the new Director
108of Education for the Territory, Mr. W.C. Groves.
Groves had in 1936 produced the definitive paper on
education in the Mandated Territory, arguing against the
use of government schools as producers of European-
oriented skills in people who were expected to move away
10Pfrom their own culture. He headed one part of his
107. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 21. later annual reports, all reviewed in Canberra, carried no such comparative 
references.108. For details of Groves’ career, see Chapter Six, 
pp. 344-5.109. W.C. Groves, Native Education and Culture Contact 
in New Guinea, Melbourne, M.U.P., 1936.
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study "The Concept of Nativization in Education” and
110expressed certain of his views in emotive terms:
....the need is urgent to arrest the racial rot; 
to prevent further tragic disintegration and 
malaise; to repair the damage of the past. Efforts 
must be made to restore a just racial pride...and 
to provide_a new form of social security which will 
preserve /“the 7 native spirit. It is worth 
preserving: iT is the people’s own.
G-roves proposed the introduction of as many traditional 
skills as possible into school curricula, and co-operation 
with agricultural authorities in efforts to improve and 
expand gardening techniques; he took a total view of 
education, as something inextricably woven into culture 
and life. It was a principle with which no informed 
person could reasonably argue. Unfortunately, the practical 
situation in which G-roves found himself in 1946 saw 
people - in the village and the European community 
alike - more interested in short-term results than 
general principles. The education programme encountered 
difficulties from the outset.
The Groves strategy, like most proposals for the
development of autochthonous structures, could not be
easily expressed in clear objectives that were acceptable
to the major colonial interests. While a senior public
servant or businessman might agree that education should
111suit the cultural needs of the people, he was in
110. Ibid., p. 61 .
111. Only a small minority of Europeans agreed with this 
approach; see, for example, P .1.M., Vol. 18 No. 4, 
November 1947, pp. 68-9; No. 10, May 1948, pp. 
28-30; Vol. 19 No. 1, August 1948, pp. 5-6, 8.
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fact more interested in employing Papua New Guineans 
literate in English and acquainted with Western 
bureaucracy or commerce. The culturally valid education 
system Groves recommended was unlikely to create 
enthusiasm among either Europeans seeking employees 
or villagers who saw white education as the key to the 
acquisition of material wealth. The Groves proposals 
included the introduction of traditional art, handicrafts, 
dancing and even modified forms of ritual observance, as 
aids in teaching from the ’’known to the unknown”; this 
might have been pedagogically sound, but it was not 
what the community as a whole wanted.
There were, in addition, greater problems in setting
objectives for the education programme than for the
health plan. The Education department had to provide
different schooling for the white, Asian and village
communities in the Territory, as well as make special
provisions for the missions, whose pre-war dominance of
education had been more obvious than in the provision
112of health services. The complexity of these factors
was apparent from the five-year education plan presented
by Groves to a conference of missionaries and senior
1 1 ^officials held at Port Moresby in October 1946.  ^ The
112. The health and education authorities' dealings with 
the missions are outlined later in this Chapter.
113. The material in the following passage, including 
quotations, is based on records of the conference, 
P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 12 October 1946.
An outline can also be found in Stanner, Transition. 
op. cit.. pp. 152-8.
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missions were promised, and later received, greatly
increased aid, with none-too-stringent checks on their
performance. In return, Groves proposed, the ’’philosophic
basis of Trusteeship” should govern education, rather
than the specifically Christian doctrine of the pre-war
years. He then stated that the Administration would in
any case be extremely flexible in its interpretation of
the conditions applying to mission education. The
Education department’s goals for its own schools were
not entirely clear. G-roves announced that four different
kinds of institutions would be recognized or established:
village schools, teaching in the venacular and conducted
mainly (in the event, entirely) by missions; village
higher-grade schools giving instruction in elementary
English at general primary level; areaachools, conducting
upper-level primary classes in English, using European
teachers and providing the key to subsequent educational
attainment; and secondary schools offering general and
114technical education in separate streams. Yet even some
of these proposals were tentative: Groves emphasised that 
the education programme would develop slowly, since there 
was ’’practically no existing foundation of establishment 
or organization in which to base a properly conceived 
plan”. Under the circumstances, the Education department's
114. An additional level of schooling was subsequently 
introduced by dividing the highest category into 
central and higher-training schools. Later again, 
an orthodox pattern of primary and secondary schools 
emerged. The missions eventually conducted an 
education system that, above village school level, 
was virtually parallel to the Administration’s.
4 3 6
accomplishment in presenting a programme at such an 
early date may have appeared impressive, but it fact it 
drew heavily upon a source that was barely acknowledged.
The Wedgewood proposals
In August 1944 Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable
Camilla Wedgewood completed a preliminary study of the
post-war education needs of Papua New Guinea, following
a tour of parts of the islands as a member of the
1 1 ^Directorate of Research. She proposed, among other
things, that a conference of all missionaries be called
"at an early date" to discuss and comment upon her long-
range, thirty-year plan for educational development in
the Territory, with particular emphasis on its first
segment, which would constitute a five-year plan covering
the immediate future. The main objective of
Wedgewood1s long-range plan was the establishment of a
five-level school system at village, area, intermediate
and technical school standard, with training colleges
117constituting the final stage. The main difference 
between her proposals and the programme later submitted by 
the Department of Education was the clear distinction that 
Wedgewood made between those institutions - notably
115. C.H. Wedgewood, Some Problems of Native Education 
in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea and Papua, 
Canberra (?), typescript, 1944. This is one or the 
few remaining, accessible records of the Directorate 
of Research (see Chapter Two, pp. 118-9, 131-5).
116. Ibid., p. 20.
117. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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intermediate schools - intended to prepare students for
higher education; and others, designated ’’area schools”,
designed for pupils possessing ’neither the ability nor
the inclination to proceed to the education given in the
11 ftIntermediate Schools”. Her basic approach to education
differed little from that propounded by Groves in 1936,
but it was expressed in dispassionate terms that gave a
clearer indication of the objectives to be set for each
kind of school. Thus the aim of technical schools ’’should
be not primarily to train skilled employees for the white
man, but to prepare natives who will be capable of using
what they learn, either as private individuals or as
Government servants, to educate their fellow-villagers
and to raise the standard of life in the villages” .^^^
She was unimpressed by the pre-war efforts of the missions
and suggested as a long-range goal ’’the establishment of
Government village schools in sufficient numbers to enable
every native child to attend school without being
1 20dependent upon any mission school”. Missions should
be free to conduct schools at their own expense, but
subsidies should be phased out within the period of the
first five-year plan and the schools taken over by the
Administration in cases where they could not continue to
function without aid; Wedgewood even appended an
extract from the Education (Scotland) Act 1918 as a legislative
1 21example of the manner in which this could be accomplished.
118. Ibid., p. 2.
119. Ibid.120. Ibid., Introduction.
121. Ibid., pp. 5-9, 17, 21-2.
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Miss Wedgewood’s study went on to consider matters
of education policy for Europeans and for mixed-blood
and Chinese children; teacher education; finance for
both official and mission schools; and the recruitment
of suitably qualified teachers for service in New
Guinea. She observed that recruits from Australia would
require additional training in order to appreciate the
needs of education in the colonies. There was an ironic
1 22corollary to this argument:
....it is essential that the Director of Education 
should be a man of wide experience in this field...
I would suggest therefore that the Commonwealth 
Government should ask the British Colonial Office... 
to recommend one of its experienced officers... 
able to come out to New Guinea for a period of 5 
years...This, perhaps¿5 the most urgent thing that 
needs to be done, for until such a man is appointed... 
it will not be advisable to do anything more than 
to make temporary arrangements for...carrying on 
the existing village schools.
The reason for her concern at the Director’s appointment 
was made clear in her most prophetic statement: ’’The 
fate of Native education in New Guinea for the next 
fifty years depends upon the planning done during the 
next five."
Groves’ problems
Soon after his appointment as 
admitted to a group of officers at
Director, Groves 
the School of Pacific
122. Ibid., p. 16.
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Administration that "immediate pressures would call for
the extension of the system of schools at present in
the Territory. This system...would he definitely limited
to pressing demands and could not he allowed to sidestep
the basic principle of adaptation to the natives' needs,
1 23even if so desired by the natives themselves." The 
Department of Education faced a dilemma. It could pursue 
an orthodox schooling programme that was likely to produce 
early results and thereby gain popular acceptance; but 
which would, in the process, create undesirable 
precedents. Alternatively, it could set long-term goals 
based on sound principles; but these were unpopular 
with both the European and village communities, who were 
concerned primarily with the immediate benefits they 
might gain from the education system. Wavering between 
these two aims, the education programme achieved neither; 
it produced only modest results during the period of 
the Provisional Administration, without demonstrating the 
capacity to achieve the long-term goals proposed by 
Groves. The department's main difficulties arose from 
the lack of administrative expertise among its senior 
professional staff. For example, the department failed 
to make detailed recommendations for its staff 
establishment to either the Buttsworth investigation or 
in the counter-proposals sent to Canberra, owing to the 
Director's involvement with the mission conference of
123. Monthly Notes. Vol. 1 Do. 1, September 1946, p. 10
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1 24October 1946; clearly, the education authorities
had not established their priorities correctly.
As a consequence, the initial Buttsworth proposals
provided an Education department establishment of only
106 positions, or less than seven percent of the total
public service; and the department was able to fill only
32 of these by 30 June 1947.12  ^ Following further
submissions, the department’s establishment was increased
to 171 by 1949» or almost ten per cent of the service,
with 96 position filled; this still represented an
unsatisfactory employment rate of 56 per cent, compared
with the public service average of 65 per cent. The
department faced many difficulties in recruiting teachers,
partly because Groves did not wish to follow the Mandated
Territory practice of employing teachers on secondment
from Australia. Rather, he sought staff with special
training to meet New Guinea conditions. A cadetship
scheme was therefore instituted in conjunction with the
School of Pacific Administration and Sydney Teacher’s 
1 27College, but there was a delay of several years before 
it began to operate effectively. The training programme 
had beneficial effects in the long term, but it involved 
a time lag, even after training commenced, that made it 
impossible for the Education department to effect a rapid 
increase in schooling through such measures. Thus by
124. See Chapter Six, p. 366.
125. N.G.A.R., 1946/47, p. 14.126. N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 17.127. Ibid., p. 85.
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1949 there were 39 schools teaching 3,232 Papua New
Guinean pupils: an unimpressive total when it is noted
that there were 13 schools for European, Asian and
mised-blood children, with 660 students. Moreover,
the latter schools absorbed a disproportionate amount
of the department’s most skilled personnel, employing 24
European teachers, compared with the six Europeans teaching
129m  village schools. This problem was caused partly 
by factors, such as the tradition of segregated education, 
beyond the department’s control; but it should have 
suggested to the education authorities that special 
efforts - perhaps an in-service training programme for 
teachers recruited from Australia - would have to be made 
to redress the balance.
A degree of imbalance was evident in other areas of 
the education programme. Of the five schools functioning 
in Papua in mid-1949, four were within a few miles of 
Port Moresby, while in the Territory of New Guinea 21 
schools, of a total of 34, were in the New Britain
1 ^ 0District, with five in New Ireland and two in Manus.
This left only six schools to cater for the villages of 
the entire New Guinea mainland: five in the Sepik 
District and one at Madang. Eight of the sixteen districts 
of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea were without
128. P.A.R.. 1948/49, p. 89; K.G.A.R.. 1948/49, p. 157.129. Ibid. There were, in addition, 97 Papua New 
Guineans teaching their own people.
130. The statistics in this and the following passage are 
drawn from P.A.R., ibid, and N.G.A.R., ibid., pp. 157-8.
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government schools, almost four years after the re­
establishment of civil administration; and in one case - 
at Chimbu in the heavily-populated Highlands region - 
a pre-war school had not been re-opened by 1949. Part of 
this difficulty arose from the allocation of staff. Of 
the 96 officers employed by the department in 1949, only 
30 were teaching; by comparison, 175 of the 211
Europeans in the Department of Public Health were working 
1 ^ 1in hospitals.
Even when allowance is made for the difficulties 
which faced the Department of Education in 1946, it must 
be concluded that its performance during the next few 
years was disappointing. This had important effects on 
the internal functioning and public image of the Provisional 
Administration as a whole. The education programme, 
more than any other, propounded a distinct alternative 
to the notion of European cultural dominance that had 
provided the foundation for all pre-war efforts and 
attitudes. Had the department been able to establish 
more schools in the short term, while still publicising 
its long-term strategy, it could have played a major role 
in modifying the views of the senior pre-war officers, 
such as Jones and lonergan, who tended to dominate the
131. P.A.R., ibid, and pp. 10, 79; N.G.A.R., ibid., and 
p. 147. These represented some 31 and 83 per cent 
of staff, respectively. Even when allowance is 
made for the fact that some personnel in hospitals 
performed purely administrative functions, the 
difference is still very great. The disparity for 
Papua New Guinean staff was even larger (ibid.) .
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major advisory groups to the Administrator. Instead,
the impression grew that Groves and his associates
valued the lengthy planning and discussion sessions of
the various committees for their own sake. "G-roves
loved debating,” says Gunther, who sat on numerous
committees with him. "He had two committees running -
Welfare and Social Development. They each met once a
week and the meetings would go on for hours. The trouble
1 32was that Groves was not 'getting on with it1."
Reconstruction Training Scheme
It was perhaps fortunate that there was a second 
programme operating during the post-war period, conducted 
in conjunction with the Department of Education and the 
missions. This was the Commonwealth Reconstruction 
Training Scheme, an extension of the work carried out in 
Australia by the Commonwealth Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction and funded separately through the 
Australian budget. A Deputy Director was appointed by 
the Commonwealth department for service in the Papua New 
Guinea region and a committee of senior representatives, 
including Colonel Murray, was set up. ^  Unlike the 
Provisional Administration's advisory committees, the 
reconstruction training group had its own executive officer
132. Interview with Dr. Gunther, 4 December 1968.
133. The records of the committee are at P.N.G.N.A.
Box 187, item PD8/7, July 1946 onwards. A summary 
of the Scheme is set out in Stanner, Transition, 
op. cit., pp. 158-60.
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and substantial finance, with relatively little 
supervision from the authorities in Australia. This 
allowed the Deputy Director to give a wide interpretation 
to the terms of reconstruction training, and so the 
Scheme was opened to virtually any Papua New G-uinean under 
the age of 25 who had been affected by the war. The main 
emphasis was on technical training and trade skills, 
although provision was also made for a category of 
"scholastic" training, which was intended primarily for 
those wishing to take up teaching as a career. By 1949 
nine training centres with almost 600 students had been 
established by the Administration; and 32 centres with 
1,722 students by the missions.1^  Almost 1,000 students 
were in "scholastic" classes and the remaining 1,300 
were undertaking trade training in such areas as 
carpentry, vehicle maintenance, plumbing and printing.
As in all other fields, reconstruction training 
faced problems of staffing and accommodation, but the 
major difficulty was in creating interest among Papua New 
Guineans, who often found the wages paid by general 
employers more attractive than the living allowances paid 
to trainees: by the end of 1949, 489 trainees had 
completed courses, but during the preceding three years 
1,227 had cancelled their traineeships. Moreover, 
although there was provision for assistance to tradesmen
134. This and the following passage are based on P.A.R., 
1948/49, p. 91 and N.G.A.R., 1948/49. p. 160.
135. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 187, item PD8/7, 16 November 1949.
445
in setting up their own enterprises, few were established 
on a permanent basis: as the Administration, missions 
and commercial interests increased their own capacities, 
and the disposals materials acquired by villagers 
deteriorated, semi-skilled tradesmen found it increasingly 
difficult to function independently. The white 
domination of the Territory economy and work force thus 
re-asserted itself. J Nevertheless, the Reconstruction 
Training Scheme made an important contribution to 
rebuilding New G-uinea, by adding substantially to the 
semi-skilled labour available from the pre-war period 
and by training teachers for the education expansion that 
began in the mid-1950's.^ ^
Missions: the 1946 conference
The development of health, education and training 
programmes after World War 2 was aided in varying 
degrees by the Christian missions operating in Papua New 
Guinea. In Papua relations between missions and 
administration had been generally good and all except 
the Roman Catholic orders had agreed to observe spheres 
of influence throughout the Territory. No such agreement 
had existed for the Mandated Territory, where relations
136. By the mid-1950fs there were virtually no Papua New 
G-uineans conducting enterprises on their own 
account, owing largely to the fact that the resurgent 
Western-oriented approach to development made it 
almost impossible for people with only traditional 
assets, such as usufructory land, to raise capital.
137. For statistics on school expansion, see Jinks, 
op. cit., p. 107.
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with the administration had often been strained. However,
certain events during the war years, notably Angau’s
move into the field of education and the Australian
government’s failure to re-appoint Mr. Leonard Murray as
Administrator, met with disapproval from the formerly
co-operative Papuan missions.  ^ It was therefore essential
for the Provisional Administration to restore mission
confidence without delay. The process began with the
labour conference of 1944, which was followed by a brief
meeting in Sydney in June 1946 and a major conference in
1 SQPort Moresby in the following October. The latter
gathering was attended by 35 representatives of all nine
major missions, and its significance to the Administration
was evident from the attendance of the Administrator and
all heads of major departments.1^0 Major policy statements
were delivered by Gunther, Groves and Cottrell-Dormer,
and these were so comprehensive that they later provided
the foundation for the published accounts of the
1 41Provisional Administration’s work. In addition, there 
were statements on programmes affecting rehabilitation 
training, legal services, forestry, and field administration, 
as well as discussions of such specialised matters as
138. See p. 431 of this Chapter and Chapter Three, p. 165.
139. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 10 to 14 October 
1946.
140. Gunther and Groves had attended the Sydney meeting 
in June, but had been unable to deliver detailed 
statements, since they had only recently taken up 
their appointments.
141. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., pp. 152-8, 160-3;
Legge, op. cit., pp. 210-13; Mander, op. cit.. 
pp. 275-88.
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1 42broadcasting and the education of European children.
The conference occupied five days and created unprecedented
good will with the missionaries. In his concluding
address Murray acknowledged the past accomplishments of
the missions, proposed greater co-operation with the
Administration, and was rewarded with a most sweeping
i 43resolution by the delegates:
This Conference, representing all missions operating 
in the Territory of Papua-New Guinea, desires to 
express its sincere appreciation of the policy for 
education, health, agriculture and rehabilitation 
outlined to it by His Honour Colonel J.K. Murray, 
Administrator, and the directors of the various 
departments of the Provisional Administration.
This marked a major success by the official group, for 
in allaying the suspicions of the Papuan missionaries 
and for the first time winning unqualified support from 
those in the Territory of New Guinea, the Administration 
overcame immediate tensions with the people who generally 
enjoyed the closest contact with the villages.
The success of the mission conference can be gauged 
from the reaction in the settler community, who saw the 
strength of the new alliance between officials and 
missionaries as a challenge to their own influence:^^
It is...a good thing that the practical hard-bitten 
men of the Missions should be given the opportunity 
to bring the Administration's corps of eager
142. Por a summary of proceedings, see P.I.M., Vol. 17 
No. 4, November 1946, pp. 72-3.
143. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 14 October 1946.
144. P .I.M., Vol. 17 No. 4, November 1946, pp. 73-4.
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unblooded young idealists down to hard earth, and 
to earthy facts. It may be paradoxical, but it 
seems to the "PIM" that the missionaries' main job 
will be to persuade the officials that the Puzzy- 
wuzzies are not angels. The most disheartening' 
feature...is the consistency with which these worthy 
gentlemen ignore the claims of the unfortunate 
European settlers...The natives, who ask little more 
than to be left alone, are being yearned over by 
three hundred officials and swamped under millions 
of Australian taxpayers' money.
Mission-Administration relations
Relations between the missions and the Provisional 
Administration were marked by some continuing tensions, 
however. The very number of mission groups operating 
in the Territory created difficulties. By 1949 there were 
six Catholic orders represented in Papua New Guinea, four 
Lutheran organizations, three Seventh Day Adventist
1 4*5groups, three Methodist missions and two Anglican bodies.
In addition, three breakaway sects were operating in New 
Guinea and four in Papua. Most of these groups had 
worked among the people of a particular area for a half- 
century or more, with very little official assistance, 
and saw little justification in the Provisional 
Administration’s claim to equal or superior partnership 
after so many years. In other instances old rivalries 
continued, particularly between certain denominations in
145. The information in this and the following passage 
is drawn from P.A,R., 1948/49, p. 91 and N.G.A.R., 
1948/49, p. 161 . Separate branches of a particular 
denomination usually had parent bodies in different 
countries. One or two were off-shoots of groups 
that had experienced internal differences after their 
establishment in the islands.
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the Territory of New Guinea, and were extended to the
Highlands region when expansion began -;here in earnest
from 1947. In some cases the contest for adherents
became quite bitter, placing the provision of social
and welfare services in a disturbing light: the mission
station which appeared to give the most to the people was
likely to win the largest number of converts, thus
maintaining the enthusiasm and material support of the
parent body in its home country. This led to exaggerations,
so that from the statistics supplied by the missions it
appeared as if they were making astounding contributions
to the Territory's development. Indeed, at first glance in  1*49
it seemed that^the disparity between mission and 
Administration efforts was enormous:
Number of schools
Administration Mission
Papua 9 687
New Guinea 44 1,746
Total 53 2,433
Number of pupils
Administration Mission
Papua 484 39,318
New Guinea 2,869 64,516
Total 3,353 103,834
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Number of hospitals and clinics
Administration Mission
Papua 61 91
New Guinea 95 174
Total 154 265
Number of patients 
Administration Mission
Out­
patients
In­
patients
Out­
patients
In­
patients
Papua 
New Guinea
15,405
58,610
16,064 
51,741
174,036
436,996
4,687
13,325
Total 74,015 67,805 611,032 18,012
Source: P.A .R., 1948/49, pp. 79, 81, 89-91; N. G.A.R.,X , I * r  y  y j / J J  • I V  y « y |
1948/49, pp. 146-7, 149, 157, 159.
Missions and education
In fact, the mission contribution was not all that it 
appeared. The statistics for mission education gave no 
indication of the quality of teaching. Only a few mission 
schools were conducted by fully-trained teachers, the 
great majority being adjuncts of outstations manned by 
Papua New Guinean catechists and evangelists who had 
themselves completed no more than a rudimentary primary 
education. ^ Enrolment of pupils was often erratic;
146. Little official comment on mission education was
recorded before 1952, when the department formally 
assumed inspectorial functions; this reflected the 
department's reluctance to disturb its equable 
relationship with the missions.
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many were older than was desirable in junior primary
classes and others attended lessons for just one or
two days a week, spending years at the same level
before returning to village life. It was not until 1952
that the powers of inspection that had been exercised
by the pre-war administrations were formally restored
to the Department of Education by the Education Ordinance
of that year, by which time haphazard developments had
1 47taken place in a number of areas. This is not to 
belittle the mission accomplishment. Each of the major 
denominations conducted some schools equal to anything 
achieved by the Administration, and all faced enormous 
problems in obtaining teaching materials and maintaining 
contact with their more distant outstations. Moreover, 
there were two aspects of mission education that held 
important implications for the development of the 
Territory. The first was pointed out by Wedgewood, who 
otherwise took an uncharitable view of mission schooling: 
mission employees linked education with other aspects of 
life; were aware of the importance of religious observance 
in traditional life; and brought a sense of commitment 
to their task that was not necessarily possessed in 
the same degree by Administration teachers.  ^ A second 
advantage, only vaguely apparent at the time, was that 
mission schooling gave the majority of its pupils only
147. There were delays in both the Department of Education
and in Canberra in promulgating the legislation;
for its major provisions, see Legge, op. cit.,
pp. 212-3.
148. Wedgewood, op. cit., pp. 5-7.
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a fleeting impression of Western society, and this may 
have been preferable to a more intense official programme 
likely to create aspirations that could not then be met, 
owing to the continuing white domination of New Guinea.
In any event, there was little point in the
Administration's questioning the quality of mission
schooling, since the Education department was unable to
assume any of the missions' responsibilities. In
reviewing the department's work up to 1950, Groves had
to emphasise the mission role, saying that "the part they
were playing...and must necessarily play in the future
must be very great. He went on to say that because the
Administration lacked resources the Missions had carried
out the larger part of the technical training under the
C.R.T.S., and Mr. Groves considered that it would not be
possible to provide anything like an adequate educational
programme for the native people, especially in vernacular
village schools, except with the participation of the
Missions. ^  The Education department's prospects were
no brighter at the end of 1951, when the new Minister
for Territories was advised that he might have to consider
"an expanding role...for the missions in the field of
education", owing to the department's problems in
150carrying out its own teaching programme.
149. CHS A518, item BQ800/1/1(A), 30 March 1950.
150. CRS A452, item 56/1197, 9 November 1951.
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Missions and health services
Dr. G-unther took a direct - sometimes aggressive -
approach to the question of mission involvement in
health services. He enjoyed the advantage, in comparison
with the Department of Education, of working from an
established base, even though the health authorities were
unable to cover the whole of the field themselves.
Gunther sought the co-operation of the missions, but based
his request for support on "certain tenets" that could
leave the missions in little doubt as to his aims; at
the mission conference of October 1946 Gunther stated 
151his proposals:
(1) That medical care and attention for natives is 
only of secondary interest to Missions compared with 
their teaching of the Gospel and their interest in 
education.
That missions will accept as a fact that the 
Public Health Department is finally responsible for 
the medical care of all people in these Territories, 
and that as the establishment of more hospitals can 
be undertaken by this Department any subsidy to the 
Mission in that area would cease.
(2) That there exist, if not in theory in actual 
fact, certain well marked lines which divide the 
Territories into individual Mission "Spheres of 
Influence".
(3) That Missionaries, as individuals, are the more 
suited to conduct certain ancillary medical 
establishments, such as Infant and Maternal Welfare 
Centres, Leprosaria and the Institutions for the 
care of Tuberculosis.
151. The material in this and the following passage is 
based on P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 9 October 
1946. Gunther’s reference to "spheres of influence" 
was meant to indicate that in virtually all areas 
where two or more missions operated, one was 
dominant; the department dealt mainly with the 
major group in each area.
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Assuming mission agreement to his proposals, Gunther 
then stated that free drugs, on a specified list subject 
to annual review, would be supplied to all missions, as 
well as financial aid to those which employed qualified 
staff "stationed in places mutually agreed upon by the 
director of Public Health and the Mission concerned"•
Such assistance would not be provided in areas where the 
Administration established its own hospitals; but in 
other instances it would give the department "the right 
to inspect all hospitals and clinics and to make any 
recommendations it thinks fit”. In the case of 
specialised institutions, such as leprosaria, the 
department would build, equip and maintain the hospitals 
while the missions provided the staff, who would be 
paid from a grant allocated by the Administration.
"These Institutions would be conducted as directed by 
the Department of Public Health."
One of the notable features of Gunther’s proposals,
compared with the education plan, was that they rested
entirely on administrative decision, there being no
legislative provision for the general oversight of
medical services at the time. In general, the department
was able to exercise satisfactory supervision, and
used the sanction of withdrawing subsidies in only a 
152few instances. There was only limited success in
152. This and the following passage, including quotations,
are drawn from CRS A452, item 56/1197, 13 December 1951.
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delegating responsibility to the missions for some 
specialised functions, notably tuberculosis treatment; 
but on the other hand it proved unnecessary to withdraw 
subsidies from missions operating close to Administration 
health centres, owing to the expanding supply of drugs 
available to the department. Nevertheless, there were 
inevitable tensions, owing to the programme of rapid 
expansion pursued by the department, and Gunther had 
no hesitation in criticising the missions when he thought 
it necessary. Recommending caution in interpreting 
mission reports, he observed:
The attitude of most / missions_7 has been, "Give 
us the tools and the money and we will use them as 
we think they should be used, but we are too busy 
to make reports so don't ask for them." Every 
mission...wittingly or unwittingly exaggerates the 
amount of work it does for the benefit of those who 
provide it with its finances to carrjr on. . .To boost 
their figures almost all of them show each individual 
treatment to the one patient as a separate unit of 
disease...Two treatments a day for a tropical ulcer 
would be shown as 60 tropical ulcers in the month 
against the one patient...Thus sometimes fantastic 
figures...of patients treated appear in their 
monthly returns. No means of persuasion known to 
us can alter this Mission practice.
Having placed the mission contribution in perspective, 
Gunther conceded that it was "essential that we give 
the Missions every physical aid to continue with the 
work they are doing and encourage them to do more" • Yet 
there could be no doubt that the Health department 
controlled the provision of medical services generally; 
in the education field, by contrast, it sometimes appeared 
that the missions still dictated the course of events.
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The planning committees
Against this background of accomplishments and 
problems during the immediate post-war years, the 
committees on Social Development Planning and Native 
Welfare Planning, both under Groves’ chairmanship, began
4 C 7their regular meetings from late 1947. The objectives 
of the two committees were unclear, and the material 
eventually submitted by them would have been better
i 54co-ordinated had it been included in the one document. 
Nevertheless, both committees adopted the sensible 
approach of examining programmes already in progress; 
then investigating areas that were not being dealt with 
effectively under existing departmental structures; and 
finally recommending measures to produce a comprehensive, 
co-ordinated effort in the field of social welfare.
Social Development Planning Committee
The Social Development Planning Committee comprised 
mainly officers of the Department of Education: Groves
153. The genesis of these committees is outlined in 
Chapter Six, pp. 337-8.154. Territory of Papua-New Guinea, Government House, 
Report of the Native Welfare Planning Committee of 
“ihe Provisional Administration and Report of the 
Social Development Planning Committee etc., both 
Port Moresby, mimeo, 1948. The reports are referred 
to as Welfare and Social Development, respectively. 
The Committee on Native Welfare Planning commented 
on ’the absence of any specific terms of reference" 
when submitting its report (Welfare, op. cit.,
p. 1).
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as chairman; Miss Barbara McLachlan, a teacher; Mr. 
Charles Julius, an anthropologist, then research officer 
in the department; and Mr. C.J. Millar, Assistant 
District Officer, Department of District Services.^ ^
The committee presented a brief report consisting mainly 
of accounts of its later meetings, at which it had 
endorsed the five-year plan of the Department of Education. 
This plan was, in effect, the statement of broad aims 
presented by G-roves to the mission conference of October 
1946; it lacked comprehensive target figures for school 
construction and pupil enrolments, but it at least set 
out the argument for "broadly-based education", as 
favoured by G-roves and his senior staff. However, the 
committee made the error of omitting even an outline of 
the plan from its final report, merely stating, "The 
Committee agreed to adopt the Five-Year Plan of the 
Department of Education as the first and major part of 
its recommendations."  ^ Since the education plan had 
been seen by few people, the report of the Social 
Development Planning Committee was of little value as 
it stood. It was mainly of interest because, operating 
from its unstated assumptions about the nature of 
educational development, it went on to make complementary
155. Millar was one of the Angau officers who had visited 
Africa and the United Kingdom. He had already 
written a paper on the structure of the public 
service (see Chapter Six, pp. 369-70), and was 
working on the establishment of co-operative 
societies at the time of his membership of the 
Social Development committee.
156. Social Development, op. cit., p. 2.
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recommendations on village welfare and mass education.
The committee saw a need, in addition to formal
schooling, for the widest possible approach to community
1 57development. It observed:
The question of maintaining satisfactory group 
relationships and adapting their conditions to 
changing circumstances is one which involves the 
application of mass education techniques to deal, 
as broadly and deeply as possible, with the social, 
political, cultural and economic and physical 
welfare aspects of community life...Such co-ordinated 
activity can best be obtained through the 
selection of representative teams to carry out 
definite schemes in specific areas.
The total programme could be viev/ed as an ’’achievement
in the general field of citizenship”, with a more
1 58specific aim in the first instance:
That aim could, perhaps, be economic, and the target 
set might, in this Territory, be carefully selected 
and clearly defined in the agricultural sphere.
To use an anthropological distinction, the ostensible 
function of the plan could be economic development, 
its latent function development in the field of 
citizenship: the two would, in fact, be mutually
complementary.
Such a scheme would require close co-operation among the 
major departments concerned - Agriculture, Education, 
Public Health and District Services - and the committee 
recommended that pilot projects be established in the
157. Ibid., p. 12. The account provided in this and the 
following passage is more coherent than the report 
itself, which presented its major recommendations 
in an initial summary, gave further details in the 
minutes of its meetings and referred to appendices 
containing additional information; it bore all the 
signs of hasty and haphazard preparation.
158. Ibid., p. 13.
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Northern and Western Districts of Papua to test methods
of co-ordination. To ensure co-operation in the
long term, co-ordinating bodies would be required at
both the central and village levels. Thus a Social
Welfare Section was recommended for the Department of
District Services; and Local Welfare Committees for the
villages, with representatives of "village councils,
Mission bodies, Native church congregations, Native
school councils, European commercial interests and Native
economic interests, such as co-operative organizations".^^
The Welfare Section and the village committees were
expected to take a particular interest in the advancement
of women and girls within the community and to pay
special attention to those people who were adopting an
urbanized pattern of life as the towns in the Territory
161underwent their sudden post-war expansion.
For the rest, the social development report made 
several sweeping recommendations that illustrated the 
concerns and foresight of the committee, without providing 
detailed proposals for further action. The Department 
of Public Works, for example, should be "required" to 
provide suitable accommodation for all Administration 
employees; a committee should be established to examine
159. Ibid., pp. 1, 5. The concerns of the report bear 
a striking resemblance to those at present 
occupying the attention of the national government 
of Papua New G-uinea.
160. Ibid., p. 11.
161. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
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juvenile delinquency; a separate prisons organization 
should be set up; the U.N. Educational, Social and 
Cultural Organization should be asked to assist and 
co-ordinate programmes in the Territory; and special 
attention should be paid to workers’ compensation and 
industrial welfare generally. The members of the 
committee showed an awareness of recent thought on social 
development in the tropics, but the format and language 
of their report were so obscure as to be largely 
incomprehensible to the pragmatic officials whose more 
orthodox views carried so much weight in Port Moresby 
and Canberra.
Welfare Planning Committee
The Native Welfare Planning Committee presented a 
longer report which devoted 50 of its 79 pages to a 
consideration of factors affecting community health. By 
contrast with the passing reference to education planning 
in the document on social development, the welfare report 
set out the Health department’s five-year programme in 
full, giving details of hospital construction and location, 
staffing, preventive medicine campaigns and co-operation
162. Ibid., pp. 1, 12-17. Some indication of the later 
delays in instituting these programmes is provided 
by the fact that the separate prisons organization 
and the labour measures were not put into effect 
until the latter 1950's; U.N. aid was not accepted 
by the Australian government until the 1960*s and 
the question of housing for Paoua New Guinean 
public servants has never been dealt with adequately, 
despite heavy expenditure beginning in the mid-1960's.
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with missions; this was the fourth occasion upon which 
G-unther had presented an exposition of his plans, but 
the committee made no apology for the repetition, it
being "purposely done to underline what we think is
163important". The committee took as its general aim
the improvement of "the physical and mental wellbeing of
the native peoples" and, as the particular goal of its
report, a programme to that end for the period to
1953/54. As a first step the report proposed "....an
acceptance of the native as a fellow human being...who
is readily capable of being brought to our own /“level 7
1 65if the correct teaching medium is chosen". The
committee made it clear that there was no such acceptance
by emphasising the need for intensive training to promote
racial understanding at all levels of the public 
1 f i f )service. Prom that training would flow a new approach
to village administration, emphasising participation in 
development and not mere control of the population.
In order to promote increased participation by 
villagers in community life, the welfare report proposed 
"closer association...through organized sports, Boy 
Scout and G-uide movements, Pirst Aid classes, the early
163. Welfare, op. cit., p. 1. (Gunther's proposals had 
already been put to Buttsworth, to Canberra in the 
reply to Buttsworth, and to the mission conference. 
The contrast between G-unther's persistence and 
G-roves' lack of drive is again apparent.
164. Ibid., p. 4.
165. Ibid., p. 9.
166. Ibid., pp. 14-17.
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creation of the Fourth Division of the Public Service, 
the introduction as soon as possible of the native people 
to the professions, controlled debating and dramatic 
and choral societies, the sponsoring of local arts and 
crafts and the introduction of our own cultures. Most 
of this is being undertaken by the Department of 
Education, but should be brought forward rapidly.”
The committee further urged that a special training 
programme be established for "accepted native leaders" 
at village level; that local government councils and 
courts be set up as soon as possible; that co-operative 
societies be given "every impetus within reason"; that 
Village Women’s Committees be formed to promote the 
emancipation of women; that the establishment of trade 
unions be investigated; and that a limited system of 
taxation be re-introduced.1^8
The welfare committee saw increased participation by
the people not merely as a means to improve village
life, but as a step towards the eventual mobilization of
the population towards national goals. In its most
i goprescient recommendation, the committee observed:
If it is the intention to bring at our earliest 
opportunity a measure of self-government, it is 
necessary these people become a homogeneous people
167. Ibid., pp. 9-10. The public service Fourth Division 
was intended to train Papua New G-uineans for higher 
levels of the bureaucracy. It was eventually set
ud in 1957 (see Jinks, op. cit., pp. 143-4.)
168. Ibid., pp. 9-12, 15-16, 18-19.169. The following passage is drawn from ibid., pp. 19-21
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rather than a series of tribes, clans and family- 
groups loosely knit together under a common 
administrative procedure...As a protestation of 
our early intention and faith, this Administration 
should begin to drive home the necessity that the 
people regard themselves as Nationals of Papua and 
New G-uinea. As a first step to this the 
Administration should introduce a National Name 
for the native people.
The committee recommended that the name "Papuan" be 
adopted and that other questions, such as the use of a 
national dress, be investigated. In creating a sense 
of national identity, much would depend on the slow 
processes of general education, but the committee believed 
that a more direct campaign should be instituted, using 
"ancillary instructional media, the wireless and the 
motion picture, to drive this propaganda to the fullest".
The committee pointed out that the public service’s
employment conditions and structure would have to be
improved if the welfare programme were to be carried
out. "We would suggest the hastening of the envisaged
reclassification of the Public Service, the early
establishment of Arbitration, but, above all, there must
be the earliest declaration of a permanent Administration
Organization...which will provide...superannuation, the
promise of promotion and the legal safeguards of a
1 70Public Service Ordinance." A building and town planning 
programme was also required to improve the conditions 
of all Administration officers and employees. It was
170. The following passage, including quotations, is 
drawn from ibid., pp. 1-3.
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also essential that an Executive Council be established, 
since the committee system which had evolved since 1945 
was "not acting purely as originally prescribed. We 
would suggest that the...Executive Council will bring 
wider thought to many problems." The committee then 
referred obliquely to the dominance of conservative 
pre-war officers at the senior advisory levels of the 
public service: "We feel that in interpreting our 
functions we can refer to a position within the Administration 
which may delay the successful implementation of any 
Policy, should it continue. We are very conscious that 
the best of intentions are easily frustrated today and 
we would warn that nothing should be attempted unless it 
can be developed...according to plan...."
The welfare committee, even more than the committee 
on social development, showed an awareness of long-range 
needs, while demonstrating its appreciation of the 
key administrative steps required to meet these needs.
The two reports would have been more coherent had they 
been combined and presented in a more systematic format. 
Nevertheless, they represented a sincere attempt by the 
more progressive senior officers in the public service 
to draft a co-ordinated social welfare programme for 
the Provisional Administration; and it must be 
remembered that they were prepared by staff with many 
other pressing responsibilities. These two reports,
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together with the plan which was prepared by the 
Economic Development Committee and is discussed in the 
next Chapter, were sent to Canberra between September 
1948 and January 1949 for consideration by the 
Commonwealth Inter-Departmental Committee on Dew Guinea. 
They required, and deserved, detailed consideration 
by the Australian government, which at that time had 
failed to support its sweeping policy statements by 
administrative programmes.
CHAPTER EIGHT
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT : PLANNING AND PARALYSIS
Need for action: Professor Isles - White 
interests and government controls - Palliatives 
for workers - Labour department seeks control 
Mr. J.L. Taylor - Labour problems 
Highlands Labour Scheme - Pre-war policy: 
development by compulsion - Agriculture: the 
Cottrell-Dormer plan - Different approaches
to co-operatives - Self-help movements
District Services control of co-operatives 
Murray's demand for guaranteed markets 
Murray's idealism - Economic Development 
Committee - Development finance and administration 
Need for Australian support
Need for action: Professor Isles
As in the field of social welfare, the programme 
of economic development set out by the Provisional 
Administration followed the broad policy announced by 
the Australian government in 1945. The policy was
1. Details of the policy, such as it was, are set out 
In Chapter Five, pp. 265, 276.
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by no means explicit, and its implications were complex
and far-reaching for the planners who sought to produce
effective action towards economic change among the
people of the Territory. In his speech on the Papua-
New Guinea Provisional Administration Bill Mr. Ward
said, ”....the basis for the economic development of the
territory will be native and European industry with the
limit of non-native expansion determined by the welfare
pof the natives generally.’1 It was far from clear what 
this statement meant in practical terms. On the one hand 
the words, if broadly construed, differed little from 
the sentiments of Sir Hubert Murray, who had often 
expressed the determination to maintain a balance between 
village and European interests. On the other hand, 
despite the protestations and policies of the pre-war 
years, the people of the country had remained merely a 
source of labour for white enterprises, which were 
confined almost entirely to planting and mining, with a 
commercial sector to support them. The question was 
whether the Australian government proposed to alter 
this pattern substantially; and if so, how it proposed 
to bring about this change.
It has been noted in Chapter Five that the clearest 
manifestation of the government’s intentions appeared 
in the field of labour policy.' However, among the
2. C.P.D., Vol. 183, p. 4054, 4 July 1945.
3. See Chapter Five, pp. 275-6.
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motives which shaped Ward's attitude to the question,
concern for the welfare of the workers and for the
political influence of employers ranked much higher than
any awareness of the economic effects of revised labour
conditions. This was consistent with the Minister's
background and political convictions and also with the
pattern of advice he received from the Directorate of
Research, whose staff were concerned primarily with
constitutional, strategic and social issues; only one
of its members, Professor K.S. Isles, was an economist.
Nevertheless, the decision by the Minister and the
Directorate to concentrate on the welfare of the people
in itself constituted an economic policy of sorts, since
it necessarily limited the amount of labour available
for plantation employment. Prom this point of view,
labour was the key economic factor, as Isles pointed out
to the first group of officers to attend the School of
4Civil Affairs in February 1945:
....you can't properly decide what policy to adopt in 
expanding production for export by European planters 
and traders, unless you balance this aim against other 
aims. And the reason why you can't is the limited 
supply of native labour. The supply was probably 
up to the limit already before the war, and could 
not be increased unless you're going to break down 
the native way of life...Now, people who know New 
Guinea may tell you this is all moonshine; that, 
instead of 60,000 natives...you could safely draw off 
100,000 /_ but 7 that would not affect the form of my 
argumentT For.•.unless very strict limits are 
placed on the recruitment of native labour, private 
business interests will find it profitable to invest 
capital in plantations, mining, trading and so on,
4, Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 1, September 1946, p. 5. 
Emphasis as in the original.
469
in such a stream that the native village economy 
will he stripped of the labour necessary to keep 
it going and developing...In other words, the 
scarce economic factor in New Guinea is, without 
any doubt, native labour... considerations of short­
term economic benefit will push considerations of 
native welfare...right into the background - and 
will even undermine long-term economic benefit.
Isles therefore recommended the establishment of an
Administration labour recruiting agency to replace the
white entrepreneurs of earlier years; the control of
private capital entering the country; the control of
monopolies; imposition of tariffs that would benefit
the village population rather than white businessmen;
and implementation of a Territories Development and 
5Welfare Act. The Act, which Directorate staff saw as 
being modelled on British precedent, would, according to 
Isles, give "generous financial provision for schemes for 
developing the native methods of agriculture, food 
supplies, health, education, etc. That involves research, 
experimental plantations, experimental livestock farms, 
provision of a good medical and hospital service, and 
so on: not only research into improved methods and new 
products, but also into market conditions. And there 
will have to be close co-ordination of research organizations 
with the administration and its officers."
Urging that the government quickly announce its 
policy, Isles in effect predicted the pattern of post-war
5. Ibid., p. 6.
6 . Ibid.
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events in New G-uinea when he observed, "The Government
cannot put off making a decision. In fact it decides by-
failing to decide. Day-to-day administrative decisions
must be taken, whether the government decides on its
basic policy or not. Private interests will make
preparations to return, and the die will be cast. Basic
7policy will then have been decided by default." When 
Ward presented the Provisional Administration Bill he 
endorsed the general principles propounded by Isles and 
the other members of the Directorate, but neglected to 
support them with legislative programmes for development 
and welfare on the British pattern. The failure to 
provide specific direction led to considerable speculation 
about the government's intentions and motives; and 
allowed those who were opposed to changes in policy to 
take advantage of the prevailing uncertainty and promote 
their sectional interests.
The main problem was that, if the Territory's export 
industries were to be limited in their operations by 
strict controls on labour and on the activities of 
entrepreneurs generally, then the country seemed fated
Q
to become an eternal welfare state. There was a related 
7 . Ibid., p. 5.
8. By the 1940's gold production had declined steeply, 
leaving copra once more the vastly dominant source 
of export earnings; see, for example, P.A.R., 1948/49» 
p. 58 and N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 124. For examples of 
settler reaction to post-war financial policy, see 
P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 3, October 1947, p. 19 (’’Orgy of 
Government Spending....") and Vol. 20 No. 1, August 
1949, p. 35.
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problem at the village level: if the labour supply were
severely limited, those men who would otherwise have
left to work would have to be found something to do at
home.' However, village cash-cronping had an unfortunate
history in those areas where it had been attempted before
World War 2: the system of usufructory land rights placed
major restrictions on the planting and harvesting of
permanent tree crops by individuals, whose enthusiasm was
further dampened by fluctuating world prices for tropical 
10produce. Even if, by some stroke of fortune, village 
participation could be assured, it would be many years 
before production could remotely approach exports from the 
European-owned plantations. The expansion of village 
holdings would require vast programmes of agricultural 
education and extension, and the Provisional Administration 
possessed very few staff in these fields.
White interests and government controls
In the meantime, resumption of activity by white 
planters could hardly be resisted, owing to the world 
shortage of tropical produce and the Provisional 
Administration’s inability to staff even its own ranks,
9. The standard argument that villagers, if left to themselves, 
would "get into mischief" was a white rationalisation 
for exploitation, but it held some truth; with warfare 
banned by officials and much ritual forbidden by 
missionaries, village life could become very dull.
10. For accounts of pre-war attempts at village planting,
see Mair, op. cit. (1948), pp. 86-91; Legge, op. cit., 
pp. 171-7 and Grocombe, op. cit.
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far less an official production service as well. In
these circumstances, and notwithstanding any limits placed
on the level of labour recruitment, Europeans would
inevitably re-assert their dominance over the Territory
economy. Once this occurred, it would be all the more
difficult to shake their control: every attempt to set
up a village production project would threaten the
plantations' labour supply and would therefore be resisted;
and the stronger the white plantation sector, the stronger
the resistance. Thus the government's policies on
marketing, labour and agricultural extension were closely
linked, even when, as in the case of village projects,
they seemed to have little direct bearing on white
interests. Events in each of these fields had an important
bearing on the attempts to drawn up development plans in
the 1947/48 period, so that, as in the matter of social
welfare, they must be considered as background to the
report of the Provisional Administration's Economic
11Development Committee.
In the fields of marketing and employment, in 
particular, the government at first showed every intention 
of retaining the complete control that had been asserted 
by Angau during the war years, but soon found that it
11. As in the social welfare field, there are published 
accounts of the major poet-war developments in the 
economic sphere; these will be summarised, referred 
to in footnotes and expanded only where important 
details have been omitted or require re-evaluation.
The emphasis is again on the genesis of the programmes 
rather than on the programmes themselves.
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could not sustain such an effort. For several years the
Territory's coastal trade was conducted by the
1 2Commonwealth Directorate of Shipping, while the Production
Control Board, which had been run by Angau, came under
the full control of the Minister for External Territories
in 1946, when an officer of his Department was appointed 
1 3its chairman. However, the Board gradually withdrew
from commercial activities as private traders returned to
the Territory, while continuing to organize the purchase
of all copra within Papua New G-uinea and its sale in
Australia. Its activities were maintained, according to
official reports, "owing to the vital importance of the
copra industry to the Territory and the need to firmly
establish the industry"; there was not even a mention of
special assistance to village producers, far less any
suggestion that European plantations should be controlled.
The Board concentrated its purchasing depots at the main
ports of the Territory, paying cash on delivery and
meeting all handling and transport costs. This was not
as advantageous to producers as it may have seemed, since
ruling prices were higher on world markets than those paid 
14by the Board. Planters protested when the Board 
established a Copra Stabilization Fund, under which a 
further deduction was made from the producer's return and
12. Department of the Government Secretary, Circular 
Memorandum No. 24 of 1947, 13 November 1947. See 
Chapter Four, pp. 199-202 for an account of the 
government's ineffectual efforts to control shipping.
13. This and the following passage are based on N.G-.A.R., 
1948/49, p. 31.14. P.I.M., Vol. 7 No. 4, November 1946, p. 9.
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accumulated in a Board-controlled fund as a safeguard
1 5against future price fluctuations. As the Fund 
increased and copra prices showed no sign of falling, 
the planters, who were not represented on the Board, grew 
increasingly restive, demanding that they be allowed 
the full return on their produce and be permitted to seek 
the best available price on the world market.
The government's control of the copra trade was of
greater benefit to Australia during the shortages of the
immediate post-war years than it was to the villagers
of New Guinea; by 1946 the plantations in the Territory
had recovered sufficiently to supply the full Australian
copra requirement of 25,000 tons annually. In achieving
this situation, the government lost any slight chance it
may have had of loosening the European hold on the
Territory economy. The Production Control Board's only
assistance to villagers was to permit direct sale of
smallholders' produce to its marketing points, but these
were so few in number that the great majority of villagers
continued to sell at reduced prices to planters and
traders. In the meantime, plantation production continued
to increase, until by mid-1948 it reached some 40,000 tons
annually, considerably in excess of Australian
requirements and about two-thirds of the estimated total
17capacity of existing plantings. Prom a certain point
15. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 7, February 1947, p. 6.
16. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 11, June 1947, pp. 15, 21; Vol. 
18 No. 3, October 1947, pn. 3-4.
17. P.I.M.. Vol. 18 No. 12, July 1948, p. 10.
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of view, this was a major accomplishment in the face of
post-war difficulties. On the other hand, this return
to normalcy also marked a resurgence of white economic
power. Indeed, the extra production began to embarrass
the government to the point where Mr. Ward was forced to
announce in July 1948 that the Production Control Board
would be disbanded and producers permitted to market their
copra independently under a series of export licences, a
system similar in principle to that which had existed before 
1 8the war. In the event, there were administrative
delays and the Board continued to function until it was
replaced in March 1952 by a Copra Marketing Board, which
performed similar functions but included two producer
1 9representatives among its five members. As the minimal 
level of government control was reduced further, white 
domination of export production went unchallenged.
Palliatives for workers
In the employment field the Australian government 
similarly failed to exercise rigid controls of the kind 
needed to reverse the precedents of the pre-war years. A 
radical change of emphasis, of the kind envisaged by Isles, 
would have meant encouraging villagers to stay at home, 
producing on their own account, rather than continuing as 
low-cost labourers for white entrepreneurs. This was made 
impossible when the Australian government acquiesced in
18. Ibid.19. P.I.M., Vol. 22 No. 9, April 1952, p. 91.
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the revival of the plantation industry under private
ownership, in order to meet short-term needs for coconut
products. Thus Ward's speech on the Provisional
Administration Bill, made some four months after Isles
outlined his proposals, contained no reference to the control
of private capital and monopolies, nor to preferential
20tariffs faouring village interests; all that remained
were several provisions relating to employment - improved
conditions and hours of work and somewhat higher wages,
for example - that were no more than palliatives to relieve
the worst excesses of the pre-war period. Indeed, the
proposal to abolish the system of indenture within five
years simply gave employers ample time in which to
21campaign against the reforms.
On the question of labour reform, the Provisional 
Administration was once more placed in an ambivalent 
position. The Minister at times gave every indication that 
he would take drastic action against white employers, 
regardless of the short-term effects on the Territory 
economy: he had cancelled labour contracts, against all
p p
advice; and continued, in strongly-worded statements,
23to criticise the "exploiters" of the New Guinea people.
20. See Chapter Five, pp. 275-7 and pp. 468-70 of this 
Chapter.
21. Further aspects of this matter are discussed in 
Chapters Nine and Ten.
22. See Chapter Four, pp. 202-6.
23. A typical example of Ward's approach was his statement 
of early 1946 that he was determined to break the 
"stranglehold" of commercial interests over New Guinea 
(Sydney Daily Mirror, 5 February 1946). His attitude 
is discussed further in Chapter Nine.
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However, he failed to produce legislation, or even 
administrative action in his own Department, that in any­
way corresponded with his tough public stance; even the 
limited measures announced in the Provisional Administration 
Bill were severely compromised during the next four years 
by indecisiveness and delay in Canberra. The combination 
of threats and inaction produced the worst possible 
combination of circumstances for the Administration: it 
was opposed at every step by employers made fearful of the 
future, but was unable to act firmly in carrying out the 
policy announced by the Minister. As the settlers grew 
increasingly aware of the administrative difficulties being 
encountered in Port Moresby, their opposition to reform 
became stronger and more effective
Labour department seeks control
The initial problems facing the labour authorities
in Papua New Guinea arose from a combination of local
circumstances and the setting of contradictory policy aims
by the Australian government. On 26 June 1945 Cabinet
approved the immediate establishment of a Department of
Native Labour, but gave it no specific functions, merely
stating that its establishment would "ensure the best
24administration of the system”. This was immediately 
rendered doubtful by other aspects of the labour policy.
24. Cabinet Agendum of 26 June 1945, attached to T.P.-N.G-., 
Department of Native Labour, DS1-1-1 of 5 February 1946.
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On the one hand, there was some attempt to discourage the 
indenture system by ending the pre-war practice of 
licensing professional recruiters and confining powers 
of engagement to employers and their salaried agents: 
'•recruiting fees, bonuses, commissions or considerations 
other than salary are not to be allowed". On the other 
hand, the Administration was intended to become a pace­
setter for industrial reform by engaging its own workers 
on a "casual" or free basis, rather than under indenture. 
To this end, the Department of Native Labour was to act 
as an employment exchange. This experiment, which ran 
directly counter to pre-war practice, may have proved 
reasonably effective in stable circumstances: that is, 
if the Administration's demand for labour had been 
relatively small, as in pre-war years, and it had been 
able to separate the employment function from inspectorial 
duties. Employment conditions during the Provisional 
Administration period were far from normal, however. 
Cabinet decided that priority in the allocation of labour 
should be given to defence works, Administration works 
and services, commerce and shipping, agriculture, mining 
and new industries. Following the v/ithdrawal of Angau 
to the Gazelle Peninsula within the first few months of 
civil rule, the burden of reconstruction fell upon the 
Provisional Administration, which by 1948 was emoloying 
some 10,000 workers, five times as many as had been
25. Ibid.26. Ibid.
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required by government before the war. This not only
diverted the attention of the department's staff from
labour inspections, but compromised the Provisional
Administration as the controlling authority, for it had
suddenly become the largest single employer in the
country. The department had scarcely greater success
than private employers in obtaining the clothing, rations,
equipment and quarters prescribed by regulation, so that
it consistently contravened the provisions that it was
28supposed to enforce.
Mr. J.L. Taylor
The Labour department faced major problems in 
acquiring staff. In view of the importance apparently 
attached to the department by the Minister, it was 
considered essential that an outstanding officer be 
appointed as its Director: a man who would be in complete 
sympathy with the government’s aims in the employment 
field. The first choice was James L. Taylor, the explorer 
of the Highlands who had expressed radical views at the 
1944 Angau conference.2  ^ Taylor took up duty during the 
last week of October 1945, before the Provisional 
Administration had been formally proclaimed. Within a 
few days he and a very able assistant, J.B. McKenna,
27. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., pp. 137-9.
28. T.P.-N.G., Department of Native Labour, Annual Report 
1946/47, Port Moresby, typescript, 1947, pp. 7-8.
29. See Chapter Two, p. 117.
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produced a series of circulars and proposals that
demonstrated their efficiency and awareness of issues.
Taylor’s approach closely resembled that which was later
adopted by G-unther in the medical field: to take direct
action and solve problems as they arose. By early 1946
Taylor had arrived at his proposed functions for the
department and in seeking Hurray’s approval for them
observed, ’’The difficulty in organizing a Department before
it is known what the ambit of its operations is to be...
will be appreciated...The following proposals...indicate
the lines upon which the Department is being organized
and for which approval has been assumed.” He wished to
see the department relieved of its responsibilities for
Administration employment and provided with a greatly
increased staff to carry out inspections of villages to
ensure that limits on recruitment were rigorously enforced.
Taylor’s other proposals involved the conduct of extensive
research into labour conditions, a reduction in the amount
of menial labour by greater use of machinery, and conduct
of training schemes for private employees. However, by
the time he submitted his recommendations to Murray,
Taylor had already become disillusioned by the lack of
support from Canberra and the consequent reassertion of
pre-war norms. In a cynical observation to the Administrator
31a few weeks after being appointed, Taylor stated:
30. This and the following passage are based on T.P.-N.Gr., 
Department of Native Labour, DS1-1-1, 5 February 
1946.31. T.P.-N.Gr., Department of Native Labour, DNL29/25,
21 November 1945.
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What has been done in the past can be done again, 
more or less in the same manner, but I am under the 
impression that we are charged with the duty of 
creating a new department to put into effect the 
Commonwealth Government's policy. I am well aware 
that this course will involve considerable 
expenditure, a fact that was brought to the notice 
of Cabinet...Staff of the Department... should not 
be long left in doubt as to the future of the 
Department, in which theirs has become involved.
Taylor already doubted whether major reforms could really 
have been intended and noted that, without adequate 
finance and staff, the new department was merely a 
gesture. Under the circumstances, he wrote:^
Were I asked to recommend the most economical... 
method of...regulating Dative Labour I should, 
without hesitation, recommend that it be left 
entirely to the Department of District Services 
and Dative Affairs...an extremely satisfactory 
solution for a Territory without adequate 
revenues....
Taylor’s sarcasm was prompted by the fact that he still 
had only one trained officer on his staff. Dissatisfied 
with the situation, he requested release in order to 
return to the Highlands.  ^ In April 1946 Taylor was 
posted as District Officer to Goroka and the Labour 
department was left to make a fresh start from the 
frustrations of the first few months of its existence.
Taylor was replaced as acting Director of Labour by 
Mr. W.R. Humphries, a former Resident Magistrate who, 
having joined the Papuan service in 1912, was by several
32. Ibid.
33. Murray journal, p. 137. Taylor also encountered some 
difficulty with the Port Moresby white community, but 
this was not the major reason for his wanting to 
leave the Labour department.
482
years the most senior continuously-serving officer in 
34the Territory. At the time of his appointment Humphries 
was already 55 years of age and, although a humanitarian 
and paternalist of the "Murray tradition", he lacked the 
flexibility and drive that had been brought to the 
position by J.L. Taylor. Prom the innovative organization 
that had initially been proposed for the administration 
of labour matters, the department under Humphries came 
to concentrate on the essential procedures that were 
required to check the more obvious abuses occurring on 
the plantations. This was not entirely Humphries' fault, 
since the department continued to face problems arising 
from the lack of adequate legislation and staff; 
nevertheless, he may have achieved more results by adopting 
the direct approach favoured by such people as Taylor 
and Gunther.
At the declaration of civil administration, draft
legislation had already been prepared to give effect to
the labour policy announced by Ward, and it was expected
that the department would need to operate for only a few
weeks under its peculiar amalgam of pre-war Ordinances
35from both Territories and some post-war regulations.
36However, as Mair later noted:
34. The fact that Humphries had not already received a senior appointment was a source of dissatisfaction 
among some former Papuan staff; related correspondence 
is in P.N.G.N.A. Box 185, item 21/3, folios March-
May 1946.35. T.P.-N.G., Department of Dative Labour, Circular 
Instruction No. 1, 28 October 1945.
36. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 218.
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Many months were to pass...before the Department of 
External Territories could find time, in the 
pressure of work which overwhelmed it, to make 
these alterations, and Mr. Ward did not apparently 
consider that there was any necessity to give this 
matter priority. It finally received the Governor- 
General's assent a few days after the general 
election of September, 1946, at which the Labour 
Government was returned; there were not lacking 
those who attributed to the Department the hope that, 
had the election gone the other way, it would be 
allowed to lapse.
Having gained the statutory authority it needed, after
a wait of almost twelve months, the department then found
difficulty in obtaining the inspectorial staff essential
for putting the legislative provisions into effect. This
problem arose largely from the uncertainty concerning
the department's role. At the time of the Buttsworth
investigation at the end of 1946 it was still not clear
whether the labour authorities would be required, for
example, to provide a "labour exchange", proposed by
Taylor as a means of reducing workers' reliance on indenture
37as an avenue of employment. Buttsworth disapproved of 
this function, on the grounds that the employment and 
inspection of labour should not be the responsibility of
70
a single agency. However, Buttsworth misconstrued the 
proposal, which involved an advisory rather than a direct 
employment service by the Administration. Consequently, 
he made no reference to the possible alternative of 
establishing an independent employment exchange as a step 
towards improving employment opportunities, nor to Taylor's
37. Taylor's other proposals are outlined on p. 480 of 
this Chapter.
38. This and the following passage are based on 
Buttsworth, op. cit., "Labour", p. 1.
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proposals that the department undertake extensive research 
into labour matters and carry out continuing field 
surveys to check on recruitment levels in the villages.
These recommendations were virtually ignored by Humphries, 
and so functions that were vital to the institution of
labour reforms were allowed to lapse without further
30inquiry. In the meantime, the Labour department had to 
carry out other duties, including supervision of workers, 
of which no one approved and for which staff were therefore 
not provided.
Labour problems
The Labour department was required to supervise the 
recruitment and employment of labour for official purposes, 
notably for stevedoring, during the whole of the 
Provisional Administration period. ^ 0 In engaging extra 
staff for this purpose, the department had to employ more 
officers than were allowed it by Buttsworth in 1947: the 
original establishment provided it with only 28 positions, 
or 1.7 per cent of the total service, while at 30 June 
1947 it employed 45 officers, or 4 . 6 per cent of the 
public servants engaged at that date. It was the only
3 9. Report on Buttsworth, op. cit., Vol. 1, "Labour”, 
pp. 1-2. Humphries proposed only that a statistical 
section be established and that inspections be confined 
to places of employment, rather than extended to 
villages generally.40. Private employers maintained that they were unable to 
recruit labour for stevedoring, while they no doubt 
enjoyed the low handling charges levied by the 
Administration (Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 214).
41. N.S.A.R., 1946/47, p. 14.
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department in this position. Most departments experienced 
serious staff shortages, but were able to make acting 
appointments within their ranks. This opportunity was 
denied the Labour department, which could not recruit 
inspectors while it remained overstaffed with white 
overseers and supervisors. Moreover, the lack of government 
interest in the organization, and the limitations of its 
staff, became obvious when it was one of only two departments 
that failed to gain increased establishment by 1949,
42following the strong protests against the Buttsworth report.
Paced with these problems, Humphries reported in a
querulous tone in 1947. Commenting on the stevedoring
duties of his department, he observed, "There were many
complaints regarding the manner in which the work was
done; but this was not surprising in view of the lack of
handling facilities, and the fact that experienced staff
were not available...Inspectors of native labour are not
stevedores and they have a multitude of other duties to
p e r f o r m . T h e  record of inspections had therefore not
44been particularly good:
There are approximately 120 main places of employment.
Of these, 55 were inspected during the year, 26 being 
visited twice by Inspectors of Native Labour, and 29
42. N.C.A.R., 1948/49, p. 17. The Police department was 
the only other organization unable to secure an increase 
in staff establishment.
43. Labour Report 1946/47, op. cit., p. 14.44. Ibid., p. 8. The "scores of places" of minor employment 
should be added to the figures quoted in the report
to achieve an accurate picture of the inspection task 
and the department's performance.
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on one occasion only. Shortage of staff has greatly 
curtailed the plans made for a three-monthly inspection 
of all the major places of employment, and of the 
scores of places where small numbers of natives are employed.
Referring to the difficulty in maintaining the supply of
labour, Humphries suggested that many men were reluctant
to engage for work on plantations because they much
preferred to stay close to home, and would do so if able
to operate their own holdings profitablyHowever,
Humphries was reluctant to take a firm stand in encouraging
4.6village enterprises:^
For every ten men who leave home today to work on 
distant plantations there would be thirty available 
if the same class of work were near at hand...But the 
expansion of native enterprises on a large scale in 
the vicinity of villages would change the economy of 
the country. Labour would not be available for European-owned plantations and these, except for a 
few favourably situated, would cease to exist.
Thus, as Stanner later observed, the post-war labour
4-7situation marked the "restoration of an old problem".
In considering why controls on labour had been ineffectual 
he wrote, "Presumably, the problem simply ran away, for 
it could not be done without some form of parallel 
investment control and this would have forced some difficult 
issues for Government capital expenditure." In fact, it 
is unlikely that the government even comprehended the
45. Ibid., pp. 1-2. It is worth noting that the problem of 
labour supply was the first matter dealt with by Humphries.
46. Ibid., p. 2. Compare this ineffectual attitude with 
Sir Hubert Murray*s pronouncement on Indenture, noted 
in Chapter Five, p. 271, footnote 44.
47. This and the following passage are drawn from Stanner, 
Transition, op. cit., pp. 140-1.
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problem; and there was little chance of dealing 
imaginatively with particular employment questions after 
J.L. Taylor left the Labour department. By 1949 Ward's 
proposed labour reforms had achieved almost nothing.
Highlands Labour Scheme
Had the labour supply been confined to pre-war sources, 
it would have proved wholly inadequate for the expanded 
needs that arose from 1945. These included greatly 
increased Administration requirements, claims for rebuilding 
plantations, and demands for trade trainees, school 
pupils and domestic servants for the rapidly growing white
A Opopulation. It became possible to service both the
official and private sectors only because the Highlands
49region was opened to recruiting in 1950. v The main
problem in recruiting from the Highlands was disease: wartime
experience had shown that the people from the mountains
were dangerously susceptible to coastal diseases, notably
malaria, tuberculosis and dysentry; and their hurried
repatriation to their homes once the sickness pattern
emerged had caused those diseases to become endemic in
50the Highlands area itself. However, by 1949 the Health 
department had gained sufficient experience with new drugs
48. Labour Report 1946/47. op. cit., p. 2. Humphries comment 
on employment priorities was, "The number of Europeans 
resident in the country has increased threefold, and 
Europeans must have native servants."
49. This decision was taken before Labor’s 1949 defeat, 
and so is discussed here rather than in chronological 
sequence.
50. See Chapter Seven, pp. 425-6.
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to be confident that the diseases could now be controlled.
Moreover, it was desirable, in Gunther’s opinion, ”to
give certain Highland people an opportunity to work on
the coast and enter an economy pattern available to 
51others”. There was no immediate prospect of economic
development in the Highlands, so that as far as Gunther
was concerned the matter resolved itself into a question
almost entirely of health control. In conferences with
the Directors of Native Labour and District Services he
took the lead in setting most stringent conditions for what
became the Highlands Labour Scheme. These required that
recruits be vaccinated; that they be employed "only at a
centre where a medical practitioner or medical assistant
acceptable to the Director of Public Health” was stationed;
that prescribed doses of Paludrine anti-malarial be
administered to the employee; that penicillin be kept
for immediate treatment of any respiratory infections;
that all diseases affecting Highlands workers be
immediately reported; that all labourers be returned to
approved health centres upon repatriation; and that
failure to comply with the prescribed conditions would
52lead to ’’immediate cancellation of the contract”. This 
was a model for what might once have been done for workers 
from coastal villages.
51. This and the following passage, including quotations, 
are drawn from CRS A518, item 57/2748, 15 December 
1949.
52. In addition, all recruitment was by the Labour 
department and was on contract - it was several years 
before Highlanders were able to move freely to the 
coast to engage in casual employment.
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The Highlands Labour Scheme was administered strictly
and the many thousands of workers who left their mountain
villages for the coastal plantations were the virtual
saviours of the white economy, although they have never
been acknowledged as such and their lack of sophistication
has given rise to much sarcasm among employers. Yet
the fact that the Scheme was instituted at all, and that
large numbers of villagers were processed throught it -
6,100 workers left the Highlands in the first year of 
54operation alone - marked the final abandonment of plans
for a revolutionary change in the economic structure and
55control of the country. Instead, any programmes for 
economic development at the village level had to be drafted 
with competition from the European sector in mind. In 
this sphere the planners encountered the problems that had 
bedevilled pre-war Papua: how to encourage general 
participation and maintain enthusiasm when returns from 
village enterprise were so small and slow in coming. Of 
necessity, the burden of these programmes fell upon those 
officers who favoured extension techniques for community
53. See, for example, P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 12, July 1951, 
p. 91 and Vol. 22 No. 3, October 1951, p. 76. The 
attitude of employers was apparent from the suggestion 
of a correspondent that, "It will be interesting to 
see if the Minj boys put up any records when they get 
to grips with that hitherto unknown quality (sic), 
steady work.” (Ibid.).
54. P.I.M,, Vol. 21 No. 12, July 1951, p. 91.55. The establishment of white plantations in the Highlands 
later allowed villagers to work locally and prompted 
the establishment of the village plots that are now
so important to the Highlands economy; but the whites 
soon established economic dominance in the area: the 
village role was merely somewhat larger, in comparison 
with that in the coastal areas.
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development: that is, the encouragement of local 
initiative through education and incentive, in contrast 
with the development-by-direction approach of the pre-war
c Cperiod. The techniques could be applied in all fields; 
the programmes for social welfare and local government 
development, noted in the previous Chapter, were clearly 
based on them. It was in the area of economic change 
that they met their first serious test.
Pre-war policy: development by compulsion
Pre-war development of village agriculture had been
restricted by shortage of staff and a lack of understanding
of traditional society, in addition to the demands for
plantation labour. As a consequence, the people of both
Territories were required by law to plant and maintain
a stipulated number of cash-crop trees, usually coconuts.
In the Mandated Territory there was no assistance with
production or marketing; the main intention was apparently
that the people should sell produce to planters and
57traders in order to meet their head-tax payments. Sir 
William MacGregor introduced a similar provision in 
Papua and this was developed by Sir Hubert Murray, in 
what at first seemed an imaginative measure, into the 
Native Plantations Ordinance. The intention of the “native
56. The ”community development“ concept has always been 
vague and this has been one of its major problems.
For an early statement resembling the Groves-Cottrell- 
Dormer approach, see T.R. Batten, Communities and 
their Development. London, O.U.P., 1957.
57. See Mair, op. cit. (1948), pp. 100-4.
491
plantations” was to encourage communal enterprise on a
larger scale than that generally found in traditional
society, as well as to provide the people with assets and
58income under their exclusive control. Unfortunately, 
motives became confused when the plantations scheme became 
linked with obligations to pay head tax; as Mair later 
observed, "....in some respects the plantation takes on 
the appearance of a remedy to which the harrassed officer 
turns in desperation when he finds it impossible to collect 
the taxes due". Thus the scheme came to involve 
European-imposed obligations, rather than the encouragement 
of enterprise for its own sake. It finally collapsed 
when, during the Depression, the price of most produce fell 
below the cost of freighting it from the Territory. As a 
consequence, the people became wholly disillusioned and 
many officials became even more convinced that "native
60ignorance" could be countered only by stricter compulsion. 
Apart from these attitudes, little remained from the 
pre-war efforts but a few overgrown coconut groves, plus 
the remnants of the Sangara (Northern District) coffee 
scheme and the Mekeo (Central District) rice project, both 
of which were revived in the 1940’s, desoite earlier 
failures. It was a discouraging background against which 
to argue that development could occur through village 
initiative.
58. There is a useful review of the policy in Legge, 
op. cit.. pp. 171-7.
59. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 88.
60. For the attitude of a former Mandated Territory 
agricultural officer, see Chapter Two, p. 116.
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Agriculture: the Cottrell-Dormer plan
Despite the failures of the pre-war years, the
Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries
emphasised village welfare and development in its
6lprogrammes for the Provisional Administration. In the
manner of Gunther at the Department of Public Health,
Cottrell-Dormer, the acting Director of Agriculture, took
advantage of several opportunities to publicise his
f) 2department’s plans, and in his recommendations on the
Buttsworth report he provided the most succinct statement 
63of his aims:
The objectives of the Department...may briefly be 
stated as follows:
1. In co-operation with the Department of Public 
Health, the improvement of native nutrition.
2. The improvement of the living standard of the 
native people by the development of:-
a. Permanent systems of mixed farming for small 
holders;
b. Native internal trade and industry;
c. Native export industries and generally of 
mutual trade with the Commonwealth and other 
countries.
3. The provision of technical services for the 
assistance of non-native enterprises within the 
Territory.
These questions had been investigated to some extent by 
the Department of Agriculture of the Mandated Territory,
61. Colonel Murray recalls that the department's name was 
intended to call Canberra's attention to its broad 
functions, although it "didn't help much" (Notes, p. 64).
62. The proposals were less detailed than the Health 
department's, but they included such continuing 
publicity as regular readio broadcasts and a journal 
of agriculture.
63. Report on Buttsworth, on. cit., Vol. 2, "Agriculture",
p . 1 .
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but much of its attention had been devoted to the 
diversification of cash crops, particularly on plantations; 
it was therefore significant that such work was given low 
priority by Cottrell-Dormer. In his address to the 
mission conference of October 1946, the Director spoke of 
his vision of a stable, secure nation of farmers: ^
The principal basic unit of the community will be the 
rural family... producing food and other crops for its 
own and local consumption and export...The rural 
family will largely be dependent on the produce of 
the small-holding for its food. Hence not only must 
the farming system include efficient and non-wasteful 
methods, but it must also include the most suitable 
kinds and varieties of food crops and provision for 
storage against lean times. Furthermore, since the 
rural family will also be dependent largely on the 
small-holding for its income it will produce crops 
for sale.../T7t will...not achieve full security unless 
it grows a diversity of crops, in each case using the 
most suitable kinds and varieties. Finally, 
particularly in the case of export crops, the produce 
of the small-holder will need to be treated or 
processed and stored by the small-holder himself or 
by the Marketing Board or Co-operative Society which 
will handle his produce.
Cottrell-Dormer went on to outline an equally glowing
future for new crops, notably tea, suggesting that nuclear
estates could be used to teach villagers techniques of
production which could then be applied to their own 
65holdings. Following the establishment of suitable 
processing and marketing facilities, the proceeds from 
co-operative enterprises could then be used to re-purchase 
the nuclear estates from white entrepreneurs. Cottrell- 
Dormer was willing to concede that certain other activities
64. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 15 October 1946.
65. This and the following passage, including quotations, 
are drawn from ibid. Something similar eventually 
occurred with Highlands coffee plantations, but in 
an unsystematic way.
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would be necessary in a uself-governing and self-supporting 
community", which would have to "engage to some extent 
in secondary industry (including small village industries 
such as soap and sugar for local consumption) and will 
therefore include a proportion of teachers, clerks, artisans, 
technicians, traders and wage-earners of various kinds". 
Clearly, this would be a far different society from the 
one inherited from pre-war colonialism; and, indeed, from 
that which developed under the rampant white capitalism 
of the two following decades.
Cottrell-Dormer’s visionary schemes, like those of 
Groves at Education, had little chance of success without 
the full backing of the Australian government against the 
white power structure of the Territory. And even their 
partial acceptance was in jeopardy unless he could produce 
an administrative organization capable of dealing with at 
least some of the problems involved. There were technical 
questions concerning the suitability of crops and techniques 
for the New Guinea environment - for example, it was 
twenty years before tea was produced commercially in the 
country. Moreover, the concept of "small-holdings" ran 
counter to the communal system of land use and suggested 
a massive programme of tenure conversion if it were to 
be put into effect. There was a further difficulty in 
establishing holdings large enough to secure the 
diversification of planting the Director considered 
essential, while maintaining an economic unit for each 
crop. But the major problem was a social ones how were
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people already subjected to strong Western influences to
66be persuaded to stay at home?
Answers to such questions were not apparent from the
agriculture scheme which, like the education programme,
was expressed in broad terms and encompassed numerous
general goals. Nor did the structure proposed for the
Agriculture department give a clear indication of priorities
for development. The department in 1946 possessed five
divisions: agricultural extension, animal industry,
fisheries, production and marketing, and experimental
stations. These were intended to put new programmes into
effect, notably in extension and fisheries, and also to
continue long-standing activities, such as experimental 
67work. However, the most experienced, pre-war staff were
still interested in testing new crops, and so devoted
much of their attention to the experimental farms, leaving
the broader functions of extension and marketing to the 
68Director. This seems to have accorded with Cottrell- 
Dormer’s own wishes, but in engaging in field work he 
had to limit the attention he could pay to administrative 
issues. The combination of circumstances produced a 
department that was over-diverse for the amount of central
66. The task might have been less difficult had there not 
been an enormous growth of European interests under 
the ’’develop by white example" policies of later years 
(see Jinks, Biskup, Nelson (eds.), op. cit., pp. 354- 
¿4, 394-401), but it would still have been formidable.
67. For further details of the divisions’ functions, see 
Stanner, Transition, op. cit., pp. 148-50.
68. Experimental work was emphasised in Oottrell-Dormer's 
radio talk on agriculture plans of 5 November 1946, 
reproduced in Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 4, December 1946, p. 5.
direction that was available to it. J The problem of
diversified effort was accentuated by the difficulty of
recruiting the professional staff necessary to co-ordinate
the department's numerous activities. Following the very
poor reception accorded Cottrell-Dormer's establishment
70proposals by the Buttsworth investigation, the department
secured only 82 positions out of a public service of
711,583, or five per cent of the total. Of these, it
had filled 35 at 30 June 1947, giving it only 3.5 per cent
of staff engaged by that time. By mid-1949 the
department's establishment had grown to nine per cent of
the Administration's total, but it still engaged just
7.6 per cent of the staff on duty, giving it an employment
rate of 56 per cent, considerably lower than the District
Services and Public Health departments' and no better
than that of the Department of Education, which had begun
from a smaller base. Its main accomplishment at that
stage was engaging in field work, which provided a
relatively high ratio of departmental expenditure away
7Sfrom headquarters.
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69. This is not to say that the department's structure and 
plans were over-ambitious, as maintained by Buttsworth 
(see Chapter Six, pp. 368-9); they were no more 
elaborate than those for the Health department, but 
had less clear objectives and were not supported by 
Grunther's drive.
70. See Chapter Six, pp. 359, 368-9.
71. The statistics in this and the following passage are 
drawn from N.C.A.R., 1946/4 7, p. 14 and 1948/49, p. 17.
72. For comparative staffing and establishment figures, 
see Chapter Seven, pp. 403, 424-5, 440.
73. It was noted in Chapter Seven (p. 401) that in this 
respect the Department of Agriculture performed 
considerably better than the Education department; 
however, money spent on experimental work was of little 
immediate benefit to villagers.
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Different approaches to co-operatives
Cottrell-Dormer suffered from the further disadvantage,
in establishing his department’s role, of being a
newcomer to Papua New Guinea and therefore not a member
of the network of pre-war officials who exerted
considerable influence in the Provisional Administration's
advisory bodies.^ Nor was he able to win acceptance
among the pragmatists by achieving quick results in
developing village agriculture. These problems were
particularly important in determining the fate of one of
Cottrell-Dormer's key proposals: the development of
village enterprises through co-operative activity. In
his speech to the 1946 Mission conference the Director
suggested that one of the functions of his department's
Division of Production and Marketing would be the
"organizing and supervision of native co-operative 
75societies". This was an obvious development from the 
Division of Agricultural Extension's activities in 
encouraging the system of mixed small-holdings which 
Cottrell-Dormer saw as the basis for the country's future 
economy. Prior to this, however, there had been support 
for the co-operative principle in other quarters; it had 
been discussed in classes at the School of Civil Affairs, 
had been studied by C.J. Millar during his overseas tour,
74. For details of the personalities involved, see 
Chapter Six, pp. 342-51 . Nor was Gunther a member 
of the network, but he forced it to pay attention 
to his demands.
75. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 15 October 1946.
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and was one of the aspects of village participation
endorsed by G-roves in his proposals for a broadly-based
If)educational system. The establishment of a network 
of co-operative societies within the Territory thus 
provided a challenge to the Provisional Administration’s 
ability to co-ordinate its activities among several 
related agencies.
Prom the outset, there were different approaches to 
the co-operatives question, and rivalry between 
departments to capture the ’’co-operative” function for 
themselves. Cottrell-Dormer and G-roves saw the answer 
to greater village participation in the use of correct 
techniques by staff in their dealings with the people; 
broadly, this required less emphasis on direction and 
control. How this should be accomplished was less than 
clear. Outlining their work on extension projects at 
Madang, Wewak and in the Ramu Valley, officials of the 
education and agriculture departments later suggested 
that there was no particular solution to the problem of 
securing village participation; and in a passage as
7 0indefinite as the methods proposed, they noted:
76. See Chapter Two, p. 107, ibid., and Chapter Seven, 
pp. 457-9.77. T.P.&N.G-., Department of Education, ’’Community 
Development through Rural Progress Societies”,
South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 7, September 1951, p. 125.
78. This and the following passage, including the 
quotation, are drawn from ibid., pp. 125-6. Although 
the review was written long after the control of the 
co-operative movement was decided, the article itself 
v/as an attempt by the Education and Agriculture 
departments to justify their approach to the 
development question.
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The projects...illustrate the diversity of approaches 
which are being explored by the Extension Division 
of the Department of Agriculture, and are considered 
by that Division to indicate the pattern which 
community development may take through agricultural 
improvements. Neither communal enterprise nor individual peasant farming is paramount. Rather is 
the one considered as a joint effort to make 
techniques commonly known, with the possibility that 
improved individual peasant production may follow.
In any case, apart from individual preferences and 
economic possibilities, there is no preference shown 
by the Department for either form - the aim is 
toward increase of economic potential and improved 
standards of living.
The article concluded that there had been some success 
in encouraging new projects by use of non-directive 
techniques. However, all this was much too vague for 
field officers who were being asked, by both their 
superiors and the village people, for quicker, measurable 
results.
Owing to their numbers and the wide scope of their 
activities, the field staff, rather than the specialist 
officers of the Agriculture and Education departments, 
had first dealings with spontaneous economic movements 
in the villages. Following the first round of post-war
70patrols to the villages, it was reported: ^
The native peoples of the Territory are becoming 
increasingly aware of an organized economy. In several 
Divisions there is a general desire to band together 
in order to obtain more trade goods at reasonable 
prices, and through the same agency, to market 
whatever surplus food stuff, etc. they might possess. 
District Co-operative Societies are in the process 
of formation in connection with which all possible 
advice is being given by Administration officials.
79. P.A.R. .  1946/47, p. 14
500
There were several reasons for village awareness: the 
people’s observation of wartime activity and materials; 
the shortage of goods in European-owned trade stores 
and the high prices charged for them; direct encouragement 
from field staff who had developed an interest in 
village enterprises while at the School of Civil Affairs; 
and the accumulation for the first time of a limited 
amount of capital from war damage compensation payments. 
G-eneral European attitudes towards the village movements 
were unfavourable, being influenced by two main factors.
The first was the fear that the people were exhibiting 
anti-white attitudes; for example, it was reported with 
concern from the Milne Bay area that the people wished 
to "discontinue dealing with European stores other than 
for the purchase of bulk supplies". The other factor, 
linked to the first by European residents, was the 
appearance of some apparently cultist practices in 
association with village self-help projects.
Self-help movements
Representative of the self-help movements of the 
post-war years were the Christian Co-operatives of the 
Northern District and the movement led by Tomu ("Tommy") 
Kabu in the Purari Delta of the Gulf District. The 
Christian Co-operatives were encouraged during the 1930’s 
by an Anglican missionary working in the Gona area, but
80. Ibid., p . 1 9 .
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at that time they resembled church-sponsored communes
R 1rather than commercial enterprises. After the war, both 
Papuan and European missionaries sponsored the collection 
of money to establish trading ventures and classes were 
conducted in the principles of co-operation and "simple 
book-keeping". However, the villagers lacked the 
experience and guidance to move from the stage of popular 
effort to that of formal organization; there followed 
confusion over accounting for the money that had been 
collected and the people's enthusiasm waned, but not 
before magico-religious features began to appear in the 
garbled accounts of the co-operatives' aims. The "Tommy 
Kabu movement" began in 1945, immediately after Kabu's 
discharge from naval service.8  ^ He sought to introduce 
European goods and techniques to the Purari villages, 
drawing on his wartime observations in Australia and on 
suggestions and promises made to him by Australian 
servicemen. As in other popular movements of this kind, 
notably the cult which centred on the former sergeant- 
major Yali in the Madang District, the efforts of the 
leader and his lieutenants to explain things thay had 
seen in other places became associated with traditional 
beliefs and the teachings of the missions, so that 
rationally-based explanations were overlaid by notions
81. This and the following passage are drawn from 
South Pacific, Vol. 4 No. 11, November 1950, p. 210.
82. The situation is outlined in F.M. Keesing, The 
Papuan Orokaiva and Mount Lamington: Culture Shock 
and its Aftermath, Port Moresby, typescript. 1951 C?)•
83. The major account of this movement is R.E. Maher, New 
lien of Papua, Madison, Wis., University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1961. This and the following passage are 
drawn from pp. 55-76 of this study.
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O  A
of supernatural influences.  ^ Although Kabu was treated
with some understanding by field officers on the spot,
the Purari Delta movement was considered by the Department
of District Services to be a ’’cult” and therefore in
need of correction. This view differed from that taken
by senior officers of the Education and Agriculture
departments, who continued to encourage Kabu in his efforts
85at community development in later years.
The restrictive attitude taken by many - but by no 
means all - field staff towards the popular movements 
of this period was a result of their having been obliged 
to assume direct control of village situations when major 
disputes arose; the administrative structure and 
traditions of the Territory provided them with no approved 
alternative. Thus spontaneous activity was often 
viewed with apprehension, if only because it seemed to 
reflect on the officer’s ability to maintain control in 
his area. Prom this point of view, enterprises of the 
kind being encouraged by the education and agriculture 
authorities were so loosely structured as to be dangerous
84. For an account of Yali's movement, and an examination 
of its magico-religious associations, see Peter 
Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo, Melbourne, M.U.P., 1964, 
particularly Chs. 3-6•
85. T.P.&N.G., Department of Education, ’’Community 
Development in the Purari Delta”, South Pacific, Vol.
5 No. 10, December 1951, p. 208.
86. For an outline of the field staff’s administrative 
approach and traditions, see Chapter One, pp. 58-64 
and Chapter Seven, pp. 404-22. The field officer 
was placed at a relatively low level in a multi­
stage, strict hierarchy (see Jinks, op. cit., p. 75) 
which virtually demanded the adoption of authoritarian 
attitudes.
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to the processes of orderly administration. Once the 
apparently cultist activities appeared in these movements, 
it seemed highly desirable that the villagers’ efforts 
be channelled through stable institutions that could be 
comprehended by the field officers and, where necessary, 
controlled by them. For this reason the formal 
co-operative movement, based on Western practices, 
commended itself to the Department of District Services 
much more than did the amorphous groupings being 
encouraged by the Education and Agriculture departments.
District Services control of co-operatives
When the extension of village enterprises through 
some form of co-operative activity was proposed by Cottrell- 
Dormer to the Committee on Native Development and Welfare 
in 194-6 it was at first opposed by the Director of 
District Services, and by several of his senior officers. 
This was mainly because they wished to ensure that the 
field staff remained the dominant power at village level, 
although Gunther, who attended the discussions, maintains 
that the proposal was resisted ’’simply because it was
a n
new; Ivan Champion was horrified”. Nevertheless, the 
progressives had an initial victory when the Committee 
recommended that the co-operative movement should be
87. Gunther interview, 4 December 1968. Champion later 
recalled that he had initially told J.H. Jones that 
the villagers were ’’not sufficiently advanced” for 
co-operatives; by 1950 he had still not changed his 
views, recommending that the Native Plantations 
Ordinance concept be restored (P.N.G.IT.A., Box 320, 
item CA35/8/1, 5 May 1950). The Government Secretary
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encouraged, and that it should be fostered by the 
Agriculture department's Division of Production and 
Marketing, as envisaged by Cottrell-Dormer. This 
recommendation was eventually rejected by the Department 
of External Territories, and in 1947 a Go-operatives 
Section was set up in the Department of District Services 
and Native Affairs.
Subsequent developments showed that the District 
Services approach to co-operatives differed greatly from 
that of Cottrell-Dormer and G-roves. Two experts on the 
co-operative movement were brought to the Territory from 
New South Wales as advisers, and G.J. Millar, who was 
appointed the first Registrar of Go-operatives, spent some 
time in Australia studying societies and their activities
o othere. On the basis of his observations and the
advisers' reports, Millar then drew up a Go-operative
Societies Ordinance, using the New South Wales legislation
89as a model because it was the only one readily available.
This was an unfortunate move, since all of the complex 
principles of co-operation were incorporated in the 
Territory ordinance and proved over-elaborate for the 
conditions which then existed in the country. As Murray
(cont.) replied drily, "I do not feel that in the 
present form your recommendation is one that will receive 
the approval of His Honour the Administrator." (Ibid.,
11 May 1950).
88. P.A.R., 1949/50, p. 35.
89. Interview with Mr. H.H. Jackman, 17 September 1973.
Mr. Jackman later became Registrar of Go-operatives 
and in various capacities was associated v/ith the 
movement for 25 years.
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later observed, the ordinance was na poor thing” that
90did little to aid the development of the movement."
Even then, the ordinance was not promulgated until 1950, 
owing largely to the accustomed delays in Canberra, and it 
had soon to be supplemented by the simpler Native Economic 
Development Ordinance of 1951, under which the smaller
91and less sophisticated economic groups could be registered.
During the 1950’s the co-operative movement met with
some success, despite a lack of enthusiasm and occasional
92overt opposition from senior field staff. However,
for a variety of reasons, including the increasing
attractions of individual entrepreneurship, co-operatives
declined from the mid-1960's and their future is now in 
93some doubt.
The drafting of the Native Economic Development 
Ordinance showed that, as in several other areas, the 
junior staff of the Department of District Services were 
willing to adopt a less formalistic approach to 
development than were their superiors. Nevertheless, 
there was general agreement within the department that
90. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 168, item 1-9-2M, undated mid-1949; 
Murray’s opinion was expressed in a letter to 
Professor Mair, following publication of her Australia 
in New Guinea.
91. Por a more detailed discussion of the ordinance, 
see Legge, op. cit., pp. 216-9 and Mander, op. cit., 
pp. 275-4.
92. Interview with Mr. E. Graham, 9 May 1972. Jackman, 
who preceded Graham as Registrar, recalls that he 
urged his Director to pay more attention to extension 
through such institutions as co-operatives in order to 
secure the future of the department. The Director 
replied that ”he would not have his men become a bunch 
of green-grocers” (Jackman interview, 17 September 1975)
95. For statistics on the development of the co-operative 
movement, see Jinks, op. cit.. p. 109.
the field staff's approach was superior to the indeterminate
methods favoured by the education and agriculture
authorities. Cottrell-Dormer did not agree, and his
department continued to support village movements of two
kinds: broadly-based activities similar to those begun
before the war, notably the Mekeo rice scheme and the
Sangara coffee project; and ventures on a smaller scale
which were termed Rural Progress Societies. In an address
to the District Officers' conference in September 1949»
94Cottrell-Dormer stated:v
While the registered Co-operative Society is the ideal 
form of organization for native communal enterprises, 
it has been my view that many of our native people 
need to be guided through a simple form of organization 
before they are able fully to understand co-operative 
principles, particularly in regard to their control 
of finance.
The Director of Agriculture continued with a thinly- 
disguised attack on the attitudes of District Officers 
and their field staff:^
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I have often heard it said that the native has "no 
sense of responsibility". Prom my observations I 
suggest that it would be truer to say that he has 
little interest in any project unless he feels that 
he has a real stake in it.../H?7he native must be led 
to participate because he thinks it is a sound 
scheme....
Por another year Cottrell-Dormer encouraged the development 
of village schemes, but the tensions and lack of
94. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 320, item 35/8/1, 17 September 1949.
The paper, entitled "Native Rural Progress Society: 
An Experiment in Social and Economic Development", 
was later published in South Pacific, Vol. 4 No. 4, 
March 1950, p. 53.
Ibid. (South Pacific, p. 55).9 5.
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co-ordination between the Departments of Agriculture and
District Services became more obvious and the Director
found increasing difficulty in administering his
organization while also taking an active interest in field
work. In December 1950 he accepted reduction "by consent"
to the rank of Agricultural Officer G-rade 3, being
succeeded as Director by Mr. R.E.P. Dwyer, a former
96Mandated Territory officer. His plans for a nation of
independent farmers were overlooked for many years;
meanwhile, the co-operative movement remained firmly under
97the control of field officers.
Murray’s demand for guaranteed markets
During the immediate post-war years three main factors 
maintained European control of the Papua New Guinea 
economy: the restoration of the plantation system, the
limited nature of labour reforms and the structuring of 
village enterprises upon Western models. By the time 
the Provisional Administration's Economic Development 
Committee met in late 1947, any radical departure from 
established precedent was unlikely. Even limited change 
was proving difficult, owing to differences in strategy 
among the major developmental agencies. To some degree
96. P.N.G.N.A. Box 887, item GH47-13, 7 December 1950.
97. The co-operative movement came under the control of 
the Department of Trade and Industry in 1961 and
in 1969 was made the responsibility of the 
Department of Business Development. However, all 
white Registrars of Co-operatives were former 
field officers.
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these differences had arisen because no definite economic 
objectives had been set by the Australian government; 
and no further statements by the Minister were in the 
offing. The Economic Development Committee thus had 
little more to draw on than the opinions that had been 
expressed by the already overtaxed senior staff in Port 
Moresby. In this respect the thinking of the Administrator 
was of considerable influence.
During his survey tour of Papua New Guinea during 
1944, Murray became convinced that the islands could
98provide all of Australia’s needs for tropical produce.
At the time, the concern of Murray and the other members 
of the Directorate of Research for secure sources of raw 
materials was conditioned by the recent events of the war. 
However, their interest went much further than a narrow 
regard for Australia's future, since they considered the 
economic development of the Territory to be a valuable end 
in itself.  ^ Murray, in particular, saw the policy of 
the post-war years as springing much more from idealism 
than national self-interest, observing in his Macrossan 
lecture of 1947 that "such an aim springs inevitably 
from the heart of our democracy".10^ This is an important 
consideration in assessing Murray's major economic 
proposals, which involved Australia's guaranteeing Paoua 
New Guinea an assured market for all tropical produce that
98. Murray notes, pp. 40-7.
99. See, for example, Isles, op. cit.
100. Murray, Provisional Administration, op. cit., p . 18.
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the Territory could provide, from both existing plantings
and new crops, up to the maximum of Australia's
requirements. Murray’s proposal was not intended to
bind the Papua New Guinea economy to Australia's; rather,
it was a short-term measure aimed at providing a hedge
against possible problems in village production during
the initial stages of diversification. It was clear
from pre-war experience that villagers, like producers
anywhere, required a reasonable return if their interest
in economic projects was to be maintained. Incentives
would be even more important for the successful
introduction of new crops, such as vanilla, pepper, spices,
tea and fibres; and for the expansion of plantings that
had proved successful on European-owned holdings, notably
102coffee, cocoa and rubber. Since it was doubtful
whether small-holders could compete on world markets in 
the immediate future, Murray was in effect proposing 
that Australia go beyond the simple allocation of cash 
grants to the Territory by subsidising its village
103projects with special import conditions and tariffs.
Murray's approach to economic development was 
perhaps over-optimistic, in view of the fact that 
Australia possessed extensive tropical regions of its
101. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
102. For Murray's assessment of particular agricultural 
prospects, see his Provisional Administration,
op. cit., pp. 48-52.
103. The proposal was also related to Isles' recommendation 
that Papua New Guinea should itself be permitted to 
adopt a tariff structure favourable to village 
rather than European producers (see p. 469 of this Chapter).
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own, but he was well aware of the implications of his 
proposals. He made no reference to such crops as sugar 
and bananas, which had been established largely from Hew 
Guinea stock throughout northern Australia, and viewed 
such products as meat and rice as import-replacement 
commodities which would never be exported to Australia.
The proposals were not unreasonable, although Murray*s 
apparent assumption that the government was capable of 
entering upon such wide-ranging commitments make them seem 
idealistic.
Murray's idealism
In his attitude towards the economic development of
Papua New Guinea, Murray was an optimist. Like Oottrell-
Dormer, Murray sometimes made statements of the kind which
Stanner has criticised for being "on a high ethical level,
declamatory in tone, and in extremely general language".
At the mission conference of October 1946, for example,
1 r>5Murray advised the delegates:
We know...potentialities...to be high. Given the 
opportunity / Papua New Guineans_7 would develop as 
other peoples, including our own, but incomparably 
faster, owing to the possibilities afforded education 
by modern developments in teaching aids, such as 
visual education and broadcasting.
Referring to this speech in one of his many slighting
104. Stanner, Reconstruction, or, cit., p. 68.
105. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 14 October 1946;
the speech is quoted by Stanner, at somewhat greater 
length, loc. cit.
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observations on the Provisional Administration, Stanner 
later wrote, "It may not be unfair...to point out the 
strong resemblance between the Administrator's... 
statement...and the Trotskyist 'law of combined development', 
according to which extremely backward countries are 
supposed to be able to advance under certain conditions 
so rapidly that they can skip centuries of economic
•\ O f .development." However, as James McAuley pointed out,
the suggestion that the Administrator was "tainted with
Trotskyism" was part of Stanner's general attack on the
influence of the Directorate and those associated with 
107it. McAuley denied the "naive rationalist assumptions" 
attributed to the Provisional Administration by Stanner, 
although in cautious tones which suggested that McAuley 
himself doubted the practicality of some of the more 
ambitious schemes proposed for Hew Guinea. The exchange 
illustrated something of both the scepticism and 
defensiveness that were aroused by the Administrator's 
attitude. Even though his views were shown to be 
substantially correct by later events, it may be said 
that Murray's approach placed too much reliance on the 
good-will of others.
Economic Development Committee
That Murray's views influenced certain of his senior
106. Stanner, Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 69.
107. This and the following passage are drawn from an 
unreferenced paper by James McAuley, entitled 
"Comments on Part I of 'Reconstruction in the South 
Pacific Islands'" and dated 27 April 1948.
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staff is apparent from the report of the Economic
Development Committee, which was submitted in September 
1 Ofi1948. The committee comprised J.B. McAdam, acting 
Secretary of the Department of Forests, as chairman;
R.E.P. Dwyer, who later succeeded Cottrell-Dormer as 
Director of Agriculture; E.P. Holmes, Secretary of the 
Department of Lands; and C.J. Millar, of the Department 
of District Services. None of the members had been 
associated with the Directorate of Research and only Millar 
had previously played any part in discussing major changes 
in policy at the central level of the Administration.
It thus says a good deal for Murray's influence on his 
staff that the Economic Development Committee's report 
endorsed many of the proposals that had emanated from the 
Directorate's personnel, including Murray himself.
The report of the Economic Development Committee was
a more substantial document than the submissions of the
109committees on either Welfare or Social Development;
it comprised almost 200 pages and was accompanied by a
110second volume containing appendices and graphs. The 
committee intended initially to prepare a five-year plan, 
similar to that for the social development of the 
Territory, but soon concluded that this was impracticable 
for two major reasons: the lack of data on key aspects
108. T.P.-N.G-., Government House, Report of the Economic 
Development Committee of the Provisional Administration, 
2 volumes, Port Moresby, mimeo, 1948.
109. See Chapter Seven, pp. 457, 460.
110. Economic Development, op. cit., Vol. 2. There were 
statistics on business firms, existing and potential 
crops and various features of export production.
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of Papua New Guinea’s resources and the difficulties
and uncertainties which continued to dominate the post-war
years. With these factors in mind, the committee
followed the example of the groups which had examined
welfare and social development by attacking the
arrangements that had been made for staffing and equipping
the Provisional Administration. Its criticisms were
112similar to those noted in earlier Chapters, concentrating
on unsatisfactory recruitment levels, low salaries, poor
conditions of general employment and accommodation, and
113deficient shipping and supply services. The growing
frustration with delays in Canberra was reflected in the
committee’s proposals to give greater authority to the
Territory Administration. The report first pointed out
that effective planning required the allocation of
sufficient staff, and the provision of finance on a
long-term basis; the Territory public service would then
be able to draw up its own programmes. Provisional
Administration staff would be posted to Canberra to
interview all applicants for the expanded service, in order
to provide ’’accurate information of conditions of
employment, and life in the Territory, and /"ensure that_7
there would be fewer disappointments on arrival in the 
114-Territories”. With a more stable service, the 
Administration would carry out its own resources surveys
111. Ibid.. Vol. 1, p. 15.
112. See Chapter Six, pp. 319-33 and Chapter Seven, 
pp. 463-4.
113. Economic Development, op. cit., pp. 16-21.
114. Ibid ., p. 17.
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in order to provide the basis for sound planning.
Owing to the protracted nature of the work, "scientific
personnel seconded from Australian Institutions for short
periods...are not the media required for this work...
/”0ur_7 officers will have a lifetime of useful work ahead
of them and their experience in the Territory, as they
pass from active field work to Administrative positions,
116will be invaluable to the Service". In effect, the
report challenged the very bases of Canberra control over 
the Territory: finance, staffing and research.
Development finance and administration
In the body of its report, the committee discussed a
variety of technical matters associated with labour supply
and with agriculture, forestry, fisheries and mineral
production, concluding, as had Murray, that there was
potential for greatly increased production within the
country, but that special considerations were required if
117success were to be assured. These included the measures
that had been stressed by the Directorate and the
Administrator: legislation based on the British Colonial
Development and Welfare Acts; and the guarantee of markets
in Australia, particularly during the establishment phase
11ftof new ventures. To carry out even its basic programmes 
in the Territory, the committee pointed out, "Australia
115* Ibid., p p .  46- 5 6 .
116. Ibid., p p .  47-8.
1 1 7 . Ibid., p p .  86-187, 194.
118. Ibid., p p .  36-45.
115
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obviously is committed to an Annual Expenditure of
£4,000,000. To stabilise the position, to provide for
continuity of development and assure uniform development
in the two Territories as well as offering an earnest to
the World of her intentions with regard to the Trust
Territory, it is most desirable that Australia should
bring down a ’Welfare. and Development Act for Papua and
New Guinea’ to guarantee these finances for at least ten 
119years.” Moreover, it was ’’necessary for Australia to
appreciate the unstable position of undeveloped Papua and
New Guinea attempting to break into...markets in crops
such as rubber, cocoa, coffee and tea...and to realize
that she must take special steps to stabilise the market
for these Territory products....” Decisions of this
kind were essential in order that clear objectives could
be set for the country’s development, not only in the
economic sphere but also to ensure effective participation
1 21by the people of the country:
It has been laid down that the local people shall be 
prepared for ultimate self government, but this is too 
general a statement for this Administration to work 
to...the Australian Government must prescribe the 
steps towards that end. It would seem that the 
present Administration should be a model for the 
ultimate Administration and that the simplest way to 
that completely native Administration would be by 
gradual displacement from the bottom up as the native 
peoples become experienced and capable of carrying the 
functions and responsibilities of higher positions of 
Administration. The Committee does not see how the 
native people can avoid following the same steps in 
the fields of Commerce and Industry.
119. Ibid., p. 199.120. Ibid., p. 197.121 . Ibid., p. 195.
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While emphasising the role of the people in developing 
their own country, the report noted that European-owned 
enterprises would be required to maintain production and 
export levels for "two or three decades”.122 Moreover,
”good” settlers could provide more regular assistance to 
the people of many areas than Administration officers, who 
would be able to visit villages only occasionally; no 
further settlement should be considered, however, until a 
full resources survey had been completed. J
To ensure that development plans, once drawn up, were
effectively implemented, the report recommended that the
existing advisory committees on welfare, economic and
social development and finance should be replaced by a
1 24-Central Development Board. The chairman of the Board
would be an officer working not in "any one department
but...in close liaison with all. He should, in fact, be
the economic adviser to the Administration and be directly
1 25responsible to the Administrator.” It would be impossible
to conduct planning entirely at the central level, however, 
particularly in the absence of much essential data, so 
that a good deal of responsibility would rest on the 
field staff to ensure that programmes were sensible and 
were being carried out or amended, as necessary. District 
Development Committees should therefore be established,
122. Ibid., p. 198.
123. Ibid., pp. 199, 194-5.
124. Ibid., p. 68.
125. Ibid., pp. 67-8. The close resemblance between the 
committee's proposals and the structures eventually 
established is discussed later; the point to be noted 
here is that it was twenty years before the 
necessary organizations were set up.
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comprising the District Officer as chairman and the senior 
officers of the departments represented in the district, 
together with representatives of "Missions, planting, 
commercial and native interests" co-opted by the District 
Officer.126
The Committee regards the establishment of these District 
Development Committees as the basis on which overall 
Territorial Planning should be built. The appointment 
of District Development Committees would result in the 
most beneficial co-ordination of departmental 
development activity at the District level.
In addition, co-ordination of programmes would be required
when they affected more than one district, but at a level
which would allow greater responsiveness to local
conditions than would generally be possible in Konedobu.
The Committee therefore recommended the establishment of
three to five "Provinces", each headed by a Provincial
Commissioner who would be chairman of the Provincial
1 27Development Committee. On the basis of programmes drawn
up at the provincial level, departmental, headquarters 
v/ould submit plans to the chairman of :he Central Development 
Board, who v/ould be responsible for "reshaping and 
reforming" them prior to their consideration by the full 
Board. The plan for the whole Territory would then be 
"broken down into s series of Provincial , District and 
Village projects". The organization pro posais, like those 
for developmental legislation, borrowec from British
126. This passage and the following quotation are drawn 
from ibid., p. 69.
127. This and the following passage a:e drawn from ibid., 
pp. 69-71.
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thinking, modified via the Directorate of Research, but 
the fact that they were not wholly original did not detract 
from their value: their use of other colonial experience 
stood in marked contrast to Australian policy of the 1950's, 
while their stress on an adequate balance between economic 
and administrative development compared more than 
favourably with the 1960's approach.
Need for Australian support
The reports by the three committees on New Guinea 
development were clearly not disinterested in their 
presentation. Their exhortatory tone, primarily when 
dealing with the problems of the public service, could have 
little appeal to officers of the Department of External 
Territories who, with their own tenure guaranteed, were 
remote from New Guinea problems and no doubt believed that 
their efforts to reclassify the Territory public service 
had not been appreciated. A more general criticism may 
be levelled at the very sweeping nature of the decisions 
being urged on the Australian government, with little 
supporting data on the use to which money grants would be 
put; and with no apparent appreciation of the domestic 
and international political implications of such things as 
preferential tariffs for Territory products. The reports
128. Eor later policy statements on the strategy of the
Liberal-Country Party government, see Jinks, Biskup, 
Nelson (eds.), op. cit., pp. 374-5, 384-7, 397-9*
The beginnings of this strategy are discussed in 
Chapters Ten and Eleven.
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were unsophisticated documents, but this was to some 
extent related to the lack of data upon which programmes 
could be based; the committees recognized this fact and 
made their recommendations accordingly. More importantly, 
the committees were not reporting on the merits of a 
policy framework proposed by the government, in an orthodox 
bureaucratic manner. Rather, they were acting like 
pressure groups, seeking to hold Cabinet to its promises. 
This role was forced upon the committees by the 
circumstances of the time: of the other interested parties, 
white settlers had shown themselves hostile to the 
principles enunciated by the Minister; the Department of 
External Territories remained uncommitted to them; and the 
people of the Territory were unable to press their own 
case. For a colonial bureaucracy, the Provisional 
Administration found itself in a most peculiar situation.
It has been shown, however, that the staff of the 
Territory public service were far from united in support 
of post-war policy and programmes. In many fields the 
senior staff lacked the convictions or the drive to give 
effect to plans that had begun as no more than vague 
promises. Nevertheless, by the end of 1948 some changes 
had been instituted, more in the area of social than 
economic development. Once begun, these programmes 
dominated the administrative effort of the Territory public 
service for more than a decade, with particular attention 
paid to the health and education programmes; to local
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government and the co-operative movement; and to 
agricultural extension. During that time the field staff 
slowly moved towards non-directive techniques in dealing 
with the people. The changes were created from an amalgam 
of pious pre-war hopes and sweeping wartime stratagems 
derived from British precedents, gaining acceptance through 
the steady, if sometimes naive, promptings of Murray and a 
handful of his supporters. All of this was achieved with 
minimal initiative from the Australian government. Yet 
once the reconstruction phase had been passed in Papua 
New Guinea, it became essential that the government take 
more positive steps, either by producing detailed plans of 
its own or by delegating a large measure of planning 
authority to the Territory Administration. Unless that 
were done the new programmes were bound to lose momentum: 
they had survived on the enthusiasm of the few and were 
handicapped by the absence of defined goals and the 
continuing opposition of major interests. By the end of the 
decade it was apparent that, even under a sympathetic 
Minister, the post-war approach could produce no more than 
a series of unco-ordinated, incremental decisions of a 
relatively minor nature. Unsympathetic control might even 
lead to a rejection of some of the Provisional 
Administration’s gains. The key issues of Murray’s 
remaining years in office thus mainly concerned relations 
between New Guinea and Australia.
CHAPTER NINE
MURRAY'S AUSTRALIAN BURDENS
Ward and the settlers - Ward wades ahore 
Murray and Ward - The Garden affair - Mr. 
Chambers and the Papua and New Guinea Act - 
The Halligan handicap - Murray and the white 
community - Murray's situation, 1949 
Controversy on Bougainville - Colonel Allen 
and Rabaul - Administrator's office made a 
political issue - Australian planning: an 
exercise in futility - Mr. Chifley intervenes 
The 1949 committees - Apparent progress: 
further delays - Executive Council fiasco
Ward and the settlers
In examining the relationship between Australia 
and Papua New Guinea during the post-war years it is 
first necessary to summarise the various aspects of the 
Australian government's influence on the Provisional 
Administration. In the preceding five chapters the 
emphasis has been on the situation within the Territory, 
with occasional references to the role of the Minister
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for External Territories and his Department. Discussion 
of the Australian approach to New Guinea must now centre 
on Mr. Ward and his staff and on their effectiveness in 
gaining acceptance for the government's policy. The 
Minister's role in this area was also of importance to 
the Administrator, who was in particular need of public 
support. Attention must also be paid to Murray's 
dealings with the community at large, particularly in 
relation to the major controversies which arose within 
the Territory. These factors, in combination with the 
efforts of the Provisional Administration, are the 
background against which the fate of the post-war 
reformist policy was decided.
It has been suggested in previous Chapters that 
Ward's attitude to New Guinea affairs was of little 
benefit to the Territory Administration: he found 
colonialism distasteful; experienced difficulty in 
dealing coolly with those who, in his view, gained from 
it; and showed little inclination to provide Ministerial 
direction in promoting its aims, even when they seemed
i
benevolent in their effects. The Minister’s role during 
the 194-0's created even greater problems for the 
Territory than have so far been indicated. These arose 
irom a combination of Ward's public image and the personal 
difficulties he encountered during the post-war period.
’1 . See Chapter Two, pp. 84-90 and Chapter Dive, p. 264 
passim.
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When Mr. Y/ard was first appointed Minister for
External Territories in September 1943, the reaction
among the exiled settler community was, ironically,
relatively favourable. Their relations with the previous
Minister, Senator J.M. Eraser, had not been happy. The
Pacific Islands Monthly maintained that "Territorians",
as it termed the various European groups, had been
"sickened and disheartened" by a "long line of Ministers
who were little more than rubber stamps. Mr. Ward may be
irresponsible and class-conscious to a degree, but he is
2no rubber stamp." It believed that the new Minister would
make decisions "idependently of bureaucratic promptings",
provided that he did not come to be dominated by people
with "cockeyed notions" about New Guinea. He would either
be the man the Territories had been waiting for, or the
"quaintest misfit" in the history of the islands. The
settlers' first impressions were good. A formal delegation
from the Pacific Territories Association saw Y/ard in
December 1943 and reported that they had enjoyed their
"most satisfactory meeting yet" with a Minister; they were
particularly pleased with the "keen interest and appreciation
•5of evacuees' difficulties" shown by him. The Pacific 
Islands Monthly editorialised that the Minister was a
4"'Yes' or 'No' man" who had given fresh hope to the settlers.
The honeymoon between Ward and the settlers was
2. This and the following passage, including quotations,
are drawn from P.I.M ., Vol. 14 No. 3, October 1943, p. 8. 
5* P .1*M., Vol. 14 No. 5, December 1943, p. 11.
4. Ibid.
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short-lived. By April 194-4 there were complaints that the
Minister, although in office for six months, had provided
none of the decisions the Europeans had hoped for and had
otherwise done very little to loosen Angau’s tight control
5over Papua New Guinea. A great deal was thought to 
depend upon Ward's first visit to the Territory, which was 
to take place from 17 to 29 April 1944; changes were 
expected once the Minister saw conditions for himself.
Ward was accompanied by the Secretary of his Department,
J.R. Halligan, but of considerably more influence were two 
advisers from the Directorate of Research: Colonel A.A.
gConlon and Lieutenant-Colonel R.D. Wright. The party 
visited Port Moresby, Lae, Finschhafen and nearby areas, 
talking mainly with Army commanders and Angau officials, 
but also on occasions addressing gatherings of village 
leaders. The official reports of these discussions indicate 
that the Europeans concentrated on their own problems, 
notably the lack of shipping to supply their plantations 
and transport their produce; while the villagers were 
promised more schools, hospitals and general welfare services 
by the Minister. There would have been nothing untoward 
about the tour, apart from tension between the Directorate
7officers and some Angau staff, had it not been for an 
incident which, although minor in itself, had an enormous 
impact on everyone associated with New Guinea: it was 
taken up by the Australian press and for the rest of Ward's
5. P*I.H., Vol. 14 No. 9, April 1944, p. 4.
6. The material in this and the following passage is drawn 
from CRS A518, item B800/1/7, 17-29 April 1944.7. See, for example, Chapter Two, p. 126.
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term as Minister was used to characterise his attitude 
towards the Territory and its people.
V/ard wades ashore
On 18 April 1944 Mr. Ward was taken on an Army workboat 
to Papa village, a coastal settlement a few miles west of
Q
Port Moresby. This village, like most in the area, was 
fringed by shallow water, so that dinghies grounded some 
distance away from the beach. It had long been the 
practice for white visitors to be carried ashore when 
situations of this kind were encountered. The merits of 
this custom were debatable, even though great significance 
was attached to white dignity. To wade ashore in boots 
was uncomfortable, while to remove them was even more so, 
owing to the sharp coral fringing many beaches. However, 
to be carried ashore was itself undignified, since the 
European usually perched precariously on the linked hands 
of two villagers, with an arm around the neck of each.
When the Ministerial party arrived at Papa, the Angau 
commander, Major-General Morris, was first ashore, 
following the accepted colonial practice of being carried 
there. Mr. Ward, however, elected to wade to the beach, 
minus shoes and socks and with his trousers partly rolled 
up. He was there photographed by the correspondent 
accompanying the party and the photograph soon appeared
8. The material in this and the following passage is based 
on CRS A518, item B800/1/7, 18 April 1944 and on my 
own experiences of getting to shore by both of the 
methods discussed.
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in most Australian newspapers, being republished at
regular intervals to illustrate stories about Mr. Ward.^
It shows the Minister wearing a lounge suit, but no tie,
and a solar topee. The rolled trousers are wet and disclose
what might have been termed "well-shaped calves”. With
his suit coat thrown back and his hands on his hips, Ward
seems to be exchanging comments with an Army officer and
appears to be relaxed and enjoying himself. It was reported
at the time that the Minister refused to be carried ashore
because he believed that such an action would have demeaned
the villagers called upon to do it; but I believe he was
a sensible man who, having just witnessed the Major-
General's progress to the shore, considered it more
dignified to walk than be carried. In any event, when
questioned about the incident following his return to
Australia, Ward told reporters he had waded ashore to show
the people that Australians were not "weaklings” and
because he disagreed with such a colonialist practice.
"The chap who thinks it necessary," he said, "probably
thinks we ought to use the stock-whip to display our
10superiority. But I am no Simon Legree." The New Guinea 
whites were unimpressed. The Pacific Islands Monthly 
stated that the villagers were "primitive folk" who set 
great store by "a master’s behaviour and appearance".
They would be upset by a Minister "performing in this 
fashion on the beach", like "a sand-boy pursuing worms"
9. The settlers saw the picture in P .I.M., Vol. 14 No.
10, May 1944, p. 7.
10. Sydney Mirror, 6 May 1944.
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and would consider him to be "something nothing", or a 
11nonentity. To hammer home the point, Europeans concocted 
expressions, obviously spurious because of the language, 
by which the villagers were alleged to have referred 
to the Minister: they included "kanaka belong Sydney"
(or, sometimes, Australia) and "masta pissim pants".  ^
Whatever the merits of Ward's action, he had presented 
his opponents with the powerful weapon of ridicule.
Murray and Ward
Prom the time of his New G-uinea tour, the Minister's
relations with the white community rapidly deteriorated
1 3in the manner outlined in Chapter Two. There were
occasional press comments indicating some sympathy with
Ward's point of view, notably after his speech on the
Provisional Administration Bill in July 1945, but by 1946
1 4these had virtually disappeared. So, it seemed, had 
Ward. With the departure of Conlon, there was no one to 
stimulate the Minister's interest in New G-uinea affairs, 
so that after the first flurry of activity in 
re-establishing the civil administration there was a 
gradual decline from the war-time vigour of policy-making.
11. P.I.M., loc. cit.
12. The word "kanaka", without adjectives, is not used by 
New Guineans in a pejorative sense, although often 
employed in that manner by Europeans. The second 
expression would have been constructed quite 
differently, and "pants" is not a pidgin word.
13. See Chapter Two, pp. 95-7.
14. Even the praise was faint; after the July 1945 speech 
the Hobart Mercury merely suggested that Ward 
"deserved credit" for his "keen interest" in New 
Guinea. (Mercury, 5 July 1945).
528
This was partly because Ward chose to endorse a distant 
relationship with his Administrator, despite the urgency 
of the tasks to be carried out in Papua New Guinea. On 
12 November 1945 the Minister directed that all formal 
communication from Port Moresby should be through the 
Secretary for External Territories.1  ^ This was a reversion 
to the early years of Sir Hubert Murray’s tenure, when 
he had addressed his official correspondence to Atlee 
Hunt; in later years Sir Hubert had written directly to
■y r
the Minister and, in some cases, to the Prime Minister.
It is not hard to see the source of this direction.
Halligan had no wish to be overborne by an Administrator 
who exercised the pov/er that Sir Hubert had enjoyed in 
his later years; and certainly not by one who had very 
recently been one of Halligan's rivals at the Directorate 
of Research. He had therefore persuaded Ward to adopt 
strictly formal administrative procedures.
The legal position was debatable, however. Section 
9 of the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act 
stated that the Administrator was "charged with the duty 
of administering the government of the Territory on 
behalf of the Commonwealth", and Section 10 that he was 
appointed at the pleasure of the Governor-General. On 
the other hand, Section 11 provided that the Administrator
15. In a confidential letter which I have not seen.
However, its tenor is apparent from Murray's reply, 
which is noted in footnote 17, below.
16. This is apparent from a comparison of the correspondence 
references for the early chapters of West, Hubert 
Murray, op. cit., with those for later chapters.
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should perform his duties "according to such instructions
as are from time to time given to him by the Minister".
There could be differences of interpretation on the status
conferred on the Administrator by Sections 9 and 10,
taken together, in comparison with Section 11. Replying
to the Minister's direction concerning channels of
17communication, Murray argued:
In view of the provisions of Section 9 of the Papua- 
New G-uinea Provisional Administration Act 1945 which 
makes the Administrator responsible to the Commonwealth 
Government - I consider, with respect, that the 
Administrator may communicate direct with the Minister 
and that it is intended or inferred that he is 
not to be confined to communicating with the Minister 
through the civil service.
Murray therefore proposed a compromise. While not
18refusing to comply with Ward's direction, Murray observed:
It is clear that, in general, correspondence will, as 
you direct, be addressed to you through the Secretary 
of the Department. I propose, however, that, in 
exceptional cases, you permit correspondence be 
addressed direct to you.
This was the practice which Murray then followed,
regularly urging action from the Minister on such matters
as the public service, the School of Pacific Administration,
judges' appointments and the formation of the Executive 
1 9Council. J
This episode showed something of Ward's attitude
17. Confidential letter from Murray to Ward, 27 December 
1945, in my possession. Emphasis in the original.
18. Ibid.
19. See Chapter Six, pp. 331, 389-90 and later in this 
Chapter.
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towards his responsibilities to Papua New G-uinea. He was
ready to have all information on Territory problems
filtered through an organization which had been opposed
to his most trusted wartime advisers in the Directorate
of Research. Ward must have been aware of the effects of
this arrangement on his proposed New G-uinea reforms:
those measures which had emanated from the Directorate of
Research - and which he had endorsed in his speech on the
Provisional Administration Bill - were bound to meet
obstruction in the Department of External Territories.
Even more revealing of Ward's tactics in this impasse was
his suggestion that Murray could write directly to him,
provided that the letters were "confined to the expression
20of personal viev/s in a non-official capacity" . Such an
arrangement, between men who were not personal friends,
could only have been destructive of the morale in his own
tKe
Department, while reducing/Administrator to the role of
21supplicant and tale-teller. Murray replied that he 
considered such a practice "inadvisable". "I do not care 
very much for unofficial correspondence," he continued, 
"though I realise that there are cases in which it 
performs a useful function...In those cases in which the 
matters raised are such that they should not go through
routine official channels, confidential but official
22documents would, I think, meet requirements." Through
20. This is the phrase used by Murray in his reply; it 
was probably identical with the Minister's own words 
of 12 November 194-5.
21. Similar tactics had been employed by Atlee Hunt in 
Sir Hubert's early days; see West, Hubert Murray. 
op. cit.. p. 53 et seq.
22. Letter of 27 December 1945.
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this rebuke, Murray may have lost an opportunity for 
exerting some influence on Ward, although it is doubtful 
whether the offer of private correspondence was anything 
more than a sop intended to persuade Murray to accept the 
formal Ministerial direction. In any event, this early 
exchange of letters showed that neither man understood 
the other1s personality.
Relations between Murray and Ward were not improved
by later contact: the Minister usually kept Halligan by
him during conferences with the Administrator, and Murray
soon formed the impression that Ward deferred too much
23to his Department; that Halligan "slowed him down".
Like his predecessors, Murray was experiencing the
disadvantages of being far removed from the centre of
power in Canberra. This problem could not be overcome
by the trips to Australia which Murray made three or four
times a year, and so it became imperative that the
Minister should tour the Territory to gain first-hand
knowledge of the situation there. However, it was not
until early 1948 that the Minister announced his intention
of visiting the islands, despite earlier rumours that he
24would make the trip. At that time controversy arose
23. Murray interview, 12 December 1966. This is the 
strongest criticism of Ward made by Murray in letters, 
notes or interviews for this study. Contemporary 
correspondence noted elsewhere (including later in 
this Chapter) indicates Murray's impatience with 
Ward, however. Apparently at a loss to explain Ward's 
lack of action, Murray at one time conjectured that 
the Minister may have tolerated Halligan1s ineffectual 
efforts because they were both Catholics; it is more 
likely that neither had a grasp of the Hew Guinea situation.
24. P .I.M ., Vol. 18 No. 4, November 1947, p. 3. Later rumours were reviewed in P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 11, June 1948, p. 8.
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over the "New Guinea timbers case", which is discussed 
below, and the tour was postponed. In the event, Ward 
did not return to New Guinea, so that in more than six 
years as Minister he visited the Territory only once, 
and not at all in the years of the Provisional 
Administration.
The Garden affair
Ward's role as Minister was further affected by his
involvement in what became generally known as the "Jock
Garden case". In January 1948, John Smith Garden, a
longtime associate of the Minister, was charged on three
25counts of fraud. It was alleged, among other things, 
that Garden had in November 1945 signed Mr. Ward's name to 
a letter which falsely stated that a lease over timber 
stands in the Bulolo Valley of the Territory of New Guinea 
had been granted to a syndicate of speculators. The 
syndicate then accepted £50,000 from the Brisbane firm of 
Hancock and Gore for their non-existent interest, Garden 
sharing in the proceeds. Garden v/as eventually convicted 
and sentenced to three years gaol; an appeal against thep c.conviction was dismissed. In his evidence Garden 
maintained that the Minister had been involved in the 
conspiracy and this led to a great deal of speculation
25. The material in this and the following passage is drawn 
from a file of press clippings in the library of the 
International Training Institute (formerly A.S.0.P.A.). 
See also P.I,M., Vol. 18 No. 6, January 1948 to No.
11, June 1948, for a detailed account of the case.
26. P.I.M., Vol. 19 No. 8, March 1949, p. 7.
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about the relationship between the two men. They had 
been close political associates; Garden had been 
Secretary of the New South Wales Labor Council for some 
twenty years and had, with Ward and two others, been a 
Lang Labor member of the House of Representatives from 1934 
to 1937. In 1942 Carden had been appointed an officer of 
the Department of Labour and National Service, of which 
Ward was the Minister at the time, and had stayed on there 
when Ward moved to Transport and External Territories in 
1943. However, Garden had retained his office near Ward's 
Ministerial suite in the Commonwealth premises in Sydney, 
even after the Labour department had moved to another 
building; this had given Garden access to the Ministerial 
notepaper upon which the forgery had been uttered. Garden 
had even gone so far as to use a Department of External 
Territories typist to re-type a letter of complaint from 
one of the parties being defrauded, so that when it reached 
V/ard it would contain no reference to the activities of 
Garden and his associates.
When these facts were presented to the court there 
were many people willing to believe that the Minister had 
at least been aware of what had been happening for more 
than two years, if not a party to the fraud, as alleged 
by Garden and an accomplice. Ward gave evidence that he 
was unaware of Garden's activities and, under cross- 
examination, was attacked by the counsel for the defence 
as an "unmitigated liar, quite unworthy of the slightest
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credence in any court whatever”, upon whose evidence
27"nobody would dream of hanging a dog". Further hearings 
were held on different charges, so that the various trials 
of Garden and his associates spanned more than twelve 
months. Towards the end of this period the government 
bowed to Opposition demands for a Royal Commission into 
the allegations against the Minister and this enquiry began 
on 1 February 1949, publishing its findings on 24 June 
of that year. The Royal Commission exonerated Ward from 
any complicity in the dealings of Garden and his 
accomplices, but by the time this finding was made public 
the Minister had been associated with the various 
allegations for eighteen months. The attack on Ward by 
Garden's defence counsel was also publicised and led to 
an exchange in the House of Representatives between the 
Prime Minister and Opposition members, so that political 
issues were added to the legal difficulties already facing 
the Minister.
The effect of this imbroglio on Papua New Guinea was 
disastrous. From having a Minister who was at least 
committed to the post-war policy in principle, if reluctant 
to put it into practice, the Territory came to be 
burdened with a man who could take no interest in its 
affairs and whose association with the country had become 
an embarrassment. During the course of the Garden trials 
there had been demands from the Opposition, and suggestions
27. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 8, March 1948, p. 7.
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in the Australian press, that Ward resign. Such an action 
could only have benefited Papua New Guinea, which still
awaited the legislation to create its permanent
28Administration. However, for a variety of reasons 
concerning the alliances within the labor party as well 
as the reputation of the government, Ward remained; at 
the establishment of the Royal Commission he merely "asked” 
to be relieved of his Ministerial responsibilities for 
the duration of the hearing. Mr. Cyril Chambers, Minister 
for the Army, was appointed acting Minister for External 
Territories in his stead. Chambers performed these 
duties for some seven months, and the degree of Ward's 
neglect of New Guinea affairs can be gauged from the acting 
Minister's efforts in securing some action, notwithstanding 
the limitations placed upon him by his temporary 
appointment.
Mr. Chambers and the Papua and New Guinea Act
Ironically, Chambers' first decision as acting 
Minister was that he would visit Papua New Guinea; indeed, 
the cablegram advising the Administrator of the temporary 
appointment also outlined arrangements for the acting 
Minister's tour.^' Accompanied by Halligan, Chambers 
spent ten days in the Territory during January 1949» 
providing such groups as the Public Service and Planters'
28. The passage of the legislation, and other matters 
relating to policy, are discussed later in this 
Chapter.
29. CRS A518, item AA800/1/7, 31 December 1948.
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Associations with their first opportunity for many years 
to air their grievances directly to a Minister. There 
was nothing unusual about the visit; its most constructive 
aspect was that Chambers assured the Administrator and
his senior staff that greater attention would be paid to
30oustanding matters. Chambers then took to Australia a 
list of the issues requiring attention and decision, 
setting a precedent for later Ministerial visits, and 
illustrating the earlier lack of action by Canberra.
During Chambers' term as acting Minister he also
secured passage of the Papua and New G-uinea Act. The
legislation, which had been delayed pending Parliament's
approval of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of
New G-uinea, was eventually tabled in the House in June
1948, but further delays occurred while the terms of the
amalgamation of New Guinea and Papua were referred to the
31United Nations. Owing to various objections from within
the U.N., the legislation was withdrawn for redrafting and
was re-submitted to Parliament only in February 1949.
The eventual passage of the Act was peculiar, in that the
Speaker of the House ruled that any debate touching upon
Ward's administration of the Territories portfolio would be
sub judice, since the. Royal Commission into Garden's
32allegations was then conducting its hearings. The
30. This and the following passage are based on ibid.,
11 to 21 January 1949.
31. See Chapter Five, pp. 304-5.
32. The debate is in C,P,D., Vol. 201, pp. 250-7, 735-77, 
842-920, 968-88 (H. of R.), 1098-1143, 1241-4 
(Senate); 15 February, 1, 2 and 3 March (H. of R.),
9 and 10 March (Senate) 1949.
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debate on the Papua and New Guinea Bill was therefore 
largely irrelevant to the situation in the Territory, 
concentrating mainly upon the question of defence, virtually 
the only issue with which Ward had not been closely 
involved. The legislation was passed in March 1949? but 
did not become operative until the following July, just 
as Ward resumed his duties as Minister. In more than four 
years of peace-time control the Labor government was able 
to provide New Guinea with a permanent form of administration 
for only the last few months of its tenure.
The Halligan handicap
Not all of the blame for Australian neglect of the 
Territory’s post-war problems can be placed on Cabinet 
and the Minister. Notwithstanding the lack of direction 
by Mr. Ward, the Department of External Territories 
showed a lack of understanding of the New Guinea situation 
and an indifference to urgent issues that eventually 
amounted to serious negligence. The weakness of the 
Department and the rigid attitude of its Secretary have 
been noted in previous Chapters, as have some of the delays 
which arose from the Department's inability to cope with 
the work load placed upon i t . ^  These problems occurred 
largely because the Department could not shake itself free 
from the pre-war limitations which its senior officers 
had come to accept as the norm. As Murray has expressed
33. See Chapter Two, pp. 81-4; Chapter Five, pp. 283-8;
and Chapter Six, pp. 331-3, 375.
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it, "A major difficulty throughout the 1945-50 period was
that the prewar...administration of the Department of
External Territories (and its predecessors) had been in
relation to grants of a few tens of thousands of pounds
(to Papua only)...and did not adjust...with any degree of
34facility to thinking in millions.” The Administrator
saw the Canberra authorities as being ”overwhelmed” by the
scale of the Provisional Administration’s demands, often
because Halligan remained ’’timid” in requesting and
allocating finance, apparently in the belief that the
supply of money would suddenly be cut off by a change of
35policy or of government. Murray has said that his plans
’’suffered critically as a consequence”, particularly in
36the fields of education and agriculture.
Compared with the initiatives of the Directorate and 
the commendable improvisation being practised in New 
Guinea, the lack of vigour in the Canberra Department 
proved more than usually frustrating to Murray, whose 
attention came to centre on Halligan as one of the main 
causes of delay. In his published observations on New 
Guinea, and in his notes, letters and general conversation, 
Murray has been over-scrupulous in his remarks about 
individuals. His comments on Halligan thus carry more 
than usual weight because of their tone. Murray 
considered the Secretary ”a suave no-man, precedent-bound
34. Murray notes, pp. 63-4.
35. Ibid., p. 38.
36. Ibid♦, p. 64.
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and scared of decisions, with inferiority feelings from
his dealings with Sir Hubert Murray...He was the most
37difficult man I have ever had to deal with.” Halligan's 
impressions of the Administrator have not been recorded, 
but even their non-official correspondence was most 
formal, with Halligan often addressing letters "Hear 
Colonel" and Murray, in his usual fashion, writing, "My 
Hear Halligan".^8
Halligan was in an invidious position, handicapped
from 1946 by a Minister who showed less and less interest
in the portfolio.^8 It was partly for this reason that
the Secretary had difficulty in securing adequate staff
increases from the Public Service Board. His Hepartment
was thus overwhelmed by the great increase in correspondence
and general activity that followed the resumption of
civil administration. Moreover, he had been belittled
and criticised by Conlon and his staff, who had little
appreciation of the controls under which the Hepartment
40and its Secretary were required to operate. He was 
understandably suspicious of those, including Murray, who
37. Murray interview, 12 Hecember 1966.
38. P.N.G.N.A. Box 168, item 1-9-3H, January 1946 - June 
1950.39. The problems of the Hepartment have not been studied 
from its files. The following is based on interviews 
with people who worked in the Hepartment or were 
associated with it during this period, notably Mr.
W. Grainger (13 Hecember 1973); Mr. J. Legge (18 October 1972) and Mr. V.H. Parkinson (16 September 1970).
40. This problem continued into the post-war years. When 
Conlon was Principal of A.S.O.P.A. he bought books with 
money donated by Sir Edward Hallstrom without observing 
Treasury regulations. Halligan refused to approve the 
expenditure and was accused of "obstructionism" by 
Conlon (Parkinson interview, 28 August 1973).
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had been associated with an organization that was so 
obviously antagonistic towards him. Nor can Halligan 
have been reassured by Conlon's efforts to usurp the 
functions of the Department through the Pacific Territories 
Research Council.
When full allowance is made for these circumstances, 
however, Halligan must still be considered seriously 
at fault. He failed to delegate responsibility to his 
subordinates, laboriously writing minutes in long-hand 
as he had in more leisurely times, and he consequently 
surrounded himself with files. He, as much as anyone, 
was responsible for the bottleneck that developed in the 
Department. As its Secretary, it was his responsibility 
to alleviate the organization's problems; he had ample 
time to do this between 1946 and 1951, when he was 
finally removed from the position. However, his only
41response was to attempt reorganizations of his Department, 
an orthodox step which was completely inadequate under 
the changed circumstances of the post-war period. His 
determination to retain responsibility which it was beyond 
his capacity to discharge was one of the major causes of 
the Provisional Administration's problems. An officer 
of his standing should have re-ordered priorities and, 
where necessary, delegated to Port Moresby responsibilities 
which could not adequately be discharged in Canberra. His 
lack of perception in the changing situation, coupled
41. Halligan's assessment is noted later in this Chapter
("The 1949 committees"), and see also Chapter Five,
pp. 284, 286.
541
with what Murray has termed his "atavistic" attitude to 
42policy, meant that he was a serious hindrance to the 
post-war effort in Papua New Guinea. It is possible to 
have some understanding of Halligan's difficulties, but 
difficult to sympathise with his ineptitude.
Murray and the white community
Handicapped in his dealings with the white community 
by a Minister who had become an object of both ridicule 
and suspicion, and by a Department in Canberra unable to 
hasten the decisions urgently needed by the Territory, 
Murray found it increasingly difficult to obtain general 
support for the post-war policy. Nor did he possess the 
relaxed social manner that might have permitted him to 
publicise the policy discreetly in the milieux favoured 
by the Territory's Europeans: the Papua Club, the R.S.L., 
the Planters' Association, the Chamber of Commerce. The 
Murrays therefore behaved as if their social outlook were 
perfectly acceptable to the European community. The 
first test came soon after Murray's appointment. In March 
1946 the Administrator asked to lunch at Government 
House two men from the Mekeo area of Papua who had recently 
arrived in Port Moresby after spending some time as 
conscripted labourers for the Japanese in Rabaul. Included 
in the invitation were six senior officials, of whom four 
attended. The settlers were horrified and their reaction
42. Murray notes, p. 38.
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to the event gives some indication of the gulf that still 
existed between white attitudes and the post-war policy.
A correspondent to the Pacific Islands Monthly asked 
indignantly why European prisoners of war could not have 
been invited and suggested that the Papuans, ’like many 
other Mekeos, ran away from the carrier lines on the 
Kokoda Trail...Old residents do not like Mekeos... 
generally they are born thieves, and untrustworthy.”4"^
The correspondent pointed out, ’’Rightly or wrongly, we 
cannot live in this country as the equal of the native at 
this stage of his development. We can only be here as 
his superior - or not at all.” Such attitudes could be 
countered only with the constant, close support of the 
Australian government - something which Murray never 
received.
The white reaction to the ’’Government House 
luncheon” episode - led, according to Mrs. Murray, by 
the managers of the main commercial houses in Port Moresby, 
such as Burns Philp - was to boycott functions held by 
the Murrays. Government House invitations were then 
issued only to those Europeans, mostly officials, who were 
willing to be present with Papuans.4'4' The boycott lasted 
for several months until, Mrs. Murray has said, ”We were 
given to understand that invitations would be welcomed.” 
This incident, more than any other, led to Colonel Murray's
43. The material in this and the following passage, 
including quotations, is drawn from P .I.M ., Vol. 16 
No. 9 , April 1946, p. 11.44. This and the following passage are based on an 
interview with Mrs. Murray, 14 December 1966.
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being dubbed "Kanaka Jack”, but he gave no sign that it 
interfered with his relations with the settlers. Over 
the years the Administrator conducted a steady, polite 
correspondence with a variety of planters and businessmen, 
usually in response to complaints about general
4-5conditions or against particular field officers. Most 
of the letters came from people Murray had met on his 
numerous tours of the Territory, and although it was 
often a month or more before Murray answered, his replies 
were always extremely cordial, with the Administrator’s 
usual concern for correctness, often containing personal 
compliments about the state of a mission or plantation 
or the generosity of hospitality.
Murray's concern for the outlying areas of the
Territory was maintained after his intensive tours during
46the rehabilitation phase of the civil administration,
and it was through these that he made his main impact on
the people. Towards the end of 1950, for example, when
Murray was 61, he made one of his regular visits to the
Western District of Papua, one of the most difficult and
47sparsely-populated parts of the Territory. Plying to 
Daru from Port Moresby, he then went by aeroplane and 
launch to the navigation limit of the Mai Kussa River,
45* This correspondence is contained in P.N.G-.N.A. Box 
166, items 1/7/15, 16 and 19 and in Boxes 168-72, 
item 1-9-3A to Z.
46. See Chapter Pour, pp. 238-42 and Chapter Six, pp.
327-8.
47. This and the following passage are drawn from P.N.G-.N.A 
Box 200, item CA1/6/41, 2-8 October 1950.
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and with a party headed by the acting Director of District
Services walked to Rouku patrol post, a new station in
the area. After spending a day at Rouku, he then completed
the two-day walk back to Daru before going on to a
48similar tour of the Southern Highlands District. This 
was quite in the tradition of Sir Hubert Murray; and 
there were other features which had impressed white 
observers after the early shock of Murray*s attitude 
towards the village people. After observances in September 
1947 to commemorate the Australian wartime landing at 
Scarlet Beach, near Finschhafen, one of the Europeans 
present observed, **We did not know before that the 
Administrator was a ‘Digger* in the old 18th Battalion 1st 
AIF. His dignity and bearing at the Finschhafen show
coupled with those two rows of war ribbons gave him added
4-9prestige.... * Murray’s role as the agent of a new 
regime for New Guinea created schisms within the 
orthodoxy of European thought, while sometimes placing 
him in some personally embarrassing positions. In mid-1948, 
at the height of the public service unrest over delays 
in granting salary increases, he was snubbed by Europeans 
attending a cricket match in Port Moresby between the
50town's European club and a team from Hanuabada village.
A report in the Pacific Islands Monthly maintained that 
the incident arose from public servants' dissatisfaction
48. No walking tours were conducted by later Administrators, 
whose ventures away from aircraft and ships were of
a purely token nature.
49. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 3, October 1947, p. 73.
50. This and the following passage are drawn from P.I.M., 
Vol. 18 No. 12, July 1948, p. 23.
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with Canberra’s neglect of their conditions of service, 
rather than from disapproval at the Administrator’s 
attitude towards Papuans. However, his meeting with the 
Papuan cricketers was accompanied by "surly” greetings 
from Europeans. The episode led to a reaction among some 
whites: the president of the cricket club resigned in
protest. The Pacific Islands Monthly correspondent 
observed:
The cricket ground incident...does not stand to the 
credit of the European community. Colonel Murray, 
as Administrator, carrying out the policy laid down 
for him by the Socialists in Canberra, is in a 
difficult and most unenviable situation. Even 
although (sic) we do not like his native policy, 
we must agree that he has done nothing to forfeit 
the respect of Territorians; and the attitude of 
Europeans towards him should be dictated by that 
knowledge, and the fact that he is a cultured and 
courteous gentleman.
This was an indication that Murray’s commitment to change 
was causing a few Europeans to re-examine their own 
attitudes: the Administrator was creating a conflict
between the belief in white superiority and European 
respect for authority.
Murray's situation, 1949
Murray's gains had been only slight, however, as 
Osmar White pointed out in a cynical but perceptive study 
of the Administrator in September 1949, when Murray had 
been in office for almost four years. Painting him as
51 . This and the following passage, including the
quotation^, are drawn from P,I.M., Vol. 20 No. 2, 
September 1949, pp. 45-7.
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a rather forlorn and lonely figure, White wrote:
His Honour the Administrator...is the instrument of 
External Territories Minister Eddie Ward and 
Secretary Joe Halligan, who is reported once to 
have said to a Territorian in an unguarded moment, 
"governments come and Governments go, hut I go on 
for ever!" Murray is a man whom few love, most 
respect and almost all pity. When far enough gone 
in the charity of rum, the rough, tough goldminers 
of the Watut and Edie Greek say of him, "Why the 
poor blankard only gets 2,500 a year! A man’d he 
a mug to do the work for that much a month!"
White commented that Murray, being "an idealist, a 
scholar, a gentleman", was "one of the poorest politicians 
and most faithful civil servants a shrewd Permanent 
Secretary ever dreamed to see hired". He had, however, 
received little support:
If Murray were hacked by a Government that had any 
real understanding of the task it has given him, he 
might succeed - or, at least, pave the way for 
future success. But he has not received any 
intelligent direction in high policy, nor the 
sympathy, support, or clear delegation of authority 
that would do much to offset the handicaps under 
which he now labours.
Murray’s approach differed widely from that of the 
pre-war period:
The present Administrator is no admirer of the methods 
of the late Sir Hubert Murray...who thought even 
missionary school-masters who educated their scholars 
to the third standard were a pack of interfering, 
disruptive busy-bodies. Such an interpretation of 
the moral responsibilities of metropolitan 
government offends J.K. Murray, to whose humanitarian 
mind even a laissez-faire imoerialism is abhorrent.
52. The apocryphal nature of at least some of White’s
story is apparent from his use of the wrong name in 
referring to Halligan, who was known by his second 
Christian name as "Reg.".
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White was sceptical of the Administrator's belief that 
the people of New Guinea could transform themselves within 
a few generations, but he showed little sympathy for the 
prejudiced whites, approving the Administrator's 
attitude towards them: "These he coldly ignores as 
self-seekers.. .."
On the other hand, White was misled by Murray's 
refusal to enter into recriminations against his superiors, 
seeing this as the attitude of "a man of rigid principles 
and rigid mind". White obviously had little knowledge 
of the frictions that had already arisen between Port 
Moresby and Canberra, or of the continuing frustrations 
that had, for example, led Murray to upbraid the Minister 
for his continuing failure to appoint more judges to the 
Territory's Supreme Court:
Much more confidence with regard to important matters 
in New Guinea Administration would be brought about 
if you were to arrange for the expiditing of the 
appointment of the additional judges whose services 
are urgently required. You will recollect 
representations by letter and radio to you with 
regard to this matter.
It was not, as White suggested, "For him established 
channels are sacred, the discipline of the bureaucracy 
inviolate." Rather, the situation had been reached where 
Murray was receiving almost no effective support, except 
from a handful of his senior officers. But he was not 
one to discuss such things with journalists.
53. P.N.G.N.A. Box 887, item GH47-3, 22 December 1948.
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Controversy on Bougainville
The Administrator*s problems were increased by a 
mounting cycle of criticism in both New G-uinea and 
Australia. On several occasions, lack of action by the 
Australian government gave rise to complaints and crises 
that the Provisional Administration was called upon to 
remedy, but with inadequate resources. When dramatic 
improvements did not occur, the same critics shifted their 
attention to Ward and the government, who in defending 
themselves paid even less attention to the immediate 
problems of the Territory. The major controversies, which 
centred on conditions on Bougainville and at Rabaul, 
developed into attacks on the government by some of the 
most conservative elements in the Territory and the 
Australian parliament. They also illustrate the effectiveness 
of the Provisional Administration’s response, under 
extremely difficult conditions, and indicate the problem 
of developing effective village programmes v/hen so much 
attention had to be paid to countering the pressure of 
European interests.
The Bougainville issue stemmed from a concern for the 
welfare of the people, but developed into a political 
controversy within which village conditions almost came 
to be ignored. It came to public attention in late 1946, 
when Monsignor Hannan of the Catholic Mission at Torokina 
wrote in the journal Catholic Missions that there had
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been no changes on the island since the end of the war;
the people there had suffered severely from the Japanese
occupation, more than in most other districts, and
54Monsignor Hannan felt deeply about this. The matter
was taken up in Canberra and Port Moresby and it was
pointed out that special relief had been provided from
Australia, with officers of the Provisional Administration
buying seeds and animals in northern Queensland and
distributing them in Bougainville from a ship specially
allocated for the purpose. p The main problems were to
re-establish taro gardens to provide the people with their
staple pre-war food and to increase medical treatment to
the level provided by Angau; staff in the district were
already more numerous than in January 1942, but it was
difficult to do more, owing to similar demands from many
other parts of the Territory. The Monsignor was far from
happy with these efforts, however, and during a visit to
Australia in early 1947 he warmed to his theme, stating,
’•More people have died in Bougainville in the last
eighteen months - under Australia rule - than during the 
56war.” He claimed that 8,000 people in all had died 
since the beginning of the war and that 4,000 of these 
had died since August 1945; in all, one quarter of the 
population had perished. The Monsignor then approached 
the Minister for Immigration, Mr. A.A. Calwell, with a
54. The material in this and the following passage is 
drawn from CRS A518, item CI840/1/3, October-
December 1946.
55. Ibid., 27 December 1946.
56. Melbourne Herald, 1 April 1947.
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request that food supplies be given to the Catholic Mission
57for distribution to the people; the proposal was refused.
Monsignor Hannan was subsequently reported to have
denied his claim about the death-toll in Bougainville,
but in what Gunther has called a ’’fit of pique” at
Calwell’s refusal of special aid to the mission, then
58demanded that food be flown to the island. There followed
5q
questions in the House of Representatives, and Murray 
was finally presented with the problem of extricating the 
government from a full-blown political controversy. In 
June 1947 he went to Bougainville, having, ironically, 
postponed his trip slightly for the second missions 
conference. With the Bougainville situation a matter 
of special importance to the government, the Administrator 
was provided with the frigate H.M.A.S. Condamine, upon 
which he took a large party that included four department 
heads. In ten days the main part of this group, including 
Murray, walked for more than ninety miles through the 
villages of south-west Bougainville. It was a notable 
expedition for an Administrator with so many other urgent 
tasks, and one in which Murray showed the combination of 
punctilio and vulnerability that puzzled many of his 
subordinates while creating genuine regard among those 
who had some understanding of his character. Dr. Gunther,
57. Gunther interview, 4 December 1968.
58. Sydney Sun, 3 April 1947; Melbourne Herald, 10 April 
1947.
59. C.P.D. t Vol. 191, p. 1300, 16 April 1947.
60. The material in this and the following passage is 
drawn from P.N.G.H.A. Box 163, item GH2—7—2, 15 
July 1947.
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who was a member of the party, recalls that Murray made 
a point of changing into fresh clothes before entering a 
new village and of going through all of the patrol 
ceremonial, which included greetings with village officials 
and saluting the flag. On one occasion he slipped over 
during this ritual, causing sarcastic comment among some 
of the accompanying group; and on another occasion fell 
while walking between villages, but kept on despite a 
painfully swollen ankle. In Gunther's words, "Murray was 
all brass, and you couldn't do other than respect the 
man.
The inspection party reported that, while conditions 
in the south-western part of Bougainville had probably 
been worse than in any other part of the Territory, the 
situation had clearly improved. 5 There had been 25,000 
Japanese in the area and once their supplies had been 
cut off they had engaged in wholesale looting of villages 
and gardens, including cutting down tens of thousands of 
coconut palms to obtain the "cabbage" portion at the base 
of the fronds. As a consequence, by August 1945 the 
death rate had grown to massive proportions, owing to 
starvation and disease. The situation had been stabilised
6 1 . Gunther interview, 4 December 1968.
6 2 . Murray was "brave", says Gunther, who recalls another 
incident at Manus, after the naval base was sold to the 
Nationalist Chinese and left in charge of a U.S. Navy 
lieutenant, who had allowed Chinese troops to guard 
the gates to the base. Upon Murray's arrival, the 
guard challenged him with bayonet at the "high port". 
"Murray didn't flinch," Gunther says. "He went back, 
dressed in his uniform and then blew hell out of all 
and sundry. The Navy transferred the Lieutenant very 
smartly."
6 3 . This and the following passage is drawn from CRS A518, item CI840/1/3, 3 and 8 July 1947.
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within twelve months, so that by the time of Monsignor 
Hannan’s complaints rehabilitation had begun. Murray
noted:^
I went to Bougainville, as did at least some of the 
party, with considerable misgivings as to the state 
of affairs we should find. While there is general 
and great regret at the ghastly occurrences / of the 
war_7**»I feel that the future can be regarded with 
considerable confidence...Having seen over 5,400 
people...I am glad to be able to report that I did 
not see a single case in which the individuals 
appeared to be other than well fed. There were 
certainly no cases which could possibly be 
described as approaching starvation.
The party reported, however, that there were still great
problems, mainly arising from the shortages of shipping
and medical personnel. This brought no response from
the government, other than a note on file to ’’follow up
the matter with the Directorate of Shipping” . The issue
had been defused by Murray’s visit to Bougainville, and
particularly by his establishing close relations with the
Catholic Bishop and Monsignor Hannan, with whom he had
spent several days both before and after his patrol through
the villages. There were no further comments from the
mission, although a statement by Monsignor Hannan in
March 1948 suggested that his views on Hew Guinea were
a little peculiar and that he had a penchant for making
spectacular remarks to the press. He suggested that the
Army should again be called in to "show the flag" to the
people of Bougainville, who might be ready for a "slight"
65measure of autonomy, "perhaps in fifty years". In the
64. Ibid., 8 July 1947.
65. Melbourne Herald, 13 March 1948.
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meantime, Australia would be well advised to secure the 
islands by having the Chinese populate them! On this 
occasion his comments drew no reaction from press or 
parliament. Bougainville slipped to the background of 
Australian consciousness until the discovery of copper 
there twenty years later.
Colonel Allen and Rabaul
The other major public controversy of the post-war
years, which began over conditions in Rabaul, was restricted
to white interests and showed the selfishness and malice
of the European community in their attitudes towards the
Provisional Administration. The central Territory figure
in this episode was Colonel H.T. Allen, who provided
further ammunition for an attack that had already been
launched on the government by Mr. T.W. White, a Liberal
M.H.R. from Victoria. In April 194-7 White moved that a
select committee of the House inquire into conditions in
New Guinea, with particular emphasis on economic matters,
the ’’unbalanced native policy” and unrest in the Territory 
66public service. Drawing to some degree upon reports in 
the Pacific Islands Monthly, White aimed a sumber of his 
criticisms specifically at the Provisional Administration, 
rather than at the government in general. He adopted the 
settler argument that pre-war conditions should be 
re-established in the islands through aid to white
66. The material in this and the following passage, 
including quotations, is drawn from C.P.D., Vol.
191, pp. 1814-26, 16 April 1947.
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plantations and enterprises, complaining of shortages of 
labour, shipping and materials of all kinds. Some of 
Vrnite’s comments were sound, including his account of 
conditions within the public service; but in the manner 
of partisan debate, Mr. Ward answered mainly with bland 
assurances and some jibes of his own at "exploiters" and 
"vested interests", assuring the House at one point, "If 
there is any unrest in the public service then it exists 
only in the minds of certain disappointed people." With 
this lack of balance on either side the actual conditions 
in Papua Hew G-uinea once more became of secondary 
importance, particularly after Colonel Allen became involved.
Allen, who had been mining at Wau before the war, 
moved to a plantation near Rabaul in 1946; in May of the 
following year he adopted the stance of settlers' 
spokesman, making a series of complaints in an article 
published by the Pacific Islands Monthly under the title, 
"What Is Wrong With New Guinea Administration: Colonel 
'Blue' Allen Deals With Muddled Situation - With The Cloves 
Off".67 rpkgn ¿uring a visit to Australia a few months 
later, Allen claimed that he had been appointed the New 
Guinea delegate to the annual conference of the Australian 
H.S.L. in October 1947, saying that he intended to press 
for a higher price for copra and the restoration of the 
Legislative Council, with provision for European 
representation. It appears that the New Guinea branch
67. P.I.M.. Vol. 17 No. 11, June 1 9 4 7, pp. 13-14.
68. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 3, October 1947, p. 25.
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of the R.S.L. may have acquiesced in Allen’s arrangements
after he made them, but he was not their formal delegate;
since a large number of returned soldiers in the Territory
v/ere public servants, they did not wish to have their work
criticised by a man who so clearly represented plantation 
6qinterests. However, Allen addressed the Australian
conference and later claimed to have secured endorsement
of a number of resolutions, mainly dealing with New G-uinea
70land and related matters. His greatest impact came with
statements to the press, claiming that whites in New
Guinea were living in tents while villagers were being
71provided v/ith specially-built houses. There were, he
said, vast areas of "idle” land in New Guinea; if Australia
wished to hold the islands it should settle them as soon 
72as possible. Approving his attack on the government,
the Bulletin was wary of giving full credence to Allen’s 
7'5claims:
The colonel painted pictures of natives housed in 
model dwellings at the cost of the Commonwealth 
taxpayers, and of one village (it was destroyed 
accidentally) rebuilt at a cost of £150,000, while 
white women lived in tents and shacks in a mass of 
mildew, and returned soldiers, prepared to pioneer 
the worst climate within the Australian ambit, were 
denied the rights of Commonwealth settlement, 
war-service homes and repatriation.
Allen achieved his effect when, in early November, he was
6 9. This assessment was given by Mr. I. McDonals, a public 
servant and member of the Port Moresby branch of the 
League (CRS A518, item U800/1/7, 3 November 1947.
70. P .I.M., Vol. 18 No. 4, November 1947, pp. 18-19*
71. Melbourne Sun, 26 September 1947.
72. Melbourne Argus, 30 October 1947.
73. Bulletin, 5 November 1947.
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interviewed by both the Prime Minister and Mr. Ward and
advised that an MinvestigationM would be carried out into 
74his claims.
Allen had made his first official complaints to the 
department of Post-War Reconstruction, supplying one of 
its officers with a set of photographs which purported to 
show the poor conditions under which the Europeans of 
Rabaul were living. They included photographs of tents 
said to be occupied by whites; and houses, allegedly built 
by the Administration, allocated to New Guineans.  ^ Allen 
further alleged that European entrepreneurs had been 
refused supplies of timber from the only sawmill in Rabaul, 
owned by the Administration. However, by the time of 
the Prime Minister’s intervention, investigations had 
begun which led to the discrediting of Allen’s main claims. 
As early as 5 November 1947 the Deputy Director of Post- 
War Reconstruction at Port Moresby visited Rabaul on 
instructions from his head office, reporting that the 
Administration had allocated timber to settlers, but that 
some had failed to collect their quotas; that the ’’native” 
houses in the photographs had been built by their owners 
from timber salvaged from the tunnels constructed by the 
Japanese under the hills of Rabaul; and that the tents
74. According to the report supplied by Allen to the 
Pacific Islands Monthly, he saw the Prime Minister 
in company with a ’’resentful” Mr. Ward, but the 
official records suggest that Allen was asked by Mr. 
Chiflev to explain his allegations (P.I.M., Vol. 18 
No. 4,' November 1947, p. 18; GRS A518, item U800/1/7, 
3 November 1947).
75. GRS A518, item U800/1/7, 3 November 1947.
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allegedly occupied by Europeans were work shelters on 
property owned or leased by Allen himself. The report 
continued:
Although much is written and reported in Southern 
Papers regarding G-overnment Control stifling individual 
effort, there is not much evidence to show it. While 
undoubtedly there is some truth in such reports, much 
is grossly exaggerated...and, as is well known in 
this country, small grouches rapidly assume enormous 
proportions...A further impression I have gained is 
that at present the endeavour is not really pointed 
to "rehabilitation" of properties, but to the 
immediate effort of making as much money as possible 
in the quickest time, whether it be from plantations, 
or from Surplus Army Equipment....
The Deputy Director concluded that the publicity Allen had 
received was "not welcomed" by the people in Rabaul, but 
that they nevertheless objected to a number of post-war 
restrictions imposed by the Australian government, 
particularly on shipping, the marketing of produce and
77such "minor matters" as the use of dynamite in fishing. 
Ex-servicemen in private enterprise appeared to be "quite 
unanimous in their criticisms of the policy laid down by 
the Commonwealth G-overnment, in respect of the Territories, 
and consequently a feeling of antipathy is being built up 
against the Administration. All complain of frustration 
on the part of the Administration (whose duty it is to 
carry out the G-overnment' s policy)...." The report 
disclosed a situation that was beginning to appear in 
most parts of the Territory: a tendency to blame the
76. The material in this and the following passage, 
including quotations, is drawn from ibid.
77. The "blown" fish were usually fed to plantation
workers.
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Australian government rather than the Administration 
for continuing problems.
Administrators office made a political issue
The government showed little further interest in 
the Rabaul issue after Allen had been more or less 
discredited. Nor did Murray attempt to capitalise on the 
political situation by pressing for special consideration 
for Rabaul; it was far from being his highest priority. 
However, Allen's attacks provided further material for 
the Opposition to continue the campaign launched by Mr.
White in April 194-7. In November Mr. Anthony, a Country 
Party member from New South Wales, returned to the New 
G-uinea theme because, according to the Pacific Islands 
Monthly, Allen had found on his return to Rabaul "that 
public affairs had deteriorated further in his absence"
and the "promises" made to him by the Prime Minister were
7Q ftf)not being kept. Mr. Anthony's urgency motion condemned:
The complete breakdown in the proper administration 
and provision of services in the Territories of 
Papua and New G-uinea, and particularly the failure 
to provide reasonable accommodation for many white 
men and women, the breakdown in continuity of fresh 
food supplies and essentials, and the unsympathetic 
attitude of the responsible Minister towards 
Australians attempting to re-establish themselves 
in these Territories.
78. The impression was confirmed in a reoort by Melrose, 
who also paid a special visit to Rabaul; ibid.,
28 November 1 94-7 .
75. P . I .M., Vol. 18 No. 5, December 1947, p. 10.
80. The material in this and the following passage, 
including quotations, is drawn from C.P.D., Vol.
195, pp. 2928-38, 28 November 1947.
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Anthony was supported in the ensuing debate by White, 
and although their exchanges with Ward were little more 
than a repetition of their respective bigotries, they 
showed that the Opposition was building up sources of 
information in the Territory that were an embarrassment 
to the Minister. In his reply Ward relied heavily on the 
report compiled for the Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction and it began to appear that he and his 
Department were out of touch with events in key areas of 
Papua New Guinea. The need for a Ministerial visit was 
increasingly obvious. When Parliament resumed after the 
Christmas recess, White revived his motion calling for a 
select committee into condition in the Territory. After 
yet another airing of the same grievances and counter­
accusations, the motion was defeated on 4 March 1948.®^ 
Thus in five months of argument, political forces in 
Australia failed to advance conditions in Papua New Guinea 
in any measurable way. The issue slipped from public 
attention for a few months before being revived at the 
end of 1948 by Ward’s involvement in the ’Garden case”, 
which damaged morale in the Territory even further.
By the time the Labor government was defeated at the 
election of December 1949, its New Guinea policy, the 
Minister and the Provisional Administration had, 
separately or in varying combinations, been the subjects 
of more than four years of almost continuous dispute.
81. C.P.D., Vol. 196, pp. 385-92, 4 March 1948.
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The issue was a minor one in Australian politics, hut
it marked an important change from the pre-war period,
when the major parties had been interested in little more
than Papua New Guinea’s importance for Australia’s 
82defence. The partisanship of the post-war controversy 
had unfortunate effects on the later administration of 
the Territory. Firstly, the settler viewpoint gained 
much greater attention than it had in earlier years, at 
the expense of village interests. Secondly, the Provisional 
Administration in general, and Murray in particular, were 
associated with the Labor cause; even though Murray had 
never been a member of the Labor Party, it was almost 
inevitable that he would be viewed with suspicion by a 
non-Labor government. Thirdly, the office of Administrator 
itself developed certain political associations; after 
Labor’s defeat, the Provisional Administration came to be 
referred to as the ”Ward-Murray regime” The Liberal- 
Country Party victory in 1949 thus opened the way to an 
essentially political reaction in Papua New Guinea: one 
which Murray had done nothing to invite, but which Ward's 
conduct had made almost certain.
Australian planning: an exercise in futility
By 1949 New Guinea's problems and shortcomings, 
which could have been excused during the immediate post-war
82. See Chapter One, pp. 39-40, 67-8.
83. See, for example, P.I.M ., Vol. 21 No. 4, November
1950, pp. 10-11.
561
period, were almost indefensible. In particular, there
was a lack of direction in policy. That this was entirely
caused by the Australian authorities will be apparent from
a review of planning for Papua New G-uinea under the Labor
government. The Commonwealth Inter-Departmental Committee
on the Territory, whose recommendations on the resumption
of civil administration were noted in Chapter Five,®^ was
revived in April 1947 after some two years of complete 
85inactivity. It comprised representatives of the 
Departments of External Territories (Mr. Halligan, chairman), 
Treasury, Post-War Reconstruction, Commerce and 
Agriculture, and Works and Housing. Its first meeting 
consisted of "preliminary discussions" and its next three 
were devoted to an examination of a proposed timber project 
in the Bulolo Valley, so that it was not until early 
August that the committee was able to consider the major 
questions of New G-uinea development. At this fifth 
meeting the committee reached the unremarkable conclusion 
that "a physical survey, including a topographical 
investigation of communications, water and power resources, 
should be made to determine the production potential of 
the Territories". Its second recommendation was astonishing: 
"that the British Colonial Office be approached with a 
view to obtaining the services of suitable personnel to
84. See Chapter Five, pp. 257-9.
85. The records of the Inter-Departmental Committee and 
the Cabinet Sub-Committee to which it was supposed to 
report, are in CRS A518, items C and D927/1; notes 
on the 1947 meetings are contained in Halligan 
papers. Box 2, item 1. The information in the 
following passage has been drawn from a summary of the 
various committees set out in item C927/1, 22 
September 1949.
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assist in carrying out the survey and to perform such
other duties as may he required".
While the notion of drawing on comparative experience 
was one which had been urged on the government for 
several years by the Directorate and Murray, the committee 
showed an extraordinary lack of perception in supposing 
that the Colonial Office would be able to spare more than 
one or two observers. Moreover, it was typical of the 
Commonwealth bureaucracy's arrogance in dealing with 
Papua New Guinea affairs that Murray was not consulted 
on the use of British personnel, nor on the possibility 
of the Provisional Administration's being provided with 
additional staff and finance to begin the survey itself. 
Predictably, the British authorities declined the 
Australian invitation, but the committee continued to look 
to the United Kingdom for assistance, while taking no 
further action of its own. In early 1948 an official of 
the British Overseas Pood Corporation suggested during a 
visit to Canberra that the British and Australian 
governments might set up a joint survey team, "composed 
of approximately twenty scientific personnel and crop 
specialists". This second scheme was rejected by the 
British government in September 1948. In the meantime, 
the Inter-Departmental Committee had followed the example 
of its predecessor by suspending its operations, having 
given no consideration whatsoever to any of the multitude 
of other problems that faced the Territory.
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After sixteen months of sporadic discussions, the
second Commonwealth Inter-Departmental Committee had thus
produced nothing to assist the Territory. This marked
the third failure by the Canberra authorities to provide
86planning support for the Provisional Administration, and
was one of the factors that led to the preparation of the
reports, discussed in the two previous Chapters, by the
Territory committees on social development, welfare and
economic development. The reports bore a note on the
cover that they were intended specifically for the Inter-
Departmental Committee, but there is no evidence that
they were ever brought to the attention of the government.
This was partly because the Inter-Departmental Committee
had lapsed, in its turn, by the time the Administration’s
reports reached Australia; the last official record of
its meeting as a formal group is for 1 October 1947.
During the next eighteen months some of the items that
the committee had placed on its standing agenda were
dealt with in the Papua and Dew G-uinea Bill, but these
were mainly machinery provisions; a review of the situation
in 1949 reported that the "major part of the work" had
87still to be done."' It was a lamentable performance by 
the Canberra authorities: one that had passed the point 
of mere inefficiency and had developed into gross 
negligence.
86. The others were the Australian Pacific Territories 
Research Council and the Council of the Australian 
School of Pacific Administration, discussed in
Chapter Five.
87. CRS A518, item C927/1, 22 September 1949. The agenda 
was no more than a list of major issues requiring 
attention and gave no indication of proposed action.
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Mr. Chifley intervenes
The lack of progress in New Guinea planning had 
become so obvious by mid-1949 that the Prime Minister 
saw fit to remind Ward of the situation, observing that 
the 1947 Inter-Departmental Committee could "be regarded
ooas having ceased to function for some time past".
Thus in August 1949, shortly after the Minister's 
resumption of his portfolio following the Royal Commission 
into his involvement with Garden, Mr. Chifley urged that 
Ward reconstitute the planning committee. The proposal 
was that there should be a third inter-departmental 
group reporting to a Ministerial Standing Committee.
This was the second time the Prime Minister had recommended 
such an arrangement, which in turn paralleled the pattern 
of organization of 1944. When announcing the formation 
of the 1947 machinery, the Prime Minister had stated that 
a Cabinet Committee would be responsible for drawing up 
a ten-year plan for the development of the Territory,88 
but there had been no action at the Ministerial level, 
partly because Cabinet had received no detailed proposals 
from its departmental advisers. The 1949 Ministerial 
standing Committee differed from its stillborn 1947 
counterpart in that the Minister for External Affairs 
replaced the Minister for Post-War Reconstruction. There 
was a similar change at the departmental level, and an 
important addition: the Administrator was included in
88. CRS A518, item 103/1/8, 1 August 1949.
89. Sydney Daily Telegraph. 16 April 1947.
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the inter-departmental group. This was the first time 
the Territory had been given direct representation within 
the Commonwealth executive; other bodies which included 
Papua New Guinea delegates, such as the Pacific Territories 
Research Council, had possessed advisory functions only.
Planning for New Guinea during the few remaining 
months of the Labor government’s tenure was no more 
encouraging than it had been during the preceding four 
years. In a minute on the reconstitution of the inter­
departmental committee, the Department of External 
Territories could offer only extremely broad recommendations 
that showed no advance on the thinking of the war years. 
Apparently ignoring the Prime Minister’s earlier desire
for a ten-year plan, the Department suggested that a
90five-year programme be prepared:-^
For the purpose of developing such a plan it will be
necessary -
(a) To inaugurate and complete further research 
work as will be necessary in connection with the 
social, educational and political aspects of the plan.
(b) To organize and carry through an economic 
survey of the Territory on a regional basis.
(c) For the purpose of such survey to obtain 
clarification of any policy matters likely to affect 
the scope and purpose of the survey.
These were merely platitudes which considered nothing 
more than the preliminaries of planning, and other sections 
of the departmental minute suggested that their vagueness 
reflected not only the Department’s inability to produce
90. GRS A518, item C927/1, 22 September 1949.
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definite proposals, but also a general uneasiness about 
the trend of the government's policy. As Hurray suspected, 
this disquiet centred on the cost of post-war administration 
in comparison with the level of return from the Territory's
Q1own finances:^
....the Commonwealth has already devoted considerable 
resources to the social and educational advancement 
of the peoples of the Territory. The emphasis which 
has been placed on these aspects of development has, 
however, entailed a substantial cost to the 
Commonwealth and it is considered that, in any plan 
for future development, more emphasis will require to 
be placed on the aspects of economic development than 
has been practicable up to now...Basic economic 
policy aims at encouraging both native and non-native 
industry, with the limit of non-native expansion 
determined by the welfare of the natives generally.
The implementation of this policy involves a much 
greater measure of governmental responsibility in the 
planning of economic development than would be 
involved in the normal forms of unrestricted commercial 
development.
Since the social and educational development programmes 
had scarcely begun in 1949, the department's reference to 
the "considerable resources" devoted to them shows its 
continued preoccupation with pre-war scales of administration. 
The suggestion that unrestricted commerce constituted 
"normal forms" of development also reveals something of 
the thought behind the tortuous syntax of the minute.
The 1949 committees
There was little chance that yet another group under 
the chairmanship of the Secretary for External Territories
91 . Ibid.
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could provide fresh impetus for hew G-uinea planning. Any 
opportunity that may have existed was soon lost in the 
confusion that accompanied the formation of the 1949 
inter-departmental committee. In September 1949, a month 
after the Prime Minister's proposal, the Administrator had 
still not been informed of it: in an enquiry that 
apparently referred to the defunct 1947 committee, Murray 
asked again whether any decisions had been reached on the 
recommendations of his committees on social and economic 
development, whose reports had by that time been in 
Canberra for a year.'" His enquiry elicited no response, 
but in the meantime the Department had prepared background 
papers on the proposal for the new planning structure and 
had arranged a meeting of the inter-departmental 
committee for 26 September 1949.^ Dr. Gunther was in 
Australia at the time, and he attended the meeting after
94approval had been hastily obtained from the Administrator.
The only meeting of the 1949 inter-departmental
committee revealed the lack of progress in Australian
planning for the Territory during the four preceding
years, as well as the narrow view of New Guinea affairs
taken by some Commonwealth departments. In opening the
meeting, Halligan suggested a characteristically
95labyrinthine procedure:-"^
92. CRS A518, item 103/1/8, 2 September 1949.
93 . CRS A518, item C927/1, 26 September 1949.
94 . P.N.G.N.A. Box 166, item GH1-8-3, 23 November 1949 
(reviewing the situation, this memorandum also' 
informed Murray officially of the committee's formation).
95 . CRS A518, item C927/1, 26 September 1949.
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The approval of Cabinet would be necessary for the 
reconstitution of the two Committees on the lines 
suggested by the Prime Minister and a draft submission 
for this purpose...prepared. In accordance with the 
Prime Minister’s suggestion, the reconstituted 
Ministerial Standing Committee would need to consider 
a programme of work for the Inter-Departmental 
Committee to undertake, and it was desirable that 
the Departments concerned should examine the matter 
in preliminary discussion with a view to the 
preparation of appropriate draft recommendations 
for consideration by the Ministerial Standing 
Committee.
In other words, Halligan could only suggest that the 
committee start the whole tortuous operation again. He 
could produce nothing from previous discussions to which 
the 1949 committee could refer and made no mention of the 
Provisional Administration's reports on development, 
presumably because they contained material highly critical 
of his Department's efforts. The most familiar feature 
of the proceddings was the lack of any suggestion of 
urgency by the Secretary: he was either indifferent to 
the needs of New Guinea, or incapable of dealing with the 
situation; possibly both.
The proceedings of the meeting of the 1949 inter­
departmental committee were far from encouraging. An
Assistant Secretary representing the Department of the
96Tieaairy observed that:-'
....greater emphasis should be placed on making the 
Territory self-supporting... so long as there existed 
two policies for the Territory, one basically 
economic in approach and the other stressing the 
paramount interest of native welfare and development, 
there would be a diversity of approach which must 
lead to confusion....
96. The material in this and the following passages is 
drawn from ibid.
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The notes of the meeting recorded further statements hy 
the Treasury official:
He appreciated the obligations which had been 
undertaken by the Commonwealth in relation to the 
welfare and advancement of the native people, but 
he thought that there should be a proper 
relationship between welfare and finances. He 
did not wish it to be thought that he was taking 
the pure Treasury approach to the Committee's 
task, but the expenditure indicated in relation 
to the health programme rather suggested that it 
had not got beyond the stage of "health for 
health *s sake".
This was the attitude that had determined pre-war policy 
for the islands and, as Dr. Burton, the Secretary for 
External Affairs, suggested:
....it would not be desirable for the Committee 
to divide into two sections, namely, those who 
want the Territory to cost nothing and to be 
self-supporting, and those who want native welfare 
to be the primary objective of Government policy... 
the Committee alone could not possible do the 
work listed, and...much of that work could be 
carried out only by those persons on the spot.
Burton's final point was of major importance, but Halligan 
failed to acknowledge it, even when he was forced to 
admit that "the Department of External Territories had 
not been adequately staffed and this had thrown many 
difficulties in the way of the previous Committee". He 
said, however, that some reorganization of the Department 
had been approved and anticipated that "with the 
additional staff...the Department would be in a better 
position to meet its responsibilities". Finally, the 
Director-General of Agriculture, one Mr. Bulcock, gave
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the quintessential bureaucratic assessment of earlier 
proceedings by saying that "the work done by the previous 
Committee could not be regarded as futile. The Committee 
had demonstrated the limitations of its Organization."
Pew comments by Dr. Gunther are recorded in the notes 
of the meeting. However, he pointed out that such matters 
as health and welfare programmes were themselves the 
foundation of sound economic development, and secured an 
admission from the Treasury representative that he "had 
not realised until this meeting the various factors 
concerned in such policy, as, for example, the way in which 
the labour supply determined the working tempo of the 
Territory. He found that by reducing such a policy to 
recognizable economic terms he could more reasily 
understand the problems facing the Committee." Gunther 
cannot have been impressed by such proceedings. "He 
mentioned that there was a growing feeling of frustration 
amongst the Territory officials, and even amongst the 
native people, and he said that they were awaiting a 
definite expression of policy under which their efforts 
could be organized...."
The meeting of the 1949 committee produced nothing 
more than a ten-point agenda that set out the same tasks 
as had been perceived as early as 1944, but it came at a 
time when the inertia of the preceding years could no 
longer be ignored. Since it virtually coincided with the
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change of government, it also provided a pattern that 
could be followed by the incoming Minister. This was 
little consolation to the Port Moresby authorities, for 
the conditions which had developed in the administration 
of the Territory could by this time only be described as 
desperate.
Apparent progress: further delays
Despite the impasse in planning, it seemed by
mid-1949 that some of the technical uncertainties that
had weakened the Papua Pew Guinea Administration were
about to be resolved. Legislation establishing a permanent
public service was finally promulgated and the Papua and
97New Guinea Act was passed by the Australian parliament.
These measures formalised the administrative amalgamation
of the two Territories and established a combined public
service, as well as making provision for the usual
98institutions of colonial government.' In addition, 
the position of Administrator was given substantive 
authority, and on 1 July 1949 Murray’s appointment was 
extended for five years in the first instance; by that 
time he had held office for three years and eight months, 
and in the normal course of events his new term would 
have expired on 30 June 1954. As was the case with such 
statutory appointments, however, the Papua and Pew G-uinea
97. The Public Service Ordinance 1949■> No. 5 of 1949, 
came into effect on 22 June 1949.
98. The name of the Territory was also changed, from 
Papua-New Guinea to Papua and New Guinea.
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Act provided that he held office ’’during the pleasure of
Q Qthe G-overnor-G-eneral".' The terms of Murray's appointment 
remained unchanged, as did his salary.
The situation was not all that it appeared, however.
The Public Service Ordinance 1949 had been in operation 
for only six months before the government announced that 
it was still only a temporary measure and v/ould be
101re-drafted before being promulgated in its final form.
As a consequence, no Regulations were introduced under 
the 1949 Ordinance, and so a wide range of public service 
entitlements remained undefined. The Superannuation 
Ordinance 1949 was also found to be unsuitable for the 
Territory's needs, and it was to be more than two years 
before satisfactory provisions were introduced. The
morale of the public service fell even lower because of 
this continued confusion. Officerswho believed that their 
"temporary" appointments of several years past would at 
last be confirmed were faced v/ith further uncertainty, 
so that tensions within the service remained high.
The most serious delays occurred in the establishment 
of an effective decision-making structure for the 
Territory. It was noted in Chapter Six that, in the 
absence of an Executive Council, major problems occurred
99. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-1, 29 June 1949 sets out 
the terms of Murray's renewed appointment.
100. For the terms of Murray's original appointment, see 
Chapter Three, pp. 174-5.
101. P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 6, January 1950, p. 17.
102. Massive amendments were introduced by the Superannuation 
(Paoua and New G-uinea) Ordinances 1951 on 9 August
and 13 November 1951.
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in developing a co-ordinated executive and planning group;
1 0 '3»and that a series of committees had emerged in its stead.
The committees, despite their limitations, had guided the
rehabilitation of the Territory and had produced the
reports on economic and social development. 'Then these
reports had elicited no response from Canberra, the
Administrator directed that a new structure be set up in
an effort to improve planning and co-ordination. This was
to be known as the ’Administrator’ s Conference”, being
attended by all department heads and, occasionally, by a
small number of their senior a d v i s e r s . T h e  group first
met in December 1948 and then at weekly intervals for a
time, although its meetings grew less frequent after the
105first few months. ' This body, too, was severely 
limited in its actions because it possessed no greater 
powers than its predecessors, so that even relatively 
trifling matters had still to receive the formal approval 
of the Administrator. However, with the passage of the 
Papua and New Guinea Act it was expected that the formal 
executive machinery so urgently required in the Territory 
would be created very rapidly. Anticipating early action, 
hurray in June 1949 requested that the Executive Council 
be set up immediately the enabling legislation came into
a r
effect. 3 He favoured a Council of fifteen members, 
including the heads of the major departments, with four 
District Officers to keep the executive informed of
103. See Chapter Six, pp. 333-9«
104. P.N.G.H.A. Bos 163, item 1-4, 9 December 1948.
105. Ibid., 9 May 1949.
106. P.N.G.U.A. Box 190, item CA1/2/3, 24 June 1949.
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developments in the rural areas. When no reply was
received from Canberra by September 1949, Murray pointed
out that the permanent Administration had been in
operation for three months and that there seemed no
107reason for further delay.
Executive Council fiasco
The next steps in the establishment of the Executive
Council illustrate once more the cycle of frustration
created by the inability of the Canberra authorities to
meet the needs of the Territory Administration, as well
as their unwillingness to allow Murray and his staff to
act on their own initiative. Replying to Murray*s
requests, Halligan stated, "Until firm decisions are taken
in regard to the Department Organization for the Public
Service of the Territory and on the matter of permanent
appointment thereto it seems that it will be impracticable
to secure the formation of a Council of a permanent 
108nature." The Secretary suggested that a "temporary" 
Executive Council comprising a "minimum number of members" 
should be set up in the interim. However, since Halligan 
did not reply until late November, almost five months 
after Murray's original recommendation, it was not until 
19 December 1949 that the "temporary" Executive Council 
met for the first time.1°9 Thus the Papua New Guinea
107. The material in this and the following passage is 
drawn from P.N.G.N.A. Box 166, item GH1-8-3, undated
September 1949.
108. P.N.G.N.A. Box 190, item CA1/2/3, 20 November 1949.
109. P.N.G.N.A. Box 169, item GH1-11-1, 19 December 1949.
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authorities were trapped in a Kafkaesque situation: the 
Department of External Territories denied them an 
Executive Council because there was no permanent public 
service; and there was no permanent public service 
because the Department of External Territories had failed 
to make adequate arrangements for it.
The temporary Executive Council was established on
1 December 1949 for a period of six months, with extensions
of the members' appointments to be made "if required".
In May 1950 and again in the following September, Port
Moresby was obliged to advise the Department of External
Territories that the term of the Executive Council would
expire within one or two days and to ask the Canberra
110authorities their intentions. Additional renewals were 
required until 1952, following the establishment of the 
permanent public service and the legislative Council. 
Meanwhile, the membership of the Executive Council 
continued as a point of contention between Canberra and 
the Administration. The Minister approved a Council of 
only nine members, six fewer than requested by Murray, on 
the grounds that wider representation could be provided 
with the establishment of the Legislative Council. Yet 
the Papua and New Guinea Act provided that the Legislative 
Council would not be formed until a year after the 
proclamation of the permanent Administration, so that a 
case clearly existed for a larger membership for the 
interim Executive Council. Nor was any provision made
110. Ibid., 30 May and 30 September 1950.
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for membership by officers stationed outside Port Moresby;
all were heads or acting heads of departments, including: 111
Mr. S.A. Lonergan, acting Government Secretary 
Mr. J.H. Jones, acting Secretary for Planning and 
Development (see Chapter Ten)
Dr. J.T. Gunther, Director of Public Health 
Mr. W.C. Groves, Director of Education 
Mr. W.N.M. Chester, acting Treasurer 
Mr. W.R. Humphries, acting Director of Labour 
Mr. W. Cottrell-Dormer, Director of Agriculture,
Stock and Pisheries
Mr. E.P. Holmes, Secretary for Lands, Surveys and 
MinesMr. J.B. McAdam, acting Director of Forests 
Six of the nine members were senior pre-war officers; 
four - Lonergan, Jones, Holmes and McAdam - from the 
Mandated Territory and two - Chester and Humphries - from 
Papua.
Only Jones, Lonergan, McAdam and Gunther were firm 
administrators, so that the Executive Council, like the 
Advisory Committee and the Committee on Native Development 
and Welfare, could be dominated by pre-war Mandated 
Territory personnel. Murray was dissatisfied with the 
membership approved by the Minister, and particularly with 
the fact that it excluded the Crown Law Officer; he 
advised Halligan that in his opinion the Executive Council, 
whether temporary or not, could not function without legal 
advice.112 The acting Crown Law Officer, Mr. W.W. Watkins, 
had recently been appointed following Bignold’s elevation 
to the Supreme Court. Bignold was a senior Papuan officer, 
and the fact that Watkins was both very junior in the
111. CRS A518, item H927/1, undated January 1950.
112. P.N.G.N.A. Box 169, item GH1-11-1, 17 January 1950.
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service and a relatively young man may have counted
against him. However, Halligan gave no reasons when
113he again refused to make the appointment. Murray
replied tersely, demanding to know why it was thought
the executive could function without its senior legal
officer; he was, he wrote, "at a loss” to understand the
114Secretary's reasoning. Murray later raised the matter
during visits to Canberra, and in October 1950 Watkins
was finally approved as a member of the temporary
115Executive Council. It was extraordinary that the 
Administrator could secure a favourable decision on such 
a matter, in which his attitude was obviously sensible, 
only after nine months of time-consuming argument. It is 
difficult to find an explanation for the Department of 
External Territories' stubborness on the issue, other than 
an apparent determination to have its own way in limiting 
the size of the Council, regardless of the circumstances.
Murray had cause to be apprehensive about the trend 
of future policy when the government changed in 
December 1949, "but after experiencing more than four 
years of bureaucratic ignorance, neglect and obstruction 
he could have been forgiven for hoping that the level of
113. Ibid., 14 February 1950.
114. Ibid., 18 February 1950.
115. V/atkins retained his membership of the Executive 
Council for only a year, being dropped on the formal 
approval of Hasluck in October 1951, shortly before 
the Legislative Council was established. It is 
hard to escape the conclusion that the Department
of External Territories finally had its way.
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administrative efficiency in Canberra might at least 
improve. Unfortunately, the improvement took some time 
to appear, and when it did a situation had been reached 
where much of the blame for past omissions was placed, 
not in Canberra where it belonged, but on the 
Administrator himself.
CHAPTER TEN
NEW GOVERNMENT, OLD INTERESTS
Change of Minister - Settlers rejoice - Mr. 
Menzies’ emphasis - Mr. Spender’s beliefs 
The Spender visit, 1950 - Spender’s promises to
settlers - Spender, Murray and the U.N.
Mission - U.N. Mission poses problems 
First attempts to remove Murray - Spender sums 
up - Reaction to the new conservatism 
Disillusined settlers - Australian aid 
Yet more committees, 1950 - Murray presses his
economic plan - Support from External Territories 
Rejection of the plan - Secretariat of Planning 
and Development - Limitations of the Secretariat 
Spender's achievement: slowing post-war trends 
White representation - Strengthening the 
companies’ hold
Change of Minister
The new Liberal-Country Party Cabinet was sworn in 
on 19 December 1949, with Mr. P.C. (later Sir Percy) 
Spender being appointed to the portfolios of External 
Affairs and External Territories. Spender, a King's 
Counsel who had served in World War 1, was elected membei
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for Warringah, Sydney, in 1937 and had been Treasurer and
Minister for the Army in the non-Labor ministries of
1940 and 1941. He ranked sixth in the new Cabinet,
compared with the eighth position held by Ward in the
second Chifley ministry, and was one of the most prominent
figures in the Liberal Party. However, his first
portfolio at External Affairs was both more important and
more onerous than had been Ward’s as Minister for
Transport; the possible effects of this situation were
psummed up by the Pacific Islands Monthly:
Mr. Menzies* decision to place those two portfolios 
in the hands of one man is a new idea, but a sound 
one...The main objection to the new arrangement is 
that External Affairs is an important portfolio, 
and the Minister may be so preoccupied with it that 
he will not have much time for External Territories - 
which, under present circumstances, demands a lot 
of time.
To reduce this problem, the Prime Minister had announced 
his intention of appointing Parliamentary Under­
secretaries to assist Ministers who had heavy responsibilities 
’’The most persistent forecast,” the Pacific Islands 
Monthly noted, ”is that the /""External Territories 7 job 
will go to Mr. Paul Hasluck, a newly elected West 
Australian, who was formerly a journalist and a prominent 
official in the Department of External Affairs. He 
should make an admirable junior Minister for the 
Territories.” However, Hasluck v/as engaged with his
1 . C.A. Hughes and B.D. Graham, Australian Government and 
Politics 1890-1964. Canberra, A.N.U. Press, 19^8, 
pp. 22-31 . Ward ranked considerably lower in the 
Curtin and first Chifley ministries.
2. The material and quotations in this and the following 
passage are drawn from P .I,M., Vol. 20 No. 6,
January 1950, p. 10.
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volumes of the official Australian war history, and the 
appointment went to Mr. John Howse, a relatively junior 
Liberal Party member from Victoria. The white community 
of Papua New Guinea awaited with interest the first impact 
of the new Minister and his assistant on Territory affairs.
Settlers rejoice
Predictably, the defeat of the Australian Labor 
government was greeted enthusiastically by settler 
interests, who were further encouraged by non-Labour 
victories in New Zealand and the United Kingdom during 
the same period. "Goodbye to Socialism - and all that!" 
rejoiced the Pacific Islands Monthly, which also noted 
more soberly:^-
It would be foolish to suggest that the end of 
Socialism means that all those plans for native 
welfare and advancement are to be abandoned.
There has been no indication of any such change 
in policy. On the contrary, it may be taken as 
certain that the new Government will carry on with 
all the enterprises designed to assist the native 
to higher standards of life. But it is equally 
certain that those plans generally will be revised, 
so that they may be tied more closely to realities, 
where necessary.
The magazine supposed that revised policies, which it 
persisted in calling "reforms", would occur as soon as 
the new Minister had an opportunity to assess conditions 
in New Guinea. There were problems requiring urgent 
attention, notably shipping, copra marketing, and the
3. P .I.M., Vol. 20 No. 5, December 1949, p. 5.4. Ibid., p. 6.
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morale of the Territory's public service, but the Pacific
Islands Monthly was ready to admit that Spender was
justified in making "no fundamental change in administration
5until he has examined conditions on the spot". After 
all, the magazine pointed out:
Mr. Ward's policies, plus his reluctance to give any 
worthwhile discretionary power to his Administrator, 
certainly placed some strangleholds on the 
Territories. But, in the new Minister's view, they must be removed with care and discretion, lest new 
evils be created.
The possible "evil" of allowing the Administrator too 
great a voice in New Guinea affairs could in any case be 
offset by a change in the government's attitude towards 
the settler community:
It is anticipated that Mr. Spender, to a much greater 
extent than has been known hitherto, will consult 
with experienced, non-official people in the 
Territories in regard to Territories problems.
There was thus a feeling of anticipation among the 
"non-official people" when the Minister announced that he 
would tour the islands in April 1950, just six years 
after the last visit by a substantive Minister for 
External Territories.
Mr. Menz i es' emphasis
The Territory's officials, and Colonel Murray in 
particular, had little cause for optimism about their
5. The material in this and the following passage,
including quotations, is drawn from P.I.M., Vol. 20 
No. 6, January 1950, p. 10.
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relations with the new government. Already, in the joint 
Opposition policy speech delivered in November 1949,
Menzies had said, ’’Australia's record in recent years in 
New Guinea and Papua is not a very satisfactory one.”
After making a predictable jibe at "Socialist Ministers at 
Canberra", he had then gone on, in an implied criticism of 
the Administration, to propose "a skilled Australian 
Territories Service offering opportunities and producing 
a level of competent and civilised administration like 
those of the British Colonial Service". This was needed 
to carry out a "basic attack on the problems of production 
and expansion". The establishment of a combined colonial 
was never seriously considered, but Menzies' remarks were 
an early indication that the Territory officials would 
share the blame for New Guinea's difficulties during the 
post-war years. The reference to "production and expansion" 
was particularly revealing; Menzies said that his 
government would change the emphasis of development. He 
maintained that under Labor the "real things" had not 
been done. "We shall make it our business to restore and 
develop production in the Territories; to improve 
shipping facilities...and encourage industrial enterprise... 
in mining, plantations and trade generally." This was a 
clear warning that greater sympathy would be shown to 
white interests. As for the Territory's people, Menzies' 
only comment was that there "should be adequate health
6. The material in this and the following passage, including 
quotations, is drawn from CRS A518, item AL800/1/7,
10 November 1949. The typed extract from the speech 
was filed by the Department the day after it was given.
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and other services for native populations'1. With guarded
statements of this sort in mind, Murray believed that the
programmes that had been instituted as part of the Labor
reforms for New Guinea, while not in danger of being
abandoned by the new government, could nevertheless be so
modified in favour of settler interests that the progress
7of the post-war years would be jeopardised. The 
Administrator was in no sense antagonistic towards the 
Menzies government, but was aware that he had been 
identified with Labor and was therefore uncertain of his 
reception by the new Minister.
Mr. Spender's beliefs
Murray was not left long in doubt. Towards the end of 
February 1950 he was summoned to Canberra, where he found 
the Department of External Territories staff engaged in a 
flurry of activity and the atmosphere "cordial but formal,
Q
if not cool". Mr. Spender had come to office convinced, 
quite correctly, that the "first essential was the mapping 
out of a practical plan for the advancement of /“the / 
people"." He was aware that the various committees 
established by the Labor government had "got nowhere" and 
believed that, "in whatever was being done, there was a
7. This and the following passage are based on Murray 
interview, 12 December 1966.
8. Murray interview, 12 December 1966.
9. P.C. Spender, Politics and a Man. Sydney, Collins,
1972, p. 274. In a conversation on 27 November 1973 
Sir Percy stated that most of what he wished to say 
about his dealings with New Guinea was contained in 
the relevant section (Chapter 29) of this book.
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lack of understanding and absence of co-ordination between
10Canberra and the administration in New Guinea” . He
sought to correct this situation by demanding firm proposals
from his Department and by engaging in a series of
well-publicised meetings with groups and individuals with
11interests in the Territory. He had determined upon an
early visit there: "The journey was, in my judgement, a
'must'. How could one intelligently apply oneself to its
problems unless the Territory and its people, so to speak,
i p
were seen on the ground?" While the tour was the 
precursor to the Minister*s new plan for Papua New Guinea, 
he had nevertheless formed certain opinions about the 
efforts of the preceding few years and the future needs 
of the country:
Minister Ward never saw much merit in private 
enterprise. The idea that private capital should 
be permitted to develop the territory would have 
been anathema to him - would lead to what was then 
called "the capitalist exploitation of the native 
people". On the other hand, the local 
administration - and I hope I do no injustice in 
saying this - seemed to me inclined to view the 
territory and its people as a large native museum 
of which they were the devoted custodians. It is 
not surprising that liaison between Canberra and 
Port Moresby was not the best.
Having accepted this simplistic view, Spender formed the
opinion that private investment was essential: "otherwise
14you couldn’t have development of anything very much".
10. Ibid., pp. 274-5.
11. P.I.M.. Vol. 20 No. 8, March 1950, p. 5.
12. Spender, op. cit., p. 271.
13. Ibid., p. 275.
14. Conversation with Sir Percy Spender, 27 November 
1973.
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It was this approach that he hoped to encourage in the 
coming years; and there can he no doubt that he saw this 
as an identifiable policy: in retrospect, he wrote that 
during his eighteen months as Minister he was able to "lay 
down a new policy for Papua and New Guinea; to stay, or 
change the direction of, much of the policy previously
1 5pursued; and to see a new one... started on the road".
In fact, the "new" policy was as old as colonialism itself.
With his preconceptions, most of them reflecting the
opinions of settler interests, the Minister was in no
position to establish an open relationship with the
Administrator. Spender recalls that he and Murray "didn't
1 6see eye-to-eye on a number of things". Yet it is 
unlikely that there was any immediate intention of removing 
Murray from office; his appointment had more than four 
years to run and any move against him might have created 
an unnecessary political issue during the first months of 
the new government. Murray’s position was cast in a new 
light, however, when a major disagreement arose during 
the Minister’s visit to the Territory during the following 
April.
The Spender visit, 1950
The background to the 1950 Ministerial visit was not
15. Spender, op. cit., p. 271.
16. Spender conversation, 27 November 1975.
a particularly favourable one for Murray and his
Administration. Murray had presented to Spender in
Canberra a seventeen-page summary of existing conditions
and outstanding issues in Papua New Guinea, but it contained
none of the recommendations for substantial changes in
policy which the Minister clearly desired. Rather, it
dealt with a multitude of apparently minor, if related,
matters which could only be appreciated in full by someone
already possessing a fairly detailed knowledge of the
Territory and its recent history. It noted, for example,
that the morale of the public service had improved somewhat
but that new allowances scarcely offset the increased cost
of living; that among the outstanding legislative matters,
a land commission was urgently required; that the very
rate of inflow of money to New Guinea was creating its own
17problems of shortages and inflation. In one or two
cases the summary argued against the conventional wisdom
of the period: that, for instance, cult leaders such as
Yali and Paliau could be viewed as ’’constructive workers”
1 Rwho were an ’’asset rather than a liability”. As for 
long-range plans, Murray returned to the theme that, in 
order to safeguard the future of Papua New Guinea,
Australia should buy as much tropical produce as possible 
from that quarter.
Representations against the Administration were made
17. The material in this and the following passage is drawn 
from P.N.G.N.A. Box 166, item GH1-8-3, 21 February 1950
18. See Chapter Seven, p. 418, footnote 68.
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by other interests. A Sydney solicitor who had read of
1 QSpender’s proposed tour of the Territory wrote: J
As you will remember, I practiced (sic) there for 
six years pre-war and saw a few ministers come and 
go. None of ’em did anything except Eddie Ward and 
he gummed up the entire works. I will offer no advice 
but to suggest that you listen to the commercial 
and planting communities alone and not accompanied 
by Government Officials. And remember, Missionaries, 
Anthropologists and Officials are not disinterested 
witnesses. They are all after bigger pay and/or 
more power. Pagua-New Guinea...should be practical 
and producing / areas_7> not anthropological 
museums. Before E. Ward, New Guinea cost nothing 
and Papua £40,000 a year. Now they cost we (sic) 
taxpayers upwards of 4 million pounds annually - 
Whaffor?
Opinions of this kind strengthened what was apparently the
prevailing feeling in Canberra that the Territory
Administration might adopt an unco-operative attitude
during the Ministerial visit; it is otherwise hard to
account for the peculiar message that was sent to Murray
a few days before the Minister's arrival, stating, "The
Minister feels that it is most important that the correct
dignity and position of the Crown...should be maintained
20in the eyes of the peoples of the Territory." Shortly 
afterwards, in an obvious reference to settler interests, 
the Administrator was further advised, "....the Minister 
does not want you or any other member of the Administration
19. ORS A518, item BQ800/1/1, 22 February 1950. The use
of the term "anthropological museum" here and Spender’s 
reference to a "native museum" give some indication 
of influences on Spender's thinking.
20. P.N.G.N.A. Box 164, loose papers, 17 March 1950. The 
Department of External Territories’ advice to the 
Minister was presumably contained in two items, "Canberra 
Survey 1950 New Guinea" and "Progress Report to Minister 
for Territories on Papua and New Guinea 1950", access
to both of which was refused.
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to shield him from the many people who would like to
approach him”.2>1 In reply, Murray pointed out that free
access to visitors had been a "consistent” policy of his
Administration; he believed that it would be a mistake
to shield the Minister from any section of the Papua New
22Guinea community.
In the meantime, agitation against the New Guinea 
authorities continued. This included messages from the 
Territory itself, such as a cable from the Planters1 
Association of New Guinea complaining about "difficult 
problems confronting planters due former government’s
2*5negative policy”. To this the Minister replied that he
was "only too glad to receive representations of your
24Association and do what I can to assist”. In most situations 
an interchange of this kind could be considered as no more 
than the formal acknowledgement of mutual interests, but 
under the conditions then existing in New Guinea it could 
be construed as a good deal more. Obviously, the tone of 
the Minister's reply differed widely from that which had 
been employed by Ward. And in view of the bitterness which 
had been engendered during the post-war years, any promise 
of assistance was likely to raise high expectations among 
the settlers. During this period there was criticism of 
the Administration from within the government parties, 
particularly from Senator R. Kendall, who had been what
21. Ibid., 24 March 1950.
22. Ibid., 28 March 1950.
23. OHS A518, item BQ800/1/1, 24 December 1949.
24. Ibid., 5 January 1950.
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was termed a "schooner master" in New Britain before the
war and who had visited Rabaul in January 1950, almost
25immediately after his election. In his maiden speech the 
Senator attacked previous policy and present conditions in
O f .the Territory.^ He was more restrained than had been Mr.
27White in the House of Representatives during earlier years, 
but he voiced a number of the usual settler complaints: 
the amount of war damage compensation paid to villagers; 
the lack of timber; poor shipping services; the cost of 
living; the failure to establish a Legislative Council 
with a strong settler presence. The situation, Kendall
pobelieved, was bad for the people themselves:
They could see three or four years hard work ahead 
of them, but they were looking forward to going 
back (sic) to what they called then and still call 
the "good fellow time before"; in other words, the 
times before the war, when they were happy, and which 
they enjoyed...The general reaction of natives in 
the territory during the past three years has been: 
"Why should we work? This is a fine G-overnment; we 
just sit back and get pennies from Heaven. This is 
our ideal state. We do not have to work." The 
work is not being done, and the territory is getting 
into a worse and worse state.
In the face of such sweeping misrepresentation, and with 
Ward no longer taking the first thrust of criticism, 
Murray had reason to be anxious about the Minister's 
attitude during his visit.
Mr. and Mrs. Spender, accompanied by the Minister's
25. P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 7, February 1950, p. 16.
26. C.P.D.. Vol. 206, pp. 175-80, 1 March 1950.
27. See Chapter Nine, pp. 555-4, 558-9.
28. C.P.D., Vol. 206, pp. 176-7, 1 March 1950.
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Private Secretary and Mr. Halligan, arrived in Port Moresby
aboard a special Qantas flight on 29 March 1950 for a tour
29which was to last for some two weeks. The Minister was 
much impressed, although clearly not enlightened, by the 
ceremonies which accompanied his progress:
We travelled by plane, day after day, to all the main 
areas, as far north as Manus Island and east as far 
as hew Britain and New Ireland...We visited many 
places never before visited by an Australian Minister. 
It was a thrilling and fascinating journey. It was 
a new world to us...I was not the centre of 
attraction by any means. My wife unconsciously stole 
the limelight. If these New Guineans were new to 
her and me, she was something out of the world to 
them. As we moved around, all eyes were on her 
petite, attractive form...The paramounts - head 
chiefs - delicately touched her dress as we moved 
before them. She and her dress were a wonder to 
them...To mark the occasion some hindquarters of meat 
were distributed to the tribes. This was, for them, 
a great treat...The tribes, in celebration, put on 
a feast for themselves and a "sing sing" which went 
on until late in the night...Their impressive 
Gregorian-like chant, as it rose and fell, beat 
through the darkness. I recall my wife saying that 
she hoped that the meat was not too rich for them and 
did not create any warlike impulses within them.
Por a new Minister responsible for the development of New 
Guinea, a tour of this exotica was the worst kind of 
introduction to the country. It gave the impression of 
a "primitive" land and, as such visits may still do, 
suggested that its people were unready for dramatic advance. 
Consequently, it added weight to the claims by Europeans 
that already too much had been done for the villagers.
Prom the first day of his visit the Minister showed
29* The party spent a further week visiting other parts 
of the Pacific.
50. Spender, op. cit., pp. 271-2.
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that he was in broad agreement with the settler point of
view, and his statements were given wide publicity through
daily press releases. Upon his arrival in Port Moresby
Spender said that many of the problems involved in the
development of the Territory could be met ‘'only by private
enterprise". It would be the policy of the government
to encourage such enterprise and the "investment of risk
capital". Proper safeguards would fully protect the welfare
of the people; there was no foundation to the "silly idea"
held in Australia "by a few ill-informed people" that men
engaged in private enterprise in the islands wished to
exploit the villagers. This statement was reproduced in
detail, and warmly welcomed, by the Pacific Islands Monthly,
which termed the Minister "a man of vision and lively 
32imagination". Prom that point onwards, Spender was 
beseiged by Europeans encouraged by the tone of his early 
remarks, and it became increasingly clear that a great deal 
was expected of him.
Spender displayed a good deal of energy during his 
tour. While most of his public comment concentrated upon 
the need for "development" and on the demands of the settler 
community, he also spent a good deal of time with officials, 
beginning with a meeting of Directors in Port Moresby.
This, like the report provided by Murray in Canberra, can 
have given the Minister little encouragement, for the
31. The material in this and the following passage is drawn
from CRS A518, item BQ800/1/1, 2 April 1950.
52. P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 9, April 1950, p. 5.
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Territory officials failed to acknowledge his announced 
"new" approach, outlining their departmental programmes 
and problems as if no changes had been proposed. Moreover, 
the departmental statements were in some cases broad and 
imprecise. G-roves, for example, was asked by the Minister 
for an outline of the Education department's situation: ^
Mr. G-roves stated that it was difficult to indicate 
particular problems of present urgency, since the 
problems of his Department arose from day to day as 
part of the routine of the development of the work of 
the Department.. .One basic fact Mr. G-roves wished to 
bring to notice was that the Department in this 
Territory, interpreting education as wider in its 
functions than those of a Department of Education in 
a European community, was a many-sided organization....
The Administration paid the penalty for Canberra's neglect 
of its planning when G-roves was asked whether he had "made 
recommendations as to the general nature of the educational 
scheme he had in mind". The Director replied that "a very 
detailed report on the five-year plan of his Department
*54
had been made", but was then forced to admit "there had 
never been any explicit approval by External Territories 
of this policy and because the policy had the approval of 
the Administrator, the Department of Education had assumed 
that it was acceptable and had made this policy widely 
known amongst its officers for their guidance". Thus 
instead of laying the blame where it belonged, on the 
officials in Canberra, G-roves gave the impression that his
33. This and the following passage is drawn from CRS 
A518, item BQ800/1/1, 30 March 1950.
34. This was included in the social development report, 
discussed in Chapter Seven. The report, and the plan 
for education, were ignored by the Department of 
External Territories (see Chapter Nine, p. 568).
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staff had been acting without formal approval, implicating 
Murray in the process.
The Administrator sought to make up for delays in
Canberra by seeking action from the Minister on numerous
matters that had been awaiting decision for as long as four
years. He raised 35 separate issues in all, ranging from
the role of the School of Pacific Administration, to the
need for Ministerial approval of 24 outstanding Ordinances,
35to the design of the Territory's own postage stamps.
Murray also returned to several of his earlier suggestions 
that had been neglected, such as the scheme for hydro­
electric power stations, the interchange of staff between 
Canberra and Port Moresby and the need to train officers 
overseas. For a newcomer to the situation the impression 
must have been that the Territory service had not, in fact, 
been working to any set programme; yet available plans 
could not proceed because so many basic issues remained 
unresolved. Murray may not have made this clear to the 
Minister, although it would have been difficult to do so, 
owing to Spender's prior convictions about the nature of 
the Administration.
Spender's promises to settlers
When the Minister, leaving Port Moresby, began his 
visit to the Territory of New G-uinea, he must quickly have
35. CRS A518, item BQ800/1/1, 30 March 1950.
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formed the opinion that all of the Territory*s Europeans, 
officials and settlers alike, had become fixated with 
their own trivial concerns. At each centre he was confronted 
with deputations of irritable whites complaining about 
such things as wages, labour recruitment, health benefits, 
district officials and land. Mr. J.H. Jones, who 
accompanied the Ministerial party during this stage of the 
tour, made daily reports to the Administrator, stating 
that many of the complaints were made with the intention 
of "undermii^" the Administration, but that many people 
were simply "letting off steam at their first sight of a 
full Minister post-war". Nevertheless, on most of these 
occasions the Minister received something that had been 
absent from his reception by Port Moresby's officials: 
wholehearted approval of his announced changes in policy.
In response, Spender made a valiant effort to deal in a 
positive manner with even the most contentious issues.
He promised to make "every effort" to secure additional land
70
leases in the townsy  to ensure the "more efficient
screening of Communist elements" entering the Territory; 
to promote the settlement of the "rich areas of the Central 
Highlands and the vast reaches of the Markham Valley"; 
and to approve the construction of a European high school 
at Wau. His most significant statement came on the issue 
of labour contracts, which had been limited to one year 
by the Labor government. The tone of his announcement
36. P.N.G.H.A. Box 204, item CA1/8/1/21, 5 - 1 2  April 1950.
37. Ibid.. 15 April 1950.
38. These had been delayed by Canberra's failure to 
approve town plans.
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indicated the extent to which he had accepted the spurious 
racist arguments of employers about the alleged problems 
and benefits of plantation work:^
An important change in the term of native labour 
employment was foreshadowed by Minister for External 
Territories Spender at a public meeting in Wau...
He said that although he was unable to announce a 
policy on native labour at present, from close 
observation of the native labour situation since 
his arrival in the Territory it was obvious that the 
present limit of one year gave employers only a few 
months of effective service. Further, the existing 
limit did not contribute to native welfare. He was 
aware of the time needed to transport natives from 
villages to places of employment, the period of medical treatment and the few weeks nutritional diet 
needed to build up physical condition while engaged 
on simple tasks such as grass-cutting. Only then 
could real training as effective workers begin. It 
was obvious the natives showed a marked advance 
physically and in their progress out of primitive 
standards of village life a few months after being 
employed. In short, they benefited considerably 
in health and reached a higher level as human beings 
through employment away from their villages.
Further, his observations convinced him that the 
majority of Europeans were just as interested in the 
welfare of the natives as any government.
Nevertheless, the constant pressure for concessions began 
to make the Minister wary. In Madang on the following 
day he told a delegation from the local Planters and 
Traders Association that he “would not permit the return 
to the pre-war system of private recruiters...World 
opinion was against traffic for profit in obtaining labour 
and world opinion could not be ignored.”^  At Manus 
Island on 9 April he told planters who complained at the 
shortage of labour that they would have to do more to
39. CRS A518, item BQ800/1/1, 6 April 1950. The following 
is the text of the cabled press release, with articles, 
conjunctions and prepositions added.
40. This and the following passage are drawn from ibid.,
7, 9 and 11 April 1950.
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mechanise their industry. Apparently tiring of the constant 
demands for government intervention, Spender said that 
planters should form a Territory-wide association and that 
stabilisation of the industry would have to be financed 
by the planters themselves; although the government might 
be called upon in adverse years to finance a deficit, this 
would have to be repaid over a period after returns 
increased.
Three main features are apparent from the Minister’s 
political style and publicity campaign during the visit. 
Firstly, he often ignored the Administrator and his staff 
in releasing details of his intentions and decisions to 
the public in the first instance. Secondly, the substance 
of some of his statements led him further than was wise 
in committing the government to certain courses of action. 
Thirdly, he continued to build up white expectations that 
had been created by his initial statement in Port Moresby. 
Relations with the settler community could be fragile, 
and no more; whites had been at loggerheads with many 
Ministers before Mr. Ward, and scepticism rather than 
charitableness was their customary attitude. For example, 
when Spender failed to visit Sohano, Bougainville, on the 
grounds that he was ”exhausted”, and sent Halligan and 
Jones in his stead, there came a bitter complaint from 
the planters' representatives.
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Spender, Murray and the U.N. Mission
VThile the white community received Spender with few
reservations, his tour strengthened the antipathy that was
41already apparent between him and the Administrator.
The relationship was soured completely by a disagreement
between the two men over the forthcoming visit of the first
United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory.
The dispute arose partly from differing attitudes towards
the U.N. itself. Murray subscribed to what might be termed
42the Evatt view of Australia's international obligations. 
Spender, on the other hand, was of the opinion that 
United Nations pressure had already produced unfortunate 
consequences in South-East Asia, particularly in the matter 
of Indonesia. He was disturbed at what he later termed 
the "cynical disregard...of the interests and human rights 
of the indigenous peoples of Dutch New Guinea" and feared
that Papua New Guinea might eventually receive the same
4S I ,treatment. Partly for this reason, and partly because
the new government had been able to make few preparations
to receive the U.N. delegation, there were suggestions
that the visit be postponed. Certain doubts had been
expressed even before the Australian election; in November
1949 a debate had taken place on whether the Mission
should plan its own itinerary or have one presented to it
41. Spender apparently believed from the outset that Murray, 
like the Labor government, was "opposed to private 
enterprise” (conversation of 28 November 1975).
42. Murray notes, p. 57.
45. Spender, op. cit., p. 286.
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by the Australian authorities. When asked his opinion,
Murray advised Canberra that the U.N. should be consulted
about the itinerary since, if it were not, the exercise
would be "somewhat unrealistic and quite inexplicably
cynical". ^  The Department of External Territories then
advised the new Minister, cynically, "Probably there would
be more adverse consequences by endeavouring to defer the
45Mission than by facilitating it". The qualms returned 
when the membership of the Mission was announced. There 
was no objection to the chairman, Sir Alan Burns, formerly 
an eminent member of the British Colonial Service, but it 
was thought that the selection of representatives from 
China and the Philippines, in addition to a fourth from
A CPrance, would pose problems. Once again, the Australian
delegation to the United Nations was advised that delay
47would be "undesirable", but it was apparent that the 
government was not looking forward to the Mission’s visit.
The matter came to a head in Rabaul on 12 April 1950. 
After the Minister’s tour of certain areas in the 
Territory of New Guinea, he had been rejoined briefly 
by the Administrator, who wished to discuss Spender’s 
impressions during his visit. The official party had been 
entertained by the Planters’ Association at Kokopo during 
the evening and had returned to the District Commissioner's
44. CRS A518, item 103/1/8, 22 November 1949.
45. Ibid., 29 December 1949.
46. Ibid., 17 January 1950.
47. Ibid., 24 January 1950.
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residence at Rabaul to continue their talks. Murray,
who for some weeks had been seeking details from
4-8Canberra of the U.N. Mission1s visit, raised the
40question with the Minister. During the course of the 
discussion Spender said that the members of the Mission 
should not be permitted to address the people nor to 
receive petitions from them during the visit. Colonel 
Murray demurred, suggesting that a Visiting Mission 
was entitled to do such things under the terms of the 
Trusteeship Agreement. The Minister insisted that the 
conditions he considered appropriate should be observed, 
until something of an argument developed, with the 
Administrator finally agreeing that he was obliged to 
observe the Minister's direction. Murray insisted, 
however, that Spender "put it in writing". The Minister 
then wrote out the following:^
48. For example, ibid., 14 January 1950.
49. The material in this and the following passage 
is drawn from separate interviews with Colonel 
Murray (12 December 1966), Dr. Gunther (4 December 
1968) and Mr. J.K. McCarthy (8 November 19 6 8),
the latter two also being present during the 
dispute. Gunther and McCarthy both laid particular 
emphasis on this incident and clearly considered 
it to be of great significance in illustrating 
Murray's concern for issues of principle, the 
Minister's attitude to his own and Australia's 
authority, and Murray's standing with Spender.50. The original of the document, in the Minister's 
own hand, is in P.N.G.N.A. Box 887, item GH47/5.
It bears the notation, in Colonel Murray's hand, 
"Seen or heard only by Dr. Gunther, Mr. McCarthy, 
Miss Kemp and self. J.K.M. 13/4/50." (By that 
time it was after midnight, hence the difference 
in dates). Miss Kemp was the Administrator's secretary at the time.
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Rabaul.
12th April 1950.
In relation to the impending visit of 
the United Nations Trusteeship Council 
Mission to the Territory of New Guinea.
I direct 1. The functions and activities of the
Mission shall not exceed such functions 
as are derived from the terms of its 
authority.
In particular 2. Notwithstanding the general nature of
I direct paragraph 1. hereof,
(a) There is no warrant or authority 
conferred upon the Mission or any 
member thereof to address publicly any 
assemblage or group of people. This 
direction shall not ap ly to any purely 
social gathering so approved by the 
Administrator.
(b) Accordingly, except as referred to 
in paragraph 2(a) hereof, no member of 
the Mission either alone or purporting 
to speak on behalf of such Mission 
shall be permitted to address any such 
assemblage or groups of people.
3. There is no warrant or authority under 
the Trusteeship Agreement, to which 
Australia is a member, for the Mission 
or any member thereof to receive any 
petition or similar request from the 
community in New Guinea or any section 
or member thereof, except in consultation 
with the Government of Australia.
4. Accordingly no person, either alone or 
acting on behalf of others, shall 
present any such petition or request, 
nor shall the Mission or any member 
thereof be permitted to receive the 
same, except in consultation with the 
Government of Australia.
Percy G. Spender
Minister for State for 
External Territories
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The Minister left for the British Solomon Islands
on the following day and the Administrator returned to
Port Moresby. Murray, who was disturbed by the events of
the previous night, considered resigning his post. He
knew, however, that he had “burnt his bridges” , having no
remaining ties with the Queensland Department of Education
or the University of Queensland. He believed that he
was right in his attitude towards the Visiting Mission and
found the situation in which he had been placed a distasteful
one. Nevertheless, he felt obliged to carry out the
Minister's direction while holding the post of Administrator.
Spender's orders proved virtually unenforceable, however,
since the terms of reference of the Visiting Mission were
52explicit, particularly on the matter of petitions:
/ “The Mission is instructed_7...
3(c) To accept or receive petitions and, without 
prejudice to its acting in accordance with rules 84 
and 89 of the rules of procedure, to investigate on 
the spot, after consultation with the local 
representative of the Administering Authority 
concerned, such petitions dealing with the condition 
of the indigenous inhabitants as were in its 
opinion, sufficiently important to warrant special 
investigation.
The Visiting Mission, which comprised, in addition to Sir 
Alan Burns, M. Jacques Tallec of Prance, Mr. T.K. Chang 
of China and Mr. Victorio D. Carpio of the Philippines, 
together with a secretariat of six, arrived in Rabaul from 
Nauru on 10 May 1950. It was unfortunate for Murray that
51. Murray interview, 12 December 1966.
52. United Nations Trusteeship Council, Report of the United 
Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in the 
Pacific on New Guinea, Document T/791. 15 August 1950, 
p. 5.
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the party did not first visit Canberra, for it fell to him 
to make known to Burns the Minister’s wishes concerning 
meetings and petitions.
In the meantime, Spender had second thoughts about
the correctness of his interpretation of the Visiting
Mission's functions. In a coded cable to the Administrator
on 4 May he stated that he had examined the question
further and, while he doubted whether the relevant rule
under which petitions could be accepted was "in conformity
with Article 87 of the Charter", this was a matter which
53could not be discussed with the Mission. The cable 
continued:^
I think that you can easily achieve the objectives I 
have in mind and set out in my directive of twelfth 
April by resting the case on the backward nature of 
the Territory and its inhabitants and the fact that 
the mission cannot expect any true appreciation by 
the natives of its place in the trusteeship system 
or their purposes and functions. In fact, I imagine 
there will be considerable bewilderment, particularly 
as the Mission follows closely on my own visit, 
when certain representations were made to me on a 
number of matters. I think you can persuade the 
Visiting Mission not to make our task even more 
difficult by confusing the minds of the natives.
On this co-operative basis I think you can without 
seeming to restrict their activities or in any way 
prejudice a co-operative approach to our 
administration achieve the objectives contained in 
my directive.55
53. This and the following passage are drawn from CRS A518, 
item 103/1/8, 4 May 1950. The question of the 
offending rule (Rule 89) might "have to be taken up
at the appropriate place".
54. Orthodox punctuation has been provided in the text.
55. The Minister was much concerned that the people should 
be fully aware of Australia's authority. At Wau he had 
asked why the U.N. flag was flying alongside the 
Australian ensign and directed that this should not 
happen again, lest it create "confusion" in the minds 
of the people (CRS A518, item BQ800/1/1, 5 April 1950).
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Murray did his best to carry out the instructions which,
the Minister now acknowledged, lacked adequate foundation.
After an interview with Burns, he cabled Spender that the
Chairman was of the opinion "that we cannot prevent
reception of petitions offered to any member of the Mission
56nor prevent public speeches by members of the Mission". 
However, Sir Alan had told Murray that he was ready to 
qualify "any important biased criticism". The Administrator 
pointed out that favourable comments had already been 
made by and to the Mission and suggested that there was 
little cause for concern about petitions. "I am satisfied 
that Burns is fully co-operative but he is restricted by 
specific terms of Trusteeship Council Directive to the 
Mission and of which of course all members are acutely 
aware." Murray was returning to Port Moresby, leaving Mr. 
Ivan Champion with the powers of Deputy Administrator for 
purposes of liaison with the Mission. Before leaving, 
however, he sent a three-page letter to the Minister, 
providing accurate assessments of the attitudes of each 
of the Mission's members towards the tour ("I found the 
Chairman to be constructively conservative....") and 
concluding, "I am not aware of the Australian Government's 
intentions and policy regarding the Trusteeship Council, 
but I do suggest that, unless the risk of a grave, even 
downright break with the Trusteeship Council is acceptable, 
the prohibition of public meetings and non-acceptance of
56. The material in this and the following passage is 
drawn from CRS A518, item 103/1/8, 11 May 1950.
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petitions without consultation he not persisted with.”
It is impossible to disagree with Murray’s assessment and 
conclusions, but events were already beyond his control.
U.N. Mission poses problems
Early on the morning of 11 May the members of the
Mission met to discuss their itinerary. The controversy
came into the open when Murray was formally asked why no
58provision had been made for public meetings. Murray
cabled the Minister to this effect, unfortunately saying
in the text that the Mission ’’insisted” on meetings, although
he later noted that the Chairman had ’’asked” him to call a
meeting in Rabaul on the following Saturday. This the
Administrator agreed to do, again urging Spender that
’’refusal to accede would present a most awkward position
of possible international repercussions” . The reply from
Canberra, which appears in the files on Department of
External Affairs paper, was apparently not drafted by the
Minister, but was nevertheless devastating in its lack of
realism. ”It is most regrettable that position has been
59allowed to develop as you describe....,” it read. J 
Disregarding the fact that the existing impasse had been 
created by the Minister, it continued, ’’The objective of 
the administering authority is the welfare of the native 
peoples and we do not concede any right of the Mission to 
override our judgement on the wisest course for it to
57. Ibid.. 15 May 1950.
58. Ibid., 11 May 1950.
59« Ibid.. 15 May 1950 (from Canberra).
57
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follow.” New Guinea could not be compared to any other 
Trust Territory; there could be doubts among the people 
“concerning the authority of the administration” if meetings 
and petitions were allowed; and so ”the Mission procedures 
should be adapted accordingly”. In the case of public 
meetings, there was no obligation to assist the Mission 
in any talks it might have with the people. However, the 
cable continued, ”We willingly agree that each case 
should be treated on its merits and you have full authority 
to co-operate with the Mission and to decide accordingly.” 
Nevertheless, ”....it is most essential for the 
administering authority to receive any petition or be 
present when they (sic) are being received”. The cable 
stated that the Minister intended to discuss “these and 
related matters” with the Mission when it reached Australia. 
In the meantime, the government’s attitude should be put 
“tactfully but firmly” to the Mission.
On this basis, and on the grounds that the Kabaul
60meeting had produced nothing untoward, Murray gave tacit 
approval for meetings at all centres in the Trust 
Territory, so ending one part of the controversy. 
Unfortunately, the question of petitions had still not been 
resolved. When it arose, as it was bound to do, Champion 
was in charge of the Mission’s arrangements and saw
60. Ibid., 15 May 1950. New Guineans complained about 
prohibitions on drinking, low wages and prices in 
Chinese trade stores; and asked that their children 
be sent to Australia for schooling. They expressed 
general satisfaction with conditions, praising the 
education programme and “the British Empire”.
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himself as still being bound by the various instructions
which had been issued during the preceding month by and
on behalf of the Minister. Thus when the Visiting Mission
was approached on 15 May with a petition from the Chinese
community in Rabaul, Champion stated that he had to be
61present when it was delivered. When asked why this should 
be, he showed the text of the most recent instruction 
from Canberra to Burns. This was more than the Mission’s 
Chairman was able to accept; he made what Champion termed 
a "polite protest" and said that, if petitions were not 
to be presented, he would be obliged to cable Lake Success 
for further instructions. At this, Murray took it upon 
himself to approve the unrestricted presentation of 
petitions; two more were received by the Mission. In the 
meantime, Canberra had been advised of Champion’s action 
and this had further aggravated the Minister. In a cable 
of 23 May he indicated that he had not read, or refused 
to understand, the communications he had received on the 
matter from the Territory: ^
I fail to understand radio message from Champion 
"discussed text with the leader who said if petition 
not permitted he would cable Lake Success to that 
effect".
I have never directed that "petitions" would not be 
permitted but have insisted that administering authority 
must receive any petition or be present when they 
are being received...
I have also suggested on this and other matters that 
a tactful personal approach to the Chairman should 
resolve any difficulties...This should be your method 
rather than a formal demarche to the Mission through 
its leader...Powers and functions of Commission should
61. Ibid., 16 May 1950.
62. Ibid., 23 May 1950.
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not be discussed with Commission itself but may be 
taken up later with appropriate body, i.e., 
Trusteeship Council.
Murray revealed his exasperation in replying: 64
....Personal and, I hope, tactful approach to Chairman 
made by me...Action had been taken to obviate demarche 
...Mission’s awareness of their instructions under 
rules of procedure of the Trusteeship Council and 
relevant section of the United Nations Charter makes 
full insistence on your directive 12 April...most 
difficult if grounds for demarche to be avoided with 
certainty.
To some extent the final episode in the dispute was caused 
by the cryptic language used in the cables between Port 
Moresby and Canberra, with the Minister quibbling over 
words in an effort to allocate blame elsewhere.
The entirely unnecessary confrontation with the U.N. 
Mission was caused partly by the Minister's stubbornness, 
but the role of his External Affairs advisers, as revealed 
in the cable of 13 May, should not be under-estimated.
It was typical of relations between Australia and Papua 
New G-uinea that obviously sound advice from the Territory 
service should have been ignored consistently by authorities 
in Canberra who refused to recognize the realities of the 
situation. In the event, the contretemps had no effect 
on the Visiting Mission's final report, which made no 
reference to the dispute over meetings and petitions and 
commented in mild, almost placatory tones on the matters
63. The use of the word ’’Commission" is an error in the 
original.
64. Ibid., 27 May 1950.
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which had been raised during its direct communications
66with the residents of the Territory.
First attempts to remove Murray
On the issue of the Visiting Mission Murray had, for
reasons mostly beyond his control, set in train the events
that would eventually lead to his removal from office.
He had openly disagreed with his Minister. Worse, he had
been proved correct on a question of international law and
in matters of diplomacy in a dispute v/ith men who were
66supposed to be experts in such matters. Finally, he had 
pointed out that the Minister was himself at fault in 
providing grounds for the Visiting Mission controversy.
He may also have given Soender the impression that, during 
the early days of the Mission’s visit, he had deliberately 
disregarded the Minister’s instructions or had dealt with 
the Mission in such a way as to make the instructions 
unenforceable. The records of the period do not support 
such a conclusion and an attitude of that kind was wholly 
against Murray’s character, but the Minister obviously did 
not see the matter in that light. He had decided that the 
Administrator would be best employed elsewhere and on 22 
June 1950, while the Visiting Mission was still in 
Australia, he offered Murray alternative appointments as
65. See U.N. Report 1950. op. cit., pp. 64-72.
66. Murray had some support in Canberra; a position paper 
prepared in the Department of External Territories 
noted that petitions were allowed in other Territories 
(CRS A518, item 103/1/8, 22 Iiay 1950).
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Principal of the Australian School of Pacific Administration
and Commissioner to the South Pacific Commission, the two
67appointments to be held concurrently. The letter 
containing the offer was drafted by Halligan and was 
extremely polite in tone, noting, "It has occurred to me 
that of all the possible appointees for the two appointments 
that I mentioned that your qualifications and experience 
fit you to render a service not only to Papua and New
6BGuinea but to Australia in her general Pacific interests.” 
Murray's term as Administrator had several years to run, 
but it was intended that the combined salary for the 
proposed appointments would be slightly more than he was 
presently receiving, but with no entertainment allowance 
(at that time £500 per year).
The ensuing negotiations between Murray and various 
individuals in Australia occupied several months and need 
only be summarised. On 1 August, while Murray was visiting 
Australia, he visited Spender at his Sydney home, and was 
again offered the alternative appointments.^ During the 
Australian visit he also saw Halligan and discussed the
70situation with Howse, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary. 
While not rejecting the offer, Murray suggested that he 
should receive a higher salary as Principal (mainly to 
offset Australian taxation), that the Principal should be
67. CRS A452, item 61/5207, 22 June 1950. The draft was dated 15 June.
68. Ibid. The irony of Halligan's drafting this letter 
will be apparent in the following Chapter.
69. Murray interview, 12 December 1966.
70. Murray interview, 14- December 1966.
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allowed entertainment "by voucher”, and be provided with a
71house near the School. Some two weeks later Murray
again discussed the matter with Howse, who was on a winter
Parliamentary tour of the islands, and on this occasion
further suggested that he should serve until the following
October, by which time he would have completed a five-year
term, and should receive some honour in recognition of
his service. Murray then travelled to Canberra with Howse
in mid-August and saw Mr. Padden, who was acting Prime
Minister at the time, about his position. He was advised
that this was entirely a matter for the Minister to
decide. In a further talk with Howse, Murray recalls being
asked, in effect, MWhat do you want in order to take the
jobs as Principal and S.P.C. Commissioner?” He replied
that, if he ”had to go”, he wanted an appointment as
Commander of the Order of Saint Michael and Saint George,
or something similar, but not a knighthood. Howse advised
the Minister, who was then in London, of the Administrator's
requests, noting in placatory tones that Murray seemed
genuinely keen to remain in Hew Guinea, particularly if
the title of Lieutenant-Governor were restored, together
7 0with its mode of address, ”Your Excellency”. Spender 
rejected this proposition, as well as Murray's other 
suggestions, in very blunt terms. Some two months later 
Mr. C.D. Rowley was appointed Principal of the School of 
Pacific Administration. Murray remained in New Guinea.
71 . The material in this and the following passage is drawn 
from Murray interview, 12 and 14 December 1966.
72. CRS A518, item B800/1/7, 29 August 1950.
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By the latter months of 1950 Spender had made his main
impact on New Guinea. He had delivered the long policy
speech which is discussed later in this Chapter, but had
also become heavily involved with the Colombo Plan and in
negotiations concerning the Anzus Treaty. Moreover, he
was suffering from an ulcer which, he maintains, was soon
to lead to his retirement from politics; and at the end
of the year he became, according to come reports, involved
in moves within the Liberal Party to replace Menzies as 
74-Prime Minister. The Murray question slipped into the 
background, but was not forgotten, for in December the 
Minister again asked for recommendations on an alternative 
position that would be suitable for the Administrator. No 
further action was taken at that time, however, and Spender 
relinquished his portfolio on 27 April 1951, shortly 
before the election resulting from the double dissolution 
of Parliament. Murray thus retained his position., but 
developments during the preceding seventeen months, in 
addition to his confrontation with the Minister, had made 
it clear that he was wholly out of favour with the government
Spender sums up
In reviewing Spender's term as Minister for External 
Territories, it is hard to disagree with his own assessment: 
"I left my Ministries feeling that I could not have done
73. See P.C. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: the ANZUS 
Treaty and the Colombo Plan. Sydney, S.II.P., 1969»
74. Spender, Politics and a Man, op. cit., pp. 300-4.
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more than I did in the time.” Certainly, he had shown 
more drive than had Ward in the whole of his last four 
years as Minister. The high point of his terra came with 
his statement on New G-uinea policy to the House of 
Representatives on 1 June 1950, a few weeks after his tour 
of inspection. It followed a similar statement on foreign 
policy delivered some three months previously, helping to 
stamp the Minister, if nothing else, as one of the most 
able publicists in the government. He set considerable
76store by his New G-uinea speech, as he later made clear:
75
If, in a strict sense, this statement might be said 
not to be a plan, it was certainly planning. It set 
forth a programme to be achieved. It marked out the 
road to be taken, and gave the necessary directives 
to those who were to travel the road. Nothing 
comparable, I venture to say, had previously been 
done on New Guinea.
The significance of the Minister’s 1950 speech has not been
assessed, mainly because it came to be overshadowed in
later years by the more numerous statements of his successor;
indeed, this may have been in Sir Percy's mind when he
later came to review his political career, and could account
77for the attention he devoted to it in his reminiscences. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to escape the conclusion that his 
"policy" was no more than a review of the problems and 
progress of the post-war years, coupled with a statement 
of his intentions which, while being no less pious than
75. Ibid., p. 304.
76. Ibid., p. 275.
77. In ibid., more than half of a chapter of eight and a 
half pages is devoted to the statment and to laudatory 
reviews of it.
those expressed by Ward in 1945, were far narrower in their 
78compass.
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The Minister devoted about one quarter of his speech,
which totalled some 11,000 words, to an orthodox review of
Australia’s relations with Papua hew Guinea, the difficulties
of development and the usual predictions about new products
79and mineral resources. ' Even at that stage, however, 
there was an equivocal tone to the speech that was likely to 
please neither the government’s friends nor its enemies, 
and which once again failed to provide the clear guidelines 
required for detailed planning. Thus Spender first 
announced that in order to achieve the government's aim of 
"the fullest development of the Territory resources" it would
O A
be necessary, as "prime objectives", to promote:
(1) The welfare and advancement of the natives peoples 
and their increasing participation in the natural wealth 
of the Territories.
(2) The development of the resources of the Territory 
to the point ultimately where the area will be 
economically self supporting....
Apart from the fact that the second of the objectives, as 
stated, was tautological, this part of the speech suggested 
that welfare provisions would continue to enjoy first 
priority. However, the Minister went on to deal at 
considerable length with economic questions:
78. The speech is in G .P .D ., Vol. 208, pp. 3655-53, 1 June 
1950. It was reissued as a pamphlet - an important 
precedent for later Ministers - and widely circulated, 
being included as a special supplement, for example, in 
South Pacific (Vol. 4 No. 7, June 1950).
79. Ibid., pp. 5 6 3 5-4 1 .
80. Ibid., pp. 3636-7.
81. Ibid ., p. 3637.
615
While it will be the task of the Government, through 
its programmes for their social advancement, to enable 
these people to take a constantly increasing share in 
the government of their country, it is to private 
enterprise under proper safeguards that the Government 
must to a major extent look for assistance in 
securing the economic advancement of these Territories. 
To this end every encouragement will be afforded to 
private enterprise in bringing its available skill and 
capital to bear on the development of the Territories’ 
natural resources and, in so doing, to impart to these 
backward peoples the means of participating to an 
ever increasing extent in developing the wealth of 
their country.
In reviewing the pattern of New Guinea trade he continued,
"It is the view of the Government that...development should
opgenerally be complementary to existing Australian industry."
He then re-stated, in one of several repetitions in his
Q  •Zspeech, the government’s development strategy: J
Generally, the policy of the Government in relation to 
the Territories will be to encourage private enterprise 
to foster production with a view to the resources of 
the Territory being developed to the utmost, and to 
advance the welfare of the native peoples. 4^-
Contrary to the priorities set out in the earlier part of 
the statement, this implied that private capital, rather 
than village welfare, would receive the prior attention of 
the government.
Such an impression was borne out by the fact that the 
Minister proceeded to announce six separate changes in 
policy favourable to European interests. Inter-island
82. Ibid., p. 3658.
83. Ibid.
84. Spender may have believed that the occasional use of the 
plural, "Territories", indicated the difference in 
status between Papua and the Trust Territory. This was 
a practice sometimes adopted by the Pacific Islands 
Monthly.
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shipping and stevedoring would revert to private control. 
Private agencies would be permitted to mill timber. The 
maximum term of employment under contract would be 
extended from one year to two. Customs tariffs would 
be adjusted in an effort to relieve pressure on the cost 
of living. The Production Control Board would be abolished 
and the marketing of copra placed in private hands. The 
settlement of ex-servicemen in the Territory, with 
government assistance, would be investigated. In addition, 
special bank finance would probably be made available for 
prospective settlers; tighter control would be exercised 
over the payment of war damage compensation to villagers; 
and approval would be given for the re-establishment of the 
New Guinea Volunteer Rifles. All of these concessions 
flowed from settler demands.
In contrast to his lengthy discussion of economic
matters, the Minister devoted only some 1,200 words, or
about one-ninth of his speech, to matters which were in
any way connected with village welfare and social
advancement. However, he made the first public
acknowledgement that a five-year education plan had been
prepared, and announced the formation of a committee to
investigate the programme of hospital building proposed by
86Dr. Gunther in 1946. His comments on these aspects of 
development were guarded: for example, the education plan 
was "being examined in the light of the needs of the
85. This and the following passage are drawn from ibid., 
pp. 3639-44.
86. Ibid.., pp. 3647-8.
85
617
Territory and the availability of staff, cost of equipment, 
buildings and other essential factors”. ' The problems 
of cost and financing were major concerns of the Minister, 
who estimated that in the post-war years some £11 million 
had already been granted to Papua and New Guinea by the 
Commonwealth,,compared with the Territory's internal 
revenue of less than £4 million. At least another £12 
million would be required for construction programmes. 
"Expenditure of that magnitude is clearly beyond normal 
budgetary provision and the question of obtaining at least 
a substantial portion of the necessary funds by way of 
loan must accordingly be explored,” the Minister added.
In addition, "the share of the cost of the Administration 
of the Territory borne by the residents should be fully 
examined".
The Minister seemed to be advocating at least a partial 
return to the "pay as you go" policies of the pre-war 
period, but this was bound to be very difficult, owing to 
other commitments which the government was obliged to 
meet. The public service, for example, had recently been 
enlarged to some 1,600 positions and it would be necessary 
to expand the building programme to provide improved 
accommodation for them, since the poor conditions still 
existing in the Territory made recruitment difficult. It 
was intended that the uncontrolled areas of the country
87. Ibid., p. 3646.
88. Ibid., p. 3652.
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would be "fully...administered within the next five 
years" this would require further heavy expenditure
on staffing and the construction of outstations, roads 
and airfields throughout those areas. The operations of 
the Commonwealth Department of Works and Housing in Papua 
New Guinea would be greatly expanded, particularly with 
a view to rebuilding wharves and providing the usual 
amenities in the towns. It was inevitable that a programme 
on this scale would require much larger cash grants; in 
suggesting otherwise, the Minister made it even more 
difficult for the Administration to secure Treasury 
guarantees for the long-term financing of development plans, 
a problem which is discussed later in this Chapter.
For the rest, the Minister announced a delay in the
establishment of the legislative Council, owing to some
doubts about the membership provided for it under the
Papua and New Guinea Act 1949« and the formation of District
Advisory Councils comprising private citizens nominated
qOby the Administrator. Both decisions involved concessions 
to white opinion. There were also some words of 
encouragement for the officials in both Canberra and New 
Guinea. The Department of External Territories would be 
strengthened; it had been the "Cinderella of Commonwealth 
Departments" and only by the "energy and enthusiasm of a
89. The material in this and the following passage is drawn 
from C.P.P., Vol. 208, pp. 3645. 3648-9, 1 June 1950 
(i.e., ibid.).
90. This and the following passage are drawn from ibid., 
pp. 3650-1.
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small number of officers’1 had it coped with its tasks.
As for the Territory Administration, Spender made the 
identical promise extended by every Minister before and 
after him: there would be increased delegation of 
responsibility from Canberra. Only by this step would ’’the 
best efficiency” be developed. He announced an increase 
in the financial delegations of the Administration’s senior 
officials; but this did little more than account for 
inflation, so that the most significant announcement about 
delegation was that two Deputy Administrators would be 
appointed to serve in ’’distant parts of the Territory” to 
ensure effective administration. The Minister wished to 
’’pay a tribute” to District Officers and announced that, 
in a step to help restore their ’’prestige and standing", 
they would in future be known as District Commissioners. 
There was no praise for senior headquarters officials and 
Murray's name was not mentioned.
Reaction to the new conservatism
The Minister's statement was received most enthusiastically
91by the Australian press. The Sydney Morning Herald stated:7
Dor the first time an Australian G-overnment has shown 
full recognition both of its obligations and its 
opportunities in New G-uinea. . .Development of these 
potentially rich dependencies has long been hamstrung 
by the fatal combination of an ill-informed and badly 
advised Minister, a weak department, and a local 
Administration reluctant to take responsibility.
91. Sydney Morning Herald, 3 June 1950. Spender quoted this 
passage with obvious relish in his reminiscences 
(Politics and a Man, op. cit.. p. 278).
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The Pacific Islands Monthly adopted a similar approach in
an editorial which began, "For the first time...hew Guinea
has been given a clear-cut policy on which to base its
administration."J The only difficulty would be in
executing certain measures. There was "a great deal of
house-cleaning to be done", and while most people could
prepare a plan, "the real test comes when other people try
94-to give effect to it". While the second part of this 
assessment was partly correct, it is impossible to agree 
with the opening statements. Most of the decisions 
announced by the Minister involved administrative 
adjustments, not new policies. His statement on village 
welfare merely endorsed measures that were already being 
put into effect, while his remarks about the role of 
private enterprise were reactionary rather than innovative.
He was essentially advocating more of everything that 
already existed, with some adjustment of priorities in 
favour of white interests.
From the discussion of settler demands and attitudes 
95in earlier Chapters,- it is possible to make some 
assessment of the ideal situation that the settler 
community wished to see develop from the Minister's 
statement: a reversion to the pre-war situation of
administrative poverty and laissez-faire production. The 
least informed of the Territory's whites may even have
92. P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 11, June 1950, p. 92.
93. Sydney Morning Herald, loc. cit.
94. P.I.N., loc. cit.
95. See, for example, Chapter Two, p. 98, Chapter Four, passim.
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expected the return of this situation following Spender’s 
statements during his New Guinea tour, hut it obviously 
could not develop from the proposals he outlined to the 
House of Representatives. Moreover, the Minister faced the 
same problem that had confronted Ward: there was still 
no research and planning organization to provide the ideas, 
plans, programmes and details needed to put even reactionary 
proposals into effect. Owing to inevitable delays in 
public service recruitment it would be some time before an 
effective executive organization could be developed. Above 
all, Spender was bound to encounter the difficulties of 
inducing change in a bureaucracy that had grown accustomed 
to proceeding in a particular direction. This might be 
termed bureaucratic inertia, not of a static kind, but in 
the sense that an organization, once in motion, tends to 
continue on a given line, until acted on by an external 
force. In the case of the bureaucracy controlling Par>ua 
New Guinea, a change of direction had gradually been 
effected by post-war circumstances and by pressures from 
such people as Ward and Murray. A further change, even 
if it were a return to the original course, required 
additional pressure which the Minister, in his remaining 
months in office, was unable to impart.
Disillusioned settlers
Spender found that the New Guinea settlers, their 
hopes high following his tour of the Territory, were quickly
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demoralised when sudden and dramatic improvements in their
conditions failed to appear. Thus as early as October
1950, four months after Spender’s statement to Parliament
had been acclaimed by the white community, complaints
96appeared in the Pacific Islands Monthly:J
The slowness of the Australian G-overnmental authority 
in implementing its policy of developing Papua-New 
Guinea through the encouragement of private enterprise 
is causing a lot of irritation both in and out of 
the Territories...Months ago, the new Australian 
Minister for Territories (Mr. Spender) announced the 
new policy - co-operation with private enterprise in 
creating a strong Australian outpost in New Guinea... 
It can be said at once, in so many words, that there 
has been so much maddening delay in giving effect to 
what might be called the Spender Policy that a 
reaction has set in...New Guinea Europeans are 
enterprising, bursting with energy...For all that, 
they cannot understand why there is so much frustration and delay in the implementation of the 
Spender Policy....
This editorial was headed, ”Is the Spender Policy Being
Sabotaged?”, and made pointed reference to ”Ward-ism, as
applied to Papua-New Guinea by J.K. Murray”, the ”Ward-
Murray native labour laws” and the ”Ward-Murray regime”.
New Guinea residents themselves were more demanding.
The Wau branch of the R.S.S. and A.I.L.A. sent a cable to
the Prime Minister in mid-November expressing their
97dissatisfaction:J 1
We, the returned soldiers of Wau, New Guinea, are 
alarmed and apprehensive at the continued delay and 
evasion shown by your Government on the policy as 
publicly outlined to us by Mr. Spender during his 
visit to New Guinea.
96. This and the following passage are drawn from P.I.M., 
Vol. 21 No. 3, October 1950, pp. 5-6.
97. P.N.G.N.A. Box 166, item GH1-7-7, 14 November 1950.
In the same month R.W. Robson, owner* and editor of the
Pacific Islands Monthly, paid his first visit to Papua
New G-uinea for ten years, having been kept out of the
Territory by wartime conditions and a direct prohibition
by Mr. Ward. Par from praising conditions since the defeat
of Labor, he wrote a series of pen-sketches filled with
the innuendo and destructive criticism that epitomised
his magazine. He noted, for example, that delegation of
powers and the establishment of District Advisory Councils
98had been promised by Spender, then complained:^
Seven months have gone by, and at this writing not one 
of these things has come to pass. I am told that 
fantastic delays occur, while more and more matters 
are referred South, to the inevitable Mr. Reg 
Halligan, for decision. Everyone blames everyone 
else - it is like fighting a feather bed.
Clearly, the honeymoon with the new government had ended. 
Australian aid
It was ironic that circumstances which had earlier 
made it difficult for Murray to secure change now helped 
to preserve the reforms that had taken place since 1945. 
Under Ward a virtual social revolution had been announced, 
but it had proved impossible to effect; the transformation 
of economic conditions and control required to make the 
social policy wholly effective. Now SJpender wished to 
relax economic controls, but was unaiLe to modify the social
98. P .1 .M., Vol. 21 No. 4, November 1 950, p. 103.
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programmes to the point where white entrepreneurs could 
have gained the freedom of access to local resources, 
particularly labour, that they demanded. The new government 
faced the same problem as its predecessors: the economic 
situation in Papua New Guinea was hopelessly inadequate to 
support an active programme of social development. If the 
government wished to pursue such a programme, it had no 
alternative but to subsidise the Territory in at least 
the proportions approved by the post-war Labor government.
In the long run, the subsidy could possibly be reduced 
once revenue from new economic activity increased. However, 
this goal had been pursued by various administrations for 
more than sixty years, without measurable success, and 
it offered little hope for the Liberal-Country Party 
government.
The level of Australia’s financial aid to Papua New 
Guinea was a matter of concern to the new government.
Shortly after Spender’s major statement on New Guinea, a 
letter from the Treasurer, Mr. Padden, politely expressed 
’’interest1' in Spender's view that Australia would have to
Q Qsupport New Guinea. - ^  Treasury was concerned about the 
large commitments being suggested, and Halligan had already 
encountered some searching enquiries from the Secretary 
for the Treasury (Mr. G.P.N. Watt) concerning the heavy 
expenditure being proposed once the reconstruction phase
99. CRS A518, item C927/1, 22 June 1950.
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in the Territory had ended. The problem of finance
increased in July 1950, following a general directive from
the Prime Minister that the government’s policy was to
’’check unhealthy expans ion in the public service”; to
avoid additional expenditure; and, if possible, to make 
101reductions. For the first time, the Department of
External Territories was obliged to request, rather than
question, the allocation of funds. It did so in terms
almost identical with those which had been employed by the
102Labor government and the Territory Administration:
I think it is necessary to view this expenditure in 
the light of the war-time background against which 
this Department was created, the post-war commitments 
entered into by the Government in regard to the Trust 
Territory of New Guinea and the Government’s post-war policy for the rehabilitation and economic 
development of the Territory of Papua and New 
Guinea...If the Government’s policy of the development of the Territory... is to be at all 
effective and capable of providing sufficient revenue 
for self-support within a reasonable time, it is my 
considered and firm opinion also that quite 
considerable funds will have to be provided for a 
wide range of capital works and for maintenance... 
over a suitable period of years.
The Australian budget for 1950/51 provided for an increase 
in the grant to Papua New Guinea from some £4.2 million 
to approximately £4.35 million, or little more than four 
per cent.10  ^ This compared most unfavourably with the 
three preceding years, when budgets drafted by the Labor 
government increased the grant to the Territory by,
100. Ibid., 31 May 1950.
101. Ibid., 7 July 1950.102. Ibid., 26 July 1950. The letter was drafted by Mr. 
J.G. Archer, Assistant Secretary dealing with 
financial and economic matters.
103. For the statistics upon which these and the following calculations are based, see Jinks, op. cit., p. 105.
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successively, 12, 22 and 33 per cent. The time was being 
reached when a levelling-off of the rate of increase was 
to be expected, but the first Liberal-Country Party 
budget represented virtually no increase in the provision 
of net goods and services, owing to tie inflation of the 
Korean War period. The obvious questions were: did this 
represent a permanent plateau of Australian finance for 
the Territory, or would increases continue in later years? 
And on what basis would the money be nade available? A 
static, annual Australian grant would render development 
planning impossible.
Yet more committees, 1950
Planning for Papua New Guinea was taken into account 
in the structure of the new Cabinet, which provided for 
seven "major" and ten "specialist" Standing Committees. 
Within the latter group was the Standing Committee on the 
Development of the External Territories. It comprised 
Spender as chairman; the Treasurer, Mr. A.W. Padden; 
the Minister for Commerce and Agriculture, Mr. J. McEwen; 
and the Minister for Works and Housing and for National 
Development, Mr. R.G. Casey. While its membership was 
smaller, the Standing Committee clearly followed the pattern 
adopted, with few results, by the Labor government; and ttv*» 
cycle was complete when, following an enquiry from 
Halligan, a parallel Inter-Departmental Committee was also
104. The material in this and the following passage is 
drawn from CRS A518, item C927/1, 31 January 1950.
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established. It comprised representatives of the
departments v/hose Ministers made up the Standing Committee
(including the Department of National Development), plus
the Administrator. As with the various groups set up by
the Labor government, there was again considerable delay
in securing recommendations on New Guinea development:
the Standing Committee awaited a report from the Inter-
Departmental Committee, which in turn required direction
from the Minister following his tour of the Territory.
However, by May 1950 a Report on Present Conditions in
Papua and New Guinea was available and, in addition to
providing certain material for the Minister’s statement,
it was available as a basis for discussion by the Inter-
Departmental Committee. There were yet more delays,
however, and it was not until 24 August 1950 that the group
of officials was convened for the first time, eight months
107after the election of the new government.
105
The Report, as presented to the Inter-Departmental 
Committee, contained nothing in the way of basic information 
that could not have been gained from the annual reports 
for the Trust Territory and Papua, and its recommendations 
mainly drew together a number of proposals that had been
105. Ibid., 23 February 1950.
106. The report is contained in CRS A518, item H927/1 and 
is minuted 11 May 1950. It may be different from the 
two other 1950 reports contained in the Halligan 
papers and to which access was refused (see p. 588), 
but it is hard to imagine the Department preparing 
three different reports; this one is innocuous enough, 
at least.
107. CRS A518, item D927/1, 24 August 1950.
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submitted from Port Moresby as long as four years previously: 
the need for a land registration commission, for price 
control, and for clarification of employment conditions.
It also pointed out, yet again, that there was no clear 
policy for the development of the Territory.^8
Murray presses his economic plan
The committee's attention was thus directed to the
major question governing the Territory's development: its
economic and trade relationship with Australia.1
Department of External Territories position on the matter
110was set out in a paper which recommended:
(a) That the economies of the External Territories 
should, as far as practicable, be developed in such 
a way as to be complementary to the Australian 
economy and that the development of any industries 
which might be competitive with Australian 
industries should not be encouraged beyond the limit 
of local Territory requirements;
(b) That, in the development of the Territories' 
economy, Australia should afford Territory industries 
such measure of assistance and protection as 
international commitments will allow; and
(c) That conversely, the Territories should as far 
as practicable ensure for Australia the Territory 
market for import requirements.
The paper made no reference to the original reasons for
108. Ibid. It is worth noting that the Minister's statement 
to Parliament was not mentioned during the course of 
the committee's discussions.109. Ibid. Mr. J.G-. Crawford, of the Department of Commerce 
and Agriculture, opened this part of the discussion.
He had been a member of the 1949 committee.
110. The following is a brief summary, by the Department, 
of material originally set out in CRS A518, item 
AL800/1/7, 10 March 1950.
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Australian protection, as put forward by the Directorate
and Colonel Murray: that only through such guarantees
could the country’s resources, notably labour, be diverted
from plantations and towards production on village
small-holdings. The economic strategy proposed by
External Territories seemed, in contrast, to aim at the
protection of the white plantation industry, while limiting
the diversification of the colonial economy. Murray was
not happy with the proposals, although the minutes of the
meeting do not present his views clearly, possibly
112because the secretary could not follow them:
Colonel Murray stated that in the long term the 
Territory could provide Australia with every tropical 
product at present imported. For strategic reasons 
we should aim at such a type of self-sufficiency.
This aim should not be publicised. As most of the 
products concerned were tree crops (which took a 
long time to come to maturity) an assured market 
over a long term would have to be given. He 
advocated that (a) the Commonwealth Government 
should indicate that for 15 years Australia will 
take all the Territory can produce at cost of 
efficiency production up to Australia’s requirements; 
and (b) a body like the Tariff Board should assess 
cost of production and stabilisation schemes should 
be introduced on the basis of costs of efficient 
production.
Murray believed that the committee should recommend such 
a scheme to the government.
The major problem associated with any such scheme of
111. See Chapter Eight, pp. 508-9.
112. CRS A518, item C927/1, 24 August 1950. The "strategic" 
arguments were a relatively minor factor in Murray’s 
thinking, but they were useful in his attempt to
win the support of the committee.
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economic expansion arose with the ensuing discussion of
possible financial arrangements. The Territory Administration
had provided a table of projected expenditure for the
twenty years to 1970, upon which the Treasury
114representative on the committee commented:
It was true one could not talk about development unless 
the general limits of expenditure were known. It 
would not be possible, however, for the Treasurer to 
bind himself to budget for firm sums such as those 
nominated, over the next 20 years. Treasury did not 
reject the principle provided there was no 
implication that the Treasurer was obliged to accept 
firm commitments.
Having been advised that Treasury approved of planning, 
but would not necessarily provide the means to carry it 
out, Murray once more suggested that statutory provision 
should be made for the funding of projects, as under the 
British Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Other 
members of the committee then pointed out, correctly, that 
the estimates of future finance v/ere not '’concrete*';
"the concept was good, but Treasury had continually asked 
for a definite development programme". Halligan ventured 
that some indication of the availability of funds was 
necessary before a programme could be drawn up. Murray 
pointed out that, while expenditure in such areas as health, 
education and district services could be estimated with 
reasonable accuracy, this was virtually impossible in the
113. The amounts suggested are of significance only because 
they were very much smaller than those eventually 
provided; the 1950 projections even envisaged a 
levelling-off of Australian grants within a decade.
114. The material in this and the following passage, 
including quotations, is drawn from ibid.
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economic sphere. Support services, particularly roads, 
would cost enormous amounts, while the amount of private 
investment could not be predicted. He maintained that, 
as in the case of the United Kingdom, the Australian 
government would have to "take some things on trust". 
Referring to the failure of the previous committees to 
produce firm proposals, Murray stated that it was essential 
for the new body to ensure that a definite programme was 
begun in 1951, "without fail". The committee therefore 
suggested that the "Development Fund approach" be put to 
Cabinet, in addition to the possibilities of providing 
finance on the more orthodox annual basis.
Following this meeting, Murray apparently engaged in
some minor lobbying in support of the development fund
concept, for on the following Sunday there were press
reports that the government was about to initiate a £100
115million plan in New Guinea during the next ten years.
This was a matter that the Administrator had already 
proposed, mainly through a loan programme to finance 
long-term capital works; but although such methods of 
funding were orthodox within the Australian budgetary 
system, the government apparently lacked sufficient 
confidence in New Guinea’s future to sanction them for the
•i A C.Territory: in July the Treasurer had observed:
115. Sydney Sunday Sun, 27 August 1950.
1 1 6. CRS A518, item C927/1, 12 July 1950.
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I have noted the Administrator’s suggestion about 
separating expenditure from revenue and expenditure 
from loan funds and also his proposal for a Papua 
and New Guinea Development Fund of £100m. for 
expenditure spread over the next ten years. I shall 
consider the points he has made but at this stage I 
would say that we may not find it convenient or 
desirable to deal with grants to the Administration 
in the way he has suggested.
Consequently, there was no official comment on the press
report of the development fund, and for some months the
debate was confined to Canberra, through an interchange
between Halligan and Watt, at the Treasury. Commenting on
various programmes which had been proposed to extend for
three, ten or even twenty years, Watt stated that he was
opposed to the concept of long-term financing for the
117colonies and could see no value in it. He maintained
that the situation in New Guinea was different from the 
case of the United Kingdom’s development fund, since in 
the British case the extra funds provided from London were 
"marginal” to the British colonies’ regular sources of 
revenue. Papua New Guinea, on the other hand, relied 
wholly on the government for its development. In later 
correspondence there were few signs of compromise. Watt had 
proposed the establishment of a separate "works committee"
1 1 Qto concentrate on capital construction and services, 
but Halligan maintained that the Inter-Departmental 
Committee was adequate for the purpose; he also denied 
that New Guinea development was being left entirely in the
117. This and the following passage are drawn from CRS 
A518, item J927/1, 9 October 1950.
118. Ibid.
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hands of the government. The Treasury attitude could 
not be shaken, however, and the question of long-term 
finance gradually slipped into the background.
Support from External Territories
Curiously, during the brief period of negotiations
with Treasury, the Department of External Territories
approach to development came close to that advocated by
Murray and the progressive Territory officials. This was
particularly obvious in the background papers prepared
for the second meeting of the Inter-Departmental Committee.
The Department's first draft of the economic strategy for
New Guinea could have been written by Murray himself. It
pointed out that the primary means of increasing the work
force in the Territory was through health and education
programmes; and, further, that available labour could be
used effectively while maintaining the existing rural 
1 20structure:
Preservation of the family unit implies preservation 
of the social framework pending gradual transition.
The social framework is essentially based on land and 
therefore tends to be inflexible. Consequently policy 
will require to aim more at bringing industry to 
labour rather than labour to industry. It must also 
aim at increasing efficiency of the force through 
education and training and the introduction of 
mechanical aids, wherever economic. If basic policy 
relating to the labour force is determined on the 
foregoing lines, the general internal policy will take 
shape accordingly. Where practicable, industry will 
be encouraged to develop in areas with large populations... 
In this way much disruption of family life will be 
avoided and the growth of native population encouraged.
119« Ibid., 10 and 22 November 1950.
120. CRS A518, item D927/1, 8 February 1951.
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The long term aim of such a policy is a native operated 
economy aided by invested capital with managerial and 
technical skills, rather than a European economy 
aided by a native labour force...Acceptance of this 
aim would affect the rate of development from the 
beginning and would imply that the process of 
development will be a long one....
The tenor of this paper followed closely a submission from
Port Moresby, which sought to supply more of the data
demanded at the first meeting of the Inter-Departmental
Committee. The Territory approach envisaged "a considerable
stepping up of the present rate of development, and the
overcoming of the problem of the availability of labour by
mechanisation and other methods, such as the incorporation
within the developmental schemes of aspects such as peasant
production, co-operative production, share farming etc.,
121whereby the 'hidden' labour force can be utilized". In
both instances the primary emphasis was on the life of the 
people and their role in the economy, rather than on 
economic development for its own sake. Unfortunately, new 
influences in the Department of External Territories 
rejected this view even before the Canberra authorities 
had time to discuss it.
Rejection of the plan
Once the discussions between Halligan and Watt on the 
development fund concept had proved fruitless, the 
Department of External Territories could envisage only a
121. P.N.Gr.N.A. Box 186, item PD1/3-1, 17 January 1951.
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continuation of informal discussions with the Treasury:
in that way it might be possible to obtain ’’general
agreement on a broad policy plan which could be placed
before the Cabinet’s Standing Committee...Otherwise the
work of the /~Inter-Departmental_7 Committee threatens to
1 22remain pretty much at a standstill.” Because of these
difficulties, the second meeting of the Inter-Departmental
Committee was further delayed. The various position papers
on economic strategy that had been prepared in early 1951
were thus not reviewed until the following August, by which
time Mr. Hasluck had become Minister for Territories and
some new staff had been recruited to the Department. One
of these officers minuted the draft proposing, as he
1 23termed it, a ’’native operated economy”:
This paper was originally drafted before I actually 
took up duty here. I tried to follow the ideas 
therein expressed. In the light of subsequent experience 
I find that paras. 3-10 / the passage quoted on pp. 
633-4_7 lay stress on the wrong points. European 
enterprise is essential for development. Much later 
the natives will take up the running. Development in 
centres of high population seems quite impracticable 
until ’white” industries are there to buy the product 
of the native grower...Whole villages may find it 
advantageous to move to an area where they can produce 
for a factory...The stress on the preservation of the 
family unit need not imply inflexible adherence to 
existing tribal lands - families may move to the 
proximity of employment as in our society.
This passage was remarkable: for its ignorance of Papua 
Hew Guinea and its customs, for its callousness in 
suggesting the creation of a class of landless labourers,
122. CRS A518, item J927/1, 7 February 1951.
123. CRS A518, item D927/1, 6 August 1951.
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and for its arrogance in rejecting other viewpoints.
Moreover, the fact that the officer was new to the
1 24-Department did not limit his influence on events:
I doubt whether /“the paper J  will be needed for any 
inter-Departmental Committee, for our own lines of 
policy have grown fairly clear from a number of 
separate development policy questions determined 
for specific cases.
It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the
techniques of administration employed by Hasluck's
Department during the following twelve years, but it is
clear that the method of incremental decision-making from
Canberra that dominated the period had its genesis in
i 25this early attitude towards planning. Neither the
Standing Committee of Cabinet nor the Inter-Deoartmental 
Committee played much further part in policy-making, 
which came to be dominated by Hasluck personally. Thus 
the planning structure proposed for New G-uinea development 
by the non-Labor government, the fourth such organization 
announced since 1944, not only failed to produce a 
detailed programme for the Territory, but could not even 
agree on the broad strategy to be followed. The 
"Spender policy'1, too, had faltered on the inherent 
contradiction involved in attempting to promote rapid 
economic development in a colony while at the same time 
protecting the welfare of the people.
124. Ibid. The officer eventually became First Assistant 
Secretary in charge of planning.
125. For some comment on the lack of planning during this 
period, see U.N. Report 1962 (the "Foot Report"),
pp. 44-58.
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Secretariat of Planning and Development
While these attempts were being made to revive New 
Guinea planning in Australia, the Territory Administration 
embarked on a similar scheme. In mid-1949, when Mr.
Chifley directed that the Labor Cabinet sub-committee on 
New Guinea be re-established - and with preparations 
finally in hand for staffing a Division of Planning and 
Research within the Department of External Territories - 
Canberra approval was also given for the setting up of a
1 p£Secretariat of Planning and Development in Port Moresby.
In the sudden flurry of activity before the 1949 election,
there was little time to arrive at a clear statement of
objectives for the Secretariat, or even to recruit staff
for it. On 15 August 1949 the acting Government Secretary,
Mr. Lonergan, following discussions with the Administrator,
offered the position of acting Secretary for Planning and
Development to Mr. J.H. Jones, who had been acting
Director of the Department of District Services and Native
1 27Affairs for some three years. Jones advised that he
was ready to begin duty in the new position on 17 August,
and on that day a circular was sent to all departments
1 PRadvising them of the existence of the Secretariat. In
his new position, Jones was formally responsible to the 
Government Secretary, but retained his office in the 
District Services building. His staff comprised an officer
126. See Chapter Nine, p. 564 and Chapter Five, p. 288.
127. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item PD1/1-1, 16 August 1949.
128. Ibid., 17 August 1949.
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seconded from the field service, a clerk, and a secretary, 
hut it was an indication of the status accorded the new 
organization that Jones’ subordinates could be
1 2Qaccommodated only in the shell of an ex-Army hut. J The 
Secretariat had all the failings of hasty organization, 
by Halligan and Lonergan, in an attempt to retain their 
control of planning; but since it lacked the immediate 
support of the group of progressive officers supporting 
Murray its future was immediately in doubt. The Pacific 
Islands Monthly, commenting on the new Secretariat, was 
by no means impressed: v
A new, important-sounding post - that of Secretary 
of Planning and Development - has been created in 
the Administration...One thing the Administration 
is not short of is plans, so Mr. Jones should be 
kept very busy.
Jones’ initial problem was to discover what he was
intended to do. The circular announcing his appointment
could merely state, ’The Acting Secretary (Planning and
Development) will at the outset be occupied on the work
preparatory to planning and directly this work is completed
1 31notification will be made of the functions of the office.” J 
After compiling a neat filing index, Jones spent most of 
the next twelve months attending discussions, in 
Canberra and Port Moresby, concerning the intentions of 
the new government; and in preparing parts of the 
background papers that have been referred to earlier in
129. Ibid., 31 August 1949.
130. P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 2, September 1949, p. 11.
131. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item 1/1—1, 17 August 1949.
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1 3 ?this Chapter. He attended the meeting of the Inter-
Departmental Committee in Canberra wi~th the Administrator
in August 1950, returning to the Territory with the
Treasury admonition that more detailed proposals were
required before long-term funding of New G-uinea programmes
could be considered. Jones then requested each department
to prepare a seven-year plan, but since none of them was
any better equipped than the Secretariat to engage in
such activity, the resulting documents for the most part
contained little more than guesses at future financial
requirements, with a minimum of supporting evidence. ^
The estimates of expenditure for the ensuing three years
proved reasonably accurate, but acting on advice that the
Commonwealth would provide a proportionately smaller share
of Territory funds by the end of the planning period,
most departments predicted a gradual reduction in their
total requirements: the figure estimated for 1956/57 -
£8.5 million - was little more than half the amount
1 3 4eventually spent in that year. '
Limitations of the Secretariat
Por planning purposes, the material produced by and
132. The 139 files, most of them very sl.im, are contained 
in P.N.G.N.A. Boxes 186 to 189. The background papers 
are in Box 186, item 1/3-1. Ironically, the records 
of the abortive Secretariat are the only ones from 
this sector of the Administration t<o have survived the 
various fires and departmental reorganizations intact.
133. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item 1/6, 19 September 1949.
The plans are contained in Box 186, item 1/3—1.
134. For statistics of actual expenditures, see Jinks, 
op. cit., pp. 105-6.
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for the Secretariat was of little use; certainly, it was 
far from being the "concrete” evidence demanded by the 
Commonwealth Treasury. It was unlikely that anything 
better could have been prepared, since Jones concentrated 
on orthodox administrative requirements, emphasising 
particularly the contribution that individual departments 
might make to economic development. In contrast, the 
Secretariat's papers on social and political advancement 
were slight documents indeed, containing the kinds of 
generalisations that could be found in one of the annual 
reports to the United Nations. Even in the economic sphere, 
the proposals were little more than revivals of schemes 
that dated back as far as Sir Hubert Murray and even the 
German administration, such as the production of kenaf 
and manila hemp.  ^ This situation was not entirely of 
Jones' making, but it is unlikely that the outlook would 
have been so narrow had, say, Dr. Gunther been responsible 
for general planning. Moreover, Jones operated in virtual 
isolation from Canberra, having at one stage to ask the 
Department of External Territories if it could provide 
information on its proposed Division of Planning and 
Research."' ^  The Canberra records disclose an equally 
limited scope: in the relevant series for this period 
there appear, for example, fifty files on economic 
development and sixty on particular commodities to be 
investigated; but most folders are as thin as those produced
135. These papers are contained in P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, 
items in series PD2.136. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item 1/1-1, undated February 1951.
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by the Port Moresby Secretariat. By comparison, there
are only three files on political development, tv/o each
on health and education and one, comprising three folios
1 37of Jones’ notes, on social advancement. This was 
hardly the material for a development plan.
By the early months of 1951 Mr. Spender’s initial
impact on New Guinea affairs had clearly begun to fade;
shortly after Hasluck’s appointment as Minister the
Secretariat of Planning and Development was abolished,
Jones returning to the Department of District Services.
The short life of the Secretariat illustrates the cycle
of frustration that continued to dominate all attempts
at producing defined programmes for Papua New Guinea.
Basic policy could not be approved owing to a lack of
supporting data, while the necessary data was of little
use because it lacked the framework of a clear policy.
As a consequence, decisions were taken by Spender, and later
by Hasluck, on unrelated grounds, except in such
relatively narrow fields as health services or agricultural
extension. In the absence of clear objectives, the
implementation of many decisions tended to be conservative.
The events of the following decade require much more
research, but it is likely that the main aspects of the
1 38Hasluck policy of ’’uniform development”, such as the
137. These papers are contained in CRS A518, items in 
the sequence 927 (e.g., Social Advancement Policy,
927/12).
138. For the Minister’s major statements on this policy, 
see Jinks, Biskup, Nelson (eds.), op. cit., pp. 356-61
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emphasis on primary schooling and the lack of attention 
to political development, were not a conscious design, 
but rather the outcome of a tentative approach that grew 
inevitably from processes of ad hoc decision-making.
Spender’s achievement: slowing post-war trends
The impasse in planning produced ironic consequences. 
V/ith the Liberal-Country Party government reluctantly 
committed to steadily increasing grants to the Territory, 
those departments which had already prepared specialised 
programmes were able to continue with them. The Departments 
of Public Health and Education, whose heavy spending on 
social measures had been a particular cause of concern to 
the new government, continued to expand. On the other
hand, departments concerned with economic affairs, such 
as Lands and Agriculture, were able to produce neither a 
sudden influx of white settlers nor a dramatic increase 
in village production. The 1950's proved to be the decade 
of social measures, to be followed by a reaction that was 
partly responsible for making the 1960's the decade of 
economic development; uniform development proved to be 
a myth, owing initially to a lack of co-ordinated 
planning.^0
139. See ibid., pp. 362-4.
140. This is merely a hypothesis. I wish to make the period 
of "uniform development" the subject of a study 
following the present one; at this point it is worth 
suggesting the lines of enquiry indicated by the 
present discussion.
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Of the ad hoc decisions taken by Spender as a result
of his New Guinea tour, few did more than slow certain
trends that had resulted from post-war conditions. One of
the most significant for independent Papua New Guinea
was the re-establishment of the Pacific Islands Regiment
on a peacetime basis, a step which had been opposed by 
1 41hr. Evatt. Of much greater immediate importance were
the amendments to the conditions and control of the
employment of villagers. The Minister’s main concession
to employers was the extension of the maximum period of
contract v/ork from one year to two, while a less publicised
move that was at first considered a victory for settler
interests was the abolition of the separate Department of
Native Labour, whose establishment had been one of the few
1 42defined features of Ward’s policy. However, these
measures were far from being a major revision of labour
policy. The government honoured the promise of its
predecessor to abolish the pre-war form of indenture within
five years, providing for employment by contract ’’agreement”
under a 1950 Ordinance which substituted civil remedies
for all of the criminal provisions that had previously
1 43applied io workers who broke their contracts. This
141. There was little advance publicity on the reconstitution 
of the Regiment and its all-white, part-time counterpart, 
the Papua and New Guinea Volunteer Rifles. The new 
government acted swiftly; an Army advance party was
in Port Moresby by February 1950 (P .I ,M ., Vol. 21 
No. 8, March 1951 , p. 21) .
142. See Chapter Five, pp. 275-6.
143. Abolition before the announced date was attempted by 
Labor, but administrative arrangements could not be 
completed before the government's defeat (CRS A518, 
item 1840/1/4, 9 and 16 November and 1 December 1949).
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was considered a blow to employers who had previously been
able to mete out punishment to recalcitrant workers; even
the Territory’s Crown Law Officer, when asked his opinion
1 44of the measure, stated:
My personal opinion in the matter was and is that an 
agreement without a means of enforcement is not 
satisfactory, and that the academic remedy available 
to an employer against a native who breaks a contract 
is not a practicable means of enforcement.
By the time this opinion was expressed Murray was no
longer in office and there were few remaining supporters
of the liberalised employment conditions of the post-war
years, but decisions that had been made during the earlier
period could not be reversed, and could be modified only
with some difficulty. Thus although the Department of
Native Labour was abolished, it had been apparent for some
time that it was less than wholly effective; owing to
difficulties in recruiting suitable labour officers, many
of the Department’s duties had to be performed, under
delegated powers, by members of the field staff. Moreover,
it had been considered for some years that it was
undesirable to have a single organization responsible for
both the administration of employment and for the inspection
1 45of working conditions. It was therefore no concession 
to employers, in practice, when the functions of the 
former Department were divided between the Departments of 
District Services (administration of employment) and the
144. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 162, item G-H1-2-7, 2 June 1952.
145. See Chapter Eight, pp. 478-80.
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Government Secretary (inspection and control) early in 
1 4-61951. The control of employment became, if anything,
a little more effective once the staff exercising it were
made responsible to their direct superiors, rather than
carrying out these duties as agency functions on behalf
1 4-7of a separate, relatively minor department.
White representation
Similarly, the formation of representative bodies 
among European residents at town and district level proved 
to have less significance than the settler interests had 
hoped. In announcing this decision, Spender had gained 
credit for a policy that had reached its final form before 
the 1949 election. It envisaged District and Town 
Advisory Councils, the latter confined to major centres 
such as Port Moresby and Madang, with the District
1 4.RCommissioner as chairman and nominated representatives. 
Action had been taken on the proposal several months before 
Spender's New Guinea visit, and the first body was set 
up in the Central District in February 1950. However, it 
was clear from their titles that these bodies had no 
executive functions; for the next twenty years they merely
146. H.G.A.R.. 1950/51, p. 51.
147. The agency functions were detailed and repetitive, 
and always resented by field staff, who sometimes 
needed direction to carry them out correctly. Most 
performed labour inspections efficiently. A separate 
Department of labour was re-establsihed in 1958.
148. The material in this and the following passage is 
drawn from P.N.G-.N.A. Box 195, item CA1/4/1, 4 and 
6 May 1950.
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offered an avenue for the expression of settler opinion
and minor status to those individuals nominated to them.
No research has been conducted into their functioning, 
and it is unlikely that it ever will be, but it might be 
suggested that the Advisory Councils, if anything, slightly 
weakened the influence of white pressure groups by 
diversifying the efforts of their members.
Mr. Spender's implication that the Legislative Council 
membership provided under the Papua and New G-uinea Act 
might be altered in the settlers' favour also came to 
nothing. Under the terms of the Papua and New G-uinea Act, 
the Council could have been established on 1 July 1950.
Earlier in that year the drafting of an Ordinance was 
begun, together with investigations into the backgrounds 
of those Papua New Guineans considered most suitable for
1 50appointment to the three places reserved for non-Europeans.
However, following the Minister's expression of
dissatisfaction with the proposed Council, preparations
were suspended, and it was not until August 1951 that
organization of the poll for the Council's three European
151elected members was begun. - In the interim, the 
Territory Administration seems not to have been involved 
in the question of the Council's composition. On the 
available evidence it seems probable that this was one of
149. For an outline of the Councils' functions, see 
Jinks, op. cit., pp. 110-12.
150. P.N.G.N.A. Box 190, item CA1/2/1, 27 December 1949 
and 14 January and 31 March 1950.
151. P.N.G.N.A. Box 191* item CA1/2/6, 20 August 1951.
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the matters which slipped into the background during the
period when Spender's attention was drawn away from New 
1 52Guinea affairs. In any event, the Legislative Council,
when it met for the first time in November 1951, was
constituted in the manner prescribed in 1949 by the Paoua
and New Guinea Act, having an official majority of 17 in
a Council of 29, with three white missionaries, three
Papua New Guineans, and only six Europeans who could be
1 53considered as representing settler interests. The
settler group was a source of constant criticism of policy
and administration during the nine years of the Council's
existence, but it was to have only marginal influence on
1 54Hasluck and his advisers.
Strengthening the companies' hold
Following Spender's 1950 statements, the most important 
changes anticipated by settlers were in the economic field. 
Here again, earlier policy and events should have indicated 
that a major change of approach was impossible. Large 
areas of apparently unused land had attracted the Minister's 
attention, but they could not be alienated without serious 
disruption to the village subsistence economy; if Mr. 
Spender had been acquainted with the colonial history of
152. The Department of Territories file on this matter 
(CRS A518, iten 0800/1/7) was not cleared for access.
153. For further details, see C.A. Hughes, "The Legislative 
Councils of Papua-New Guinea", Parliamentary Affairs, 
Vol. 12 No. 2, Spring 1959, p. 209.
154. See, for example, B. Jinks, "The New Guinea Tax 
Issue", Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society, 
Vol. 1 No. 2, 1967, p. 16.
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Papua New Guinea, he may have ignored the settlers’ demands
on this matter. In the absence of large tracts of
alienable land, the soldier-settler scheme which the
Minister favoured was scarcely practicable. A plan to
provide credit and land for ex-servicemen was eventually
instituted in 1958, but it was mainly used to aid earlier
1 56settlers who were experiencing financial difficulties. '
Moreover, most of the land grants, notably in the Northern
District of Papua, were made from areas that had been
alienated by the Administration for other, abortive schemes
that dated back to the pre-war period. There was no
influx of white immigrants as a consequence of Spender’s
proposal. Rather, the plantation economy continued to be
dominated by the company-owned, manager-operated units,
as individual owners were forced to sell out. As Howlett
has observed, it appeared that the pattern which followed
1 57the first world war was being repeated after the second.
The trend ran counter to Ward’s 1944 policy, but since 
the Labor government had shown no signs of overcoming 
the problem, J events under its successor did not involve 
any particular change in favour of the settlers.
155. The main source then available would have been Mair’s 
Australia in New Guinea (op. cit., pp. 72-9, 92-7), but the author would not have been highly regarded
by a non-Labor Minister. The proposal was criticised 
by James McAuley in the journal of the School of 
Pacific Administration in early 1952, possibly 
affecting official views on the matter (J.P. McAuley, 
’’White Settlement in Papua and New Guinea”, South 
Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 12, March-April 1952, p. 250) .
156. Por further details, see D.R. Howlett, The European 
Land Settlement Scheme at Popondetta, New Guinea 
Research Bulletin No. 6, Canberra, A.N.U., 1965, 
pp. 3-9.
157. Ibid., p. 3.
158. See Chapter Eight, passim.
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Two other schemes announced during Spender1s term of 
office produced no particular gains for private interests 
in New Guinea, other than the incidental advantages that 
tended to flow from increased spending. The first, a 
continuation of oil exploration that had been carried out 
spasmodically between the wars, continued into the 1960’s 
without locating a field of economic proportions. The 
second, which led to the production of plywood from the 
pine stands in the Bulolo Valley, was announced by Spender 
in December 1950, but had already been approved in
1 59principle by the Labor government’s 1947 committees.
The scheme involved a joint venture between the Bulolo 
Gold Dredging Company, whose mining operations in the area 
had almost ended, and the Commonwealth government, through 
a company to be known as Commonwealth New Guinea Timbers 
Limited. It was ironic that the project, one of the most 
economically successful in the Territory's history, should 
have introduced a minor element of socialism into the 
country. It was to be the last for many years, for in 
1950 investigations were begun into the encouragement 
of private enterprise. The Minister approved the granting 
of special concessions to new private ventures, subject 
to extremely vague conditions: that a proposed project 
was one to be encouraged; that the company presenting a 
proposal was sound; and that it required concessions in
159. South Pacific, Vol. 4 No. 13, January-February 1951, 
p. 233. See also ibid., Vol. 5 No. 12, March-April 
1952, p. 274. The committees’ discussions are noted in Chapter Nine, p. 561.
160. The Hoskins Oil Palm Scheme of the 1960’s had some 
similar features.
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16 ”1order to be profitable. It was this further trend
towards company ventures, with a consequent growth in the
numbers of transient white employees, rather an increase
in white settlement, that followed the Spender statements
of 1950. Further investigation may show that the most
far-reaching consequence of the Minister's proposals was
his view that development in Papua New Guinea "should
1 62generally be complementary to Australian industry". It
has been noted that, to the Territory Administration, this
1 65involved guaranteed markets. It is probable, however,
that in practice the Spender pronouncement led to the 
obstruction of projects in Papua New Guinea, such as the 
production of meat, soap and rice for home consumption, 
that would be in competition with imports from Australia. 
Sven then, it is likely that this attitude resulted less 
from a deliberate policy decision than from a series of 
ad hoc rulings made during succeeding years.
The first eighteen months of Liberal-Country Party 
government did not produce the reversals of post-war 
policy in Papua New Guinea that Murray had feared and 
settler interests had hoped for. It was clear that all 
future governments would have to persist with the dual 
policy of economic development and social advancement, 
and that this could be accomplished only by continuing to
161. CRS A518, item 927/2, 19 July 1950.
162. C.P.D., Vol. 208, p. 3638, 1 June 1950.
163. See Chapter Eight, pp. 508-9 and p. 629 of this 
Chapter.
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grant substantial sums of money to the Territory 
Administration. Attempts at long-range planning had 
proved unsuccessful yet again, and it began to appear as 
if the only alternative would be to place substantial 
power over day-to-day decisions in the hands of an 
individual, if the delays of the preceding five years 
were to be avoided. In such a case, the individual 
would not be Murray, whose differences with Spender had 
made him thoroughly unpopular. Following the appointment 
of Mr. Hasluck as Minister for Territories in May 1951, 
it became apparent that the question of the Administrator’s 
role could not long be left in doubt.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
HASLUCK AND THE REMOVAL OF MURRAY
Mr. P.M.C. Hasluck - Cautious beginning 
Hasluck meets the people - Controlling the 
public service - Halligan's departure - 
Assistant Administrator - Mr. D.M. Cleland 
Murray under attack - Mount Lamington 
eruption - Murray and Cleland - Future 
of Rabaul - Hollandia visit - Murray is
dismissed - Emotional farewells - Murray's
attack - Hasluck exerts authority: pattern 
of the future
Mr. P.M.C. Hasluck
Murray served as Administrator for only ten months 
of Hasluck1s twelve and a half year tenure as Minister 
for Territories. The policy with which Hasluck was 
later identified did not achieve its full expression
1. Hasluck was appointed Minister for Territories on 
11 May 1951. Colonel Murray went on leave to 
Australia in March 1952 and did not resume full 
duty as Administrator.
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until 1956 and so will not le discussed in this study.2 3
During his first months in the portfolio, the new 
Minister acquainted himself with conditions in Papua hew 
Guinea and created the conditions necessary for the full 
exercise of his authority. The events of this period 
thus give some indication of Hasluck's approach and, like 
those which occurred during Spender's term as Minister, 
suggest avenues for future inquiry.
Hasluck's background was of significance in influencing 
his role as Minister, particularly since it was 
considerably broader than that of any of his predecessors.
At 46 years of age at the time of his appointment, he 
was sixteen years younger than Murray. Born in Western 
Australia, he had worked as a journalist there from 1922, 
meanwhile specialising in the history of policy towards 
Aboriginals. He was awarded a Master's degree before 
being appointed lecturer in Australian History in Perth 
in 1940. In the following year he joined the Department 
of External Affairs and was appointed officer in charge 
of the post-war section of the Department in 1942. He 
worked under Dr. Evatt on matters concerning Australia's 
relations with the United Nations and in 1946 was 
appointed Counsellor-in-Charge to the Australian Mission
2. See, particularly, P.M.G. Hasluck, Australian Policy 
in Papua and New Guinea, George Judah Cohen Memorial 
Lecture, Canberra, typescript, 1956; and Australia's 
Task in Papua and New Guinea, Roy Milne Memorial 
lecture, Canberra, typescript, 1956.
3. The material in this and the following passage is drawn 
from South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 3, May 1951, p. 38.
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to the U.N. After differences with Evatt, Hasiuck resigned 
from External Affairs in 1947 and was appointed Header 
in History at the University of Western Australia in the 
following year. He was elected Liberal Party member 
for Curtin, Y/estern Australia, in 1949 and entered the 
1951 Cabinet as its most junior member. He was the first 
Minister to be given responsibility for both Papua New 
Guinea and the Northern Territory; and the first, since 
the islands had assumed any peacetime significance for 
Australia, to hold only one portfolio. As the author of 
three books on Aboriginal policy, and as one of the 
architects of Australia's policy towards the United Nations, 
Hasiuck was equipped for his ministerial duties as few 
others in Australian political history. Moreover, with 
his experience of research and administration, he was 
trained to take a close interest in the details of 
departmental affairs.^ In some respects his interests 
and outlook resembled those of Murray, and at first 
sight there was a possibility that the two men could work 
closely together. On the other hand, both were 
strong-willed and conscious of their status. The new 
Minister was also aware that the changes in New Guinea 
policy proposed by Spender had failed to produce 
conspicuous results; it was to be expected that he would 
seek to remove the causes of any previous failures.
4. The information in this and the following passage is 
based on talks and interviews with various people who 
were associated with Hasiuck during his term as 
Minister for Territories. These are tentative 
conclusions until a detailed study is completed.
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Cautious beginning
The most significant early actions by the new Minister
were in the field of administration rather than policy.
He made a tour of Papua Hew Guinea; superintended the
arrangements which finally brought some order to the
Territory's public service and legislature; and effected
staffing changes in both Canberra and Port Moresby. In
dealing with issues remaining from previous years,
5Hasluck made only modest claims:
In coming to this job, I do not claim to have any 
precise or detailed knowledge of all the territories 
nor do I pretend that I know how to tackle all 
its (sic) problems. I can claim to have devoted a 
good deal of time and thought to the subject during 
past years and to have a lively appreciation of its 
importance to Australia at the present.
The Minister saw the significance of Papua New Guinea 
extending far beyond the questions of defence and the 
development of resources:
....we recognize that we have a great national 
responsibility for the social welfare and advancement 
of dependent peoples. Quite frankly and without 
apology, I approach this job in a rather idealistic 
way...We have a moral compulsion to do it.
Hasluck's emphasis was much more in keeping with the 
approach of Ward than of Spender. There could no longer 
be any doubt that the dual policy of development and
5. South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 4, June 1951, p. 67. Mr. 
Hasluck gave a semi-formal talk to students at the 
School of Pacific Administration on 1 June 1951; the 
following are extracts from it. For purposes of 
publication it was entitled "The Administration of 
Australia's Territories", but it was not intended to 
be a major statement.
6. Ibid., p. 68.
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welfare, involving large grants from Australia, would 
continue, particularly if this junior Minister wished to 
establish his reputation in a field where he had every 
claim to expertise.
Hasluck’s measured, almost cautious approach during 
the early months of his tenure became apparent when, on 
25 July 1951, just two and a half months after assuming 
the portfolio, he began a two-week tour of Papua New 
Guinea. This visit, unlike his predecessor’s, was 
accompanied by a minimum of publicity and involved no 
policy statements. By that time the disappointment among 
the settler community that followed Spender’s tour had 
deepened and Hasluck was subjected to the same barrage of 
complaints and demands that had been directed against his 
predecessor. These included grievances from the Rabaul 
Chinese community, representations from planters favouring 
relaxed controls on labour, and criticisms of copra
7marketing. In each case the Minister reacted coolly, 
giving brief directions to his own staff or to the
QTerritory Administration. There were no promises of 
change or even of early action. The settler reaction 
indicated puzzlement, although expectations still 
remained:^
7. Papers on these and other matters are in CRS A518, 
item BK800/1/7, June-October 1951.
8. For example, a margin note to a submission from the 
Rabaul branch of the Returned Servicemen’s League 
requesting restoration of penal sanctions to labour 
legislation reads, "The Minister refused to consider 
this."
9. P * I•M ., Vol. 22 No. 1, August 1951, p. 11.
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....here is a man who will not deliver any ill- 
considered judgements, or facile promises'. When 
this Minister’s decision is given it will be wise 
and fair...Mr. Hasluck said that consideration 
would be given to all...requests. But, in cases, 
even if granted, there would be great delay in 
introducing new measures, as this would involve 
new legislation...One wonders who organizes tours 
of this nature. The time is obviously too short 
for the Minister to do anything except listen to 
the carefully-prepared statements of public 
bodies - and take quite a lot of ear-bashing on the 
side from those with axes to grind.
The settler assessment of Hasluck’s personality was 
ironic, in view of the bitter relations that later
10developed between him and the Territory's Europeans:
The first thing we noticed about our new Minister 
is his youth, the lines of laughter round his eyes, 
and that air of frank friendliness which belongs 
to most West Australians.
Por his part, Hasluck contented himself with some general
comments and an enigmatic statement that he hoped to see
"much closer contact between Port Moresby and Canberra";
the Pacific Islands Monthly interpreted this as yet
another promise of greater delegation of responsibility
to Territory officials. However, it was equally possible
that the Minister intended to supervise affairs in Papua
New Guinea more closely, and this became the more likely
interpretation when he began a series of visits to the
1 ?Territory at intervals of four to five months, 
thereby establishing a pattern that was followed by all 
Ministers to the time of self-government.
10. Ibid.
11 . Ibid., p. 63.
12. Hasluck's visits after July 1951, and before Murray 
left, were in November 1951 and April 1952.
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Hasluck meets the people
The most notable departure from precedent during
Hasluck*s first visit to Papua New Guinea was the
presentation to him of an address by the Presidents of
the Rabaul and Reimber Native Village Councils. Par from
being the usual pledge of loyalty, the address was a
clear statement of the people’s own opinions and grievances,
referring to the need for increased wages, more land in
the Rabaul area for village use and higher prices for 
1 3copra. The address gave ample notice of the need for 
reform when the people analysed their own role in colonial 
society:
There are some white men in New Guinea, and some 
Chinese who do not want the native people to become 
educated, and to engage in business. They want the 
people to stay workboys...We are not cross with 
these people, because they make money, and we do 
not know why they should be cross with us because 
we wanting to make some money too. If we do not 
want to work for them for £1 a month, they say we 
are big-heads, and should be in gaol.
The people’s assessment of Murray’s role was as accurate 
as any that could be made, perhaps even suggesting to 
Hasluck that any move against the Administrator should 
proceed with caution:
If we say we do not like some things that does not 
mean we do not like the Government of Australia or 
the Government of New Guinea. We know that the 
Administrator, Colonel Murray, is our friend.
15. The material in this and the following passage is drawn 
from CRS A518, item BK800/1/7, 31 July 1951.
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In reply, the Minister promised action on such matters 
as the payment of war damage compensation with rather more 
enthusiasm than he had shown towards the settlers’ 
demands.^ He pointed out, however, that some matters 
were complex, resorting to a tale that was perhaps intended 
to show his ability to communicate with unsophisticated 
people:
If one man is up in a mango tree, and another is 
standing on the ground, and they are both looking 
at the same mango on the tree, the man up above 
might say, "That mango is good and ready to eat.” 
But the other man, looking at it from underneath, 
might say, "That mango is not ripe yet." That 
is because they are both seeing different sides 
of the same fruit. Some of our problems in New 
Guinea are like that mango...I have first to make 
sure that I have seen all sides of the question.
Similar representations from settler interests failed
to impress the new Minister as they had Mr. Spender. A
few days before Hasluck arrived in Rabaul, the Executive
Council of the Planters Association of New Guinea resolved,
at a meeting specially called for the purpose, to protest
to the Minister about the composition of the Legislative 
1 f)Council. The meeting disagreed with "the opinion of 
the Administrator that there are natives who could 
adequately represent diverse native interests"; was 
"aghast" that only three elected European members would
14. Ibid.15. TETa was a false analogy. Villagers’ tastes differ 
from Europeans’, and many mangoes are picked and eaten 
green. The Minister might have benefited had he 
learned the true parallel and applied it in later 
years in the peoples’ demands for self-government.
See also Fowler on the "demerit" of analogy.
16. The material in this and the following passage is drawn 
from ibid., 27 July 1951.
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be included in the legislature; and maintained that its
protests were the "first indication of a growing resentment
amongst Europeans" at the attitude of the Administration
towards private enterprise in the Territory. The Secretary
for Territories, who accompanied the Minister, noted that
the planters1 submissions should be considered when the
membership of the Council was being reviewed, but by the
end of his tour Hasluck had directed that preparations for
the Legislative Council should proceed on the basis of the
17Papua and New G-uinea Act 1949» No reply to the Planters' 
Association appears on the file. The new Minister seemed 
intent on resisting pressure, regardless of its origin.
Controlling the public service
In dealing with the remaining problems of the Territory
public service, Hasluck had the doubtful advantage of
almost two years of preparatory work, begun in the last
months of the Labor government, which had done little to
appease officials, particularly at the senior levels of
the Administration. After the many delays following the
1 ftpresentation of the Buttsv/orth report in 1947, a second
1 Qclassification had been completed in 1949. This had 
produced slight salary increases and some minor adjustments 
to conditions of service, but a Public Service Ordinance 
introduced in 1950 had left many matters unresolved,
17. P . N. Gr . N. A .  Box 191, item CA1/2/6, 20 August 1951.
18. See Chapter Six, pp. 360-75.
19. Ibid., p. 372.
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including permanent appointments for the majority of
POdepartment heads and certain other senior officers.
However, this second report had recommended the appointment
of a Public Service Commissioner for Papua New G-uinea, an
Australian precedent that had not previously been followed
21in the islands.
Mr. E.A.F. Head took up duty as Public Service 
Commissioner in September 1949, having most recently been
Assistant Commonwealth Public Service Inspector in
22Adelaide. He had joined the Commonwealth service in 
1913 and had worked with the Public Service Board since 
1924; at the time of his arrival in Papua New G-uinea he 
had no experience of the Territory or its Administration. 
From the outset, the Public Service Commissioner followed 
Commonwealth practices wherever possible, supervising 
the drafting of legislation for the Territory service 
similar in detail to the Commonwealth Act and following 
the precedent established by the 1949 Archer report in 
adopting Australian standards for job classification. J 
Thus when the Commonwealth service was reclassified on a 
work-value basis in 1950, Head recommended that this
20. See Chapter Nine, p. 572.
21. Staffing matters had been the responsibility of the 
Department of the Government Secretary both before 
and after the war.
22. The material in this and the following passage is drawn 
from P .I,M., Vol. 20 No. 1, August 1949, p. 75. It 
later became common practice for relatively junior 
Commonwealth officers to be appointed to Territory 
positions for which they lacked the necessary 
experience and flexibility.
23. Head allegedly told his staff that he had no intention 
of learning new procedures. (Interview with Mr.
F.N.W. Rolfe, 10 October 1972).
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procedure Toe followed in Papua New Guinea; salary increases 
would be granted as a consequence, and on this basis all
O Asenior positions should be re-advertised in Australia.
This step, Head believed, might ’’attract applicants with 
qualifications considerably superior to those of the 
officers now occupying these positions”. Since the 
Commissioner was a statutory appointee responsible to the 
Minister, Murray was unable to direct him in such matters, 
so that for several months negotiations took place through 
the Secretary for Territories concerning the status of 
the department heads of the Administration. There were 
several for whom Murray had little regard, but he was 
obliged to defend them all, pointing out that the 
qualifications of most were such that they were unlikely 
to be bettered by new applicants; ’’moreover, the making 
of changes in the relevant Departments is likely to
25impede rather than to assist organization and administration”. 
Nevertheless, it was not until April 1951 that the first 
six department heads were confirmed in their positions.
This left key positions in the Departments of the 
Government Secretary, District Services, Law and Agriculture 
to be filled on a permanent basis. These were among the 
first matters attended to by Hasluck during his first 
visit to Port Moresby, all appointments being decided in 
favour of the Territory public servants who had acted in 
the positions for some time.
24. P.N.G.N.A. Box 887, item GH47-13, 7 November 1950.
25. Ibid.
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In certain respects the public service decisions were
unfavourable to Murray, who had been opposed to the
appointment of some former Mandated Territory officers,
26and particularly Lonergan, to top positions. However,
Lonergan had been acting G-overnment Secretary for more than
two years and it was inevitable that he would be confirmed
in the position. In addition, J.H. Jones finally became
the permanent Director of District Services, following the
abolition of the abortive Secretariat for Planning and
Development. This meant that the two most important executive
agencies of the Administration were under the firm control
of former Territory of New G-uinea staff; the network which
had threatened to encircle the Administrator for several
years past was now fixed in place. In addition, the Public
Service Commissioner asserted his right of access to the
Minister, through the Secretary for Territories, in the most
obvious ways; his letters to Canberra, for example, were
copied to G-overnment House, but had the words, ’’Information
27Only” written ostentatiously across them. Finally, Head
addressed correspondence directly to the Administrator,
instructing that stricter controls should be exercised over
the granting of leave and the provision of travel and
78accommodation for public servants on tours of duty. No 
reply from Murray appears on the file, but the Commissioner's 
letter bears the terse inscription in the Administrator's
26. Murray interview, 12 December 1966; Murray letter,
26 May 1969.
27. The correspondence is in P.N.G-.N.A. Box 162, item 
GH1-3-4, March 1951.
28. Ibid*« 24 and 27 March 1951.
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hand: ’’Have spoken to PSG re his staff duties.” Head
had greatly exceeded his authority, "but such clashes may
have strengthened the opinion, created in Canberra while
Spender was Minister, that Murray resented interference
30from the Minister’s representatives.
20
Halligan’s departure
In Canberra the Minister made a major staff change,
aimed at improving his Department's efficiency. In June
1951 Halligan was transferred to the sinecure of senior
Australian Commissioner to the South Pacific Commission
and ’’special adviser” to the Minister on "matters arising
from Australian membership of and responsibility to the
31United Nations Trusteeship Council”. There was a 
double irony in this appointment: it was one that had 
been suggested for Murray in 1950; and Halligan was 
removed from office just when, according to one of the 
officers associated with him, ”he was starting to believe 
that things in the world were happening just as the 
'long-haired intellectuals' had been telling him they
29. Ibid., 27 March 1951.
30. This episode merely marked the beginning of the tensions
between Administrators and Public Service Commissioners 
(from 1969, Chairmen of the Public Service Board) that 
arose from their divided control of the Administration. 
While similar problems have arisen in the Australian 
public services, they were constantly exacerbated in 
the case of Papua New Guinea by the fact that the 
parties could seek the intervention of an intermediate 
authority: the Secretary for External Territories,
who acted on behalf of the Minister. The three parties 
then sought to play one off against the other. This 
was a complex matter that acquired greater significance 
in later years; it merits detailed investigation.
31. South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 5, July 1951, p. 78.
had." But while Halligan may have made a more effective 
Secretary for Hasluck than for his predecessors, the new 
Minister was taking no chances. In Halligan's stead, he 
secured the appointment of Mr. C.R. Lambert, who had most 
recently been Director of northern Territory Affairs in the 
Department of the Interior.^ Lambert, an accountant by 
profession, had spent the greater part of his senior career 
working in the areas of rural development and reconstruction, 
but possessed no experience in New Guinea affairs.
Assistant Administrator
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32
Hasluck's next step was the appointment of an
Assistant Administrator, although with different functions
34-from those proposed in Spender's 1950 policy speech.
It was originally intended that one or two "Deputy" 
Administrators should be stationed away from Port Moresby - 
one obvious location being Rabaul - in order to hasten 
decision-making and to improve co-ordination among the 
Districts of the Territory. Thus when applications were 
called in October 1950 the advertisement stated that two 
Deputy Administrators were required; that applications 
from both within and outside the Papua New Guinea public 
service would be considered; and that the appointees
32. Interview with Mr. W. Grainger, 13 December 1973.
33. South Pacific, loc. cit.
34. See Chapter Ten, p . 619. Spender acted on proposals 
that dated back to 1947, but which had previously 
received little attention in Canberra; the position 
is reviewed in a memorandum from Jones to Halligan 
in P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item PD1/2, 30 May 1950.
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■scwould be required to serve “in any part of the Territory".
The duties were broad: “The Deputy Administrators will
be required to assist the Administrator in all phases of
administration.“ In December 1950 the Department of
External Territories announced that more than 100
applications had been received and that several candidates
%were being interviewed. This was the period, however, 
when Spender was engaged with other matters, and no 
decision was announced. Additionally, the Minister was 
still seeking an alternative position for Murray; the 
Pacific Islands Monthly, quoting “influential circles“ in 
Canberra, reported that the appointments would be delayed 
“pending some clarification of the Administrator's powers 
and authority".
Mr. D.M. Cleland
There was a further delay while Hasluck reviewed the
original purpose of the Deputy Administrator positions,
but even so he acted relatively quickly; on 9 August
1951, less than four months after assuming the portfolio,
he announced that an “Assistant Administrator" would soon
take up duty in the Territory.^8 The appointee was Mr.
D.M. Cleland, who had served as chief of staff in Angau 
*50during the war. y There were some notable departures from
35. P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 3, October 1950, p. 113.
36. P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 6, January 1951, p. 7.
37. Ibid.
38. South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 7, September 1951,
39. See Chapter Two , p. 102.
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the original concept: one position was filled, rather 
than two, and the Assistant Administrator was to be based 
permanently in Port Moresby. It was not unreasonable to 
provide some relief for the Administrator, who was by that 
time clearly overburdened, but the failure to appoint a 
second deputy in a major centre other than Port Moresby 
indicated that the proposals for decentralisation of the 
Administration and the delegation of power had been 
rejected by Hasluck. On the other hand, the appointment 
meant that, as soon as Cleland settled in, there would be 
a successor to Murray ready on the spot.
The political affiliations of the new Assistant 
Administrator were unmistakable. He had for the preceding 
five years been Federal Director of the Liberal Party of 
Australia, after losing the by-election for Mr. Curtin’s 
former seat of Fremantle to Mr. K. Beazley in 1945.^
The appointment of a person with such a background to the 
position of Assistant Administrator, which carried with it 
the responsibilities of formal head of the Territory 
public service, may under certain circumstances have 
appeared a wholly political manoeuvre likely to harm the 
neutrality of the Administration. However, Cleland had 
obvious claims to the position. He had an impressive war 
record, having served in the Middle East and Greece,
40. The material concerning Sir Donald Cleland is drawn 
from South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 7, September 1951, 
p. 122 and P,I,M., Vol. 22 No. 2, September 1951, p. 8
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where he was awarded the M.B.E., before being promoted
to the rank of Brigadier in 1942 and assuming the posts
of Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, Angau, and
Chairman of the Production Control Board in New Guinea.
Por his services to the Territory he was made a Commander
of the Order of the British Empire. He had enjoyed a
reputation for efficiency while in Port Moresby and his
organizing ability had gained him some credit for the
Liberal Party's electoral successes in 1949 and 1951.
Prom a certain viewpoint Cleland was what the Pacific
41Islands Monthly termed "the outstanding candidate".
Nevertheless, he brought with him no particular commitment
to New Guinea development and, although a solicitor by
profession, he possessed no obvious intellectual qualities
that would assist him in anticipating the Territory's
changing needs. These factors, coupled with his executive
background, indicated that Cleland's contribution to
Papua New Guinea administration was likely to be in the
formal, organizational field. At the time there was a
clear need for managerial skills at the upper levels of the
Administration, particularly in some of the major
42developmental departments, but they could be fully 
employed only if there were direction from some superior 
authority concerning the strategy and programmes to be 
followed. Murray had been denied this role, and so it 
became inevitable that instructions would have to be
41. P.I.M ., loc. cit.
42 . See Chapters Seven and Eight for particular problems 
in the Departments of Education and Agriculture, 
respectively.
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issued from Canberra.
Murray under attack
The Cleland appointment placed Murray in an even more
uncomfortable situation. The Assistant Administrator's
political sympathies were well known and it was widely -
and in this case correctly - rumoured that he had been
one of the applicants in 1945 for the position of
Administrator. Within the public service the belief
was that Cleland would be promoted to the office of
44Administrator as soon as the opportunity arose. Settler
interests further saw his appointment, simultaneously
with those of Lonergan and Jones, as a counter to some
of the changes which had occurred since the war. The
Pacific Islands Monthly quoted Ma private note from an
4-5old resident of New Britain":
I take it that Mr. Cleland may be able to act as a 
brake on too much administrative idealism and that 
he and Jones (fast friends during later Angau days) 
will work together. But the thing is, is it too late 
to bring about the required reforms and tighten up? 
The rot among natives has gone far - very far - and 
that goes for / District_7 Services, as they are so 
much affected By the slackness, sloth, general 
distaste for work and lack of real interest in 
native welfare that a come-back will be hard to 
stage.
Moreover, during the preceding few months the magazine 
had begun a campaign against Murray personally, a notable
43. See Chapter Three, pp. 172-3.
44. Interview with Mr. W. Grainger, 13 December 1973.
45. P .I .M ., Vol. 22 No. 2, September 1951, p. 10.
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change from earlier years, when Robson’s attacks had been 
aimed more broadly, at the "Socialist” or "Wardist" 
"regime". The criticism was at first fairly moderate; 
in November 1950, Robson complained at the delay in 
carrying out Spender’s promises of decentralisation, noting 
that matters had still to be referred to "the inevitable 
Mr. Reg. Halligan" for decision, then continuing:^
I would place the blame mostly upon the present 
Administrator - a most worthy professor, who has had 
no experience whatever in this kind of turbid and 
turgid organization, who is too much of a gentleman 
to do the obvious, necessary things, and who is the 
South Pacific’s outstanding example of a round oeg 
in a hole that has become painfully square (sic).
By January 1951 the attack had become more pointed.
Robson reported that a delegation from the Territory public
service, while petitioning the Minister in Canberra, had
been told by Spender that many matters being referred to
47him should have been dealt with in Port Moresby.' Robson 
termed the decision-making process "vicious", maintaining 
that it made the Minister appear ridiculous. He continued:
It is quite well known that both Mr. Spender and his 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Mr. Howse, are 
looking on, in apparent helplessness, while Mr. 
Spender’s much-lauded Territories Policy of last 
May (sic) is rendered more or less nugatory by the 
fumbling, inexperienced hands of the Ward-appointed 
Administrator, Colonel J.K. Murray.
According to Robson, Murray was allowed to remain in office
46. P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 4, November 1950, p. 103.
47. The material in this and the following passage, 
including quotations, is drawn from P .I.M., Vol. 
21 No. 6, January 1951, p. 6.
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only because his term had been extended to mid-1954 by 
the labor government. ’’Further, Colonel Murray is a 
courteous and completely sincere gentleman, who is 
manifestly doing his best, and Mr. Spender presumably 
shrinks from harsh measures. But Colonel Murray is so 
clearly a misfit in the Administratorship that it is most 
unfair that the Territories, and the Minister’s own record, 
should be made to suffer by that final act of unadulterated 
Ward-ism.” Significantly, the article concluded by 
suggesting that Murray’s appointment should be terminated, 
like that of Mr. C.W. Frost, the former labor Minister 
for Repatriation, who had been relieved of his post as 
High Commissioner to Ceylon by the Menzies government.
With the appointment of Cleland, the Pacific Islands 
Monthly shifted its emphasis, so that by April 1952 one 
of Robson's editorials was headed, "The Hasluck-Cleland 
Driving Force in Papua-New Guinea”. ' It maintained that 
the new Minister was "promoting the establishment of new 
industries” in the Territory and was being ’’ably 
supported by Assistant Administrator D.M. Cleland”.
Murray was not mentioned. Nevertheless, the government 
still lacked an obvious case, other than one based wholly 
on political grounds, for removing the Administrator.
By 1952 Murray had considerable experience in his 
position; his competence was not seriously questioned 
other than in the settlers' press, which had never produced
48. P.I.M.. Vol. 22 No. 9, April 1952, p. 11.
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evidence of Murray's personal inefficiency; and. his 
formal qualifications were, if anything, more than ever 
relevant to Papua New Guinea development. Moreover, an 
awkward situation had been created following the explosion and 
eruption of Mount Lamington, in the Northern District of 
Papua, in January 1951.
Mount Lamington eruption
The Mount Lamington eruption was a major disaster,
49resulting in the deaths of more than 3,000 people. The 
volcano, which lies well to the south of the volcanic 
ring which runs through the New Guinea islands, was thought 
to be extinct. Some two days before the major eruption, 
it had rumbled ominously and given off clouds of smoke, 
but Mr. Chief Justice Phillips, who was acting Administrator 
during Murray's absence on one of his tours of the 
Territory, had decided that there was no immediate danger.
On 18 January the volcano erupted from its cone, causing
49. A summary of events is in P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 7,
February 1951, pp. 11, 17-20, 102-3 and assessments of effects on villagers in F.M. Keesing, The Papuan 
Orokaiva versus Mount Lamington, op. cit. and C.S. 
Eelshaw, Resettlement in the Mount Lamington Area, both 
Port Moresby, typescript, 1951. One or two aspects of 
white reaction are worth noting. The Pacific Islands 
Monthly sub-headed its report, "Over 30 Europeans and 
4,000 Natives Killed" (loc. cit.). Subsequently, 
there was opposition among Europeans in Lae to the 
relief fund for the Higaturu area, partly because of 
the "Administrator's insistence that there should be 
no appeal for the assistance of Europeans only", while 
a letter from "Old Planter", of Lae, suggested that 
the villagers were being "mollycoddled" (P .I,M., Vol.
21 No. 8, March 1951, pp. 85, 102). Murray was later 
given a set of A.B.C. recordings of his radio talks 
and interviews about the disaster; he offered to give 
them to me because he "could never bear to play 
them" (interview of 14 December 1966).
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many villagers to flee from the area. Then on Sunday
morning 21 January the side of the mountain was blown out
in a massive explosion which, coupled with "glowing clouds"
of white-hot gas, killed all living things in an eight-
mile radius. Many officials, including Murray, arrived
in the area and made what was generally acknowledged as an
outstanding effort in assisting the people. Murray was
deeply shocked by the disaster, which he has termed "the
50one thing I could never forget", going with very little
sleep for several days and working constantly alongside
51his junior staff.
There were soon demands for an inquiry into the lack
of action in evacuating the area once the first warning
signs had appeared. Criticism was levelled at Phillips,
who had full formal responsibility at the time, and in
February the Minister was forced to issue a statement
52defending the Chief Justice. Under the circumstances, 
any move against Murray during the early months of Hasluck’s 
term as 'inister could very easily have been interpreted 
as victimisation. Nevertheless, the government was very 
grudging in its acknowledgement of the Administration’s 
rescue work, and none of the officers who went into the 
area after the major explosion was included among the 
fourteen individuals who later received awards for their
50. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
51. Discussion with Mr. W.7. Crellin, 11 November 1 9 6 9.
52. S,P,P., 2 February 1951.
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efforts. Even the Pacific Islands Monthly suggested 
that there should have been some recognition of the 
contribution of Murray, "who was one of the first in the
devastated area and who stayed there doing as much as
it 54anyone".
Another interesting, though minor, sidelight on 
relations between Minister and Administrator was Murray1s 
association with the Governor-General, Sir William McKell.
In March 1950, following a tour of Papua New Guinea by 
McKell, the Murrays had been guests at Yarralumla during 
one of the Administrator’s visits to Australia.^ Further 
visits followed, and the Administrator and his wife were 
the Governor-General’s guests, this time in an official
capacity, during the Australian Jubilee celebrations in
56mid-1951. This happened to be the occasion of Murray’s 
first discussions with Hasluck, and it may have disconcerted 
the new Minister to have a subordinate arrive for a meeting 
from the Governor-General's residence. However, there 
were no further attempts to entice the Administrator away 
from Port Moresby with alternative appointments. Rather, 
he was made to feel increasingly uncomfortable, with 
Cleland playing an important role in the operation.
53. The only Territory public servant to receive an award 
had been in the area at the time of the explosion.
Two Papuans employed by the Administration received 
awards. Three went to Qantas pilots who flew surveys 
of the Mount Lamington crater. (P.I.M., Vol. 22
No. 10, May 1952, p. 37).
54. Ibid., p. 38.
55. Sydney Daily Telegraph, 17 March 1950.
56. P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 12, July 1951, p. 7.
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Murray and Cleland
During his last few months in Papua hew Guinea,
Murray’s relations with his Assistant Administrator were,
as always, entirely correct, hut an underlying tension
was apparent from the outset. Immediately upon his
arrival in Port Moresby, for example, Cleland suggested
disingenuously that he should not use his Army rank of
Brigadier. Murray replied that, since the Administrator's
commission had originally been published with Hurray's
rank shown, then the same procedure would be in order for
58the Assistant Administrator. Cleland's status was
given further emphasis by administrative adjustments
ordered by the Minister. Cleland became head of the new
Department of the Administrator, in which capacity he
superseded the G-overnment Secretary as head of the public
service. The Assistant Administrator's position carried
with it a higher salary, a larger entertainment allowance
and better housing conditions than those enjoyed by other
heads of departments, so that in these respects Cleland
was on a par with the Supreme Court judges, and in the
50administrative sphere was clearly a powerful figure.
All department heads were made responsible to the Assistant 
Administrator in the first instance; and he, rather than 
the Chief Justice, assumed the responsibilities of acting
57. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item CH1-3-3, 20 August 1951.
58. Ibid., 25 August 1951.
59. Ibid., 13 July 1951.
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Administrator during Murray's absences from Port Moresby.
In other circumstances, Cleland should have been the 
Administrator's main executive officer, but in addition 
to the uncertainties that Murray now felt about his own 
position, a situation developed around Cleland that tended 
to isolate Murray from his own service.
The Minister's directions on the role of the Assistant 
Administrator were far from explicit. Cleland was to 
assist the Administrator; to be responsible to him for
the "co-ordination and promotion of development policies";
60and to advise him "generally". According to Hasluck, 
the Territory’s District Commissioners needed a senior 
official to whom they could refer matters concerning the 
agency functions they performed on behalf of other 
departments. However, he concluded, "This appointment does 
not alter in any way the character of the office of 
Administrator." This could not be true since, apart from 
the personal and political factors involved, the Assistant 
Administrator’s position as permanent head of the 
Department of the Administrator had two undesirable effects 
on the structure of the Administration. Firstly, it 
placed the Government Secretary under the control of the 
Assistant Administrator, leaving the Administrator with 
no executive staff of any kind and attenuating the decision­
making chain even further. Secondly, it added the
60. This and the following passage are drawn from ibid., 
9 August 1951.
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Department of the Administrator to the other two key
administrative agencies - the Departments of the G-overnment
Secretary and District Services - and thereby increased,
rather than reduced, problems of administrative
co-ordination. This was a contrived arrangement to
ensure that Cleland was available to replace Murray, a fact
which became obvious when the Assistant Administrator's
position was left vacant for two years after Murray's
departure.^ Murray made little comment on the situation;
in a letter welcoming Cleland and setting out the "character
of the service", he merely remarked drily that in many
other colonies the co-ordination of programmes was the
63responsibility of a Secretariat. The administrative 
situation had by then become so complex that when Cleland 
embarked on his first visit outside Port Moresby he found 
it necessary to advise the District Commissioner at Daru 
that he did not wish to "usurp" the functions of the 
Government Secretary and that for all practical purposes 
the District Commissioner should continue to work through 
the Department of the Government Secretary when dealing 
with agency functions performed for other departments.^
61 . The relationship between these agencies is noted in 
Chapter Six, pp. 360-3.
62 . The Department of the Administrator continued in being, 
but it was not until July 1954 that Mr. Rupert Wilson 
was seconded from his position of a Treasury Assistant 
Secretary in Canberra to the Assistant Administratorship. 
He remained for only two years and his successor, also
on secondment, stayed for only a few days! The role 
of Assistant Administrator finally achieved some 
purpose with the appointment of Dr. John Gunther in 1956.
63. P.N.G.H.A. Box 162, item GH1-3-3, 25 August 1951.
64. Ibid., 19 September 1951.
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Hurray was particularly concerned at Cleland's
attitude towards his responsibilities as a Territory
public servant. Two episodes which remained in Murray’s
mind were Cleland’s inspection of the Department of
Education's headquarters in the absence of its Director,
Mr. C-roves, and a report to Canberra by Cleland on certain
senior officers, who were not given the opportunity by the
Assistant Administrator to comment on his assessment of 
66their work. Dr. Gunther recalls that, during the
Administrator's absences from Port Moresby, Cleland followed
the precedent established by Chief Justice Phillips of
66moving into Murray's office. On one of these occasions 
Cleland apparently forgot to remove copies of confidential 
personal letters to the Minister from the drawer of the 
Administrator's desk; when Murray found them he was 
furious and, according to Gunther, "carpeted Cleland for 
going behind his back". Poliowing this episode, Murray 
directed Cleland to hold formal discussions with him in 
order to establish the status of the Assistant Administrator's 
position. ^  Murray again pointed out that the administrative 
structure created in 1951 was probably "unique" in 
colonial government, involving as it did an Administrator, 
an Assistant Administrator, a Government Secretary and an 
Official Secretary to the Administrator; and added that 
the problems of control and communication would have to
65. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
66. This and the following passage are drawn from an 
interview with Dr. Gunther, 4 December 1968.
67. This and the following passage are drawn from P.iT.G.P.A. 
Box 887, item GH47-13, 25 January 1952.
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be solved by personal discussion if further confusion
were to be avoided. Murray re-stated the functions of the
Assistant Administrator, as prescribed by the Minister,
and concluded an otherwise mild letter with the direct
order, "Unless by direction of the Minister or the
Administrator, there should not be correspondence to the
Minister or to the Secretary of the Department other than
68in the Administrator’s name and office.
Future of Rabaul
By early 1952 relations between the Administrator and 
his senior executive had deteriorated sharply and Murray’s 
own position was in jeopardy. He nevertheless continued 
to adopt an independent stance, although he was aware that 
the Minister needed no ecouragement to remove him. Two 
issues were of particular significance: the siting of 
Rabaul township and the question of an exchange visit with 
the Governor of Netherlands New Guinea. As in several of 
his other disagreements with the authorities in Australia, 
Murray's position was affected by his attitude towards 
questions of protocol and the status of the Administrator’s 
office.
The question of Rabaul’s future had remained unsettled 
since 1946, when the Labor government had first decided 
that the township should be moved, owing to the danger from
68. The emphasis appears in the original.
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the volcanoes surrounding it.^ "' After several years of
correspondence, studies and plans had produced no decision
from Canberra, Murray, in an effort to secure action from
the Liberal-Country Party government, requested Cleland
to visit the area and prepare a report on the situation 
70there. However, the Assistant Administrator's study
merely clouded the issue further by recommending that much
of the township should be moved, but that the harbour
facilities should remain on their old site. In the meantime,
the Australian budget of 1951/52 had reduced the Territory
71works programme for the year, so that it became impossible
to finance the move; the fact that the great majority of
Rabaul's white community opposed the transfer also
72influenced the final decision* The government then 
determined, against the advice of the Territory Executive 
Council, that Rabaul should continue as the main centre 
in Hew Britain, whereupon Murray, incensed at what he has
69. The early records of the debate over Rabaul are in 
P.N.G-.N.A. Box 185, item GH26/3, January-1 larch 1946.
The initial decision was endorsed in 1948, when financial 
provision was included in the 1948/49 works programme 
(CRS A518, item A241/3/1, 9 April and 21 August 1948). 
There was disagreement as to the most suitable site, 
however, and further reoorts were prepared, still 
without producing results. There is a voluminous 
correspondence on the matter in P.N.G-.N.A. Box 164, 
items 44/4/4/4 and 44/4/4/9.70. Cleland’s report is in P.N.G-.N.A. Box 164, item 
44/4/4/4, 4 February 1952.
71. CRS A518, item A241/3/1, 13 November 1951.
72. Murray notes, p. 66. See also P . I. M ., Vol. 20 No. 10,
May 1950, pp. 56-8 and Vol. 21 No. 10, May 1951, p. 11, 
when the magazine noted, following the eruption of 
Mount Lamington, "If there are any residents still 
unconvinced on this matter they should take a walk 
through Higaturu and the adjoining villages." In fact, 
the Rabaul cones are unlikely to explode, but they 
could erupt at short notice, with severe consequences 
for the town and its residents.
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termed "one of the worst rejections of the Territory 
Administration’s recommendations in my time”, appealed
7*5directly to the Prime Minister.  ^ The Administrator did
not have the formal authority to make such representations,
so that this episode, together with his earlier interview
with Mr. Padden concerning the future of his appointment,
suggested once more that Murray was reluctant to accept
his status as invariably subordinate to that of the
74Minister for Territories.
Hollandia visit
The issue of Murray's proposed visit to Netherlands 
New G-uinea was of minor importance compared with the fate 
of Rabaul, but it brought a sharp, direct rebuke from 
Hasluck. Murray, who had been constantly thwarted in his 
desire to arrange staff exchanges with other colonies, 
wished at least to establish some contact with the Dutch 
authorities to the West. The first official approach was 
made by the newly-appointed Dutch Governor, Mr. S. van 
Waardenburg, in early 1950,^ but the Australian government
73. Murray notes, pp. 67-8. The Executive Council
recommendation was unanimous. Murray was annoyed less 
by the rejection itself, since he had become accustomed 
to such actions by the government, than by its possible 
consequences: ”1 hope, indeed, that it is not paid for
by ultimate disaster” (Murray notes, p. 68).
74. See Chapter Nine, pp. 527-9 for details of Murray’s 
representations to Ward on the rights conferred on the 
Administrator by the Papua-New Guinea Provisional 
Administration Act (whose provisions remained unchanged 
in -1949)'. See also Chapter Ten, p. 611 concerning 
Murray’s interview with Padden.
7 5 . P.N.G'.N.A. Box 887, item GH47/1 , 15 February 1950.
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was reluctant to agree to direct contacts being established
between Port Moresby and Hollandia, owing to the tensions
y 6surrounding Indonesian claims to the Dutch possession.
In May 1951, however, a "survey party" of officials from
Papua New Guinea flew to Hollandia and it was eventually
agreed that van Waardenburg should visit Port Moresby, which
77he did from 7 to 10 November 1951. Murray wished to 
return the visit as soon as possible and Wsought permission 
from Canberra on two separate occasions to make the journey 
to Hollandia in the New Year. He was fobbed off on each 
occasion: a greater interval should pass between visits;
the Assistant Administrator had to tour outlying districts
7 o
of the Australian Territory. Murray then wrote directly 
to van Waardenburg, suggesting February 1952 as a suitable 
time.^C' When the Minister learned of this proposal he 
cabled Murray, "Your precipitate communication with 
Hollandia in disregard of my suggestions for delay have 
created awkward situation." The Administrator was to have 
no further communication with "representatives of other 
governments" without Hasluck's specific approval. The 
Minister and the Department of External Affairs both
O  0considered an early return visit to be "undesirable".
At no time during this exchange was Murray given any reason 
for the government's attitude; and being unwilling to 
accept such offhanded treatment, he contested the Minister's
76. Ibid., 9 November 1950.
77. Ibid., 26 May and 6 and 22 November 1951.
78. P.N.G-.N.A. Box 164, item 1/6/1/15, 11 November and 
20 December 1951.
79. Ibid., 11 December 1951.
80. The foregoing passage is drawn from ibid., 8 January 1952.
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conclusions, as he had with Spender over the issue of the
U.U. Visiting Mission. He replied, "It nay be that
such visits should be regarded as conventional. To regard
then as being otherwise, even in the rather tense present
situation, would appear to convert a conventional procedure
o ninto one having a political import.” Ho reply to this 
rather sophisticated reasoning appears on the file, but 
if Murray had the last word on the issue, it was to be his 
final gesture.
Murray is dismissed
Hurray had arranged to go on leave in March 1952, 
intending to be away for several months. In six years and 
five months of service, he had taken only four months 
leave, compared with the usual entitlement of nine months, 
and had not been on holiday outside the Territory for
O 'Z
almost four years.  ^ By the time of his departure on 3 
March 1952 he was, he says, "very tired; they were the
O  A
hardest years I had ever spent”. ' Dr. Ian Hogbin recalls 
seeing the Murrays a few days before they left; unlike 
the previous occasions when he had been a guest at 
Government House, Hogbin thought Murray depressed, for 
although he had no thought of being removed from office, 
he had been subjected to great pressure from Canberra and
81. See Chapter Ten, pp. 607-9»
82. P.N.G-.M.A. Box 164, item 1/6/1/15, 9 January 1952.
83. The information is contained in an unreferenced letter 
dated 5 June 1952 from Cleland to Lambert.
84» Murray Interview, 14 December 1966.
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even suggested to Hogbin that he was being "put on the 
85skids". During the next few weeks, however, he and Mrs. 
Murray visited Tasmania and, upon his return to 
Queensland to spend the remainder of his leave, Murray
86felt refreshed and fully prepared to resume duty in June.
In Murray’s absence from Port Moresby, final preparations
for his dismissal had been completed. On 30 April 1952
Cabinet approved the Minister’s recommendation that Murray’s
appointment be terminated and on the following day legal
advice was received that dismissal was in order, under the
87terms of the Papua and New Guinea Act. ' Murray was
advised by letter on 2 May, despite the fact that the formal
recommendation to the G-overnor-G-eneral was not made until
5 May, nor approved by him until 8 May. In the meantime,
Murray had written a non-committal note acknowledging his
dismissal, which was to take effect on 30 June 1952. He
was to receive an ex gratia payment of £5,000 in lieu of
salary for the remaining two years of his original term 
88of appointment. It soon became clear that he could 
expect little else from the government.
On 8 May the Minister instructed Lambert to draft a 
statement of about 150 words announcing Murray’s departure 
and reviewing his term as Administrator.8  ^ Hasluck’s
85. Hogbin interview, 21 December 1975.
86. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
87. This and the following passage are drawn from CRS A518, 
item D800/1/7, 1 May 1952.
88. The Administrator’s salary had been increased to £2,500 
from 1 July 1950 (P.N.G-.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-1,1 July 1950).
89. CRS A518, item D800/1/7, 8 May 1952.
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minute suggested, MWe need not say he was responsible
for all of /""the main changes and achievements 7 but we
can at least give him what credit is due from the fact
that they happened while he was Administrator." Thus
began what one former officer of the Department of External
Territories has described as the 1 re-writing of history"
qOthat occurred during Hasluck's term as Minister. The 
press statement, released on 10 May, simply noted that 
Murray would "relinquish" his position, then concentrated 
on the immediate post-war period: "Colonel Murray's term 
had been largely one of restoration and re-establishment 
following war devastation."-^ The "notable features" of 
Murray's term were, according to the statement, the 
amalgamation of the Territories and their public service 
and the inauguration of the Legislative Council, all of 
which had clearly been inevitable. No mention was made 
of the welfare policy, of agricultural extension, local 
government, co-operatives or attempts at economic planning; 
far less of Murray's humanitarianism and his struggle 
against racist attitudes: merely that "the re-establishment 
work done during his period of office had laid the 
foundations and helped to shape the course of policy".
Luring the following weeks it became even clearer that 
conditions would be made difficult for Murray until he was 
safely out of the way. He was made to pay for official 
cars he had used to inspect agricultural research stations 
in Tasmania while on leave there; and, more seriously, 
was denied payment in lieu of long-service leave for his
90. Interview with Mr. W. Grainger, 13 December 1973.
91. CRS A452, item 61/5207, 10 May 1952.
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qpterm as Administrator. The Public Service Ordinance of 
1951 made provision for long-service leave at the rate of 
three months after each six years of service, but this had 
not been the case in 1945, so that Murray*s original 
letter of appointment, which remained unchanged when his 
five-year term began in 1949, made no mention of it.
However, as Murray pointed out in a letter to Lambert,
"the granting of long leave to Lieutenant G-overnors and 
Administrators was an established practice /“before the 
war__7 based on the not unreasonable supposition that those 
public officers required long leave in much the same way 
as the members of the Civil Services which they controlled.” 
The Minister determined, however, that in view of the 
"generosity" which had been shown Murray, no long-service 
leave would be granted. It is difficult to interpret this 
decision as other than an act of spite.
Emotional farewells
It now remained for Murray to determine the manner 
of his going. There would be a minimum of embarrassment 
for the government, and presumably for Murray himself, if 
he simply remained in Australia and had his personal 
effects packed by staff in Port Moresby, for despatch to 
Brisbane. On the other hand, it was foreign to Murray*s
92. This and the following passage are based on papers 
in my possession.
95. This and the following passage are based on letters of 
10 and 50 June 1952, respectively. Long leave was 
granted retrospectively to all other staff who joined 
the service between 1945 and 1951.
687
character to behave as if he were in any way ashamed of
what had occurred. On 8 June 1952 he therefore returned
to Port Moresby to complete his term. Then, in order to
make his attitude towards the situation abundantly clear,
he requested Canberra’s permission to make a farewell tour
of some two weeks throughout the Territory.^ The
Department of Territories suggested some amendments to his
itinerary, but was in no position to reject Murray’s
proposal, since the Minister still wished to preserve the
fiction that Murray was leaving of his own accord. In
the meantime a ”J.K. Murray Fund" had been launched by a
circular letter, on Government House notepaper and bearing
Cleland's signature, inviting public subscriptions.*^
While these collections were being male, the Murrays
proceeded on a round of public receptions in the main
centres of the Territory, with police guards of honour,
meetings with village elders, and official dinners and
Q6other, larger social gatherings. Tie Territory’s 
Europeans, and particularly its public servants, now felt 
closer to Murray, the victim of Canberra omnipotence, 
than they ever had to Murray the Administrator; and 
perhaps a little guilty as well. They, together with 
people from nearby villages, flocked 1o functions held in 
the various towns. There was a crowd at Sogeri, in the 
hills above Port Moresby, to witness Murray’s final parade 
as Commandant of the Royal Papua and lew Guinea
94. P.N.G.N.A. Box 167, item 1-8-17, 10 June 1952.
95. P.N.G.N.A. Box 167, item 1-8-18, 16 May 1952.
96. For reports of these events, see 3 ,.P .P., 13 June 
and 4 July 1952.
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Constabulary,J while the presentation from the public 
appeal, which had yielded £631-9-9, was made in full 
colonial splendour at the Konedobu Club, bastion of the 
’’old-timers” of the public service. As the Murrays prepared 
to leave for Australia by ship, it appeared as if New 
Guinea’s whites and Colonel Murray had finally come to 
terms with each other.
While Murray had been turning an ignominious departure 
into a round of tributes, his dismissal was the subject 
of several protests to the government. The first of these 
was made by Mr. Ward in the House of Representatives, 
when he accused the Minister of victimising Murray because 
he was a Labor appointee. Ward gave an accurate 
summary of events of the preceding two years, maintaining 
that Spender had attempted to make Murray’s position 
untenable and that the Administrator had disagreed with 
the efforts of the Liberal-Country Party government to 
change the emphasis of New Guinea development in favour 
of white interests. However, Ward destroyed his case by 
implying that Labor would, in turn, dismiss a non-Labor 
appointee. The only reason given by Hasluck, in reply, 
for the termination of Murray’s appointment was that at 
63 he was considered ’’rather advanced” in age for further 
tropical service.
97. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-2-17, 3 July 1952.
98. This and the following passage are drawn from
C.P.D., Vol. 217, pp. 442, 453, 15 May 1952.
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It was left to the Territory’s missionaries to show 
that the defence of Murray was more than a political 
gambit. In June the Kwato mission protested to the 
Governor-General at the dismissal; the National Missionary 
Council passed a resolution calling for his reinstatement; 
and the Anglican Bishop of New Guinea appealed to the 
Prime Minister, stating that the removal of Murray was a 
’disservice to New Guinea”.^ 9 Bishop Strong was particularly 
scathing about Hasluck's reference to Murray’s age:^^
Those of us who have witnessed his great physical and 
mental energy and one like myself who saw his courage 
and physical endurance last year in the days following 
the eruption of Mount Lamington are amazed and 
unimpressed by this suggestion. We are asked to 
believe that this man whom we have seen to be 
indefatigable in his work and travels is incapable on account of age of continuing his term of office 
until 1954.
The Bishop feared that Murray’s dismissal would make the 
Administrator’s office ’’more than ever the pawn of rival 
political parties”, and that it would result in reduced 
emphasis on village welfare. Unfortunately, in this as 
in other issues of earlier years, Murray's supporters 
tended to harm rather than help him, merely by being 
associated in his defence; this, at least, was the way 
in which the controversy was viewed by the Minister.
Stung by the missionaries' criticisms, Hasluck replied 
that the Administration's efficiency would be "improved” 
by the removal of Murray. He also emphasised that there
99. P.I.M., Vol. 22 No. 11, June 1952, p. 121.
100. S.P.P.. 13 June 1952.101. S.P.P., 20 June 1952. The statement was released on 
11 June.
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would be no change in the policy of promoting the welfare
of the villagers. Then some three weeks later, on 3
July, he made a second statement, apparently in answer
to reporters' questions about Murray's effect on the
102efficiency of the Administration. Hasluck maintained 
that he was being "forced to say in public what I would 
rather have left unsaid": namely, that Murray's capacity 
was "not adequate" for the job of Administrator. He had, 
Hasluck said, decided to dismiss Murray only after "twelve 
months careful observation".
Murray's attack
Until this time Murray had made no public comment, 
even though he had been shocked by the abruptness of the 
dismissal and the fact that the Minister had not even had
103the courtesy to convey his decision to Murray personally.
Even the Pacific Islands Monthly, in its June issue, was 
forced to admit that Murray had "refused to allow himself 
to be used by the muck-raking politicians. He conducted 
himself in trying circumstances with dignity and restraint... 
Even his Territories critics will remember him with respect
102. This and the following passage are drawn from 
S.P.P.. 4 July 1952.
103. These were not Murray's exact words (interview of 
14 December 1966), but this was the impression he 
conveyed; certainly, an action of this kind would 
have been completely foreign to his own concepts of 
the courtesy, honesty and courage required of a 
man in a position of authority. Mr. V.H. Parkinson 
(talk of 3 January 1974) recalls that Lambert was 
considerably disturbed at the manner in which 
Murray was dismissed.
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and esteem.”10 -^ Hasluck’s statement he considered to be 
provocative, however, particularly in view of Murray’s 
own reticence on the issue of his dismissal. It was
also to be expected that he was moved by the reception he 
and Mrs. Murray had received during the farewell tour, but 
even then he may not have replied to Hasluck’s most recent 
allegations had it not been for the circumstances of his 
departure from Port Moresby. This, by all accounts, was 
an emotional occasion. The Murrays were to leave aboard 
the M.V. Bulolo on 9 July. Shortly before the ship sailed, 
hundreds of people had gathered at the wharf, the Murrays 
had been garlanded with leis of frangipani by 
representatives from Hanuabada village, the Royal Papua 
and New Guinea Constabulary Band was there, and, according 
to the South Pacific Post, a thousand people sang MAuld 
Lang SyneM to the accompaniment of the band. Shortly 
before the ship sailed, Murray was asked by the editor of 
the Post if he had a final statement to make. Murray then 
gave way to his pent-up feelings and answered the 
editor's questions in an uncharacteristic manner. Murray 
later said that he had not expected all of his comments 
to be reported, but this would have been a naive hope,
104. P.I.M.. Vol. 22 No. 11, June 1952, p. 121. At the 
time, Robson was pleased that Murray had not given 
more ammunition to Ward; the "muck-raking politicians” 
were not intended to include Hasluck. Robson’s 
attitude was that Murray was immune to direct attack
so long as he failed to defend himself. Following 
Murray’s statement upon his departure from Port 
Moresby (see below), Robson made a bitter attack on 
him (P.I,M., Vol. 23 No. 1, August 1952, pp. 43-5,
47-9,~0Tn
105. Again, these were not Murray's words, but his feelings 
were clear (interview of 14 December 1966).
106. S.P.P., 11 July 1952.
692
under the circumstances. In any event, the South Pacific
Post’s next issue carried the lead story that Murray had
termed Hasluck’s latest comments on the dismissal affair
107"absurd and a gross impertinence". He said that he 
had been under pressure to leave the Territory ever since 
the Menzies government had come to power, predicting that 
the policy on village welfare would be changed after his 
departure and that Canberra control of Hew G-uinea affairs 
would increase. He regretted leaving the Territory, but 
professed relief at being able to "escape the methods and 
manners of the Minister and some of his senior departmental 
officers." Murray said that Hasluck, before criticising 
the Territory Administration, should first put his own 
house in order, and gave several examples of what he 
termed "unpardonable delays in Canberra". Murray was also 
critical of Canberra’s disallowing Ordinances that had 
been passed by the Territory Legislative Council and 
approved by the Administrator, suggesting that such vetos 
had sometimes been influenced by "Australian pressure 
groups". He suggested that Australia would have problems 
in Hew G-uinea if social and political development were 
allowed to lag behind economic change; and urged the 
government to grant the Administration "a much greater 
measure of decentralised power". As the South Pacific 
Post observed with unconscious irony, it was one of the 
most impressive farewells since the war.
107. This and the following passage are drav/n from ibid.
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Hasluck exerts authority: pattern of the future
Murray's statement, including his claim that he had
been subjected to a "war of nerves" by Canberra, appeared
in Australian newspapers the day after it was made,
causing the Minister a good deal of concern. Hasluck did
not reply at once, presumably because he was waiting to
see whether Murray made any more specific allegations.
It was typical of Murray, however, that having departed
momentarily from his detached stance, he felt unable to
enter into controversy for its own sake. This provided
Hasluck with the perfect opportunity to answer Murray's
case, which he did in signed newspaper articles in early 
1 OBAugust. The articles are of interest less for their
review of events - Murray is not even mentioned by name
in them - than for the fact that they provide an exact,
unabashed, patronising account of the way in which Papua
New Guinea was to be subordinated to Canberra's wishes
for the next twenty years. In the first of his articles
the Minister concentrated on the constitutional situation
109of the Territory and its Administrator:
Governments encourage Administrators to "do the 
honours" properly, but sometimes this leads to 
unexpected consequences. It needs a very level head 
and practical outlook to avoid confusion in the 
duties of the post. The greater part of the 
allegations of "remote control" from Canberra do 
not concern any interference with the exercise of 
the powers delegated to an Administrator but a 
confused view of what the office of Administrator
108. Sydney Morning Herald, 4 and 5 August 1952; South 
Pacific Post, 11 and 18 August 1952.
109. Sydney Morning Herald, 4 August 1952.
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really is. For example, some critics complained of 
the dis-allowances of Ordinances by "Canberra”, as though the Administrator ought to have the final 
word. Yet...the responsibility rests squarely on 
the Governor-General (which means in practice the 
Federal Executive Council acting on a recommendation 
from the Minister for Territories)...In fact... 
everything that the Administration does in Papua and 
New Guinea is done on behalf of the Australian 
Government in pursuance of a policy laid down by 
the Government...and with funds provided in a large 
part by the Australian taxpayer...The policy of the 
Government is to encourage the Territorial 
Administration to do more and more on the spot but 
for the time being the delegations are necessarily 
limited to administrative action. The immediate 
need is for administrative efficiency rather than 
constitutional dream castles.
These statements entirely misrepresented the situation.
Murray had not contested the formal allocation of power, 
but the manner in which it had been exercised: 
ignorantly, insensitively and tardily. To Murray the 
Administrator had the duty to represent the interests of 
the villagers of Papua New Guinea, in a constructive, not 
a paternalistic manner. In the sense that Hasluck saw 
the Administrator as nothing more than the agent of the 
Minister and his Department, he had no alternative but to 
dismiss Murray. In doing so, he ensured that the Papua 
New Guinea Administration would be limited in flexibility 
and initiative. This mattered only to the villagers, until 
the confrontations of the 1960's - over the Hahalis 
movement of Buka, the Mataungan Association of the Gazelle 
Peninsula, the land rights of the Bougainville people and 
the movement to self-government - showed Australia's
110efforts at colonial government to be rigid and ineffectual.
110. For accounts of these issues see Peter Hastings, New 
Guinea: Problems and Prospects, Melbourne, Cheshire,
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All of these events belong in a further study. But 
I suspect that study will show that, had Murray's 
approach been adopted by Ministers, Administrators 
and senior officials, then and in later years, Papua 
New Guinea's progress to independence would have 
been smoother and more rapid.
CONCLUSION
PART I - POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND 
COLONEL MURRAY
Prevailing opinions - Policy: aims and origins 
Policy and the Provisional Administration - 
The role of J.K. Murray - Administration of 
policy: formal organization - Informal
networks - Recruitment and training - An 
end to planning
Prevailing opinions
Any assessment of Australian post-war policy 
and administration in Papua New Guinea, and particular! 
of Colonel Hurray's role during the period, must 
take into account the views that have come to be 
generally accepted since that time. Apart from wholly 
partisan statements, the two more or less contemporary 
accounts - Hair's Australia in New Guinea, published 
in 1948, and Stanner's The South Seas in Transition, 
published in 1953 - express divergent opinions.
Hair was confident that an essentially new policy had
1 . Op. cit.
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been introduced and fairly optimistic that it would
succeed. Stanner was able to review the blunders of
the post-war years in criticising the Labor government’s
2’’well-meant but tactless humanitarianisrn". The next 
book on the Territory - Legge's Australian Colonial 
Policy, published in 1956 - was primarily an account 
of Papuan administration before World War 2. Its 
summary of post-war events was inconclusive: the record 
was ”by no means a negligible one”; but the ’’post-war 
period did not...present a complete and dramatic 
departure from the general goals of the past”.
Legge's was the last discussion of the post-war 
period for many years. Studies published in the 1960’s, 
particularly by such journalists as Hastings and Ryan,^ 
concentrated on contemporary events. Although often 
critical of Liberal-Country Party policy, they tended to 
treat it in isolation; there was an assumption in these 
writings that the important features of Papua New G-uinea 
development dated from 1949, or even from the beginning 
of the Hasluck era in 1951. Thus it was only a matter 
of time before a summary of the country’s history would 
include a passage maintaining, "At the end of 1949...
2. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 103.
3. Legge, op. cit., p. 225.
4. Hastings, New “G-uinea: Problems and Prospects, 
op. cit. and Ryan, The Hot Land, op. cit.
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a new Australian government...was voted into office, and
a change in the official policy towards Papua and New
G-uinea soon became evident.. .Under the new policy the
old notion that Papua and New G-uinea should be self-
5supporting was abandoned...."
Predictably, Colonel Murray has received even less 
attention than the post-war period as a whole. In the 
accounts by Stanner and Mander, his name is not even 
mentioned in the text. Mair was clearly impressed by 
Murray, although certain passages in her book were 
inaccurate and on other occasions she was given to over­
statement. She maintained, incorrectly, that Murray was 
"offered" the post of Administrator, and was exaggerating
when she claimed that he faced "active opposition" from
7"most of the senior members of the Public Service".
Mair stated, more accurately, that Murray's "indomitable 
spirit and uncompromising integrity" were major influences 
on post-war reform, but such sentiments were of the kind 
that provoke rejoinders. This became easier after Murray 
was dismissed, so that by 1956 Legge maintained that 
Murray's "very sincerity was a source as much of weakness 
as of strength, for it made it difficult for him to handle 
the political pressures of the situation in which he found
ohimself". This situation "required on the part of the
5. R. Langdon, "A Short History" in P. Hastings (ed.), 
Papua New (Guinea: Prospero's Other Island, Sydney, 
Angus and Robertson, 1971, pp. 54-5.
6. Stanner, Transition, op. cit. Mander, op. cit.
7. Mair, (1948), pp. 209-10.
8. Legge, op. cit., p. 199.
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Administrator, a tactical finesse which was foreign to 
Murray's single-minded outlook": Murray's apparent 
failure was largely of his own making.
The only recent attempt to set the post-war period
in perspective, by E.P. Wolfers, maintains that the trend
of events was determined by pre-war and wartime policies
that could not achieve full expression owing to lack of
9finance or the exigencies of the situation:
A number of /“Labor's "new deal's"_7 most important 
provisions, However, were but a continuation of 
A.N.G.A.U.'s ad hoc decisions during the war (the 
amalgamation of the two administrations, and the 
provision of government money for development), 
long-overdue reforms left over from the pre-war 
period, or measures designed to restore the 
territories to at least their pre-war level of 
affluence and amenities...On the other hand, a 
number of the reforms that were promised or 
implemented, bore all the marks of being no more 
than extensions of traditional Labor foci of 
domestic political interest into Australia's 
dependencies...In the developmental categories 
for government action (health, education, political 
and economic development)...the Labor government 
could do little. Throughout its period of office 
reconstruction and repair absorbed most of the 
available funds and personnel, and development had 
to be left to the Australian Liberal-Country Party 
government.
These conclusions provide an interesting standpoint for 
examing the information presented in this study of
post-war Papua New G-uinea.
Policy: aims and origins
Post-war policy for Papua New G-uinea can be examined
9. E.P. Wolfers, "Trusteeship Without Trust" in P.S. 
Stephens (ed.), Racism. The Australian Experience: 
Vol. 5, Colonialism, Sydney, Australia and Pew 
Zealand. Look "Co. , T972, pp. 112-3.
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on two different levels: firstly, whether the intention 
differed notably from that of the pre-war period; and 
secondly, whether policy evolved from basically different 
sources. On the first level, it can be said that the 
aims expressed by Ward, however vaguely, differed from 
those of even the "enlightened" administration of Sir 
Hubert Murray. At no time before World War 2 had policy 
involved or envisaged a shift of economic and political 
power from white interests to the villagers. Pre-war 
controls on white enterprise had been opposed because they 
tended to make conditions less advantageous for Europeans; 
but they posed no threat to the whites' dominant position. 
By contrast, a change in the power balance underlay every 
aspect of the announced post-war policy, from the proposals 
for government schools to the general statement that white 
expansion would be limited by the needs of village 
welfare. Certainly, the policy embodied the "long- 
overdue reforms" mentioned by Wolfers: and a good deal 
more besides. It was, contrary to Legge's claim, a 
"departure" from past goals, if by that term is meant a 
movement considerably beyond those goals: in proposing 
a shift of power within the colony, post-war policy set 
a basic objective which was qualitatively different from 
that of the pre-war regime. Moreover, orthodox sources 
played a minimal role in shaping policy for post-war New 
G-uinea. The Department of External Territories was almost 
totally eclipsed in this field by the Directorate of 
Research, while party influences flowed not so much from
701
traditional domestic sympathies as from the new inter­
nationalist concerns of Dr. Evatt.
The details of the present study show, for example, 
that 33vatt's support for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter was strongly reflected in the proposal for 
a South Seas Regional Commission; and in turn was 
projected into Australia's adoption of trusteeship as the 
active guide to its colonial policy. This move away from 
the aggressive, protectionist attitude towards the pre-war 
Mandate was hastened by the academics in the Directorate 
of Research, who adopted as their model the British 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Thus the two major 
features of post-war policy - eventual self-determination 
and village development through large financial grants - 
had their origins quite apart from domestic politics and 
the Australian bureaucracy.
These broad proposals were developed in several ways 
by Directorate personnel. Their recommendations included 
those by T.P. Pry for the permanent amalgamation of the 
Mandated Territory and Papua; the scheme which led to the 
establishment of the School of Civil Affairs; the reforms 
to the labour system proposed by Hogbin; the short- and 
long-term education plans outlined by Camilla Wedgewood; 
the assessment of agricultural development that followed 
Murray's potentiality survey of the islands; and Isles' 
advice that a new economic strategy would be needed if 
reforms were to be wholly effective. The Directorate's
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attitude on all major questions dominated wartime planning, 
from the inter-departmental committee of 1944 to the 
Minister’s statements on the restoration of civil admin­
istration and the details of the Provisional Administration 
Bill of mid-1945.
The major question surrounding post-war policy 
concerns not its origins, but the Minister’s failure to 
spell out its details fully and publicly after the war’s 
end. The reasons for this failure have been examined in 
the central section of this study, from Chapter Five to 
Chapter Nine. They include the Minister's very narrow 
interests; his Department's antagonism to the Directorate's 
personnel and concepts; the determination of Halligan 
and his staff to re-occupy their formal advisory role; 
their inability to carry out this role adequately; their 
determination, nonetheless, to block alternative sources 
of advice; the work pressures, conflicts, political 
agitation and general debility of the Territory that 
made it difficult for either the Department of External 
Territories or the Provisional Administration to give 
more than passing attention to policy questions; and 
the disruptions caused by the Minister's involvement in 
the Garden case and the subsequent Royal Commission. The 
remarkable feature of the post-war situation was not that 
the reformist policy lacked definition, but that it 
survived at all.
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Policy and the Provisional Administration
It might he argued that, in the absence of further 
details in the years following Ward’s 1945 speech, policy 
could not be said to exist in a practical sense. Yet a 
policy expressed in very broad terms is still a policy, 
particularly if it is followed by action consistent with its 
intentions. And the action which determined that the main 
features of the policy would persist was taken by the 
Prime Minister, who continued to incrsse the Commonwealth 
grants to the Territory. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
Territory continued to receive this level of finance owed 
a good deal to Colonel Murray's personal intercession with 
Chifley in 1947: this marked the beginning of the 
Provisional Administration’s efforts to keep the post-war 
policy alive.
The Territory Administration’s forays into the field 
of policy are one of the singular features of the post­
war situation. By 1947 the colonial bureaucracy had been 
effectively subordinated to Canberra: through the 
Minister's distant relationship with his Administrator; 
Halligan's success in closing off Port Moresby's sources 
of independent policy advice; and the relegation of the 
Territory public service to secondary status by the 
Buttsworth report. Yet the Provisional Administration 
showed, in such key developmental areas as education, 
health, agricultural extension, co-operatives activity and 
local government, a practical commitment to the post-war 
policy that far exceeded that of the Department of
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External Territories, or even of the government itself.
Nevertheless, there were major divisions within the 
Provisional Administration on the implementation of 
reforms. Most of the key administrative staff - notably 
in the Departments of the Government Secretary and District 
Services - had been remote from, or in opposition to, the 
stimulus of the Directorate, while the relatively junior 
officers who prcpeunded a changed approach (Taylor, Black, 
Fenbury, Millar) lacked the authority to put their plans 
into effect. Of the handful of public servants who 
favoured reforms, only Gunther was able to force the issue 
against the network of pre-war officers. This meant that 
the translation of Labor’s broad aims into effective 
programmes, and even the survival of the post-war policy, 
depended heavily upon the efforts of the Administrator.
The role of J.K. Murray
No particular initiatives of the post-war period can 
be traced wholly to Colonel Murray, but his was the most 
crucial role: he transmitted the policy which he had 
helped shape to the officials and the people of Papua New 
Guinea. He had almost no effective support, but by 
encouraging such progressive officials as he could find 
he ensured that constructive steps were taken in several 
key areas. This is not to say that he was always 
successful. He had neither the knowledge of the network 
of pre-war officials to manipulate it with regular
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success, nor the support from his superiors to force it 
to his wishes. In any case, these methods were foreign 
to Murray: rather he relied, sometimes unwisely, on the 
willingness of others to be persuaded into changing their 
views. It is also likely that Murray expected people to 
be more impressed by the intellectual force of the arguments 
supporting reform, and by the status of the Administrator’s 
office, than they actually were. But this did not make 
him, as Legge suggests, "single-minded”, in the sense of 
being inflexible. During his term as Administrator Murray 
learned a great deal about Papua New G-uinea, as his 
Macrossan lectures showed. It was simply that this 
knowledge did not change his opinion that radical alterations 
should be made to the pattern of colonial life in the 
islands.
The main interest in Legge's criticism of Murray is 
his suggestion that the Administrator would have achieved 
more had he shown greater ’tactical finesse" in handling 
"political pressures". During the first four years of 
Murray’s term the political pressures came largely from 
settler interests and their supporters in Australia. It 
was Ward, not Murray, who lacked "finesse" in dealing with 
them; who, indeed, went out of his way to be antagonistic, 
leaving Murray to bear the consequences. Murray's personal 
relations with the settlers were always cordial, as is 
shown by his correspondence with them and the relative lack 
of criticism of the Administrator in the settler press.
Murray could have gained acceptance at this level only by
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agreeing to settler demands for the restoration of 
reactionary policies. Prom 1949 the strongest political 
pressures came from the new government, but once again 
Murray could have done little to improve his standing 
without rejecting a large part of the post-war policy; 
political finesse on Murray's part could only have involved 
compromises likely to hinder rather than advance post-war 
reforms.
It can still be asked whether certain aspects of
Murray's character were a drawback at the time. He was a
singular personality in post-war Papua New G-uinea, combining
scientific knowledge, liberal attitudes and administrative
experience; but these very qualities set him apart from
the Territory's Europeans: courteous, kindly and attentive
towards them, Murray was not of them. He also had a
keen sense of his own position, and this was shared by
his wife. Ian Hogbin recalls being told "with approval"
by Mrs. Murray that women wore gloves to Government House;
this was part of the respect demanded by the Administrator's 
10office. To a degree this attitude was carried into 
Murray's dealings with Australian Ministers and officials: 
in his desire for the title of Lieutenant-Governor; his 
determination to express his own views on contentious 
issues; and his suggestion of honours for himself and 
Mrs. Murray when Spender first attempted to remove him 
from office. On balance, however, these foibles were more
10. Hogbin interview, 21 December 1973.
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a reflection of Murray’s desire for the recognition of 
Papua New Guinea than a wish for personal aggrandisement.
The final questions concern Murray's decision to 
take the Administrator’s job in the first place, and his 
refusal to bow out in 1950, when the opportunity 
presented itself. When the position was advertised in 
1945 Oonlon said, only half in jest, that the first
11Administrator would "either be broken or commit suicide”.
Had the appointment been decided after Gonlon’s fall from 
power it would obviously not have gone to Murray, but 
once it was offered to him he was irrevocably committed; 
if Murray had backed out at that stage he would have 
been deserting his colleagues, just as most of them were 
to abandon the cause of post-war reform. Murray also 
hoped that he could gain an extension of his war-time 
secondment from the university; when secondment was refused, 
he was wholly committed to Papua New Guinea. T"urray was 
caught up in the rush of events in mid-1945: from a 
certain viewpoint, he was fortunate in not having to return 
to a relatively quiet existence after the stimulation of 
the war years. However, he did not suspect that the 
vigour of the Directorate would be succeeded so quickly 
by the apathy and ignorance of Halligan and his Department.
When asked why he had not left Papua New Guinea when 
offered alternative appointments by Spender, Colonel Murray 
replied simply that he could see no reason to do so: "I
11. Hogbin interview, 21 December 1973.
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1 2thought I was doing a good job.” While not refusing the
offers made to him, Murray set conditions for acceptance
that would have amounted to an implicit endorsement of the
post-war effort in the Territory. Once these were refused,
it was merely a matter of time before Murray was removed
from office; the white community sensed this, and by
1951 the feeling in Port Moresby was that he "hadn't a
1 3friend in the town". However, Murray made no attempt 
to ingratiate himself with the government. This attitude 
may have suggested - as it did to Legge - stubbornness 
and a lack of perception. But Murray was fully aware of 
what he later termed the "war of nerves" against him; 
in an old-fashioned and sometimes unworldly manner he was 
governed by principles, and it was his misfortune, and 
Papua New Guinea's, that these were shared by so few 
others.
In all, Murray as Administrator was more interested 
in, and more at ease with the villagers of Papua New 
Guinea than the white community. The truest measure of 
his effectiveness could have been gained from the people, 
but their views were ignored. Yet they were not unaware 
of the events and conflicts that surrounded them.
Murray's meetings with councillors at Government House 
and his support for the rebuilding of Hanuabada were well 
known to the people in the vicinity of Port Moresby, but
12. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
1 3 . Hogbin interview, 21 December 1973.
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the fact that this knowledge spread throughout the 
Territory, at least among the more sophisticated villagers, 
was evident from the address presented to Hasluck in 
1951 hjr the people from the G-azelle Peninsula, which 
coupled the people's desire for a new role with the 
statement, "'.Ye know Colonel Murray is our friend." This 
suggests that villagers were aware that changes were 
taking place - more than were many Europeans - and that 
. .urray was identified with them. Many factors had 
contributed to these changes, but they were epitomised 
and focused by Murray. Ee created an atmosphere in which 
reform remained the central issue. Awareness of the 
changed post-war situation was kept sharp so long as Murray 
remained Administrator. And by the time he was removed 
from office major precedents had been established.
Regardless of the influence of other factors, the 
Administrator put the issue beyond doubt: after Murray, 
there could be no turning back.
Administration of policy: formal organization
The major factor which limited the implementation of 
post-war reform was not the policy itself - vague though 
it was - nor the strength of settler opposition to it, 
but the general weakness- of the administrative machinery 
in both Canberra and Port Moresby. In Canberra this stemmed 
from the government's neglecting to restructure and expand 
the Department of External Territories in terms of the 
revised policy objectives for the post-war years. To be
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reasonably effective, such changes would also have 
required the replacement of Halligan: a need that was 
quickly perceived, and met, by Hasluck in 1951. A 
restructuring of the Territory administration was also 
clearly indicated, but the Buttsworth inquiry of late 1946 
was carried out under narrow terms of reference that bore 
little relation to the massive tasks that had been assigned 
to the Provisional Administration by Ward’s 1945 proposals. 
Once again, some of the blame for the limited scope of the 
Buttsworth investigation lay with the Minister and the 
government, but an effective Secretary for External 
Territories would have perceived the need for major reform 
and advised the Minister accordingly. Ironically, the 
only useful proposal by Buttsworth - for the establishment 
of a Secretariat - was borrowed from the Territory’s 
junior officials, who had been influenced by overseas 
experience and the thinking of the Directorate. For the 
rest, the scope of the Buttsworth inquiry, and the conditions 
it assigned to the Territory's public servants, were 
destructive of initiative and morale.
Informal networks
The informal networks that operated among the key 
officials of the post-war period effected little change in 
the Canberra-Port Moresby relationship, while tending to 
divide the Provisional Administration itself. When the 
Directorate of Research was disbanded its network collapsed 
and Colonel Murray was left without a base of support.
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Supplementary structures like the Research Council would 
have assisted him, but they were short-lived. Further 
attempts to expand contacts through staff interchanges 
between Port Moresby and Canberra, and to weaken established 
ties by having officers travel overseas, foundered owing 
to Department of External Territories opposition and lack 
of interest on the part of the Minister. Murray then 
attempted to establish a reformist network of his own, 
but it could not easily find expression through the formal 
structures provided for the Territory administration.
This problem helped to speed the departure of Taylor, Black 
and Millar and frustrated such officials as G-roves, 
Cottrell-Dormer and Fenbury. By contrast, the limited 
formal structure created by the Buttsworth recommendations 
fitted admirably into the closed network operating among 
the pre-war officials in Canberra and Port Moresby.
The succeeding reviews of the public service produced 
a formal structure which, by 1949, was related a little 
more closely to the needs of Labor policy. When the 
Liberal-Country Party government came to power, however, 
it decided that the progressive group within the 
Provisional Administration, and the administrative structure 
which had gradually been built up, were inappropriate to 
its purpose. In particular, Spender’s attitude towards 
Murray suggested that he saw the progressives as a major 
force, but he left the organizational structure and 
subordinate staffing of the Territory administration
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1 4largely undisturbed. Spender and his advisers failed 
to appreciate the manner in which formal structures could 
continue to pursue goals already set for them, despite 
the weakening of the complementary network of senior 
personnel.
Recruitment and training
In the absence of any plan to meet the personnel 
requirements implied in Labor’s policy, staffing in both 
Canberra and Port Moresby was far from satisfactory. The 
Department of External Territories laboured, through the 
Commonwealth Public Service Board, to expand its 
establishment, but with very limited success. Recruitment 
to the Provisional Administration gave the impression of 
greater flexibility, but the resulting changes were less 
than might have been expected. Outside recruitment 
occurred at two levels: in categories which had been 
lightly staffed in pre-war years (Education, Health, 
Agriculture); and for those groups - particularly the 
field officers - where wartime losses had been heavy. The 
latter recruits were young men who were rapidly assimilated 
into the conservative District Services network. Thus 
the injection of new personalities was largely confined 
to the areas of social development and welfare; hence 
the limited scope of the Provisional Administration’s
14. The disbanding of the Department of Native Labour at the 
end of 1950 was mainly a symbolic gesture against 
Ward’s policy; it has been shown in Chapter Eight 
that the control of employment was scarcely affected 
by the move.
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progressive network, and of subsequent attempts to 
promote political and economic development at the village 
level.
The general limiting of the scope of the post-war 
administration was epitomised by the restrictions placed 
on staff training. In giving great emphasis to training 
programmes, the Directorate, and then Murray himself, had 
viewed the transformation of officers' attitudes towards 
colonialism as the key factor in implementing change in 
the rural areas. The programme was intended to operate 
in two major streams: institutionally, through the School 
of Pacific Administration, and by exchanges among other 
colonies and between Port Moresby and Canberra. However, 
the School's functions and clientele remained limited, 
owing to the possessive attitude of Kalligan and his 
Department, while all requests for staff exchange and 
secondment were ignored or refused.
Planning frustrated
In summary, formal structures in both Canberra and 
Port Moresby were so inadequate that the dominant informal 
networks of pre-war years were able to maintain control 
of them. Appointees tended to be drawn into the conservative 
network, while their conditions of service created 
dissatisfaction with the post-war regime, whose goals could not 
be made clear owing to the limited training provided for 
new entrants. These weaknesses added to the cycle of
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frustration which developed around the planning and 
implementation of post-war policy. Formal planning 
structures were simply absent until 1949, when a research 
section was established within the Canberra Department and 
a Secretariat set up in Port Moresby. However, both these 
groups were staffed from the orthodox personnel networks, 
so that they had little empathy with the progressive group 
that had attempted to promote change within the Provisional 
Administration. Thus when the progressive groups 
instituted planning exercises of their own, their reports 
were ignored by the orthodox networks of pre-war officials, 
through lack of communication and comprehension.
Moreover, efforts to secure appropriate administrative 
structures, personnel recruitment and staff training for 
the Territory proved so onerous that planning was forced 
into a lower priority. And when the long-range schemes of 
Murray and his advisers were finally rejected by the 
Menzies government, issues were merely dealt with as they 
arose: the pattern of ad hoc administration that
dominated Papua Hew G-uinea for a further twenty years 
followed inevitably upon the events of the early 1990's.
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PART II - INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Closed and open systems - Metropolitan controls 
and quantitative assessment - Wartime defence 
of systems - Post-war responsiveness - Policy 
goals and elaboration of structure - Problems 
of adaptation - Innovation and reaction
Closed and open systems
In seeking to draw more general conclusions from
this study, it is useful to consider the colonial
administrations in the pre-war, separate Territories
of New Guinea and Papua as closed organizational
systems. They were not, of course, closed in the sense
of physical systems which have neither inputs nor
output capabilities; rather, to adopt systems
terminology, they lacked negentropic qualities in that
1 5they failed to elaborate structure. It should be noted 
that the usual qualities of a closed system are 
considered to be entropie: that is, they tend typically 
to lose organization, to "run down”, then to "hold that 
minimum level within relatively narrow limits of
15. '/alter F. Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems 
Theory, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall,
t  wrp. s i .
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1 ¿T
disturbance". The New Guinean and Papuan pre-war
systems were, to use Buckley’s phrasing, sufficiently
exposed to the intrusion of environmental events to force
them to move to a new level of equilibrium.1^ They
achieved a steady state: a condition of homeostasis 
18over time. Equilibrium was the operational imperative 
in that the systems were concerned with their own 
maintenance in their existing forms and made only those 
adjustments to changing inputs as were necessary to 
maintain those forms. Neither system exhibited any 
tendency to aim for new, more comples structural forms
1 Qsuch as were required for advance towards self-government.
Each system was affected intermittently by two
kinds of inputs: those from the metropolitan government
and those from settler groups and their Australian
supporters. These inputs aimed at the same goal as the
systems themselves: the maintenance of the systems in
their equilibrium condition. The colonial administrations
were closed to inputs from those sectors of the
community - the indigenous Papuan and New Guinean
populations - who might have wished them to elaborate
20structure in the manner of open systems.
16. Ibid., p. 40.
17. Ibid., p . 50 .
18. Katz and Kahn, o p . cit., p. 24.
19. See Chapter One for the details of this argument.
20. See, for example, Brian Jinks, New Guinea Government:
An Introduction, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1971, 
pp. 74-6.
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Apart from the question of the systems’ denying
access to certain inputs, there is also the consideration
of the systems’ responsiveness to those inputs that
were permitted access. Here it must be noted that the
New Guinean and Papuan administrative systems were
dependent sub-systems of the Australian political system
21with very limited degrees of autonomy. Thus some 
inputs, notably those from certain Australian politicians, 
public officials and businessmen, were considered to 
possess a mugh higher degree of legitimacy than those 
from some other sources: the League of Nations, the 
very few academics with an interest in the country, and 
most mission bodies. Although the actual structure of 
the administrative systems did not deny access to these 
latter categories, as it did to Papua New Guinean 
communities, the systems were so unresponsive to inputs 
of doubtful legitimacy as effectively to close themselves 
to these sources. Por purposes of analysis and in view 
of the dependent nature of the colonial administrative 
systems, the former kind of inputs is termed ”authoritative” 
and the latter ”non-authoritative”. So long as the 
authoritative inputs aimed at the maintenance of the 
existing systems they demanded no elaboration of structure: 
hence the systems failed to produce negentropic qualities 
and can be considered as closed, notwithstanding the 
fact that they remained receptive to a limited range of 
inputs.
21 . The terminology follows that of Almond and Powell, op. cit.
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Metropolitan controls and quantitative assessment
It may seem that the colonial system was in an 
advantageous position in initiating change, if it wished, 
since it was usually so physically remote from the 
metropolitan system that its actions could not be kept 
under close control. But this very remoteness ensured 
that metropolitan officials sought to exert strong 
influence in those areas of policy and administration 
where this was possible. As Jeffries has observed,
"....if the Governor wanted to spend a hundred pounds,
that was something the chaps at home could get their
22teeth into". That is, there was an unusual emphasis
on evaluation in quantitative rather than qualitative
2 ^terms. The dependence of the colonial system on
metropolitan norms and inputs was reinforced through the
socialisation of staff and the assessment of their
performance; it was always clear that the relevant
standards were those set by, and accepted in the
metropolitan country, regardless of the special conditions
24-in the colonial system. In such a situation, structure
22. Sir Charles Jeffries, The Transfer of Power, London, 
Pall Mall, I960, p. 35.
23. The terminology is applied as in Victor Thompson, 
Modern Organization, New York, Knopf, 1961; see 
p 7 w r  in particular.
24. The setting of standards peculiar to the metropolitan 
society is discussed in detail, in the British case, 
in. Sir Ralph Purse, Aucuparius, London, Oxford 
University Press, 1962; and, with some wonderment, 
in Robert Heussler, Yesterday’s Rulers: The Making 
of the British Colonial Service, ÌTew York,
Syracuse University Press, 1963.
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and socialisation limited the ability of the colonial 
system to change in response to anything but authoritative
inputs.
The hew Guinean and Papuan systems were, before 
World War 2, similarly dependent upon metropolitan 
influences. Although the Territories were physically 
closer to input sources than was the case in most other 
colonies, there was heavy emphasis on quantiative 
assessment of performance. In both colonial systems 
there were severe shortages of resources and an almost 
complete absence of formal training for public servants. 
Sven more than in the British case, personnel relied 
heavily upon metropolitan initiatives. However, there 
were remarkable few metropolitan demand inputs 
promoting change, since colonialism was not recognized 
as a policy issue by any of the potential sources of 
authoritative inputs. Thus the pre-war administrative 
systems in the Territories of New Guinea and Papua ran 
down to certain levels (particularly low in the case of 
Papua), were unable or unwilling to elaborate structure 
beyond those levels, and were satisfied with the 
maintenance of structure at the run-down points.
Wartime defence of systems
It might be supposed that the Pacific war opened 
the colonial systems to enormous volumes of inputs from 
international, Australian and internal sources. Certainly,
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there were great changes in the conditions of life in 
the islands; old patterns of behaviour disappeared, 
crises arose and were eventually dealt with, some splendid 
improvisation occurred and many people - villagers and 
Australians - believed that a new era had begun. But 
this was not the case. During the war systems goals 
remained the same as they had been. Maintenance (or, more 
accurately, defence) of the existing systems was the 
major aim of the war effort in New Guinea and Papua; for 
Australia, defence of the dependent sub-systems in the 
Territories was essential for the survival of the major 
system itself. Under the stress of the period, there 
were no authoritative demands for immediate changes. 
However, in the interests of the major sjrstem's future 
survival there was an increase in non-authoritative demands 
for increased responsive capability in the dependent 
sub-systems. Yet even at this level there were tensions 
between demands for greater responsiveness to indigenous 
inputs and those favouring expatriate Australian 
interests. Measures introduced by Angau were intended 
primarily to promote the military goal of system 
maintenance: the mobilisation of labour for defence
construction; the training of villagers for military 
service and support; the provision of health services 
to increase the labour supply. Angau was a terminating 
system, so that any departure from pre-war norms during 
its period of control were incidental to its limited
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maintenance responsibilities. In short, nothing that 
occurred during the war was sufficient to create an open
system in Papua New Guinea.
Post-war responsiveness
It was at the restoration of civil administration in 
194-5, and not at the time of the Japanese invasion in 
1941, that the colonial administrative system became 
open and responsive to new ranges of inputs: international, 
Australian and domestic; authoritative and non- 
authoritative. This was not a spontaneous movement; 
rather, it was a responsiveness forced from the system 
by major changes in its extra-societal environment and, 
to a certain extent, in the intra-societal environment 
as a result of the war. Above all, responsiveness was 
demanded by authoritative inputs from the Labor 
government and Minister of the time. The authoritative 
inputs were presented in the broadest possible terms 
and there was an easy assumption that the changes 
required in the colonial administrative system could be 
wrought by those on the spot. It was not generally 
recognized that the structures and personnel of the 
colonial system had changed so little that its responsive 
capability was still severely limited. The Department
25. See, for example, the speech by the commander of
Angau, Major-General Morris, to the 1944 conference 
of his staff (Chapter Two, p. 115).
25
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of External Territories, which provided the link between 
the major system and the colonial sub-system had, like 
the colonial civil administrations, been in a state 
of virtual suspension during the war. Meanwhile, the 
highly responsive group of advisers in the Directorate 
of Research had worked closely with the Minister, the 
Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian 
forces. The Directorate, of itself, possessed no 
authoritative status but was frequently able to channel 
its demands through authoritative structures. At the 
same time, it was never called upon to accept 
responsibility nor to demonstrate its executive capacity 
(in systems terminology, its conversion capability). It 
impressed the Minister by its willingness to countenance, 
and in many cases to suggest major changes; it showed 
an innovative desire in that it proposed system 
adaptation at a greater rate than was being demanded 
at that time by authoritative inputs. But the 
Directorate did not have the duty of inducing responsiveness 
in the colonial system: that task fell to Colonel 
Murray, who provided the link between the innovative 
drive of the Directorate and the minimally-responsive 
structures of the colonial system. Murray was, to use 
Marshall Dimock’s term, the ’’policy official” charged 
with instituting change. He became the central figure 
in subsequent attempts to resolve inter- and intra-structural
26. Marshall E. Dimock, ’’Bureaucracy Self-Examined" in 
R.K. Merton, A.P. Gray, B. Hockey and H.C. Selvin 
(eds.), Reader in Bureaucracy, Glencoe, 111.,
Pree Press, 1952, p. 404.
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tensions.
Policy goals and elaboration of structure
In view of Colonel Murray’s policy role, it is
important to make a general distinction between
administrative process and policy content. The concept
of process is inherent in the systemic approach, where
it has been noted that an open system displays negative
entropy in elaborating structure and achieves a state
of dynamic homeostasis. But this definition of process
provides no dimensions for a particular situation.
There is little indication of the extent to which
structures are or should be elaborated, nor of which
structures are most likely to promote the state of
dynamic homeostasis. Elaboration of structure is
essential to the continuance of the dynamic state of the
system: such a system is "not at rest”, since it will
27•'tend towards differentiation and elaboration”. But 
beyond a certain level the process of elaboration could 
prove dysfunctional; proliferating structures could 
clog the system. It can be argued that the systemic 
approach itself provides the necessary corrective through
no
negative feedback, but there is still no indication of 
the source of feedback, nor of the kind of feedback that 
would flow from over-elaboration of structure. This
27. Katz and Kahn, on. cit., p. 26.
28. Ibid.
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problem is similar to the one encountered in the Easton
analysis, which has been characterised as static and 
29tautological, " The dynamic system, however, poses a 
question which is quite different in detail from the 
Easton problem: that is, dynamic homeostasis threatens 
to create over-elaboration (where there is inadequate 
feedback) or quantitative checks only on elaboration, 
since there is nothing in the systemic process itself to 
provide a check on the quality and relevance of structures. 
It is necessary to establish clearer criteria for system 
performance: for structural quality and for the kinds of
outputs (notably those involving elaboration of 
structure) which trigger negative feedback and the 
consequent correction of any trends towards over­
elaboration or elaboration in irrelevant or inappropriate 
directions. In other words, there must be general 
guidelines on what is relevant and appropriate in the 
performance of the particular system.
In the case of the political system - which in this 
context will be termed the "primary” (i.e., Australian) 
system - the problem of determining system goals has 
already been noted. For the purpose of the following 
analysis it is of minor significance, however, since the 
Papua New G-uinea colonial administrative system did not
29. These criticisms relate mainly to the fact that the 
Easton analysis gives system maintenance as the 
goal of the system: for example, Evans, op. cit. 
maintains that this must inevitably produce a 
static situation, regardless of the feedback loops of the system.
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enjoy primary status: it was a dependent sub-system of
50the primary Australian system. In such a case the 
relevance of structural elaboration is determined by 
authoritative inputs from the primary system. These 
comprise the policy content to be dealt with through the 
systemic process of the dependent sub-system - the Papua 
New Guinea administration. Here, then, policy content 
anchors the system. In the case of the open system 
elaborating structure, policy content provides the test 
of structural relevance, triggers the necessary feedback 
in instances of over-elaboration or inappropriate 
elaboration and thereby provides goal-orientation for 
the system dynamic. But goal-orientation does not mean 
automatic goal-achievement by the system. A given set 
of inputs will not necessarily produce the exact outputs 
desired, owing to limits upon the conversion capabilities 
of the system (or sub-system). The major limitations 
involve structural efficiency and personal adjustment. 
Policy content of itself provides no guarantee of the 
quality or appropriateness of outputs (which may include 
elaborated structure).
Problems of adaptation
In summarising to this point: a high correlation 
between policy inputs and system outputs will be achieved
30. This does not limit the usefulness of such analysis 
to a small number of special cases, since there 
are many sub-systems, wholly dependent or otherwise, 
which could be considered.
726
only through organizational behaviour which is 
appropriate to the particular process of conversion.
The aspects of systemic process and policy content have 
been taken into account; it is now necessary to link 
the third, related element of organizational behaviour 
with the other two factors.
It has been noted that, before 1945, the colonial
administrative systems of New Guinea and Papua were
effectively closed. In the organizational structure of
such a system "a kind of rigidity grows out of role
enactment, and...bureaucrats, over a period of time,
31become insensitive to the needs of change". As Blau
has noted, "The widely held belief that members of
bureaucratic organizations necessarily resist change
rests on the assumption that bureaucratic structures
are characterised by a perfect state of equilibrium, which
32makes any alteration a disturbance." Blau points out
that this rarely is the case; but bureaucracy is, as
Schaffer suggests, "adaptive rather than innovative"
and the bureaucratic style emphasises "incremental
33rather than other sorts of change". In terms of 
management theory, bureaucratic systems would generally 
achieve a homeostatic state with few problems, but in
31. Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organization, New York, 
Knopf, 1961, p. 166.
32. Blau, op. cit., p. 248. For a further discussion 
of varying approaches to the nature and qualities 
of bureaucracy, see Albrow, op. cit.
33. Bernard Schaffer, "The Deadlock in Development 
Administration" in Golin Leys (ed.), Politics and 
Change in Developing Countries: Studies in the 
Theory and Practice of Development, London, 
Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp. 191-2.
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the great majority of cases the state would not be 
particularly dynamic. Moreover, the structures of 
public administration operate under much stronger 
policy constraints than do many other organizations; 
coupled with changes in technology and society, policy 
generally demands a sufficient degree of dynamism from 
administrative agencies to maintain the system in a 
receptive, responsive, adaptive and open state. But 
the authoritative inputs of policy content manifestly 
failed to demand and produce this state in the pre-war 
administrative systems of Hew Guinea and Papua.
When authoritative demands for change - in a number
of areas, massive change - were made upon the formerly
closed systems (now combined in a single unit) from
194-5, the result was organizational dislocation in
34Papua Hew Guinea. The situation must also be 
considered against the background of wartime disruption, 
but this factor added to, rather than caused, the 
bureaucracy’s problems. Officials wished to re-establish 
order and, since organizational goals had remained 
unchanged during the military occupation of the islands, 
this meant arriving at a new state of equilibrium.
The state could not be identical with that of the pre-war 
period, but it would be equilibrium, nonetheless. It 
was in such a situation that the officials had previously
34. The combining of the two systems under Angau in
1942 did not affect the state of the amalgamated
system, which remained closed until 1945 (see above)
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functioned and in it they found security. The new Labor
government policy threatened this security and provoked
strong reactions. As Blau has observed, "....officials
who find their security in strict adherence to familiar
routine...strongly resist change in the organization
and are incapacitated by new problems that confront
them"."' Victor Thompson similarly maintains that
"resistance to change may...be exaggerated by insecure 
36officials".' All of the characteristics of insecurity, 
insensitivity, incapacity and resistance can be seen in 
key areas of the post-war Papua New Guinea bureaucracy 
once it was subjected to demands for change.
Innovation and reaction
It must be noted, however, that resistance to certain 
demands had been functional in the pre-war closed systems 
in that it contributed to equilibrium and system 
maintenance. In a newly-open system resistance to 
change can be defined as dysfunctional so long as it 
opposes structural elaboration in the direction indicated 
by policy inputs. In this sense, the resistance of the 
Papua New Guinea bureaucracy during the post-war 
period was dysfunctional. Since policy inputs from the 
Labor government were generalised in the extreme, 
elaboration of their content was left, by default, to
35. Peter Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society, New 
York, Random House, 1956, p. 89.36. Thompson, Modern Organization, op. cit., p. 163.
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the policy official - Murray - and such structures as 
he was able to establish. The evidence suggests that, 
within the limits of Murray’s formal powers and the 
personnel available to him, the structural elaboration 
he proposed was appropriate to the broad policy aims of 
the Labor government. In that case, the resistance he 
encountered within the bureaucracy was generally 
dysfunctional.
Further evidence suggests that in some instances 
resistance to appropriate structural elaboration was 
"exaggerated’1, within Thompson’s meaning of the term; 
resistance of this order is considered by Thompson to be 
"bureaupathic". That is, the officials’ response may 
be a reflection of their personal needs; and since the 
best opportunity to satisfy those needs falls to those 
in authority, their particular response may be transmitted 
throughout the organization under their control,
70
thereby creating bureaupathic structures. J In post­
war Papua Hew Guinea it might be suggested that such 
structures emerged in the Departments of the Government 
Secretary and District Services, while in the Department 
of Public Health elaboration proceeded in the direction 
indicated by policy content. This indicates that 
responsiveness varies sectionally according to the
37. Thompson uses generalised terms only; he does not 
provide a specific test of the relevance of 
structural elaboration and resistance. This problem 
is discussed below.
38. Thompson, Modern Organization, op. cit., p. 153.
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kinds of structures that go to make up the total system; 
certain structures possess a more appropriate "fit” with 
policy content than do others. It could he argued, 
however, that the only major differences between the 
Papua New G-uinea departments were the personalities of 
the officials controlling them. In that case, the 
concept of '’structure'1, to be useful in this analysis, 
would have to include personnel factors as well as those 
relating to formal organization; this could make the 
concept highly variable and very hard to define over a 
range of situations. Nevertheless, the systems approach 
would maintain that, depending on the proportions of 
responsive and resistive structures within it, a total 
system may achieve a state of adaptive or dynamic 
homeostasis; in certain circumstances, presumably, 
resistance to change could develop to the point where 
the system reverted to a closed state.
On balance, the Papua New G-uinea post-war 
administration ultimately achieved a state of dynamic 
homeostasis, at least at the peak of the period under 
consideration. This occurred despite the unspecific 
nature of authoritative policy inputs and the strong 
resistance of some structures. The explanation, in 
terms of organization theory, is that certain structures 
developed innovative drive in their own right.
Thompson defines innovation as the "generation, acceptance 
and implementation of new ideas, processes, products
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3Qor services”. Innovation goes considerably beyond
the adaptive processes of homeostatic organization. It
is more than a strong commitment to "moderation,
compromise, negotiation and accommodation"; innovation
is "radical" in departing from existing behaviour
patterns.^  An innovative structure moves ahead of
the process of stimulus (by input of policy content)
and response (by conversion to output): it becomes
anticipatory, in that it perceives forces of change
41before actual demands are made. This can occur when 
the responsive structures of the system become attuned 
to a wider range of inputs than those of a purely 
authoritative kind. The planning committees set up from 
1947 in Port horesby could be placed in this category.
The organizational consequences of innovation must 
also be noted. Among resistive structures the very 
existence of innovative areas within the total system 
tends to create greater insecurity. It ha.s been noted 
that the pre-war colonial systems rested on standards 
of quantitative assessment; this, in turn, helped to 
produce performance in quantitative terms and resulted 
in a cycle of what Thompson has called "quantitative 
compliance".^  The steady equilibrium state of the 
closed system rested on controlled behaviour, and so the
39. Victor Thompson, "Bureaucracy and Innovation",
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 10 ITo. 1, 
June 1965, p. 27 7” *
40. G-awthrop, op. cit., p. 183.
41. Ibid., pp. 178-9.
42. Thompson, i.odern Organization, op. cit., p. 158.
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appearance of innovative structures produced antipathetic 
reactions. "In an organizational context dominated by 
the need to control, innovation is dangerous because,
4*3by definition, it is not controlled behaviour." As 
a consequence, a number of innovations were resisted 
more strongly than ever, with the mounting resistance 
placing an increasing burden on the policy official, 
Golonel Murray. His persistence in encouraging and, in 
some cases, initiating innovation was of major 
significance in breaking the cycle of quantitative 
compliance and establishing a dynamic administrative 
system. For after the innovative trend was seen to 
persist for some time resistive structures, in turn, 
began to adapt. That is, persistence in unco-operative 
behaviour began to produce its own sense of insecurity. 
However, the move from resistance to adaptation had 
not proceeded far before there was an attempt to change 
policy, following the election of the Liberal-Country 
Party government in Australia.
The events which followed the change of government 
make it possible to test the relevance of the main 
strands of this analysis in reverse, as it were. Policy 
content changed and, with it, the systemic processes 
appropriate to the new situation. As a consequence, 
changes in organizational and individual behaviour were 
required if this were to remain functional in relation
43. Ibid., p. 163.
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to system goals. Yet the Ministerial direction that 
access to the 1950 United Nations Visiting Mission he 
restricted was contested by Murray, while other proposals 
by Spender for revisions of land and labour policy 
produced little or no action. It might then be argued 
that the behaviour of Murray and the Administration was 
dysfunctional in relation to the revised goals of the 
system: the new government required elaboration of
structure in certain directions, but that was not 
forthcoming. Indeed, Hurray's resistance to change could 
even be viewed as bureaupathic, in terms of the analysis 
already presented, so that his subsequent removal from 
office was entirely justified.
Such an interpretation would appear nonsensical.
The Spender policies which Murray opposed, or at least to 
give his full support, could not be considered 
"innovative“ in any usual sense. In that case, the 
analysis of the system can proceed only upon some judgement 
of the value of a policy, or of an individual's attitude 
towards it. Thus Professor Robert Parker maintains that 
the sudden injection of new ideas and outstanding 
personalities into the Papua New Guinea situation from 
1 9 4 4 "tends to make nonsense of the systems approach and 
all its works". ^  This would certainly be true if one 
were to claim - as did some of the early proponents of 
the systems approach - that it provided a total framework
44. In a note to the author on an earlier draft of this
analysis, undated June 1972.
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of analysis. However, it should still be possible to 
proceed from some common-sense appraisal of what is 
innovative and then use the systems approach to analyse 
the manner in which organizations respond to, or react 
against, such innovations.
With these more modest goals, there should be something 
to learn about the present situation in independent Papua 
New Guinea from the generalisations that can be drawn 
from J.K. Murray's attempts at innovation. Thus the 
need for a clear, explicit policy is obvious, as are the 
problems that can arise from insecurity brought about by 
rapid change, from quantitative compliance and from 
over-elaboration of structure. The question remains, 
however, whether there is anything to be gained from 
proceeding in these terms. Parker has argued that such 
an exercise amounts to "a perfectly orthodox exposition... 
dressed up in a peculiarly inappropriate metaphorical 
vocabulary". And in many ways it would be much simpler 
to say that bureaucrats grow used to "going by the book", 
and that organizations tend to spawn other organizations 
if some check is not kept upon them, rather than to 
use such terms as "quantitative compliance" and "over­
elaboration of structure" to describe much the same 
thing.
Under these circumstances it must be asked whether
45. Ibid.
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any further claims can he made for systems theory; and 
there are probably two. Firstly, its metaphorical 
language should have the advantage of applying a common 
terminology to a range of situations. Secondly, the 
systems approach combines the various segments of 
organizational analysis into a whole. Unfortunately, 
the terminology may be more of a drawback than an 
advantage. To take just two examples: the key concept 
of "inputs” can embrace everything from a demand by a 
minor pressure group to a world-wide cataclysm; and the 
term '‘structure" could include things as far removed from 
each other as major bureaucratic departments and casual 
friendships among a group of employees. Up to a point, 
there might still be some advantage in applying such 
broad concepts, provided that they draw attention away 
from unnecessary detail towards fundamental relationships 
between the various parts of the administrative system.
This leads to the second major claim that remains to 
be made on behalf of systems analysis: its insistence 
that the organization must be viewed as a whole. It may 
be argued that this approach merely endorses a truism; 
but in that case the systems approach at least provides 
a framework within which to apply that truism. The 
critics of systems theory may themselves have benefited 
from its insights before dismissing it in favour of 
orthodox analysis which might otherwise have produced 
quite disjointed results. I believe, for example, that
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my study of the Provisional Administration was aided by 
my attempt to apply the systems framework to it: the 
relationships between government policy, administrative 
action,, tensions among bureaucrats and pressure from 
the white community possibly became clearer because I 
then saw some need to establish that relationships in fact 
existed. In the modern context, the independent 
government of Papua New G-uinea could benefit from the 
knowledge that it is most likely to achieve effective 
change if it can:
(a) match explicit policy with
(b) appropriate formal structures that can
(c) limit their growth to essential needs and
(d) promote productive networks among officials.
No doubt there are other ways of arriving at this 
conclusion. But systems analysis would serve some 
purpose if it provided decision-makers with a framework 
against which to check their progress towards these 
goals.
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